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ABSTRACT 
 
SUB-STATE NATIONALISM  
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
SCOTTISH, BASQUE AND KURDISH CASES 
 
Saylan, İbrahim 
PhD, Department of Political Science  
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Saime Özçürümez 
 
May, 2011 
 
 
 
Scholarly works have paid little attention to the impact of European integration on 
Kurdish sub-state nationalism in Turkey, either as a case study or in comparison with 
sub-state nationalisms in other European countries. At the same time, many studies on 
sub-state nationalism have put too much emphasis on the ‘transformative’ impact of 
 iv
integration processes on sub-state nationalisms, especially in the Western European 
context. This study seeks to overcome both shortcomings through a comparative 
analysis of the Kurdish, Scottish and Basque cases. It is intended not only to contribute 
to our understanding of each case within the broader dynamics of European integration 
but also to provide further empirical evidence for a more generalizable understanding 
of the ongoing evolution of sub-state nationalism within the European integration 
process.   
 
Thus, the broader goal of this dissertation is to understand the impact of the 
European integration process on sub-state nationalism. Conceived as an arena in which 
different forms of nationalism challenge and reinforce each other, the European 
integration process is claimed to have had a significant impact on the sub-state 
nationalism. In order to assess the nature and extent of these impacts, this study first 
focuses on the emergence and development of sub-state nationalism in the national 
context. Adopting the political approach to nationalism, the emergence and 
development of sub-state nationalism is explained on the basis of the conflict of 
identity and interests. An opportunity structure-based analytical framework is used to 
focus on the resources for, and constraints on sub-state nationalist activity in its uneasy 
relationship with its host-state. The opportunity structure approach is then 
operationalized in order to examine the impact of European integration on the Scottish, 
Basque and Kurdish cases. As major political representatives of the nationalist ‘cause’ 
in their respective ‘homelands’, Scottish National Party (SNP), Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV) and  Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) are analyzed in terms of their 
 v
emergence, development and how they have changed in response to European 
integration.  
 
The empirical findings show that all of these parties support European 
integration since they consider that the integration process broadens the 
opportunity structures available to themselves. Both the transformation of the 
nation-state and the emergence of new channels for regional influence that have 
also been utilized by sub-state nationalist forces provide these parties with new 
opportunities. This study shows that the impact of European integration on these 
parties in terms of their identity construction, ideologies, goals and strategies vary 
for a number of reasons. Essentially, compared with the SNP and the PNV, the 
EU’s impact on the DTP has been indirect and limited.  
 
It is possible to draw several general conclusions about these cases. First of all, 
these parties primarily see the EU as an external support system in their 
competition with their host states. Second, there is no reason to see the EU and 
sub-state nationalists as natural allies. While the EU does not intentionally 
encourage sub-state nationalist activism, sub-state nationalist support for European 
integration is a calculated element of nationalist politics. Third, support for the 
integration process does not necessarily mean that the ultimate political goals of 
sub-state nationalist parties have been transformed into aspiring to something less 
than independent statehood. The British and Spanish cases show that democratic 
accommodation of ethno-political demands not only leads to the 
 vi
institutionalization of various ethnic groups but also supports the development of 
dual identities. Nonetheless, it would be unrealistic to expect that devolutionary 
processes or EU membership will bring an end to sub-state nationalist aspirations. 
Nationalism, as a form of politics, is not made obsolete by EU integration 
processes. Rather, the latter reshape the interaction between sub-state nationalist 
political parties and their host states within new circumstances.  
 
 
Keywords: sub-state nationalism, European integration, opportunity structures, the 
SNP, the PNV, the DTP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii
 
 
ÖZET  
 
AVRUPA BÜTÜNLEŞME SÜRECİNDE  
DEVLET-ALTI MİLLİYETÇİLİK:  
İSKOÇ, BASK VE KÜRT ÖRNEKLERİ ÜZERİNE 
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA  
 
Saylan, İbrahim 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Saime Özçürümez 
 
Mayıs, 2011    
 
Akademik çalışmalar Avrupa bütünleşmesinin Kürt devlet-altı milliyetçiliği 
üzerindeki etkilerine gerek vaka çalışması şeklinde gerekse diğer Avrupa ülkelerindeki 
devlet-altı milliyetçilikler ile karşılaştırmalı olarak pek az ilgi göstermişlerdir. Aynı 
zamanda, devlet-altı milliyetçilikler üzerine pek çok çalışma, özellikle Batı Avrupa 
bağlamında bütünleşme sürecinin ‘dönüştürücü’ etkisine pek fazla vurgu yapmıştır. Bu 
çalışma Kürt, İskoç ve Bask örneklerinin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi yoluyla bu iki 
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sorunlu noktaya yoğunlaşmaktadır. Avrupa bütünleşmesinin geniş kapsamlı 
dinamikleri çerçevesinde bu inceleme yoluyla yalnızca her bir vaka hakkındaki 
bilgimize değil, aynı zamanda daha fazla ampirik veri sağlayarak devlet-altı 
milliyetçiliğin Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinde süre giden evrimi hakkında daha genel bir 
kavrayışa ulaşmamıza katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.  
 
Diğer bir deyişle, bu çalışmanın kapsamlı amacı Avrupa bütünleşmesinin devlet-
altı milliyetçilik üzerindeki etkisini anlamaktır. Farklı milliyetçilik formlarının 
birbirine meydan okuduğu ve destek verdiği bir alan olarak düşünülen Avrupa 
bütünleşme sürecinin devlet-altı milliyetçilik üzerinde kayda değer etkileri olduğu öne 
sürülmektedir. Bu etkilerin doğası ve kapsamını değerlendirmek amacıyla bu çalışma 
ilk olarak devlet-altı milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkışını ve gelişimini ulusal bağlamda ele 
almaktadır. Milliyetçiliği incelemede benimsediğimiz siyasal yaklaşıma uygun olarak, 
devlet-altı milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkışı ve gelişimi kimlik ve çıkarların çatışması 
temelinde açıklanmaktadır. Devlet-altı milliyetçiliğin ev sahibi devletle (host state) 
zorlu ilişkisinde sahip olduğu kaynaklara, önündeki engellere yoğunlaşmak için fırsat 
yapıları (opportunity structures) temelli analitik çerçeveden yararlanılmaktadır. Daha 
sonra, söz konusu fırsat yapısı yaklaşımı Avrupa bütünleşmesinin İskoç, Bask ve Kürt 
vakaları üzerindeki etkilerini incelemek için uygulanmaktadır. Her biri 
‘anavatanlarında’ milliyetçi ‘dava’larının başlıca siyasal temsilcileri olan İskoç Milli 
Partisi (SNP), Bask Milliyetçi Partisi (PNV) ve Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) 
ortaya çıkışları, gelişimleri ve Avrupa bütünleşmesinin üzerlerinde yarattığı etkiler 
açılarından incelenmektedir.  
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Ampirik bulgular söz konusu partilerin tamamının fırsat yapılarını kendi lehlerine 
genişlettiğini düşündükleri için Avrupa bütünleşmesini desteklediğini göstermektedir. 
Hem milli-devletin dönüşümü hem de devlet-altı güçlerce de yararlanılan aslen 
bölgeleri güçlendirici yeni kanalların ortaya çıkması devlet-altı milliyetçi partilere yeni 
fırsatlar sağlamaktadır. Çalışmamız göstermektedir ki kimlik inşası, ideolojiler, 
amaçlar ve stratejiler açısından incelendiğinde Avrupa bütünleşmesinin bu partiler 
üzerindeki etkileri bir dizi nedenle farklılık arz etmektedir. Temel olarak, SNP ve PNV 
ile karşılaştırıldığında, DTP üzerindeki Avrupa Birliği etkisi dolaylı ve sınırlıdır.  
 
Yine de bu vakalar hakkında birkaç genelleme yapmak mümkün görünmektedir. 
Her şeyden önce, bu partiler ev sahibi devletleriyle rekabetlerinde AB’yi öncelikle bir 
dışsal destek sistemi olarak görmektedirler. İkinci olarak, AB ile devlet-altı 
milliyetçileri doğal müttefikler olarak görmek için herhangi bir neden yoktur. AB 
devlet-altı milliyetçi etkinliği bilerek ve isteyerek desteklemezken, devlet-altı 
milliyetçiliğin Avrupa bütünleşmesine verdiği destek milliyetçi siyasetlerinin hesap 
edilmiş bir öğesidir. Üçüncü olarak, bütünleşmeye verdikleri destek devlet-altı 
milliyetçi partilerin nihai siyasal amaçlarının ille de bağımsız devletlikten vazgeçecek 
şekilde dönüştüğü anlamına gelmemektedir. Britanya ve İspanya örnekleri 
göstermektedir ki etno-politik taleplerin demokratik yollarla karşılanması sadece farklı 
etnik grupların kurumsallaşmasına yol açmamakta, aynı zamanda ikili kimliklerin 
gelişimini desteklemektedir. Ancak, yetki devrinin ve AB üyeliğinin devlet-altı 
milliyetçiliğin özlemlerine son vereceğini düşünmek gerçekçi olmayacaktır. Bir siyaset 
şekli olarak milliyetçilik AB bütünleme süreçleriyle geçerliliğini yitirmemiştir. Aksine, 
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bu süreçler devlet-altı milliyetçi partiler ile ev sahibi devletler arasındaki etkileşimi 
yeni koşullar altında yeniden şekillendirmektedir.  
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Devlet-altı milliyetçilik, Avrupa bütünleşmesi, fırsat yapıları, 
SNP, PNV, DTP.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The idea of studying the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism within the 
European context from a comparative perspective has been mainly encouraged by the 
debates that intensified around mainly nationalism and European integration, 
especially in the early 2000s. These debates revealed that the European Union’s (EU) 
view of the Kurdish issue supported Kurdish sub-state nationalism, and that Kurdish 
nationalists in Turkey were increasingly attempting to make use of Turkey’s 
democratization efforts for the sake of its EU bid to promote Kurdish identity and 
interests. Within this process, the EU’s criticisms of Turkey’s insistence on a military 
solution, and its pressure for the recognition of Kurdish identity, were a direct 
challenge to the hegemonic conception of Turkish nationalism that has traditionally 
viewed any Kurdish cultural or political demands as a critical threat to the ‘indivisible 
unity of the state with its nation’. Meanwhile, within Turkey, the pro-European 
perspective of pro-Kurdish political parties has contributed to a growing ambivalence 
about the idea of integration with the EU. Consequently, many intellectual and 
political circles have claimed that the EU and Kurdish nationalists are political allies, 
adding that this is an exceptional case within the European context.  
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This perception is, however, based on a limited understanding of the European 
integration process, which, in conjunction with globalization, is transforming nation-
states and providing new channels of influence for sub-state nationalist movements 
and parties to express themselves and pursue their goals and interests. Therefore, this 
study is motivated by the idea that political and intellectual debates in Turkey need 
more empirical evidence from a broader perspective about sub-state nationalist 
political activism within the European integration process. It is expected that a detailed 
comparative analysis of the transformation and interaction of nation-states and sub-
state nationalisms within the European integration process can better help scholars 
achieve a clearer understanding of the specific nature and dynamics of Kurdish 
nationalism within the European integration process at a time when the Turkish state 
itself is being restructured.      
 
Sub-state nationalism is one of the most controversial issues in contemporary 
Europe. As a form of nationalism, sub-state nationalism is a broad category that 
describes movements and political parties claiming the right to self-government within 
a demarcated territory (‘homeland’), which is basically derived from the assertion of a 
distinct ethnic/cultural identity and common past, whether real or invented. Being 
highly ambiguous and inconstant, the claim to self-government ranges from cultural 
rights to total independence (Beland and Lecours, 2006). As a broad category, it 
encompasses a variety of cases shaped by specific historical, social, political and 
economic factors. Like its emergence, a sub-nationalism’s development largely 
depends on the national context, in which the structure and reactions of the nation-state 
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have a great influence. Historical, political and economic resources, and the role of 
elites, are also decisive in constructing a (sub-)‘national’ identity and in the political 
mobilization of the masses, while the historical conjuncture and international support 
can either bolster or hinder sub-state nationalist activism. 
 
Hence, sub-state nationalist movements and parties emerge and develop within 
the framework of specific circumstances which shape their demands and 
survival/maintenance. For instance, while Basque nationalism flourished in Spain 
(although it has been unable to create the same effects in all Basque provinces), its 
influence has remained highly limited in France. The ultimate goals and strategies of 
sub-state nationalist parties striving for the same ‘nation’ may also differ significantly. 
For instance, in the Basque case, while ETA favors independence as its ultimate 
political aim, and is willing to use violence to achieve it, the leading party of Basque 
nationalism, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (the PNV), calls for the amendment of the 
Spanish constitution to allow co-sovereignty for the Basque country. In the UK, 
Scottish nationalism remained a negligible force until the mid-1970s when Scottish 
National Party (the SNP), which favors ‘independence in Europe’, began a political 
campaign that brought the UK to the point where discussing the disbanding of the 
Union is a commonplace.  
 
These examples illustrate how the demands of sub-state nationalist movements 
and parties may vary in time, and may remain limited to demanding cultural rights or 
aim at separation. Nevertheless, as one can discern from the earlier definition, sub-
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state nationalist movements and parties all challenge the constitutional status quo in 
existing nation-states in at least in three ways. First of all, they assert a distinct 
identity. That is, they reject the current definition of national identity and demand the 
recognition of their national identity, thus requiring redefinition of the existing 
definition of national identity. Secondly, the territory that is claimed to be the 
‘homeland of the distinct group’ is already a part of one, or more than one, existing 
nation – state(s). Thirdly, autonomy in any case requires territorial, political and/or 
administrative reorganization, which sometimes leads to violent conflicts. Therefore, 
central governments have generally viewed activities of sub-nationalists with suspicion 
and seen them as divisive. While some countries have chosen to seek ways to 
democratically accommodate sub-nationalist demands, some others have preferred 
repression. Since there is no simple solution to the complexity emerging from the 
demands of sub-state nationalists against the responses of nation-states, the 
relationship between sub-state nationalism and the state remains contentious and 
conflictual, even in advanced Western democracies. 
 
Sub-state nationalisms, whatever form they take, have long been considered a 
domestic matter. Parallel to the dominant modernization paradigm, ethnic\local 
loyalties and territorial concerns, despite their crucial importance in terms of sub-state 
nationalist claims, have been regarded unfavorably as divisive, authoritarian and 
primitive, and doomed to disappear through processes of national integration. The 
international political system has also supported this view, remaining largely 
indifferent to sub-national and\or minority demands during the Cold War.       
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However, contrary to predictions that ethnic and local\territorial identities 
would dissipate, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a rise in sub-state nationalist activism, 
which has become a more visible and influential force. Especially within the European 
context, sub-state nationalist parties have gradually proliferated to become significant 
forces in Europe’s political life. Equally importantly, integrative processes, particularly 
economic globalization and the European integration, have had remarkable impacts on 
the perception and dynamics of the contentious relationship between sub-state 
nationalism and the nation-state (Keating, 2001). The European integration process, 
together with globalization, has led to an economic and political transformation in 
which the nation-state structure has been challenged at both supranational and regional 
levels (Keating and Hooghe, 1995). The process of European integration has eroded 
the fundamental components of the nation-state structure, particularly regarding 
sovereignty and territoriality. This includes the recognition of the superiority of 
Community Law and the growing importance of qualified majority voting in the 
decision-making process, which signifies the investment of political power at a 
supranational level. Meanwhile, the unhindered flow of capital, goods, services, and 
people entails the deterritorialization of national space. Even though nation-states still 
retain important functions, these developments suggest that nation-states have lost 
their autonomy in many areas that were hitherto deemed exclusively national (Wallace, 
1994; Rhodes et al., 1997; Sadler, 1993).  
These disintegrative effects of supranational integration on the nation-state 
structure are also complemented by regional empowerment thanks to specifically 
European integration process within the broader processes of globalization. The main 
 6
patterns of regional influence can be observed in several ways. Examples of a ‘fait 
regional’ include the insertion of the principle of subsidiarity into the Maastricht 
Treaty, the partnership principle in structural policy, the establishment of the 
Committee of Regions as an advisory body, inter-regional co-operation and the 
increasing number of permanent regional offices in Brussels (Caciagli, 2003). It should 
also be stressed that the regionalist attack on the nation-state is not only based on 
functional arguments that the centralized state structure is no longer capable of 
responding to the economic and administrative needs of local and regional territories in 
dynamic integrative processes, but also on normative grounds. That is, the nation-state, 
based as it is on the idea of the homogenization of culture, is increasingly criticized as 
being restrictive and undemocratic, while the EU encourages the protection of the 
cultural rights of local communities and national minorities.  
 
Sub-state nationalist movements and parties, most of which are already located 
in particular regions, in tandem with regionalist activism have embraced this new 
opportunity structure to voice and pursue their demands.  Indeed, the European 
framework provides a highly favorable context for sub-state nationalist political parties 
to restructure the ‘host state’ and shape the EU according to their aspirations, ranging 
from a confederal Europe to a ‘Europe of the Regions’. A great majority of them see 
the European integration process as an opportunity structure, for it provides, in several 
ways, a new context for national minorities and the management of nationality issues. 
For minorities, whether economic or sub-national, EU integration provides an arena of 
potential direct access to resources where they can assert their identity and possibly 
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increase their returns to their groups (Sadler, 1993). This factor has also been 
positively conditioned by the idea that assertion of ethnic identity has a democratizing 
power against the culturally homogenizing tendencies of central governments 
(Richards, 1999; Keating, 2000).1      
 
Support of sub-state nationalisms for the European integration process can be 
best discerned from the discourse of sub-state nationalisms. They support the EU for a) 
moral reasons, since the EU prioritizes respect for collective rights; b) economic 
reasons, since the EU promises a better standard of living, an end to unemployment 
and better management of local resources; c) political reasons, since the EU facilitates 
access to power and resources through decentralization and subsidiarity principles 
(Guibernau, 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, although sub-state nationalisms have found a more congenial 
framework for expressing their cultural distinctiveness and pursuing their 
economic/political goals through the European integration process, the opportunity 
structure provided by the EU should not be exaggerated. The current challenges to the 
nation-state do not mean that nation-states are withering away, or that we have come to 
the era of the end of the nation-state. On the contrary, nation-states still have important 
functions, such as providing welfare services, security and control over the labor 
market (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000). More importantly, they continue to provide collective 
identity, and nationalism’s symbiotic relationship to the state endows it with a central 
                                                 
1 Some authors take an almost anarchic stance on this issue. For instance, Walzer argues against both the 
idea that democracy has any natural units and that self-determination has an absolute subject, suggesting 
instead to “Let the people go who want to go” (Walzer, 1999: 209, 215).  
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role in legitimizing political power (Llobera, 1993). The link between the nation-sate 
and legitimate government continues to mould the political order in the national polity. 
Accordingly, politics in the EU still remains primarily national (Laffan, 2006).  
        
       There are a number of factors that make it difficult to identify the exact nature of 
the triadic relationship between the EU, nation-states and sub-state nationalisms. These 
include the different constitutional arrangements within EU member states, the 
different political contexts shaped by the level of sub-national identity and the 
willingness and capacity of those movements to establish direct contact with the EU 
(Jones, 2001). The EU integration process provides a supportive framework for sub-
state national groups in the sense that they can develop economic and political 
cooperation among themselves, and they can represent themselves at the EU level. In 
addition, some nation-states grant cultural and political autonomy to certain groups in 
order to provide an effective institutional framework to accommodate sub-state 
nationalist movements. Nevertheless, the EU still sees the states as monolithic political 
entities, and states cannot be obliged to sign up international treaties and conventions 
related to minority rights. That is, the EU has no legal power to compel a state to 
recognize any minorities within its boundaries, making it difficult for it to uphold a 
common policy for national minorities, since the issue of national minorities is still 
overwhelmingly ‘national’. In this sense, the idea of state sovereignty remains intact, 
and this principle can still be used to make convincing arguments against national 
minority rights (Jackson Preece, 1998: 173).  
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      In short, it seems more convincing to contend that the nation-state structure 
is being transformed within the European integration process rather than being 
transcended. However, even if the capabilities of the nation-state remain strong, the 
interdependence among actors at the national, supranational and sub-state levels limits 
its autonomous use of sovereign rights. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult for nation-
states to remain indifferent to the normative framework of the EU, which advocates a 
plural/participatory democracy and recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the 
sub-state national groups living in member states. Consequently, the integration 
process has become a crucial variable for every political actor in the EU to take into 
account. It has transformed the nature of the relationship between sub-state nationalism 
and the nation-state by reshaping the context of the conflict. To put it differently, the 
EU’s new European political architecture, through its impact on the nation-state 
structure, has created a new dimension to the relationship between sub-state 
nationalism and the nation-state by reshaping the opportunity structure for sub-state 
nationalist movements for voicing their demands in general and for political parties 
articulating demands of sub-state nationalists in particular. Therefore, the concept of 
sub-state nationalism today can be best understood within the context of a triadic 
relationship between nation-state, sub-state nationalist movements\parties and the EU 
(Keating, 1996).      
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1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Based on the assertion that the relationship between sub-state nationalism and 
the nation-state has gained a triadic nature within the European integration process, 
the broad goal of this dissertation is to problematize the dynamic and complex 
interaction between sub-state nationalisms in Europe and the ongoing process of 
European integration by focusing on the new opportunities the process offers for sub-
state nationalisms. In addition, as part of the broader goal, the dissertation investigates 
the ways through which sub-state nationalisms shape and re-shape their discourses 
and activities according to the changing circumstances created by integration. In other 
words, it focuses on the impacts of the integration process on the goals, strategies and 
national identity construction of sub-state nationalist parties. The empirical 
comparative findings are expected to contribute to knowledge about the question of 
what happens to sub-state nationalism within the European integration process. 
 
Nation-states constitute the backbone of the international political regime, and 
they still have crucial functions within their territorial boundaries. However, while 
nation-states have undergone a transformation at functional and normative levels, the 
conventional understanding of nationalism, which equates nationalism with the nation-
state, has also been challenged within the European integration process. Today, one 
can discern at least four types of nationalisms at European level, namely traditional, 
sub-state, trans-sovereign, and protectionist nationalisms (Csergo and Goldgeier, 
2004). Within this context, ‘traditional’ nationalisms aim to preserve the existing 
nation-state structure based on territorial sovereignty and cultural homogeneity. While 
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‘protectionist’ nationalisms claim to protect the nation and its cultural underpinnings 
from the ‘invasion’ of mass-scale immigration, ‘trans-sovereign’ nationalisms seek to 
further economic and cultural cooperation by transcending the territorial boundaries of 
nation-states. Sub-state nationalism has territorial claims which are based on exclusive 
group identities. Their demands may range from cultural or political autonomy to 
achieving an independent, sovereign state of their own.2 Therefore, contrary to the 
arguments that nationalism has a doctrine (Kedourie, 1993) or an indispensable 
specific program (Hobsbawm, 1992), it seems that it can change its institutional format 
over time and is not tied to any specific state form (Keating, 2000), which shows its 
resilient character.   
The existing varieties of nationalisms in Europe imply that Europe has become 
an arena of competing nationalisms which co-exist, and mutually reinforce or 
challenge each other (Csergo and Goldgeier, 2004). Within this context, many sub-
state nationalisms see the EU as an ally; while they are accommodated within party 
politics at regional and national levels, they also have a say in shaping European 
integration to varying degrees. Separatist nationalisms, such as ETA/Herri Batasuna 
faction in Basque nationalism that resorts to political violence do not favor European 
integration. As a result of its resorting to political violence, it has already been 
                                                 
2 Within the original categorization of Csergo and Goldgeier, sub-state political movements and political 
parties aiming at independent statehood are treated as a part of traditional nationalism. For instance, they 
argue that Basque nationalism is an example of traditional nationalism. The definition of sub-state 
nationalism adopted in this study includes all nationalist movements and political parties that claim self-
government in a specific territory for a specific group (‘nation’) on the basis of cultural and ethnic 
distinctiveness. Their aims may range from cultural autonomy to total independence. In this sense, the 
main criterion adopted for the definition of sub-state nationalism is its position in relation to the state 
rather than its ultimate goals, which are usually expressed in highly ambigious ways.   
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outlawed by the EU and the Spanish state as a terrorist movement.3 Therefore, it can 
be suggested that there is a place for sub-state nationalist movements in the European 
integration process as long as they assert their cultural distinctiveness through 
peaceful means without resorting to violence to pursue their goals. To stress again, it 
is difficult to contend that the EU intentionally encourages sub-state nationalist 
activism when one considers the fact that nation-states constitute the building blocks 
of the EU. Moreover, as mentioned above, respect for national territorial borders is 
one of the main principles of the international political system, which makes questions 
of nationalities (or minorities) still a national question.  Nevertheless, it can be seen 
that the dynamics of European integration have led to a fragmentation of the nation-
state structure and is facilitating sub-state nationalist mobilization by redefining the 
political opportunity structure for sub-state nationalist movements\parties. When the 
process is viewed as such, it becomes clear why a great majority of sub-state 
nationalist parties support the integration process, which leads many to view them and 
the EU as allies.    
 
Turkey, with its own Kurdish nationalism, and as a negotiating state for EU 
membership, is part of this context. The broader context characterized by the ongoing 
interaction between the EU and sub-state nationalisms has the potential to shape the 
interaction between the Turkish state and Kurdish nationalism by providing it with a 
                                                 
3 The decommissioning of the IRA can be seen as evidence for the fact that sub-state nationalisms 
do/can no longer insist on political violence within the European context. The opportunity structure that 
the EU provides for sub-state nationalisms inter alia can be thought as an important factor in this 
process. However, ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna from Spain) and the PKK (the Kurdish Workers’ Party 
in Turkey), both of which are on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations, continue to be exceptions for 
different reasons.   
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new dimension. An analysis of the opportunities and new channels created by the EU 
integration process for Europe’s sub-state nationalisms and the latter’s view and use 
of this process may give us a wider picture of the current political situation in the 
continent. Such an attempt may also help us show the converging and/or diverging 
perspectives of sub-state nationalisms in Europe concerning the EU. This will allow a 
more meaningful discussion of European conditionalities regarding Turkey’s Kurdish 
issue. The narrower objective of this study, therefore, is to seek to understand the 
interaction of the Turkish state with Kurdish nationalism, and the potential openings it 
may have within the broader framework of European integration. 
 
This dissertation suggests that this interaction is inevitably gaining a new 
dimension within the European integration process, and Kurdish nationalism may seek 
to utilize this process, as many other sub-state nationalisms in Europe do, through 
demanding the recognition of Kurdish cultural distinctiveness by the Turkish state, 
seeking to gain political representation as a region at the EU level, such as in the 
Committee of the Regions, and by engaging in economic and cultural cooperation 
with other regions in Europe. 
 
Within this perspective, this dissertation seeks to discuss the following questions: 
 
1) What are the impacts of the EU integration process on nation-states and sub-
state nationalisms? Are conventional definitions of nationalism, as formulated 
in prominent theories in the literature, still valid within the contemporary 
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European context? To what extent does the EU erode the exclusive rights of the 
nation-state? Why do most sub-state nationalisms in Europe support the 
European integration process? In what ways does the EU encourage sub-state 
nationalisms to further their aims? Does\can the EU have a common policy or 
practice towards sub-state nationalist movements?  
 
2) What are the impacts of the European integration process on the SNP, the PNV 
and the DTP in terms of their national identity construction, goals, strategies 
and ideologies? Specifically, how may a comparison of the Kurdish case with 
other cases in the EU shed light on the questions of what are/may be the 
contemporary implications of the EU integration process for the Turkish 
nation-state in terms of the Kurdish ‘problem’? Is the EU’s view of the Kurdish 
problem consistent with its general perspective about sub-state nationalisms? 
How do Kurdish nationalists see the EU integration process? What are their 
cost and benefit calculations? How are these calculations manifested in their 
strategies? 
 
3) How is the interplay between the nation-state (nationalism) and sub-state 
nationalism reshaped within this dynamic context, in which different forms of 
nationalism compete, challenge or mutually reinforce each other?  
 
While the existence of several research questions seems to contradict a basic 
principle of academic research that recommends ‘say a lot about a little’, it is 
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necessary to consider all these questions because they are in fact closely interrelated 
and invoke each other. The main focus of this study is ‘What are the impacts of the 
European integration process on the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism?’. All of the 
questions raised above, except perhaps for the third one, aim at clarifying different 
facets of this main research question. However, within the framework of the political 
approach adopted in this study, it is also essential to deal with this third question. Sub-
state nationalist activism first and foremost challenges existing nation-states, and 
specifically, national identity construction generally invites reactions from the ‘other’ 
(i.e. official\state nationalism and the national identity constructed by it) as much as it 
needs the ‘other’ in the construction of its own national identity within this dynamic 
process. In some cases, it also leads to highly interesting consequences. For instance, 
Scottish nationalism compels the people of the ‘South’ to question British identity and 
think more about their English identity, about which there has occurred little reflection 
due to the trust in the durability of a British identity, and the relative indifference of 
liberal philosophy to nationalism.     
 
Through investigating these questions, this study aims to contribute to the literature 
of nationalism, EU studies and Turkish studies in four ways.  First, by seeing 
nationalism as a form of politics (Breuilly, 1993), this study shares the view that the 
relationship between nationalism and European integration is a dynamic process in 
which old and new forms of nationalism challenge and reinforce each other. Within 
this process, while aspirations for institutional forms remain a shared element of all 
contemporary nationalisms, the ways different actors go about nationalist claims are 
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noticeably altered by integrative processes (Csergo and Goldgeier, 2004). A 
comparative analysis of sub-state nationalism through political parties may shed light 
on the impacts of this dynamic process on various aspects of sub-state nationalism 
within markedly different contexts. Specifically, this study concurs that nationalism 
does not lose its relevance within European integration4, but that the ways different 
actors use it change (Csergo and Goldgeier, 2004). Conceiving European integration as 
also an arena of competing nationalisms, this study seeks to contribute to a better 
understanding of sub-state nationalism, beyond the dichotomies of civic\ethnic, 
divisive\liberationist and so on. By analyzing the political implications of their 
activities and discourses, it specifically questions the view that sub-state nationalism 
has been transformed (‘Europeanized’) so that it no longer pursues statehood.  
 
Secondly, in accordance with the adopted theoretical framework, this study 
examines the interplay of sub-state nationalisms and official nationalisms in the light 
of three cases. Since nationalism is considered as a form of politics (Breuilly, 1993), 
that is, primarily related to power, positions are assumed to be continuously redefined 
within the so-called triadic relationship. An analysis of the conventional dimension on 
the axis of sub-state nationalism and official nationalism will enable us to see the 
nature of their current interaction within the context of integration.      
 
Thirdly, Kurdish nationalism has been generally studied as a problem of terrorism 
threatening the domestic political stability of the Turkish state and deteriorating its 
                                                 
4 Deeply affected by theories of modernization, the founding fathers and pioneering scholars of 
European integration predicted that nationalism would wither away within an ‘ever closer union’ 
(Anderson, 2000).  See Chapter 4.  
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relations with the international community, specifically the EU, or as a case study in 
itself. However, the analysis of the impact of European integration on pro-Kurdish 
parties in Turkey has thus far received very little scholarly attention.  This study, by 
providing the broader picture of the interaction between sub-state nationalisms, nation-
states and EU integration, aims to understand the current interaction between the 
Turkish state and Kurdish nationalism as a sub-state nationalism within the European 
integration process. In this way, it seeks to explore the new dimensions of the 
interaction between the Turkish nation-state and Kurdish nationalism brought about by 
European integration. A final contribution of this study will be to analyze the views of 
Kurdish nationalists about the European integration process therefore providing further 
opportunities for analyzing the interaction between the political and the conceptual 
dimensions of a case of sub-state nationalism.    
 
 
1.2. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Within the framework of the research questions stated above, the study covers 
three cases from three different countries. The operational units of the research 
questions of this dissertation are limited to the following political parties: Scottish 
National Party (SNP) from the UK, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) - Basque 
Nationalist Party- from Spain, and Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) - Democratic 
Society Party- from Turkey. The DTP was founded in 2005 and closed down by the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey in 2009.5 Since it was a continuation of previous pro-
                                                 
5 On 11 December 2009, the DTP was banned by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, ruling that the 
party has become a “focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country, and 
the nation” (http://www.resmi-gazete.org/tarih/20091214-4.htm). On its closure, the ex-DTP MPs, 
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Kurdish political parties, an analysis of the DTP necessarily encompasses its 
predecessors since the 1990s, when pro-Kurdish political parties began to take part in 
legal electoral politics. All the political parties chosen for the study have several 
competitors, so they are not the exclusive representatives of sub-state nationalism in 
their regions (‘homelands’). Thus, each case and hence each sub-state nationalism has 
its own particular characteristics which can be viewed as a social movement in a 
broader sense (McCrone, 1998; Guibernau, 1996 and 1999), comprises political 
parties, civil society organizations, cross-party organizations, and so on. However, in 
accordance with the purpose of this study, the scope of the observations is limited to 
political parties.  
 
The principal reason for the selection of these examples of sub-state 
nationalisms and political parties rather than their competitors is that they have been 
major political parties within each sub-state nationalist movement in terms of 
dominating the construction of nationalist discourse and electoral support.  However, 
the interaction of these political parties with other sub-state nationalist parties in their 
regions and nation-wide political parties is included in the study when deemed 
necessary. Thus, the study firstly narrows its scope to political parties. Then it focuses 
mainly on the major examples from each case, and limits itself to the analysis of 
certain themes: the impact of the European integration process on national identity 
construction, and the ideologies, goals and strategies of the parties in question. In other 
words, the dissertation does not seek to put forward a comprehensive comparison of 
                                                                                                                                             
except for the two having lost their MP status (Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk), joined Peace and 
Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) that is the current successor of the DTP. 
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these cases, whether as social or political movements. Neither does it aim to establish a 
typology or a model of sub-state nationalisms.  
 
Connor points out that comparative studies of nationalism are conducted to see 
the commonalities and peculiarities of each case, and thereby a more comprehensive 
representation and understanding. However, they generally lead to disappointment, 
since they leave readers more struck by their dissimilarities than commonalities, or 
they produce simplistic generalizations resulting in questionable conclusions (Connor, 
1994: 76-7). Undoubtedly, the social, economic, cultural, political and historical 
particularities of each case make a comprehensive comparative study difficult. Indeed, 
the differences among the cases selected in this study are far greater than their 
common characteristics. For instance, Basque and Kurdish nationalisms have specific 
qualities concerning the ways in which influential factions within them view and use 
violence as a legitimate strategy. However, given the constitutional and legal ban on 
the establishment of regionally -or ethnically- based political parties in Turkey, the 
other two cases have been able to declare their goals and organize freely as long as 
they renounce violence as a strategy. Unlike the Scottish one, Basque and Kurdish 
cases have trans-state character. They are also ideologically divergent. While the PNV, 
as a Christian-democratic party, is situated in the center-right wing of the political 
spectrum, the SNP represents social-democratic, center-left ideas. The DTP is a left-
wing party that primarily strives for the recognition of Kurdish people by the Turkish 
state and also has a strong emphasis on egalitarian policies. The parties also differ in 
terms of their involvement in the process of European integration. While the PNV and 
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the SNP have been shaping and shaped by the integration process, the relationship 
between the DTP and the European integration process has been rather limited and 
indirect.  
 
Nevertheless, despite these significant differences, the three political parties 
share several characteristics. First of all, they are all examples of sub-state 
nationalisms, which claim the right to self-government in a specifically demarcated 
‘homeland’ on the basis of cultural\ethnic distinctiveness. Second, these parties use 
constitutional, non-violent means in their struggle against the center. Third, their host 
states are part of the European integration process as either members or candidates of 
the EU. Considering that the main focus of the study is to understand the impact of the 
European integration process on these parties, European integration provides a 
common context by making a comparative study more feasible, which lessens the risk 
of inappropriately comparing apples and pears. One must stress that the comparative 
methodology, which promises more than just finding out the differences and 
similarities among the three cases in question, can also contribute to the wider 
understanding of the nature and dynamics of the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism 
within the process of European integration. 
 
Besides the commonalities among the cases, each case has also a value in itself 
in terms of the broader goal of the study. While the PNV deserves special attention in 
terms of its goal of co-sovereignty, the SNP’s ideal of ‘independence in Europe’ makes 
it an ideal case to test whether the European integration process is bringing about a 
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transformation of the nationalist ideology that is based on the classical equation of 
nation with the state. It has been widely argued that the goals of sub-state nationalist 
parties have become Europeanized as to relinquish the ideal of independent statehood.6 
However, ‘Independence in Europe’ still denotes a search of state of its own. Hence, 
one can question if pro-Europeanness of sub-state nationalist parties is just a strategy 
to make use of new opportunity structures rather than denoting a transformative effect 
of European integration on sub-state nationalism. Since Turkey is not a member state 
of the EU, one may claim that the Kurdish case is not mature enough for us to make 
sound comparisons with other cases within EU countries. However, such a comparison 
actually allows us to see the interaction between European integration and sub-state 
nationalism with a different lens, and can also shed light on the reasons for the 
widespread perception that Kurdish nationalists and the EU are allies. Moreover, the 
inclusion of the Kurdish case in the study is expected to contribute to a general 
understanding of sub-state nationalism on the basis of the EU’s impact on Kurdish 
sub-state nationalism itself and on the relationship between official nationalism in 
Turkey and Kurdish nationalism, which has been barely studied within this 
perspective.  
 
For several reasons, the time span of the research is limited to the last two 
decades. Although the origins of Basque nationalism date back to the end of the 19th 
                                                 
6 The lack of demand for a state of its own is claimed to be one of the distinctive characteristics of 
contemporary sub-state nationalism. See for instance, McCrone (1998), Keating (1996). Thus, 
Europeanization here assumes a specific meaning distinct from other meanings mainly referring to the 
impacts of European integration on the domestic structures of member states and the ongoing formation 
of the European polity.  
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century, Spain only became a member of the EU in 1986. Since that time, European 
integration has had important consequences for both the Spanish state and Basque 
nationalists. Within this process, the PNV has been an ardent champion of a pro-
European perspective. In Scotland, the SNP emerged in 1934, and had remarkable 
electoral success in the 1970s. However, it was not until the late 1980s that the party 
experienced a radical transformation in its view of the EU. Within the period, Turkey 
renewed its application for European membership, and was granted the status of 
‘candidate country’ in 1999, which represented a ‘categorical jump’ in terms of its 
relations with the EU. Therefore, the section on Kurdish nationalism covers the period 
since 1999, by focusing particularly on the period from the establishment of the DTP 
in 2005 to its closure in 2009.       
   
 This comparative study makes use of qualitative research techniques of content 
and discourse analysis. In studying the research questions in the operational units of 
analysis and within the European integration process, this research uses primary and 
secondary documentary sources such as party programs, party dailies and magazines, 
speeches of party leaders, election campaigns, related legal documents, decisions taken 
by EU institutions. The Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities, the 
Constitutional Treaty, political and academic debates made during the Convention for 
the Constitutional Treaty are also examined in relation to the assumed roles of regions 
in the European integration process, and in regard to national minority rights. For the 
Turkish context, the regular reports and declarations of the EU Commission, as well as 
European Parliamentary debates on the Kurdish issue since 1987, are utilized to 
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understand the European perspective on Kurdish nationalism. To supplement the 
documentary data, interviews with party representatives at different levels have been 
held.  
 
This study has used a content analysis of the primary and secondary sources to 
elicit the main concepts used by sub-state nationalisms in shaping and reshaping their 
discourses according to the changing socio-political circumstances. Among other 
content units, this study relies on an analysis of a combination of themes and concepts 
drawn out from these sources. In a general sense, it focuses on the themes of nation-
state, sovereignty, European integration and nationalism, and it seeks to identify both 
the key common and particular concepts used by the three political parties in question. 
While comparative methodology in a general sense is expected to broaden our 
understanding of the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism by exploring ramifications 
and amplifications of the impact of integration in the different contexts, content 
analysis also allows a longitudinal analysis, in that it can address the same issue over a 
period of time. Thus, it is possible to analyze the development and evolution of each 
case by pursuing certain themes and concepts over time, which also helps to make 
comparisons between the cases. Nevertheless, content analysis can easily fall short of 
decoding the latent meanings of texts. For this reason, discourse analysis is needed to 
study the rhetorics and arguments of the political parties in their interaction with the 
European integration process.  
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           This study necessarily deals with a number of key issues and concepts from 
various disciplines such as anthropology, political science, international relations, 
sociology and European studies. The connections between key issues and concepts 
from multiple disciplines are primarily viewed from the political approach. It is 
considered that an investigation of the nationalist conflict guided by the political 
perspective with the help of theoretical tools of multiple disciplines will enable us to 
analyze the political, social, economic and international aspects of the ongoing 
interaction between sub-state nationalisms and the European integration process in a 
comprehensive way.  
 
1.3. A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY: THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION 
Since its inception, the field of nationalism has been troubled by terminological 
chaos due mainly to the particularities and dynamic political character of each case of 
nationalism.7 Unsurprisingly, the heterogeneity of the field also prevents conceptual 
homogenization in studies of sub-state nationalism as a type of nationalism. Apart 
from the lack of neat definitions of key concepts, the term sub-state nationalism does 
not reflect a consensus among researchers. Rather, what is here called sub-state 
nationalism is elsewhere named in numerous ways, such as minority nationalism 
(Birch, 1978; Watson, 1990; Lynch,1996), nationalist regionalism (Keating, 1988 and 
1995)8, regional nationalism (Dardanelli, 2001), regional-cum-ethnic protest (Rokkan 
                                                 
7 For a detailed analysis of comparative methodology, see Mattei Dogan and Dominque Pelassy (1990) 
How to Compare Nations – Strategies in Comparative Politics (2nd ed.), Chatham House Publishers, 
New Jersey. See also Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (eds.) (1994) Comparing Nations: Concepts, 
Strategies and Substance, Wiley-Blackwell: London. 
8 Keating also employs the terms of minority nationalism (Keating, 2001) and new regionalism 
(Keating, 1998) in his studies.    
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and Urwin, 1982), regionalism (Caciagli, 2003), ethno-regionalism (De Winter and 
Türsan, 1998), ethno-nationalism (Connor, 1994)  micro-nationalism (Payne, 1991), 
micro-regionalism (Longo, 2003), small nationalism (Kaldor, 2004), mini-nationalism 
(Synder, 1992), neo-nationalism (McCrone, 1998)9, nations without states 
(Guibernau,1999), peripheral nationalism (De Winter and Cachafeiro, 2002), primary 
regionalism (Hebbert, 1990), and separatist nationalism (Breuilly, 1993; Agnew,1989).  
 
Among these hybrid terms, this study adopts sub-state nationalism. The logic of 
this naming is derived from the fundamental claim of the initiators and supporters of 
this type of nationalism. They argue that state power is monopolized by a larger, 
dominant ethnic group, while their ethnic groups (that are claimed to be ‘nations’ by 
sub-state nationalist movements) are not represented, or inadequately represented, in 
the existing political structure (Catt and Murphy, 2002: 18).  
One can argue that the term ‘sub-state nationalism’ helps to overcome the 
terminological chaos in the literature. First, it helps to distinguish between sub-state 
nationalism and ‘regionalism’, which are frequently used interchangeably, although 
they actually refer to two different phenomena. That is, while they share economic and 
territorial aspects, there is a clear distinction between them in terms of their ideological 
and ethno-cultural dimensions (Kellas, 1998). Regions, as economically and/or 
culturally defined units, see themselves as a part of a nation, whereas sub-state national 
                                                 
9 McCrone borrows this term from Nairn, who defines Scottish nationalism as neo-nationalism. In his 
analysis, he McCrone uses this term for sub-state nationalist movements in advanced western countries, 
namely Scottish, Quebece and Catalan cases.  
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units claim that they constitute distinct ‘national’ units.10 This claim goes together with 
a call for the reorganization of the existing state structure and a redefinition of 
prevalent national identity. In this sense, sub-state nationalism and regionalism are 
different because of their differing self-determination claims.  
Second, sub-state nationalism might also provide a reasonable alternative to the 
term ‘ethno-nationalism’ that has dominated the literature for a long time. 
Underplaying the importance of political and economic factors, this approach implies 
an essential meaning to the ethnic character of these nationalisms. Besides its scientific 
connotations, ethno-nationalism is generally used in derogative ways. In the politics of 
nationalism, representatives and adherents of (official) state nationalism tend to label 
sub-state nationalism as ethnic nationalism, meaning inherently reactionary, 
exclusionary and divisive. They tend to ignore that every nationalism consists of both 
civic and ethnic elements to varying degrees. In this regard, ethno-nationalism (or 
ethnic nationalism) can be seen as limited term. Instead, sub-state nationalism may 
provide a more encompassing name for groups whose claim of nationness provokes 
nationalist political conflict.         
    
Finally, sub-state nationalism is also more explanatory relative to the term 
‘minority nationalism’ since the status of minority does not always make sense. For 
                                                 
10 In some cases, sub-national units constitute specific regions of existing nation-states. In this sense, 
regions as politico-administrative units overlap with historically claimed territories of sub-national units. 
For instance, The Basque Autonomous Community is one of the seventeen autonomous communities, or 
regions, of the Spanish nation-state. At the same time, its territorial borders constitute part of the Basque 
‘homeland’. Thus, from the point of view of the center, Basque nationalism can be seen as regionalism. 
However, since nationalism is loyalty to the nation, and thereby the focus of Basque nationalist 
movement is the Basque nation, it is more plausible to term it as sub-state nationalism rather than 
regionalism.  
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instance, within the context of this comparative study, Scotland is accepted both as a 
region and a nation by the British government. In Spain, even though nationality is not 
an explicitly specified status for any region in the country’s constitution, Basques are 
accepted as a historical nationality. In the Kurdish context, neither Turkey’s central 
government nor Kurdish nationalists accept the idea of minority status for Kurds.    
 
1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
Adopting the political approach to nationalism, and investigating the impact of the 
European integration process on sub-state nationalism through a comparative analysis 
of political parties in three different contexts, this study includes three theoretical 
chapters that aim at giving a detailed account of the nature, interrelationship and 
interaction of the main concepts, institutions and actors within the context of sub-state 
nationalism. Since sub-state nationalism is a type of nationalism, Chapter 2 focuses on 
the central concepts of nationalist ideology. In doing so, it first questions the relevance 
of ethnicity for nationalism if it seeks to achieve congruence between political and 
cultural units. Then, it centers upon the political approach, endorsing a modernist 
paradigm among the theories of nationalism. For this reason, it emphasizes the role of 
the modern state, and politics more generally, in the formation of nations and the 
development of nationalism is emphasized. At the same time, it is stressed that the 
ideological aspect of nationalism is crucial, not only for its establishment, but also for 
the maintenance of the nation-state. Within this framework, it then elaborates on the 
processes of the construction of the nation as a cultural and political entity.  
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On the basis of the theoretical considerations raised in the second chapter, Chapter 
3 explores the nature and dynamics of sub-state nationalism. After a summary of the 
three main theoretical approaches to sub-state nationalism, it focuses on sub-state 
nationalist politics. Since each sub-state nationalist movement emerges and develops 
within opportunity structures which are shaped by a combination of internal and 
external factors, the examination of sub-state nationalist politics is conducted in 
relation to the nation-state (or, host state), its constitutive and reproductive ideology 
(state nationalism), and the international conjuncture. In doing this, the chapter focuses 
on the role of political agency, specifically that of political parties, in the definition of 
sub-state national identity and its political goals and strategies.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates the impacts of European integration on sub-state nationalist 
parties. For this purpose, it is concerned with the restructuring of the opportunity 
structures by elaborating on the transformation of the nation-state and the new 
channels emerging as elements of integrative dynamics. Then, it focuses on two 
specific questions: How do sub-state nationalist parties make use of new opportunity 
structures in defining and seeking ways to reach their goals? What are the impacts of 
European integration on the ultimate goals of sub-state nationalist parties? In 
answering these two critical questions, this chapter clarifies the different aspects of the 
new context.  
 
Overall, the theoretical chapters provide an opportunity structure-based analytical 
framework that enables a consistent inquiry of the three particular cases that were 
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shaped in highly different circumstances. In accordance with the main aim of this 
dissertation, each empirical chapter (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) seeks to understand the 
impact of the European integration process on sub-state nationalist political parties by 
observing changes in their construction of national identity, ideology, goals and 
strategies. Finally, each chapter gives an account of the interplay between the relevant 
state and sub-state nationalisms within the new context. This should provide a better 
understanding of the current nature and dynamics of nationalist politics.  
 
Investigating the impacts of European integration on the SNP, Chapter 5 first gives 
the historical background to the emergence and development of Scottish nationalism in 
conjunction with its interrelationship with the British state and nationalism in the UK. 
It next examines Britain’s accession to the EC in 1973 and Scottish devolution in 1997 
as two critical developments that deeply affected the opportunity structures that the 
SNP made use of in the construction of Scottish national identity, determining the 
goals and strategies of the party within the new context.       
 
 In the same way, Chapter 6 looks into the impacts of European integration on the 
PNV through the changes in opportunity structures and the utilization of the new 
channels by the party elite. First, it provides a detailed analysis of the emergence and 
development of Basque nationalism in relation to critical junctures of the Spanish state 
and its conception of the Spanish nation. The chapter then explores the establishment 
of the Basque Autonomous Community as a part of Spanish democratization and 
Spanish accession to the EC in terms of their effects on the opportunity structures that 
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the PNV has benefited in promoting Basque identity and interests through politics of 
nationalism. Finally, it discusses the specific impacts of European integration on the 
PNV.  
  
 Chapter 7 investigates the influence of the integration process on the DTP. 
Following the analytical framework used in the fifth and sixth chapters, Kurdish 
nationalism is scrutinized within the context of the conceptualization and 
institutionalization of the relation between the state and nation. Thus, after an 
examination of Kurdish nationalism within the context of Turkish modernization, it 
considers the Europeanization reforms in the post-Helsinki period as crucial factors in 
reshaping the opportunity structures for pro-Kurdish political parties, specifically the 
DTP. Despite the fact that the DTP is deprived of many of the new channels of 
influence at an EU level because Turkey is not yet an EU member state, the 
democratization reforms propelled by Turkey’s EU perspective have already created 
some significant changes in the opportunity structures for pro-Kurdish sub-national 
political efforts.  
    
The comparative analysis of empirical findings regarding these three cases, 
conducted in the Conclusion, is expected not only to contribute to our understanding of 
each case within the broader dynamics of European integration, but also to provide 
further empirical evidence for a more generalizable understanding of the ongoing 
evolution of sub-state nationalism within the European integration process.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO NATIONALISM 
 
 
Nationalism has been one of the ideologies that has stamped its imprint on the 
modern age. Despite being politically potent for more than two centuries, it remains a 
puzzling phenomenon (Anderson, 1996). Apart from the generally agreed notion that 
nationalism is a modern phenomenon, there is no consensus about the origins and 
nature of nations. Theoretical accounts about the emergence, development, meaning, 
content and functions of nationalism, and its relationship to the state are equally 
controversial. The complexity of analyzing nationalism might relate to several factors. 
First, nationalism has both universalistic and particularistic characteristics. While 
nationalist ideology presents nationality as both a natural and normative principle of 
social and political organization, it takes its color from particular contexts. Given the 
fact that it has so many different forms and variations, only with reference to a 
concrete historical context can we say what the term actually does or should mean. In 
other words, it is more appropriate to speak of nationalisms rather than nationalism 
(Alter, 1989: 5). The particularity of nationalism leads some writers to claim that the 
“nation is a category of practice, not (in the first instance) a category of analysis” 
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(Brubaker, 1996)11, or even to reject any explanatory theory of nationalism (Breuilly, 
1993).  
 
Second, even though it is possible to approach nationalism as an ideology, it 
has always been a coalition of discourses. Indeed, nationalism is an empty ideology 
which can articulate different ideologies, ranging from liberalism to socialism and 
fascism.12 It can also adapt to different contexts and changing conditions. Thus, 
nationalism is characterised by ambiguity and resilience. On the one hand, these 
characteristics help explain its potency13 to appeal to the masses and to survive 
changing conditions. On the other hand, they imply a highly complex subject to 
theorize. These two factors are further complicated by ‘terminological chaos’ (Connor, 
                                                 
11 Brubaker’s stance represents a ‘post-modern’ way of theorizing nationalism, different from the 
classical debate between ethno-symbolists and modernists. Taking nations as discursive formations, 
Brubaker has paved the way for various postmodernist accounts of the phenomenon. For instance, 
Verdery argues that the nation should be viewed as symbol rather a thing. Thus one can explain how a 
single symbol (‘nation’) takes on multiple meanings (Verdery, 1996). In his study on Lega Nord 
nationalism in Italy, Tambini contends that there is no virtual\false nationalism; the nation is a 
contingent event, with nationalism being a useful tool for political mobilization in times of economic, 
social or political crises (Tambini, 2001). 
12 Guibernau’s analysis about the nature of nationalism is worth quoting at length: “While nationalism 
provides a series of goals – creation of a state, the reconstruction of the nation, the development and 
encouragement of the national culture and interests -  it does not indicate the direction to be taken or the 
methods which should be adopted to achieve them. Except during a period of extreme repression, 
nationalism does not supply an account of the content and means of a nationalist movement or party. 
Nationalism does not determine what politics its adherents should support. It is insufficient to know 
where one wants to go, one needs also to find out and decide how to get there. Thus, we can find 
nationalist parties following conservative, Marxist, social-democrat or liberal strategies” (Guibernau, 
1996: 63). 
13 While some scholars tend to relate the power of nationalism to its ability to engender sentiments of 
belonging to a particular community, Keating provides a wider perspective on the ground that 
nationalism is an antidote to the dilemmas engendered by modernism, which has entailed the breakdown 
of traditional social orders and the erosion of traditional authority structures. According to Keating, 
nationalism works as a mechanism for coping with the dilemmas of modernism by linking the individual 
to the collective, the past to future, tradition to modernity. Since it assumes such a large range of 
functions, it is inevitably ambiguous and contradictory. Furthermore, nationalism bridges the artificial 
division of aspects of social life such as the political, the economic, the social, and the cultural (Keating, 
1996). This point may be helpful in explaining not only the continuing strength of nationalism in 
general, but also in understanding the reinvigoration of sub-state nationalism since late 1960s. This 
point will be discussed in detail in the third chapter.   
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1994); that is, there are no neat definitions of key concepts in the studies of 
nationalism.  
 
The difficulties of studying nationalism do not, however, imply that 
nationalism cannot be theorized. Rather, it suggests that any attempt at finding a 
definitive theory of nationalism would be a futile endeavor because there are multiple 
definitions of nationalism available at any one time, and its prevailing definitions 
change in response to social and political change. What then does unite all different 
movements, ideas, policies and projects defined as nationalist? The answer is that even 
if nationalist ideology is void, malleable and amorphous, it still has common markers. 
In this sense, ‘What is nationalism?’ is a meaningful question, although the answer 
needs to be loosely defined. In order to understand nationalist ideology, one has to 
capture its worldview that prioritizes the nation and legitimates political authority on 
the basis of the will of nation.  In addition to that, while analyzing nationalism, one 
should always bear in mind the fact that nationalism is only one of the forces that 
shapes the modern world, and that it has always to be considered in a broader context 
(Halliday, 1997).   
 
Relying on the claim that nationalism is a multifaceted phenomenon involving 
sentiments, ideology and politics, this chapter discusses the key concepts of the 
phenomenon in light of the major debates in studies of nationalism while prioritizing 
the political dimension.  However, such a political approach does not amount to de-
emphasizing the role of ideology, which is of vital importance in terms of legitimizing 
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nationalist political movements and, more crucially, establishing and maintaining 
nation-states. Since sub-state nationalism is a form of nationalism, such a general 
theoretical framework can be considered helpful in placing sub-state nationalism in its 
broader context.  
 
Despite having different origins, developments, goals and strategies, all sub-state 
nationalisms politicize ethnicity to some extent to assert their distinctiveness; so-called 
civic nationalisms also have an ethno-cultural definition. For political purposes, sub-
state nationalist movements are derogatively labeled as ethno-nationalist by central 
authorities. Equally importantly, sub-national demands grounded on ethno-cultural 
distinctiveness always imply a political conflict, sometimes even in violent forms. 
These facts alone compel any theory of nationalism to question the relationship 
between nationalism and ethnicity. Therefore, this chapter first deals with ethnicity as 
a collective identity and its relevance for nationalism. Second, it outlines the 
foundations of nationalist ideology to give a concise account of the nationalist 
worldview of socio-political life in terms of its basic principles and claims. In this 
regard, one can distinguish between the world it depicts and the world that exists in 
reality. Third, the chapter focuses on the political approach of the modernist paradigm, 
which is the theory of nationalism adopted here. For this reason, it emphasizes the role 
of the modern state and, more generally, politics in the formation of nations and the 
development of nationalism. At the same time, the chapter stresses that the ideological 
aspect of nationalism is also crucial, not only for establishing but also for maintaining 
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the nation-state. Within this framework, this study subsequently elaborates on the 
processes of construction of the nation as a cultural and political entity. 
 
2.1. THE NATION  
The specificity of nationalism compared to other ideologies derives from the 
fact that it locates the source of individual identity within a people called the nation. 
The idea of nation is of central value for nationalism; without it no nationalism is 
possible (Greenfeld, 1992; Alter, 1989). The nation, as both a cultural and political 
community, is conceived of as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, 
and the basis of collective solidarity. According to nationalists, humankind is naturally 
divided into a collection of nations, each possessing a distinctive character and 
separate identity. Nations are believed to be organic communities based on the bonds 
of comradeship, loyalty and duty, and are always seen as fundamentally homogenous; 
other divisions along the lines of status, class, locality, and in some cases ethnicity are 
thought to be superficial (Heywood, 1998).14  
 
Guibernau defines the nation as  
 
“a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a 
clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and 
claiming the right to rule itself. Thus, the ‘nation’ includes five dimensions: psychological 
(consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and historical” (Guibernau, 
1996: 47).  
 
                                                 
14 For nationalists, the nation is definitely forged out of Gemeinschaft-type relationships (community, 
typically found in traditional societies, and characterized by natural affection and mutual respect) 
(Heywood, 1998:161; Guibernau, 1996). Gellner stresses the same point that “nationalism is a 
phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft: a mobile anonymous society simulating a 
closed closely-knit community” (Gellner, 1997: 74).  
 36
This definition, like the others, is contested; in the literature of nationalism, 
there is little agreement about the role of ethnic, as opposed to political, components of 
the nation; or about the balance between subjective elements like will and memory and 
more objective elements like territory and language; or about the nature and role of 
ethnicity in nationality (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 4). Theoretical conceptions of 
the nation are strictly determined by what scholars understand by nationalism. That is, 
their view of the nation determines their approach to nationalism. While scholars 
generally agree that national identity is a combination of subjective and objective 
criteria, the origins and the nature of nations, and the relationship between the nation 
and the state are contentious.  
 
One can argue there are two main rival views of nationalism. The first group of 
scholars, generally categorized as modernists, explains both nationalism and nations as 
modern phenomena by focusing on developments that rendered them both possible 
and/or necessary: the processes of modernization, such as industrial growth, the spread 
of mass communications, the emergence of modern states, and secularization. 
According to this group, nationalism is historically contingent or required and precedes 
nations. Considering nations as ‘manufactured’, ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’, they stress 
the pivotal role of structural factors and subjective elements in the construction of 
national identity, without totally neglecting the importance of objective elements. In 
this process, such scholars see pre-modern identities, including ethnicity, primarily as 
resource material to embody nations with distinctive identities, with any supposed 
continuity with the past being considered as largely fictitious or imaginary. 
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The second group (ethno-symbolists) concedes that nationalism is modern, but 
at the same time it stresses the ethnic origins of nations. According to this strand, 
ethnic identities are persistent and national identity is historically rooted. National 
identity cannot be created ex nihilio, and ethnic identity both substantiates national 
identity and explains the emotional appeal that nationalism creates among the masses 
(Smith, 1991).15 It is not surprising therefore to observe that theories of nationalism are 
in large part repeated in theories of ethnicity (Jaffrelot, 2003: 5). That is to say, while a 
soft- primordialist approach to ethnicity corresponds to an ethno-symbolist 
understanding of nationalism, constructivist and instrumentalist conceptions of 
ethnicity underpin modernist views of nationalism.16 
 
Thus, the relationship between the nation and ethnicity, and the relevance of 
ethnicity for nationalism constitute one of the main dimensions of the debate on the 
nation. At this point, an investigation of the relationship between ethnicity and 
nationalism and the significance of ethnicity for national identity is necessary to 
understand both the mechanisms of national identity construction and the nature of 
sub-state nationalism, often referred to as ethno-nationalism or ethnic nationalism.     
 
 
 
                                                 
15 As well as Smith, the approach that Wimmer (2002) describes as new romanticism is shared in some 
specifications by Armstrong, Hastings, Llobera, Hutchinson and some other scholars in the literature on 
nationalism.   
16 Joireman (2003) states that there are mainly four approaches to ethnicity: primordialism, soft-
primordialism, instrumentalism, and social constructivism. For a detailed analysis of each view, see 
Joireman (2003).  
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2.1.1. The Nation and Ethnicity   
Like all other collective identities, ethnicity is basically an outcome of a social 
categorization based on the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is created and re-
created at the level of every day interaction; thus, it emerges and is made relevant 
through social situations and encounters. In other words, it is relational, hence fluid. 
Following Barth, Eriksen argues that ethnicity is a product of social boundary-making 
processes conditioned by social interaction and integration.  
 
“Only in so far as cultural differences are perceived as being important, and are made socially 
relevant, do social relationships have an ethnic element.” (Eriksen, 1993: 12).  
 
 
To put it differently, while ethnic groups are different from cultural groups, 
ethnicity occurs in social contexts where cultural differences make a difference. Since 
cultural boundaries are fuzzy, they do not necessarily correspond with ethnic 
boundaries. Eriksen warns that an emphasis on the relative and relational character of 
ethnicity should not lead us to ignore its symbolic aspect, for ethnicity refers both to 
aspects of loss and gain in interaction, and to aspects of meaning in the creation of 
identity. Thus, it has a symbolic aspect as well as a social, organizational one. That is, 
ethnic categories do not only exist because they serve certain functions; they also have 
a symbolic power that is crucial for the maintenance of ethnic identity related to 
ancient languages, religions, kinship systems or ways of life. In sociological terms, 
symbols – flags, rituals, diet, etiquette, arts and language - and origin myths have 
crucial functions both to maintain the boundaries of an ethnic community in relation to 
‘others’, and to provide it with a sense of continuity. Thus, they identify who belongs 
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to the ‘in-group’ and who belongs to the ‘out-group’, enabling and sustaining each 
individual’s identification with their community (Joireman, 2003).  
Consequently, ethnic groups have clearer boundaries than cultural groups, but 
they are still culturally grounded in social interaction. They are communities whose 
boundaries are continuously shaped by both the ‘pragmatics of calculated choice’ 
(Tambiah, 1989) and symbols and myths. In this process, symbols provide members of 
an ethnic group with a belief of continuity, notwithstanding their relative and relational 
character. Therefore, the basis of ethnicity has some degree of reality inherent within it 
(Panayi, 175).17 However, ethnic groups should be considered as socio-historical 
entities rather than natural givens or primordial entities that are subject to change 
rather than being durable. More importantly, in terms of their nature, ethnic groups are 
not political groups. 
 
When does ethnicity become politically significant? What is the importance of 
ethnicity for nationalism? Are nations simply a continuation of ethnic groups? To 
respond to these questions, a Weberian approach to ethnicity can provide a useful 
starting point. Weber maintains that ethnicity of itself does not lead to group 
formation; rather, it only ‘facilitates’ group formation, particularly in the political 
sphere. Instead, for Weber, it is the political community which appeals to a shared 
ethnicity and drives it into action (Weber, 1996).  
 
                                                 
17 Eriksen (1991) argues that nations are ethnies that were able to establish their states, while ethnic 
groups are groups that failed to do this. This study sees ethnicity as a resource material in the 
construction of the nation, which will be discussed at length below.   
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There is a widespread conviction that ethnicity becomes more important when 
there are perceived threats to identity (Krüger, 1993). In the contemporary world, the 
politicization of ethnicity is chiefly seen as a reaction to the fear of assimilation by 
nation-states or the fear of immigrants. However, this argument can be only a part of 
the larger picture, since each and every nation by definition depends on ethnic 
distinctiveness.18 In addition to that, nation-states based on a legitimizing nationalist 
ideology make extensive use of ethno-cultural elements and the mechanisms of ethnic 
social categorization. This is not to say that ethnic groups precede nations, but to assert 
that nationalism plays a central role in the politicization of ethnicity by benefiting from 
the methods and repertoire of ethnic identification in the construction of national 
identity.19 In this sense, it is not surprising to find close links between theories of 
ethnicity and those of nationalism. Ethno-symbolists and modernist approaches to 
nationalism need to deal with this connection between ethnicity and the nation.  
 
2.1.1.1. The Ethno-Symbolist Perspective: From Ethnie to Nation 
The ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism argues that nations have pre-
modern ties in the form of a population’s ethnic origins. A.D. Smith, one eminent 
proponent of this approach, claims that nationalism necessarily and naturally builds on 
                                                 
18 Thomsen argues that the idea of ethnic-less nationalism makes no sense, for without a perception of 
being a distinct group there can be no idea of nation. Thus, any political movement ceases to be 
nationalist.  According to him, so-called ethnic and civic elements exist in every nationalism to varying 
degrees, but the problem arises when the ethnic is confused with the ethno-cultural. Although a sense of 
ethnic sameness is part of every nationalist movement, what is perceived as the unique culture of the 
nation need not be accentuated in nationalist rhetoric (Thomsen, 2001: 29). Thomsen’s argument can be 
criticized on the grounds that ethno- cultural elements may not be emphasized in some cases, but ethnic 
distinctiveness is achieved through ethno-cultural elements: language, religion, clothes, diets, artefacts, 
and so on.  This study builds on this view and suggests that it is not possible to escape ethno-cultural 
elements in constructing or imagining nations.  
19 The politicization of ethnicity is also possible in forms other than nationalism. For instance, the Black 
Movement in the USA emerged as a political movement against discrimination on the basis of race.   
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much older ethnic communities. An ethnic community, or ethnie, denotes a human 
population characterized by a common ancestry, shared memories and culture, a link to 
a specific territory, and a sense of belonging to a community (Smith, 1991: 25). 
Therefore, ethnic attributes include not only cultural and historical content but also 
subjective components. Ethnies are primarily characterized by a belief in a common 
ancestry; that is, they are ‘super-families’. However, they are not natural, as 
primordialists would claim. Rather, ethnic crystallization, brought about by factors 
inherited from pre-modern times and conditions propelled by modernity, paved the 
way for transformation of ethnic categories into ethnic communities. Only a few of 
these could survive the pressures of absorption and assimilation, becoming firmly 
crystallized and durable to constitute the ethnic cores on which contemporary nations 
were based. Smith identifies two types of ethnies giving rise to different patterns of 
nation-formation. Historically, lateral ethnies led to civic-territorial nations through 
mechanisms of bureaucratic incorporation, while vertical ethnies turned into ethnic-
genealogical nations through vernacular mobilization. Nationalist ideology played a 
crucial role in determining when and where nations would emerge (Smith, 1991: 99). 
The historical trajectories of these two types of ethnies resulted in two types of 
nationalism, namely territorial and ethnic nationalism.  
 
Thus, in Smith’s approach, although they have changed remarkably through 
historical and socio-economic processes, ethnies nevertheless underlie contemporary 
nations; the historical and symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnicity (the ‘myth-symbol 
complex’) substantiate national identity as a multidimensional collective cultural 
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phenomenon (Smith, 1991: 25). While Smith does not totally neglect the impact of the 
nation-state and the deliberate efforts of their intelligentsia, for him nations are 
crucially connected to pre-existing cultures, without which they could not exist. In this 
sense, ethnicity is a relatively independent variable, if not the only one, accounting for 
the emergence of all nations and nationalisms. In short, for theorists like Smith, even 
though nations are not natural communities, their continuity with the past cannot be 
simply viewed as an invention of nationalism.  
 
Such theorists, relying focusing on the ‘ethnic origins of nations,’ can be 
criticized on several grounds. First, although they seek to find a middle way between 
primordialist and modernist views on the relationship between nation and ethnicity, 
their approach is impaired by the tension of defining ethnicity as both durable and 
fluid. Durability implies that present nations are yesterday’s ethnies, albeit so-called 
crystallization throughout history. In other words, the ethnies of pre-modern times are 
retrospectively seen as predecessors of existing nations. In addition to the problem that 
this view allows little room for historical contingency, empirical evidence shows that 
there are many cases of nations formed without immediate ethnic antecedents 
(Hobsbawm, 1990). Smith defends his position by claiming that the first nations were 
formed on the basis of ethnic cores, providing models for subsequent cases of nation-
formation. When there were no ethnic antecedents, the need to fabricate a coherent 
mythology and symbolism became everywhere vital to ensure national survival and 
unity (Smith, 1991: 41-2). However, this reformulation of this basic argument 
obviously obscures his central thesis. Secondly, seeing nationalism as a continuation of 
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long-standing patterns of ethnicity leads him to prioritize culture, specifically in the 
form of ethnicity, in his theory of nationalism at the expense of neglecting the 
fundamental role played by politics.    
 
2.1.1.2. Modernists and Ethnicity  
In contrast to ethno-symbolist theses, modernists explain the emergence of 
nations and nationalism in terms of societal transformation, albeit their focus of main 
explanatory variable differs. Nations, whether fabricated, invented or imagined, are 
modern entities. Since the continuity of each national collectivity is largely fictitious or 
imaginary, ethnicity is viewed as a resource material rather than an explanatory 
variable. For instance, Gellner states that human societies are characterized by culture 
and organization (power). These are general and perennial characteristics of social life: 
human beings always live in cultural diversity, and social life is based on organizations 
in which human beings are differentiated by social position. Cultures persist and 
change; they are both resistant and unstable. In this sense, it is natural to observe 
cultural continuities along with transitions from one form of social organization to 
another. However, observing cultural continuities is very different from using them as 
proof of an ‘immemorial antiquity to nations’ (Gellner, 1997: 93). Contrary to Smith’s 
ethno-symbolist approach, Gellner claims that nations are not a continuation of 
ethnicity; rather, nations were invented and became the root of political obligation in 
the age of nationalism when culture and power became related to each other in a new 
way in the modern age.20 According to him, nationalism is a marriage between state 
                                                 
20 For a detailed distinction between culture and power, see Gellner, 1997, pp. 1–13 and 90–101. See 
also “the Warwick Debate” between A.D. Smith and E. Gellner for a highly sophisticated discussion of 
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and culture, induced by the exigencies of industrial society, such as impersonal, 
context-free communication and a high level of cultural standardization. In this 
respect, nationalism is the general imposition of high culture on society. Nations 
emerge ‘when general conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally 
sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities’ 
(Gellner, 1983: 55). In this process, nations were created by nationalism, not the other 
way round. Hence, ethnicity is not a ‘given’, but a construction of the state (Kellas, 
1998: 65). Although Gellner stresses that ethnicity, thus the nation, is a construction of 
the state and nationalists, his theory underplays the role of politics in explaining 
nations and nationalism; he focuses instead on the modern conditions that required the 
emergence of nationalism.   
 
As a modernist, Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner’s argument that nationalism 
comes before nations, but he focuses on the political dimension of the great societal 
transformations of modernity. He argues that nations are invented traditions 
constructed by elites for the sake of social coherence in the midst of rapid change, 
especially in the face of the threat posed by mass democracy. Nations as invented 
traditions enable continuity with the past. However, this continuity is largely factitious, 
so sense of historical continuity and cultural purity is invariably a myth and, what is 
more, a myth created by nationalism itself. In this processes of invention, ethnicity 
provides the historical pedigree in the creation of nations (Hobsbawm, 1992: 3).   
 
                                                                                                                                             
one of the major questions in studies of nationalism: whether nations are modern inventions or 
historically rooted entities (in other words, “whether nations have navels?”).  
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However, it would be difficult to generalize this instrumental\functional 
conception of ethnicity in the construction of the nation to all modernists. For example, 
like Gellner, Anderson focuses on socio-economic and cultural transformations in his 
account of the emergence of nationalism, and, parallel to modernist understandings, for 
him, the nation is neither natural nor eternal, but a modern historical construction. 
However, according to Anderson, the construction of national identity is more 
complex and cannot be simply reduced to the needs of modernization. Therefore, in 
criticizing Gellner, who sees the nation as a fabrication, Anderson maintains that all 
communities are imagined. Therefore, they should not be distinguished by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. Nations are imagined 
political communities, which became imaginable thanks to fundamental changes such 
as new conceptions of time, the decline of dynastic realms and, more importantly, 
print-capitalism (Anderson, 1991).  
 
Approaching nationalism as a cultural system rather than a political ideology, 
Anderson represents a noticeable shift in thinking about nationalism from the material 
to the cultural, through misremembering the past, memory and imagination.21 He 
suggests that nations are imagined as inherently sovereign, limited and as 
communities. Since the nation is imagined as a community, it is conceived of as 
having a deep, horizontal comradeship. For Anderson, it is this fraternity that explains 
why so many people willingly die for their nations. Imagining the nation as a 
                                                 
21 As an enquiry of the subjective formation of nation and nationality, Anderson’s theory resonates 
Renan’s view of the nation as a spiritual principle. More recently, Billig has given an account of daily 
reproduction of nationalism, which seems to be also inspired by Renan who stresses that the nation’s 
existence is a daily plebiscite.    
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community charges it with a solidarity derived from horizontal comradeship and turns 
it into an emotionally charged object. Anderson’s account is, in some sense, similar to 
the ethnicist approach of Smith, who views nations as super-families, and who finds 
his theory useful in explaining why and how nationalism is able to generate such a 
widespread popular support. Nevertheless, Anderson’s theory differs from that of 
Smith in terms of their view of continuity. While Smith emphasizes the pre-modern 
roots of nations, Anderson considers nations as modern entities that came into being in 
modern conditions. Thus, while the nation is a fabrication or invention for Gellner and 
Hobsbawm, Smith basically claims that nations succeed ethnies in the modern era. In 
Anderson’s theory, even if the role of ethnicity is not clearly detailed in the process of 
imagination, the imagination of the nation as a community, which specifically enables 
the forming of social organization on the basis of horizontal comradeship, is a 
remarkable characteristic of ethnic groups.  
 
This outline of ethno-symbolist and modernist accounts of the relationship 
between nation and ethnicity shows that, although ethnicity is one of the central tenets 
of the debate on the nature and origins of nation, there are few examples of integrated 
theories of ethnicity and nationalism.22 While modernist views of nationalism 
generally neglected ethnicity as a factor, the theorization of ethnicity remains 
rudimentary even in ethno-symbolist studies. Nevertheless, there is still a crucial 
distinction between them. Ethno-symbolists, on the one hand, argue that ethnic 
boundaries often become durable even though the content of a group’s culture may 
                                                 
22 Kellas aims at developing an integrated theory of ethnicity and nationalism by combining a number of 
disciplines ranging from neurology to political science. See Kellas (1998).  
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change, since symbols and myths act as ‘border guards’ against ‘them’. Ethnies and 
nations are crucially connected at a temporal level. Ethno-symbolists view such 
continuity as decisive, because it is able to explain the power and appeal of 
nationalism. On the other hand, even though modernist cultural explanations of 
nationalism reject the claim of continuity in favor of the constructed character of 
nation, they fail to appreciate the critical role of politics in that construction. In this 
sense, whether modernist or ethno-symbolist, cultural explanations of nationalism are 
seemingly more advantageous in explaining the emotional or psychological aspects of 
nationalism. It is obvious that they are severely impaired by their neglect of the crucial 
role assumed by politics in looking at the relevance of ethnicity to nationalism. Since 
they focus on the nation rather than nationalism23, or on the use of or change in culture 
brought about by modernization through nationalism, they are unable to explain 
processes of national identity construction and nationalist mobilization in which 
various conceptions of the nation as well as economic and political interests compete 
for power.24 In addition, their alleged supremacy of explaining the emotional power of 
nationalism becomes less convincing when the power of ideology is taken into account 
in terms of socialization of individuals as co-nationals.   
 
                                                 
23 Actually, this basic point is crucial in terms of its effects on nationalism studies. It both reflects the 
author’s attitude towards the nation and nationalism. For instance, Connor sees ethnic conflicts as 
inevitable when true nations seek self-determination. Smith maintains that national identity cannot be 
transcended, at least for the foreseeable future, within the European integration process. Modernists 
focusing on nationalism have generally negative ideas about it. In contrast, in an interview, Anderson 
expresses his sympathy for the utopian elements in nationalism. See: 
http://www.culcom.uio.no/english/news/2005/anderson.html  (visited on December 26, 2007).  
24 Besides Smith and Anderson, Gellner’s theory is also apolitical. It neglects the role of politics in 
explaining nations and nationalism. It deals instead with the reasons why industrializing states adopted a 
national form in order to prosper, and the functions assumed by nationalism in the processes of 
modernization (Kellas, 1998:53).  
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This study endorses a modernist understanding of nationalism that claims that 
nations are modern historical constructions. However, it is also obvious that nations 
were not constructed out of nothing. Actually, nations are similar to ethnies in many 
senses. They are both communities of common myths and memories, as well as being 
territorial communities. Whereas the link with a territory may be only historical and 
symbolic in the case of ethnic groups, nations are physically and actually connected to 
a territory, which is called the homeland (Smith, 1991: 40). Nevertheless,  
 
“… this is not enough to justify naturalization of prior communities, as if they have existed in 
some essential way, or have simply prefigured a history yet to come” (Eley and Suny) .25  
 
Hence, nations and ethnic groups have some characteristics in common, but it 
does not mean that they are the same. Yet, national identity is necessarily related to 
ethnic identity, since ethnicity provides invaluable raw material for the construction of 
national identity. National identity is a product of nationalism as an ethnic ideology 
that politicizes ethnic identity and selectively makes use of ethno-cultural elements in 
constructing the nation. Accordingly, nations are the children of nationalisms that 
emerged during, and gradually became the dominant ideology of, the modern age.26 
The historically constructed nature of nations, which constitutes the core idea of the 
modernist understanding of nationalism, and is epitomized in Gellner’s much quoted 
                                                 
25 This phrase probably best summarizes ‘retrospective nationalism’, which is probably the most 
fundamental criticism by many modernists leveled against ethno-symbolist arguments. See also Breuilly 
(1993). In response, ethno-symbolists argue that modernists do not see the dangers of “‘blocking 
presentism’, that is, an exclusive focus on the views and interests of the present generation in shaping 
the past” (Smith, 2001a: 83).     
26  Modernist theoretical accounts differ in terms of the time and location of the first appearance of 
nationalism. Despite a widespread agreement that dates nationalism back to the French and American 
revolutions (Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1995; Guibernau, 1996), there are other views: while Greenfeld 
(1992) maintains that it dates back to 16th century England, Anderson (1991) claims that the creole 
communities of the Americas developed their national consciousness well before most of Europe.  
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statement “it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round” 
(Gellner, 1983), requires us to answer four interrelated questions at this point: What is 
nationalism? Why did it come to be so important in modern times? How does 
nationalism engender nations? What is the relationship between nation and state for 
nationalist ideology and in practice? The responses to these questions are vital, not 
only to better understand the nature and dynamics of nationalist ideology and politics, 
but also to explain the emergence of sub-state nationalist movements and their 
interplay with other forms of nationalism, which constitute the topics of the next 
chapter.  
 
2.2. NATIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS:  
THE STATE AND THE NATION   
 Historically, nationalism as an ideology was closely related to the rise of the 
nation-state, being linked to the popular sovereignty brought about by the French and 
American Revolutions.27 Besides the functions it assumed in the formation of the 
industrial capitalist economy, nationalism accompanied liberalism in realizing 
revolutionary ideals of equality, liberty and fraternity.28 Although suffrage was only 
gradually extended to include all citizens in a national territory, the nation gained the 
                                                 
27 Guibernau (1996: 55) suggests that the French Revolution helped create the division of Europe into 
nation-states, which favored the definition of citizenship by nationality as well as by legal, political and 
social rights. Thus, the French Revolution politicized the cultural concept of nationality, and the 
subsequent association of nationalism with popular sovereignty encouraged liberals to agitate for the 
realization of this ideal in their own lands.  
28 Equality and fraternity are also important characteristics of an imagined community. Probably, the 
main fault line between liberal and nationalist ideologies is their conception of liberty. While the former 
conceives of freedom on an individualistic basis, the latter prioritizes the nation over all other individual 
and group identities. In its extremist interpretations, nationalists argue that true freedom can only be 
realized through one’s total identification with a nation. Despite this apparent contradiction, nationalist 
ideology serves to resolve the collective action problem of liberalism.   
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meaning of a sovereign people with nationalism.29 In other words, nationalism initially 
developed as democracy.30 In its original form, it was inclusive and emancipatory, 
although as it spread throughout the world in different circumstances and times it 
gained different emphases and forms. 31 
 
This study adopts a political approach to nationalism, giving greater weight to 
the transformation of political power in modern conditions. While this perspective by 
no means ignores the role of social, cultural and economic factors, it prioritizes politics 
in explaining the emergence and growing influence of nationalism in the modern era. 
Such a standpoint is largely inspired by the work of Breuilly.32  
 
Breuilly argues that nationalism in a general sense has three dimensions: 
psychological, ideological and political. The psychological/emotional aspect is closely 
                                                 
29 Different groups named as nations had existed before, but the meaning and extension of the nation 
entirely changed with nationalist ideology (Hobsbawm, 1990).   
30 Greenfeld emphasizes that nationalism initially shared the same principle tenets as liberalism, in that 
they both locate sovereignty within the people and they recognize the fundamental equality among 
people within a specific territory (Greenfeld, 1992: 10). In the same way, considering the emergence of 
the nation-state as a consequence of a multi-dimensional process changing the relations of power in 
society, Guibernau stresses the significance of the close link between the concept of citizenship and the 
idea of popular sovereignty constituted by nationalism. She also draws our attention to the revolutionary 
consequences of nationalist ideology in terms of politics in the following decades and today. Because 
revolutionaries stated that the principle of sovereignty resided essentially in the nation, national-self-
determination turned out to be one of the most frequent interpretations of popular sovereignty. 
According to her, however, one should not forget that the attainment of citizenship rights was achieved 
as a consequence of a slow process launched by the French Revolution (Guibernau, 1996:  51-53). 
Hobsbawm also shares the view that nationalism initially had an inclusive and emancipatory character 
(Hobsbawm, 1990).  
31 Greenfeld argues that the emphasis on the idea of the nation moved from its sovereign character to the 
uniqueness of a people, so that the original overlap between it and democratic principles was lost. The 
two branches of nationalism are obviously related in a significant way, but are grounded in different 
values and develop for different reasons.  
According to her, two dissimilar interpretations of popular sovereignty underlie the basic types of 
nationalism: individualistic-libertarian/collectivist-authoritarian. Thus, Greenfeld obviously maintains 
dichotomy of ethnic and civic nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992:  8-11).   
32 Other eminent representatives of the political transformation approach are Eric Hobsbawm, Paul 
Brass, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann.  
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related to the human condition: the need for belongingness, the meaning attributed by 
people to their culture, language and territory. The specificity of nationalist ideology is 
that while it seeks to combine the cultural and the political, it exploits the emotional 
investment of individuals in the elements of their culture. As argued above, there is 
nothing inevitable about a creating national identity out of perennial cultural diversity 
and fluid ethno-cultural traits; the peculiarity of nationalism springs from the fact that 
it reifies culture and makes a political principle out of it.  
 
Ideologically, nationalism is built on four basic assertions: a) the world is 
divided into nations, each of which is defined by and differentiated from others 
through their distinctive characteristics; b) the interests and values of the nation take 
priority over all other interests and values; c) all political power derives from the 
nation; d) the nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least 
the attainment of political sovereignty (Breuilly, 1993; Smith, 2001b).  
 
Hence, nationalism’s grounding in the idea of the nation provides it with its 
principles and legitimacy. A nation associated with a clearly demarcated territory is 
mobilized for self-determination. Thus, the idea that ‘like should rule the like’ 
(Wimmer, 2002: 58) constitutes nationalism’s main political objective. To put it 
differently, nationalism refers to a political principle (the ‘nationality principle’) which 
seeks to achieve congruence between cultural and political units (Gellner, 1983: 1). It 
denotes a new mode of boundary making according to which the legitimate unit is to 
be one composed of persons of the same culture. Thus, it not only defines the limits of 
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the unit but it assumes that the unit has an institutional leadership (the state), and its 
main concern is that foreigners should not rule us (self-government) (Gellner, 1997).    
 
There are various answers to the question of why the nationality principle 
gradually became the dominant political principle of the modern age. Modernist 
approach to nationalism explains the gradual dominance of the new type of boundary 
making on which nationalism is based through great societal transformations. 
Modernist theories differ in terms of the key variables they use in explaining the 
relationship between modernism and nationalism. While Gellner puts the emphasis on 
socio-cultural transformations induced by the requirements of a capitalist industrial 
society, neo-Marxist scholars stress economic factors, particularly the uneven 
development of capitalism.33 To stress the remarkable role assumed by nationalism in 
the modern era, some scholars go further, to the extent that they maintain nationalism 
is a constitutive element of modernity. For instance, Llobera (1994) suggests that 
nationalism is ‘the god of modernity’. Wimmer maintains that “nationalist and ethnic 
politics are not just a by-product of modern state formation or of industrialization; 
rather modernity itself rests on a basis of ethnic and nationalist principles” (Wimmer, 
2002: 1).34  
                                                 
33 For further information, see Michael Hechter (Internal Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development, 1536–1966, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), Tom Nairn 
(The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, London: Verso, 1977).  
34 In his words, Wimmer radicalizes the modernist approach to nationalism by elevating it to the 
constitutive element of modernism. His sociological perspective, which stresses the centrality of 
nationalism to modernity, is illuminating in many respects. For example, it provides a quite helpful 
framework to comprehend various mechanisms of social closure performed by nation-states. However, 
it does not explain the question of why nationalism became so important in the modern era. Or, to 
express this in another way, since nationalism is seen as the constitutive ideology of modernity, such a 
question loses its meaning at the expense of reducing the complex processes of modernism to a single 
ideology.   
 53
Breuilly, however, contends that   
 
“there tends only to be interest in nationalist ideas or sentiments in so far as they are taken up 
by in political movements. Furthermore, political action usually has the effect of selecting from 
a range of sentiments and giving focus to particular ideas which otherwise remain diffuse” 
(Breuilly, 1993: 420–1).  
 
The important point Breuilly makes here is that nationalism is not an 
ideological movement that aims at the realization of nationalist ideals.35 Rather, 
Breuilly argues that nationalism should be viewed above all as a form of politics 
designated and pursued by elites in their competition for power. To reiterate, this 
argument does not reject the fact that a number of related factors affected emergence 
and development of nationalism. For instance, he points to the role of secular 
intelligentsia in nationalist politics, or processes of capitalist development and urban 
industrial growth, along with the extension of communications, mass literacy, and 
increased social and geographical mobility that all enabled the conditions of ‘standard 
national cultures’ (Breuilly, 2000). However, Breuilly explains the emergence and 
importance of nationalism in the modern age through transformations in the nature of 
power, which led to the production and reception of nationalist politics. According to 
him, nationalism is principally about politics, and politics is about power. Power in the 
modern world is mainly about control of the state. For that reason, a theory of 
nationalism should relate nationalism to the objectives of gaining and using state 
                                                 
35 The idea that nationalism is a political movement that develops in stages is quite common in the 
literature of nationalism. Among others, Hroch’s analysis, where he distinguishes three structural phases 
of any national movement, is a well-known example. According to him, in a national movement, Phase 
A refers to the period in which activists commit themselves to scholarly inquiry into the cultural, 
historical and linguistic heritage of their ethnic group, while Phase C implies that the national movement 
succeeded in finishing Phase B and were able to make the majority of the population nationally 
conscious (Hroch, 1985).    
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power. He argues that once nationalist politics is made the center of attention, the 
theory of modernity should focus on political modernization. The central feature of 
political modernization is the development of the sovereign and bounded state, as part 
of a system of competing states.36 This in turn is part of a broader shift towards 
societies in which the major functions (political, economic, and cultural) are 
concentrated into specialized institutions. As a corollary, the distinction between the 
state as ‘public’ and civil society as ‘private’ became clearer. In addition to political 
transformations with the rise of modern state, the transition to a ‘generic division of 
labor’ gave rise to a new emphasis upon people as individuals rather than members of 
particular groups.  
 
This political and economic transformation brought about the question of how 
to connect society and the state: nationalism appeared as a practical solution, imposing 
citizenship ideals upon a society which was now defined as a cultural collectivity. In 
other words, political elites wishing to legitimize state actions and attract the support 
of the masses exploited modern conditions which led to a standardized culture and 
made stressing the collective character of society more acceptable (Breuilly, 1996: 
165).37 
                                                 
36 For a detailed discussion on the modern state, see Poggi (1990).  
37 The instrumental/functional character of nationalism in modern conditions is also stressed by 
Hobsbawm. Differently from Breuilly, Hobsbawm relates the emergence of nationalist politics to the 
need for social coherence in the midst of rapid change, especially the threat posed by mass democracy 
rather than the emergence of the modern state. According to him, nations are invented traditions 
constructed by elites so that they can keep political power in their hands. Although his ‘from below’ 
approach is useful to understand the inclusion of the masses in the polity due to the threat posed by 
socialist workers’ movements, socialist ideology became a significant political force about half a 
century after the French Revolution. I think uniqueness of Hobsbawm’s theory lies in his idea of the 
‘nation as invented tradition’ that evinces mechanisms of cultural innovation in different contexts.      
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Therefore, as an outcome of political transformation to modernity, nationalism 
became important in bridging the state and society.38 In this sense, nationalism as a 
                                                                                                                                             
Quite differently from an understanding that stresses the instrumental character of nationalism amidst 
political transformation within the general framework of societal changes featuring modernity, it is also 
possible to view nationalism as a compromise between elites and the rest of society. For instance, 
criticizing Breuilly’s approach as state-centric and that of Gellner as functionalist, Wimmer maintains 
that nationalism emerged with a cultural compromise and social closure, which entailed a certain way of 
defining the border between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
The idea of cultural compromise is central to his explanation for the emergence of nationalism. Cultural 
compromise is defined as a process of negotiation between the new state elites and the rest of society, 
and as a process where interests do not always overlap. Nevertheless, it is critical that “actors sharing 
the same communicative space agree certain values are valuable and that certain modes of classifying 
the social world make sense” (Wimmer, 2002: 8).  
Thus, nationalist ideology emerges from cultural compromise, which results in a consensus on 
nationalizing principles of social inclusion and exclusion. Nation-states also represent an exchange of 
the guarantee of political loyalty for the promise of participation and security. Although this view recalls 
the classical state theories of political philosophy, such as those envisaged by Hobbes and Locke, who 
stressed the idea of security in making a social contract to establish the state, the notion of participation 
is distinctive. The element of participation not only reminds us of the argument above that nationalism 
originally emerged in close association with democracy, but also relates to the existence of the strong 
civil societies where nationalism initially emerged.  
Nevertheless, Wimmer’s account of the emergence of nationalism is rather vague in least in two senses. 
First, although actors have certain interest in reaching a cultural compromise, such as security, 
participation and loyalty, it is not clear why cultural compromise results in nationalism, rather than a 
different set of principles of social-boundary making.  Second, cultural compromise seems to take 
culture itself out of the processes of inclusion and exclusion, which is a crucial part of the nation-
building process. Indeed, Wimmer describes the nation-building process as community-building, 
realized through four closely interrelated processes of legal, military, economic, social closure. 
Interestingly, although the nation is institutionalized in these processes, its cultural aspect remains apart 
from the process. It comes to the fore again when state elites are unable to provide collective goods to 
the whole population of the nation-state. Then, similar processes of social closure develop on a sub-
national, ethnic basis (Wimmer, 2002: 9). Actually, Wimmer’s idea of cultural compromise assumes the 
existence of a civil society such that cultural homogeneity is not a concern. For instance, in multiethnic 
nations, the existence of dense trans-ethnic networks of civil society organizations becomes a major 
precondition for achieving and maintaining a cultural compromise. However, his theory falls short of 
giving an account of sub-state nationalist movements in western societies like Britain or Spain that have 
strong civil societies.     
Nevertheless, Wimmer’s theory still provides two important contributions. First, one can reason from 
Wimmer’s theory that since a confluence of interests underpins cultural compromises, changes in power 
relations can give rise to changes in cultural compromises. In consequence, by framing the nation-state 
as a cultural compromise, Wimmer suggests that nations and nation-states are not only imagined 
communities of fraternity and solidarity but also imagined communities of interest. In this sense, the 
negotiated character of national identity enables us to understand the dynamics of nationalist politics in 
different contexts and conjunctures. Second, although its cultural aspect is weak, the concept of social 
closure provides a valuable analytical framework to comprehend how different mechanisms of 
inclusion, thus exclusion, in national boundary-making processes operate. Finally, although Wimmer 
criticizes Breuilly’s state-centric approach, Breuilly actually explains the development of two forms of 
nationalism on the basis of state – (civil) society relations. See Breuilly, 2005.  
38 Breuilly (1993) lists legitimation, coordination and mobilization as the main functions of nationalism. 
Guibernau (1996) also stresses vital functions assumed by nationalist ideology in terms of the political 
relationship between the nation-state and its citizens. For instance, it serves the state by securing the 
consent and cooperation of the masses for the interests of the state: to wage war, to collect revenues and 
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form of politics is crucially connected to the development of the modern state39 as the 
crucial political dimension of modernization. Nevertheless, although its emergence is 
related to the political transformations brought about by modernization, the effects of 
nationalism proved to be more extensively transforming. The nation-state40 gradually 
became the hegemonic form of political organization worldwide, thus equating the 
modern state to the nation-state. In addition, it became the universal framework for 
processes of modernization by giving it a particular meaning.  
 
Breuilly’s perspective is distinctive in several ways. First, like other scholars 
adopting a political approach, he prioritizes the role of the modern state and more 
generally politics in the formation of nations and the development of nationalism. 
Second, he views nationalism as political and instrumental since he rejects any idea of 
cultural identity as a defining characteristic of nationalism. That is, according to him, 
nationalism is about capturing or maintaining the political power that is concentrated 
in the state in the modern age. Third, since Breuilly’s theory focuses on oppositional 
movements in which opposing groups of elites seek to mobilize the people, coordinate 
                                                                                                                                             
to maintain social order. Moreover, the cultural enfranchisement of the masses through nationalist 
rhetoric helps legitimize the state and obtain the support of the masses.   
39 The twin processes - from territorially consolidated service to differentiated service, and from 
differentiated territory to consolidated territory - is what constitutes the development of the modern state 
(Finer, 1975). On the basis of Tilly’s definition of the state, Poggi (1990: 23) defines the fundamental 
characteristics of the modern state as “organization, differentiation, coercive control, sovereignty, 
territory, centralization, formal coordination of parts”. Poggi claims that the state’s sovereignty and 
territoriality logically signify that each state exists in a political environment consisting of a plurality of 
states. The modernity of the state is explained by the fact that states conceive themselves as existing side 
by side, among their other defining characteristics. This is specific to modern states: that they conceive 
themselves as making up a system of states, as well as differentiating them from empires that saw 
themselves as being politically in charge of the world (Poggi, 1990: 25).  
40 The nation-state emerged as a specific type of modern state; it basically sought to unite the people 
subjected to its rule by means of homogenization, creating a common culture, symbols and values, 
reviving traditions and myths of origin, or sometimes inventing them. In this sense, it is very different 
from the absolutist type of modern state that preceded the nation-state (Poggi, 1990).     
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various interests and legitimate their actions, it also provides a useful theoretical 
framework to analyze sub-state nationalist movements. His argument that nationalist 
activity is oriented towards state power is illuminating, not only in framing the 
opportunity structures for opposing nationalisms, but also in discussing what happens 
to sub-state nationalism within the context of European integration.41  
 
Within this framework, this study views nationalism as a form of politics, and, 
as Hooghe (1992) clearly states, it considers the maintenance of power and power 
shifts as key mechanisms in understanding the national dynamics between different 
social and political groups in a society. It is also correct to say that Breuilly’s focus on 
only politically significant nationalisms tends to neglect the crucial role that nationalist 
ideology assumes in both the construction and reproduction of the nation as a cultural 
and political collectivity. Thus, his theory is useful in understanding the nature and 
dynamics of nationalism, but falls short of comprehending its mechanisms. This study 
aims to overcome this shortcoming by benefiting from the theories of Geoff Eley and 
Ronald Grigor Suny, Eric Hobsbawm, Paul Gilbert, and Michael Billig, who all focus 
on the ideological aspect of the construction and maintenance of national identity.  
 
To recapitulate, the political approach to nationalism sees nations and nation-
states as products of nationalism. In the struggle for power, the emergence of particular 
                                                 
41 The transformation of the nation-state has changed with the effect of integrative processes, especially 
European integration: notably two fundamental components of the nation-state, namely territoriality and 
sovereignty with the transfer of some competencies to supranational institutions and deterritorialization 
as a consequence of free flow of goods, people and information. The transformation of state will be 
discussed in detail in the third chapter.   
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nations was not inevitable. Instead, particular nations are the result of the defeats of 
alternative nationalisms (Billig, 1995: 28). The establishment of the nation-state 
merely indicates the political and/or military triumph of certain nationalist elites, or 
just a specific part within them, but it does not mean that social and political 
integration has been completed. In accordance with the ideal of congruence between 
political and cultural units, the process of nation-building, which already started with a 
nationalist political movement, now sets about integrating and harmonizing socially, 
regionally, or even politically and institutionally divided sections of the people (Alter, 
1989: 21). Nationalism as a form of identity politics by its nature politicizes cultural 
identity. And, since the homogeneity of the nation is largely fictitious, it needs to 
create a common culture in order to tie the inhabitants together in a national 
fellowship. Therefore, national identity as a construction is above all a political 
identity. Construction of a national identity then is a part of the broader process of 
nation-building. The building of the politico-legal and cultural aspects of nationality 
will be discussed in detail in the following sections.  
 
At this point, it should be stressed that there are various mechanisms 
underlying nation-building, and the efforts needed for this purpose vary since each 
case is shaped by its historical and political environment. However, there is always a 
general principle that it strives to institutionalize national boundaries drawn according 
to nationally defined processes of inclusion and exclusion. In Wimmer’s words,  
 
“national boundary-making aims at surrounding different dimensions of human life - economy, polity and society - as 
expressions of a single entity, and in this process different forms of closure (legal, political, military, and social) are 
organized along the same set of nationalist principles” (Wimmer, 2002: 57).  
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This new type of boundary-making is so extensive and comprehensive that the 
nation-state model represents a unique type in history so far, in which the state, nation 
and society converge, and politics becomes a nation-wide politics (Hobsbawm, 77). 
Furthermore, within ‘the universal code of particularity’ (Billig, 1995), nation-states 
reinforce each other, making the nationalist representation of the world more and more 
plausible, as if this were the only natural way to think and speak about society, politics, 
law and so forth (Wimmer, 2002: 57). Hence, the nation has gained two meanings in 
nationalist ideology: the nation as the people living within a state, and the nation as the 
nation-state. The connection between these two reflects the general ideology of 
nationalism; that is, nations as peoples should have their own nation-states (Billig, 
1995: 24). This brings us to a highly controversial point in the literature of 
nationalism.   
 
2.2.1. The Nation’s State or the State’s Nation 
As stated above, nationalist ideology assumes that the nation is a pre-existing 
entity. Thus, nationalist political movements aiming at self-government through self-
determination develop themselves and struggle on an already axiomatically justified 
ground since they represent nations. Those, whether perennialists or ethno-symbolists, 
who contend that nations precede nationalism, as a corollary to this argument, also 
maintain that nations and states are not necessarily related to each other. Since nations 
are natural entities based on ‘non-rational’ ethnonational bonds or historically rooted 
cultural collectivities, the effect of nationalism in terms of their existence is negligible 
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or ethnic cores essentially give the shape of each nation. Therefore, nationalism turns 
out to be an ideological political movement that provides autonomy for ‘true’ nations.  
 
To illustrate, Smith contends that the ideology of nationalism focuses on the 
nation rather than the state. It aims to unify the nation and endow it with a distictive 
individuality, and make it free and autonomous. He argues that, whereas the state is a 
legal and institutional concept, the nation is fundamentally cultural and social. The two 
concepts may overlap in terms of territory and citizenship, but the idea of the nation 
defines and legitimates politics in cultural terms, because the nation is a political 
community only insofar as it embodies a common culture and common social will. The 
territorial state is the best candidate for it, but it is not the only one. In other words, the 
drive for congruence between nation and state is powerful and frequent, but by no 
means an inevitable component of nationalist ideology. Therefore, “nationalism must 
be separated from the nation-state, and national identity from state sovereignty” 
(Smith, 1995: 113).42 That is why Smith occasionally accuses modernists of confusing 
state-building and nation-building processes.43  
  
Theorists of the modern state also repeatedly emphasize that state-building and 
nation-building are conceptually different processes, albeit often overlapping. For 
instance, Finer claims that the modern state has five characteristics: territoriality, 
                                                 
42 In a similar vein, by maintaining that the roots of modern national identity can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages, Llobera argues that the literature on nationalism has long been beset by a false dilemma: 
whether the state made the nation or vice versa (Lllobera, 1994: 3). According to him, this contradiction 
dissolves if a perspective of longue duree is adopted (Llobera, 1994: 119). State and nation make 
strange bedfellows, because they are organized on different principles. 
43 For the same warning, see also Seton-Watson (1977), and Iivonen (1993).  
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bureaucracy (function), international sovereignty (the derivate of territoriality and 
function), nationality, and forming a community. While the first three are 
characteristics of state-building, the last two are the features typically associated with 
nation-building. According to him, although there are both historical and logical 
connections, nation-building is different from state-building. Nationality is about 
common consciousness (no matter the sentiments or facts on which that is founded), 
and it is the precondition of being a ‘nation’. Then it leads to the nation having its own 
state. State and nation are thus connected but distinct. Therefore, nationality consists of 
both citizenship with its implication of reciprocal rights and duties, and also the sense 
of a community of ethnos and a sense of shared destiny (Finer, 1975: 86-9). These two 
mutually compatible and self-supportive notions characterizing nationality are 
extremely important in order to understand nationalist institutionalization and its 
potency during the last two centuries. However, such an understanding obscures the 
scene when it amounts to the argument that nations and states are not necessarily 
linked to each other because nations have a self-evident existence that is autonomous 
from the nation-state. 
 
It is obvious that taking nationalism as a fundamentally cultural phenomenon44 
leads to ignoring or at least relegating the political dimension and the pivotal role 
played by nationalism in the creation of nations. However, once nationalism is seen as 
a form of politics and nations as constructions, nationalist arguments, and also 
                                                 
44 Complaining about the terminological chaos in the literature of nationalism, Connor distinguishes 
between nationalism and patriotism. While the former refers to loyalty to the nation, the latter means 
loyalty to the state (Connor, 1994). His effort at clarification obviously reflects an ideological stance 
that naturalizes and favors nations and nationalism. Hence, the imprecise vocabulary in the literature 
may be attributed to intentional preferences as well as awkward usages of the terms.     
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‘nationalist theories of nationalism’, become quite problematic. Basically, there is an 
inverse relationship between the self-representation of nationalism and actual reality 
(Gellner, 1993: 19). Nations are constructed entities, and the so-called cultural 
homogeneity of nations is brought about by the continuous efforts of nationalist 
movements and the nation-state that is grounded and legitimized by its constitutive 
ideology of nationalism. In this sense, there is an apparently symbiotic relationship 
between state and nation. That is, while the nation-state derives its legitimacy from the 
nationality principle, it has played a central role in the construction and reproduction of 
the nation, which is essential in terms of both the establishment and maintenance of the 
nation-state.  
 
This is not to claim that the processes of state-building and nation-building are 
conceptually identical. For instance, sub-state nationalist movements seek to achieve 
stable sub-national identities against one or more nation-states at the same time 
without having their own states. However, since we do not see nations as self-evolving 
entities throughout history, we should emphasize the role of nationalism – before, with 
and after the establishment of the nation-state - as the producer of nations. In this 
sense, nation-building is closely related to state-building; an argument that can be 
supported by historical evidence.   
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2.3. DIFFERENT ROUTES TO NATIONALISM:  
CIVIC AND ETHNIC MODELS 
Nationalism developed as ideological political movements flourished in 
particular circumstances that were shaped by historical trajectories and political 
circumstances, and culminated in the formation of nation-states. The notion of 
particularity mainly affected two things: the way that nation-states were established, 
and the concept of nation they adopted in the institutionalization of the link between 
the state and society through citizenship.  
 
Historically, nation-states as consequences of successful political movements 
appeared in two stages. First, they appeared as the nationalization of those existing 
absolutist states of Western Europe that were relatively homogeneous. The model of 
the nation-state was then globalized through the break-up of more heterogeneous 
empires. In other words, nation-states were established in two ways: either the modern 
state was captured by the nationalist project, or they were built on its premises by 
ideological and institutional copying (Wimmer, 2002 65).45 Actually, before the 
nationalist ideas that led to their break-up reached the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian 
empires, nationalism had already appeared with the emergence of the Herderian 
interpretation of nationalism in Germany.  
 
                                                 
45 Another account regarding the spread of nationalist ideology comes from Gellner. He defines five 
time zones of nationalism (the ‘marriage between the state and high culture’) in Europe. The 
westernmost zone, the Atlantic coastline, was least affected by nationalism because the states based in 
Lisbon, Madrid, Paris and London correlated with cultural zones; in the second time zone, Germany and 
Italy, which were well-endowed with high culture, needed to provide a political roof for their culture. In 
these cases, a great deal of cultural engineering was not needed. However, other time zones had to 
create a high culture and state at the same time (Gellner, 25-26, in Iiovonen).  
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The well-known civic/ethnic differentiation has been used largely to categorize 
nationalist movements, their conception of the nation and citizenship regimes. It was 
first conceptualized as Western and Eastern nationalisms by Kohn, according to 
whom, while the former sees nations as associations of territorial populations governed 
by a single set of laws and institutions, the latter considers nations as organic wholes 
(Kohn, 1967). In terms of the history of nationalist movements, the former type 
resulted from a state-sponsored route, the latter developed as demotic (popular) 
movements through vernacular mobilization. Smith argues that the civic model equates 
to the standard Western model (Smith, 1991). 
 
Indeed, ‘civicness’ and ‘ethnicness’ have for decades been used as opposites 
(Nikolas, 1999). While the civic type expresses a voluntary, tolerant and inclusive 
type, the ethnic type is characterized as hot, inimical, and reactionary. Recently, one 
can observe a relative convergence around the idea that national identity includes both 
civic and ethnic elements. However, usage of these labels as dichotomous is still 
dominant in academia, and it is also the case in politics, though for different purposes. 
Nevertheless, the meaning attributed to ethnic is so derogative - thus divisive, violent 
and reactionary - that either nobody explicitly holds it and sub-state nationalist 
movements themselves need to underscore that they are not ethnic. On the other hand, 
they often accuse their host states of having ethnic nationalisms and providing an 
ethnic core with privileges.  
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Rather than accept this dichotomy, it would be more meaningful to assert that 
every national identity consists of both civic and ethnic characteristics. Therefore, “the 
duality should not be used as antithetical but it must be seen as a relationship of 
complementarity” (Özdoğan, 2000). That is, ethnic and civic should be considered as 
two ends of a continuum rather than mutually exclusive categories (Lecours, 2007: 
163). Experiences of nation-building show that elements of both models may (and do) 
exist at the same time in varying degrees and differing forms. That is to say, the nation 
is defined, not in terms of rival models, but as a collectivity signifying a cultural and a 
political bond (Özdoğan, 2000).  
 
Such a perspective does not totally disregard the analytical usefulness of this 
distinction. It is apparent that the so-called civic type sees the nation as a political 
association based on consent and will; in contrast, the ethnic model takes culture as its 
starting point, not the state.46 The implications of this crucial distinction are obvious, 
and can be best observed in citizenship regimes. Nonetheless, since the difference 
between ethnic and civic variants has generally been overstated, it becomes difficult to 
see that the civic type has also an ethnic dimension. Ethnicity may not always involve 
a common belief in a common ancestry, but it always, without exception, connotes a 
cultural distinctiveness that is essential for any claim of nationhood. In this sense, 
although only the ethnic type is labeled as exclusive, the inclusiveness of the civic type 
has its limits: not only is civic national identity constructed on a territorial basis, but 
                                                 
46 Brubaker maintains that the French and Germans arrived at their nation-states from opposite 
directions. While the former defined themselves territorially in terms of a country created by a state and 
then productive of a nation, the latter defined themselves ethnocentrically in terms of a community of 
descent and language, which is the product of a state (Brubaker, 1992: 13). 
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the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘others’ is defined by particular cultural values, 
symbols, language and a common history.  
 
This point is extremely important since, in terms of the civic-ethnic dichotomy, 
the civic type turns to be a ‘point-zero nationalism,’ which implies that nationalism is 
always located on the periphery (Billig, 1995)47. However, taking the civic-ethnic 
distinction as a continuum rather than a dichotomy enables to see nationalism as the 
property of all nations, not only a property of others, in the world of nation-states. On 
the other hand, still maintaining the distinction helps us analyze how cultural elements 
are used as resource materials in different combinations in the construction of national 
identities, without neglecting the importance of particular historical experiences. 
  
2.4. THE CONSTRUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF THE NATION 
Nation-building is as an architectural metaphor used for the process induced 
within a state to integrate the nation into a national fellowship. It may well precede the 
foundation of the nation-state given that some nationalist movements start with 
‘cultural innovation’ by cultural elites. Nevertheless, when nation-building is seen as a 
two-tiered process consisting of the construction of ‘the nation’ as a cultural 
collectivity and a polity, it is evident that the second dimension, ‘citizenship’ has to 
wait until the foundation of the nation-state. On the other hand, even if some 
nationalists reject it, these two dimensions are so interwoven that the modern concept 
of the nation is inextricably linked to the concept of the state. Therefore, nationality 
                                                 
47 For a typical example of this perspective, see Michael Ignatieff (1993) Blood and Belonging, London: 
Vintage.  
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connotes membership of a nation only because it can connote membership of a state 
(Gilbert, 2000: 61).  
 
The development of nation-states shows that the nationalist political 
movements that achieved their nation-states first emerged through the intellectual 
efforts of cultural elites before developing into political movements that finally 
succeeded in mass mobilization around the ‘national cause’. Nevertheless, the 
achievement of the nation-state only meant gaining political power in the name of the 
nation. Besides the politico-legal institutionalization of nationality through citizenship, 
which crucially linked the state and the nation, the nation-state still needed to exert 
greater efforts to create the nation that is claimed to already exist as a homogeneous 
cultural entity in which membership to the nation was defined by different 
combinations of resource materials. Now we can elaborate on this interwoven two-
tiered process, which is illuminating, not only for understanding the emergence and 
development of sub-state nationalist movements, but also for understanding the 
mechanisms that they use in ethnic-boundary making in this ‘game of mirrors’.  
 
2.4.1. The Nation as (Ethno-) Cultural Collectivity  
Alter rightly argues that “the nation should be seen as a goal rather than an 
actuality” (Alter, 1989: 21). Although historical evidence shows that most successful 
nationalisms presume some prior community of territory, language, or culture, these 
so-called objective elements per se do not lead to a distinct national identity. Nations 
come into existence as an amalgamation of objective and subjective elements through  
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“cultural innovation, involving hard ideological labor, careful propaganda, and a creative 
imagination. (In other words), if politics is the ground upon which the category of the nation 
was first proposed, culture was the terrain where it was elaborated, and in this sense nationality 
is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and unpredictable process, forged from an interaction 
of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention, which cannot be reduced to static 
criteria of language, territory, ethnicity or culture” (Eley and Suny, 1996: 7-8).  
 
In the complex process of national identity construction, territory, language and 
culture gain a moral meaning through the manufacturing and manipulation of a 
particular view of the past. While ethnicity provides nationalism with the historical 
pedigree that it lacks (Hobsbawm, 1992), nationalist construction converts the cultural 
traditions of everyday life into more specific claims (Calhoun, 1993: 224). Historical, 
political, cultural, geographical and socio-economic symbols or boundary-markers 
(heroes, habits, institutions, values, traditions, glories and traumata) are used 
selectively in the present-day construction of the past (Hoppe, 2005). Thus, ethno-
history is of a crucial role in making and maintaining an ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction by 
providing the nation with a primordial aura through which claims of historical 
continuity and certain rights specific to nations are legitimated.48  
 
In this process, a nation is not only imagined as a community of people, but 
also as a people with specific territory. Territory is sanctified as the homeland, for 
which ‘we’ have shed blood for the sake of ‘our’ unity, autonomy and honor against 
                                                 
48 Another mechanism utilized in the national boundary-making process is stereotyping, which is 
applied at in-group and out-group levels in constituting ‘us’ and ‘them’. While ‘us’ is invested with 
positive characteristics, ‘them’ is defined as ‘lazy, dummy, uncivilized, merciless and so on’ (Eriksen, 
1993: 25).  Thus, stereotypes contribute to define our nation in relation to other nations or counter- 
ethno-cultural groups. In the Turkish context, while a Turk, who is intelligent, hardworking and moral, 
is equal to all the world, all other nations are regarded as enemies since Turks have no friends but 
themselves. Stereotyping also operates against ethnic groups challenging hegemonic discourse. In 
Turkey, the category of ‘Easterner’ which is also interchangeably used with ‘kiro’ (to mean 
‘uneducated’ or ‘unurbanized’) shows both how ‘intra-orientalism’ functions and also rejects/conceals 
the existence of ethnic groups other than Turks (specifically, Kurds).  
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‘them’. Hence, territory is not simply the space where the nation lives, but it is an 
inheritance from ‘our’ ancestors. In this sense, territory is an essential part of both a 
nation’s life-space and ethno-history.49 The land belongs to the people and the people 
belong to the land (Gilbert, 2000: 62), despite the fact that the territorial boundaries 
were actually determined by the military successes or failures of a given center of 
rule.50 
 
In nationalist discourse, language also gains a special status with particular 
connotations. Rather than being just a means of communication, it turns into a context 
through which national uniqueness is approved and culture is experienced and 
reproduced in distinctive ways. The role assumed by language is especially pivotal in 
the Romantic version of nationalism, which paved the way to so-called ethnic 
nationalism. In the Herderian conception of the nation, language amounts to a level 
that enables and expresses a particular way of viewing the world through a national 
‘worldview’. Thus, it becomes major element of national distinctiveness.51   
 
Consequently, nationality as the collective identity that the people of the nation 
acquire by identifying with the nation, results from toilsome ideological labor, creative 
                                                 
49 Billig states that nation-states hate losing territory, not only because the loss of territory entails 
political and economic losses, but also because it hurts the imagined homeland (Billig, 1995: 75). 
Therefore, since it requires a redefinition of the homeland’s borders, any loss of territory has dramatic 
consequences. That is, besides the political and economic repercussions, the nation would be torn apart 
ideologically.    
50 Territory is so central to nationalism that if and when cultural differences come to be expressed 
territorially then the ethnic movement becomes a nationalist one (Eriksen, 1993: 26-7).  
51 The Scottish case is a particularly notable example in terms of the debate on the significance of 
language for national identity. Despite efforts to revive Gaelic, English remains the native language of 
Scots. By showing that language is not an indispensable part of the allegedly objective criteria for 
nationness, Scottish nationalism thus presents an important challenge to the Herderian conception of the 
nation. 
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imagination and political propaganda. Through it, we come to naturalize us and them 
as nations in the world of nations. Despite there being different routes to nationalism, 
thus different conceptions of the nation, national identity construction processes share 
certain traits.  
 
For one thing, the connection between nationalism and history is critical. 
Nationalism historicizes language, culture, and customs in order to prove the 
particularity of the nation among others in accordance with the general code of 
particularity. In national historiography, as territory becomes the homeland, it gains a 
moral, sacred meaning. By interpreting chronological events in a relationship of 
causality, the national historiography serves to legitimate the foundation of a nation’s 
state of its own with a specific date; at the same time, it serves to date back the nation 
to immemorial times.52 Thus, while the nation expresses infinity at a temporal level 
(from past eternity to future eternity), the nation-state is presented as the political 
expression of that eternity, even though its historical roots are known. Temporally, the 
national narrative consists of golden ages and hard times through which the nation was 
able to show the world how it was created for brilliant deeds and able to survive 
natural and/or political diseases. The ‘temporal turn’ is also obvious in the national 
identity construction of sub-state nationalist movements (e.g. ‘before and after the 
Spanish invasion’ in Basque nationalism; ‘before and after the foundation of the 
                                                 
52 Hobsbawm eloquently summarizes the significance of historiography for nationalism as follows: 
“historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to the heroin-addicts: we supply the 
essential raw material for the market. Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a 
nation is the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the people who 
produce it. So my profession, which has always been mixed up in politics, becomes an essential 
component of nationalism” (Hobsbawm, 1992: 3).  
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Turkish Republic’ in Kurdish nationalism; ‘before and after the Treaty of Union’ in 
Scottish nationalism). Sub-state nationalists also interpret the temporal turn as proof of 
their hope that their nation will ‘triumph’ sooner or later.  
 
Second, the national narrative personified through symbols and rituals has to be 
internalized by the people that constitute the nation. National education, the media, 
public ceremonies, compulsory military service and the mass production of public 
monuments assume crucial functions in the internalization of the national narrative by 
the nation’s members (Hobsbawm, 1990). Through careful imposition, national 
identity is internalized and naturalized as an emotional attachment and overriding 
loyalty to the nation.  
 
Furthermore, since nationalism is the constitutive ideology of nation-states, the 
specific conception of the nation needs to be reproduced for the sake of the survival of 
the nation-state. Depending on historical background and political circumstances, 
nationality is defined somewhere on the continuum of ethnic-civic interpretations in an 
ever-changing combination. This is directly related to the political character of national 
identity, which is always open to challenge and negotiation within the dynamic and 
often conflictual domain of competing nationalisms. When official/state nationalism 
faces an immediate challenge, such as immigration and sub-state nationalism, it may 
take on a more conservative and reactionary form. This argument also applies to the 
so-called civic model. In the following chapters, the various forms of interaction 
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between official and sub-state nationalism(s) will be analyzed in the light of Scottish, 
Basque, and Kurdish cases.   
  
2.4.2. The Nation as Polity 
Besides its cultural dimension, nationality is also constructed in politico-legal 
terms as citizenship, with immediate and concrete consequences. In the modern world, 
the institution of citizenship is directly linked to the domain of nation-states, where the 
state and the nation are connected to each other.53 Hence, despite the fact that sub-
national groups also constitute polities, sub-state nationalist movements lack the 
instrument of citizenship at their service.54  
 
As mentioned above, in the wake of the French Revolution nationalism 
emerged as democracy. The democratic aspect of nationalism was not only related to 
the imagination of the nation as a horizontal comradeship (community), but also to a 
                                                 
53 One can mention at least two models of citizenship which directly relate to the conception of the 
nation. The historical trajectories of nationalist movements condition their conceptions of the nation on 
the civic-ethnic continuum; as a corollary, the conception of the nation shapes citizenship regimes. 
Although citizenship models are conventionally analyzed as two models, namely the civic (jus soli) and 
ethnic (jus sanguinis), the civic model also consists of two different interpretations. Therefore, we can 
argue that there are three models of citizenship. The first model is the French type that territorially 
defines citizenship. Rejecting ethno-cultural diversity, it is based on cultural homogeneity. Since it 
establishes an obligatory relationship between political authority and culture, it is culturally repressive 
and assimilationist. It is not exclusivist, but its criteria of inclusiveness may be problematic. The second 
type of civic model is the Anglo-Saxon type that is based on territoriality like the French type. However, 
it differs from the French type, since it rests upon voluntary assimilation. It conceptualizes the nation as 
unity of diversity rather than as a monolithic unity. As long as different ethnic groups are loyal to a 
legal-political supra-identity, they are free to live their cultures (sub-identities) that are legally 
recognized. The ethnic model is different from the civic model in the sense that it defines the nation as a 
genealogical, organic entity. Membership to it is not voluntary, but automatic by birth (Kurubaş, 2008: 
27-8).  
54 Even so, as part of their political strategies, many sub-state nationalist movements try to provide 
certain citizenship rights to their ‘co-nationals’ within sub-national boundaries. Especially, the social 
policies pursued by sub-state nationalist movements and political parties to enhance solidarity among 
the members of an assumed nation are one of the notable strategies of sub-state national building. 
(Beland and Lecours, 2008).  
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universalistic interpretation of citizenship. With the French Revolution, citizenship, 
which had been the symbol of freedom since ancient Greece, became associated with 
nationality (Gross: 1999: 91). The link established was so critical that to be a citizen of 
the state now meant belonging to its nation. Thus, the equality derived from belonging 
to the same community, culturally defined, was complemented by equality before the 
law. Furthermore, co-nationals as citizens gained certain political, economic and social 
rights and duties, such as social security, political representation through elections, 
taxation, military service, and so on. Conflation of the state and nation in the modern 
(nationalist) interpretation of citizenship is now so taken for granted that international 
law does not recognize any distinction between nationality and citizenship (Bendix, 
1977).  
 
The institution of citizenship constitutes a core element in nation-building, 
since it crucially serves to link the ideas of ‘nation-as-people’ and ‘nation-as-the state’. 
While the idea of the nation as a cultural collectivity entails a great deal of cultural 
innovation, the premises of citizenship are highly concrete. Thanks to citizenship 
enabling institutional closure in the legal, political, economic and social domains 
(Wimmer, 2002: 58), national boundaries at an imaginary level become quite palpable. 
Thus, within the territorial borders of a nation-state (‘homeland’), people have now 
come to constitute not only a cultural community but also a polity that established their 
state (‘popular sovereignty’) and associated themselves with it on the basis of certain 
rights and duties (‘citizenship’).  
 
 74
Given that the cultural homogeneity of the nation is a myth, nation-building 
policies aim at homogenization through standardization and/or assimilation. The 
institution of citizenship provides a politico-legal framework for these policies. In this 
sense, it constitutes the framework where the nation is concretized. Nevertheless, the 
intended fusion of cultural and political conceptions of nationality has not developed 
smoothly; in particular, sub-state nationalism has emerged as one of the major 
challenges to it. Before focusing on the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism as a 
specific form of nationalism and the impact of European integration on it, it is useful to 
recapitulate the main arguments of this chapter. 
 
First, nationalism emerged as a response to political transformations brought about 
by general processes of modernization. Since political power has become concentrated 
in the state in the modern age, the struggle for power has focused on gaining or 
maintaining state power. However, it was unclear how to connect the state and the 
people due to the increasingly specialized division of labor among people and a 
growing civil society. At this point, nationalism proved to be functional since the new 
boundary-making based on nationalist principles facilitated the unification of the 
market and helped to resolve the problem of coordinating collective action. 
Concretely, nationalist ideology has served the state by securing the consent and 
cooperation of the masses for the interests of the state: to wage war, to collect revenue 
and to maintain social order. Moreover, the cultural enfranchisement of the masses 
through nationalist rhetoric has played a vital role to legitimize the state and gain the 
compliance of the masses. Therefore, although a number of related factors were also 
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influential in the development of nationalism, the political aspect should be prioritized 
in explaining the phenomenon of nationalism.   
 
Second, in this regard, nationalism should be seen as “a form of politics” to control 
or maintain economic and political power in a society. Maintenance of power and 
power shifts are the key mechanisms in understanding the national dynamics between 
different social and political groups in a society. Various elite groups seek power in the 
name of the nation. In this sense, nationalist politics is a form of identity politics that 
politicizes ethnic identities, re/constructing and mobilizing them as nations. Thus, 
nationalism is necessarily a political movement, although nationalist movements 
cannot be compared to interest groups, because their leaders are not primarily pursuing 
material benefits for their group members, although this is often part of the equation.  
 
Third, nationalism aims at state power, but this goal does not necessarily amount to 
achieving an independent nation-state. There can be ‘state-renouncing’ nationalisms as 
well as ‘state-seeking’ types (Oommen, 1997). Nevertheless, nationalism in any case 
aims at self-government for its nation on its own territory (‘homeland’). As a corollary 
to this, it seeks to obtain at least a portion of state power in its own hands, which 
brings about political conflict among competing elites on the basis of national identity 
and interest.  
 
Fourth, since politics always involves a struggle for power, national identity is a 
“contestable” identity rather than being fixed.  Nations are considered as homogeneous 
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entities, which is the principal mythical assumption of nationalism. In reality, however, 
nationalist movements and nation-states strive to construct nations as cultural and 
political collectivities with distinct characteristics. In the process of national identity 
construction, both civic and ethnic elements are used. Nationalism necessarily relates 
to ethnicity, not because ethnicity has any primordial essence, but because it provides a 
historical pedigree to national identity. In this respect, the nation-state cannot be seen 
as ethno-culturally free; civic and ethnic conceptions of nation should be viewed as 
two ends of a continuum.  
 
Fifth, taking nationalism as a form of politics should not prevent us from seeing its 
‘ideological’ aspect. Otherwise, we cannot explain how we become and stay national. 
Nationalist ideology that is always at the service of nationalist politics is of vital 
importance for the construction and daily reproduction of national identity.  
 
In relation to this, since forging national identity is a product of political struggle, it 
is subject to constant redefinition brought about by changing power relations in 
national and international contexts. This has several significant implications. First, 
national identity, wherever it stands on the ethnic-civic continuum, must be daily 
reproduced so that the nation-state can survive, because nationality is above all about 
consciousness and/or a feeling of belongingness. Second, the currently dominant 
definition of national identity can always be challenged, which may result in 
repression, negotiation or violent conflict.  
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Finally, the political approach helps us understand, not only different forms of 
nationalisms, but also the diversity of sub-state nationalisms in a contextual 
perspective. Although such an approach stresses the role of elites, the focus on the 
nation-state is meaningful in at least two senses: the nation-state largely explains the 
reasons behind the emergence of sub-state nationalisms and has shaped the opportunity 
structures that such movements and parties utilize.    
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CHAPTER III 
SUB-STATE NATIONALISM AS A FORM OF NATIONALISM 
 
 
Sub-state nationalism as a form of nationalism creates a challenge to the 
supposedly indissoluble unity between the nation, state and territory. It refers to the 
political expression of a nationalism whose claims and desires about the extant 
definition of the nation and its political structure conflict with those of official, even if 
not constitutionally declared, state nationalism. Governmental reactions to sub-state 
nationalist activism often expose the symbiotic relationship between the state and 
nation, even in allegedly civic examples. Hence, the emergence and development of 
sub-state nationalism can be best comprehended within the general context of the 
macro processes of state- and nation-building and necessarily in relation to state 
nationalism.  
 
As expressed in the second chapter, the nation-state as an outcome of 
nationalist ideology attempted to unite the state and the nation into a single entity 
through cultural and politico-legal efforts. On the one hand, the institution of 
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citizenship was used for the purpose of fusing nation and state; the cultural and 
political elites sought to achieve the ‘imagined nation’ by means of homogenization, 
creating a common culture, symbols and values through invention of traditions and 
myths of origin. Yet, especially the latter type of efforts were so hard because they 
required winning the hearts and minds of all the population, especially the integration 
or assimilation of those elites associated with centrifugal sub-national forces. Actually, 
national integration involved a two-tier process: social mobilization, both as an engine 
and consequence of modernization processes, constituted the unplanned component, 
while the deliberate component of governmental policies in the name of national 
integration aimed at changing people’s attitudes and loyalties. This second component 
is also known as nation-building (Birch, 1989: 36–37). Contrary to widespread 
convictions about the integrative power of modernization processes and nationalist 
policies, one thing gradually turned out to be apparent about these complicated and 
conflictual processes: the aimed fusion of cultural and political conceptions of 
nationality did not develop easily. While nation-states sought to achieve territorial 
consolidation, national integration was challenged by the fact that the territories of 
nation-states in most cases did not correspond to only one nation or ethnic group 
exclusively. More accurately, the politicization of one ethnic identity through 
nationalist claims ignited others in the same way, thus leading to a still relevant axis of 
political conflict in many nation-states.  
 
This chapter aims to discover the nature and dynamics of the sub-state 
nationalist phenomenon. After summarizing the main arguments of the different 
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theoretical approaches towards the emergence and development of sub-state 
nationalism, it focuses on sub-state nationalist politics. Since each sub-state nationalist 
movement emerges and develops in an opportunity structure which is determined by a 
combination of internal and external factors, examination of sub-state nationalist 
politics has to be conducted in relation to the nation-state (or, host state), its 
constitutive and reproductive ideology (state nationalism) and the international 
context. In doing this, the chapter focuses on the role of political agency, particularly 
political parties, that is of crucial role in the definition of sub-state national identity 
and the political goals and strategies of its advocates.  
 
3.1. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SUB-STATE NATIONALISM 
Studies on sub-state nationalism can be evaluated in two groups. The first 
cluster of works consists of indirect comments by major theorists of nationalism, such 
as Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith and Breuilly. They all treat sub-state nationalism as 
either rudimentary or contingent.55  
The second group consists of works directly focusing on the subject, either in 
the form of case studies or comparative research, such as those by Connor, Hechter, 
Keating, McCrone, Guibernau, Letamendia and Lecours. In their accounts of sub-state 
                                                 
55 Smith (1991: 123–42) sees the renewed strength of sub-state nationalism (the ‘third wave of demotic 
ethnic nationalisms’) since the end of 1960s as further proof of his ethno-symbolist theory of 
nationalism, but it still remains an issue of secondary importance in his studies. On the other hand, 
modernists generally tend to view it as contingent and instrumental. Among them, Hobsbawm (1990: 
163–92), who predicted the end of nationalist ideology, is probably the figure most hostile to sub-state 
nationalism. He argues that the current wave of nationalism has nothing to do with the integrative, 
emancipatory characteristics of earlier nationalisms.  
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nationalism, these works unsurprisingly rely on particular approaches advocated in 
theories of nationalism. These theories can be categorized in three groups: cultural, 
economic, and political. Considering that these diverse accounts are all driven by a 
critique of the consensual interpretation of modernization, it would be meaningful to 
start with the main tenets of this paradigm.  
 
3.1.1. The Modernization Paradigm: Developmentalism And Diffusionism 
Lijphart suggests eight main theoretical reasons for expecting the importance of 
ethnic identities to decline.56 According to him, theories of modernization, among 
others, that dominated the social sciences from the 1950s to the early 1970s occupy a 
noticeable place. Drawing on the classical distinction between traditional and modern 
societies, the modernization paradigm primarily focuses on the problems of 
development and takes the processes of nation-building as central to political and 
economic development. It predicts a breakdown of the traditional order and the 
establishment of a new type of society with new values and new relationships through 
industrialization, urbanization, improvements in transportation and communication, 
and the growth of mass education (Lijphart, 1977: 46–7). Although theories of 
modernization differ over the particular elements which are crucial for modernization 
and nation-building57, they all share   
                                                 
56 The other reasons were enlisted as “comparisons with the third world, the end of ideology, 
supranational integration, liberal wishful thinking, the domino theory of ethnic demands, Marxism and 
economic probabilism, the hyperboles of future-oriented theorizing” (Lijphart, 1977).   
57 Modernization paradigm has various variants. For instance, Deutsch argues that the development of 
social and political integration depends on the extent of mass communications and social interaction.  
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“the idea of the nation as a mass participant political culture and as a popular civic-territorial 
community (…) into which ever wider strata of the territorial population were drawn through 
processes of employment, mass education and citizenship” (Smith, 1998: 21).  
 
Thus, the modernist definition of the nation stressed the element of civic 
participation that is crucially linked to the idea of self-government. Whilst the nation is 
the ideal agent and framework for social development, national self-government is 
seen as the only way to provide the social and political resources necessary for social 
development. Hence, the nation-state, as the political expression of the nation, 
provides citizenship rights for the population and demands its allegiance in return. In 
accordance with the fundamental role ascribed to the nation as the basic unit of 
political organization throughout the world, the nation-state and its legitimizing 
ideology nationalism are charged with significant functions ranging from providing 
collective identity in a time of a rapid change to offering guidelines for the formation 
of a modern educational system and a standard national culture in the processes of 
nation-building and modernization (Breuilly, 1993: 418–9). Thus, the modernization 
paradigm stresses the political nature of nations and the active role of citizens and 
leaders in the nation-building process. Nations and nationalism are fundamentally 
conceptualized in functional terms as being at the service of social and political 
development. While the nation is taken as a political community that is defined in 
                                                                                                                                             
He predicts that since social mobilization promotes national integration and assimilation through 
diffusion of culture and values of the core community throughout the peripheral communities, 
ethnic\cultural differences would lose significance. See: Karl Deutsch (1953) Nationalism and Social 
Communications, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. For other exemplary variants, see also: Pye 
Lucian and Sidney Verba (eds.) (1965) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press; Lerner Daniel (1965) The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the 
Middle East, New York, Free Press of Glencoe. 
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civic-territorial terms, nationalism is basically appreciated for its modernizing potency 
to resolve the problem of collective mobilization by providing people with a 
motivating national identity.   
 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence showed that these theories were incomplete or 
even misleading. First of all, theories of modernization on the axis of traditional and 
modern societies set out to form a universal model which would help to understand the 
Western socio-economic and political experience in order to reveal the path for newly-
established non-Western countries to follow for their social and political development. 
This so-called model was based on the assumption that Western societies were 
modern, which meant that they were culturally homogeneous and civic-territorial 
nations. From this perspective, ethnic conflict seemed to be anachronistic, and the 
remaining sub-national ethnic loyalties in the developed world, such as Basqueness or 
Scottishness, were deemed to be ‘residual’.58 Ethnic conflicts in non-Western, 
developing countries were explained by the fact that they were ethnically 
heterogeneous and divided. However, according to theory, when they achieved social 
and political development, they would attain national integration. In this sense, 
theories of modernization considered modernization as ‘not only a homogenizing but 
also an irreversible process’ (Huntington, 1971: 289–90) that would assimilate 
different ethnic groups into one nation. However, this neglected the possibility that 
                                                 
58 Gellner summarizes the typical modernist formulation as follows: nationalism is fueled by cultural 
differences, and cultural differences are eroded by modernization. Therefore, the more modern societies 
become, the less material there is for nationalism to work on (Gellner, 1997). In another work, Gellner 
(1994: 43) attracts our attention to the point that High Culture, which is at the same time ‘national 
culture’, is articulated on the basis of a specific culture. This was actually a fatal mistake that led 
modernists to ignore the fact that modern industrial culture has always had an ‘ethnic coloring’  
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modernization might also lead to new conflicts, and that the ethnic/cultural identities 
assumed to be merely residual would resist the nation-building process aiming at 
cultural homogenization and political centralization (Calhoun, 1993: 220). Another 
problem is that, according to its teleological interpretation of social change, the 
paradigm’s predictions were extended to developing countries, ignoring the 
particularities of each country owing to their unique historical trajectories. In addition, 
the functionalist logic that appreciated the modernizing force of nationalism while 
tending to see it as an ideology of the transition period from a traditional to a modern 
society, also failed to understand the potency of nationalist ideology.59 
 
In short, the modernization paradigm is underpinned by a consensual 
understanding of societal development. In the processes of nation-building, 
nationalism is viewed as a functional response to modernity with little value as an 
explanatory factor by itself (Newman, 2000: 37). In addition, since ethnic identities are 
considered residual and doomed to disappear, ethnicity is not expected to remain a 
factor in societal relations.   
These diffusionist and functionalist assumptions of modernization theories 
became more controversial from the early 1970s, when it became obvious that ethnic 
                                                 
59 The same logic unsurprisingly dominated reflections about the fate of nationalism within the then 
recently launched European integration project. It might seem paradoxical that many scholars predicted 
that nationalism would fade away despite the fact that the nation-state was the dominant form of 
political organization, and development was defined on national grounds. In fact, this was not actually a 
contradiction considering the modernist mode of thought, according to which nationalism has two types, 
civic and ethnic. Civic nationalism was ‘good, integrative’, thus functional in the course of 
modernization. What was predicted to die out, as a consequence of modernization, was ‘reactionary, 
anti-modern, divisive, exclusive, destabilizing’ ethnic nationalism.  
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conflict was not declining but intensifying throughout the world, and reviving in West 
European countries. The inadequacies of the dominant paradigm led to two basic 
reactions. First, some of the preeminent scholars of modernization theories modified 
the paradigm in order to respond to new challenges to nation-building processes. For 
instance, Deutsch stressed that national assimilation is an extremely slow process. If 
modernization generates rapidly increasing social transactions and contacts among 
different groups, conflict is more likely than assimilation. Therefore, the prevention of 
conflict depends on the ability of integration to keep pace with the growth of 
transactions (Deutsch, 1969). However, such a modification failed to explain the 
renewal of ethnic conflict in developed countries.  
 
Later, development theory was gradually superseded by center-periphery 
theories that emphasized the failure of national integration as the major factor behind 
ethnic conflict. For example, Lipset and Rokkan (1985) maintained that, if the 
modernization process was incomplete and the periphery remained isolated, then a 
distinctive territorial politics might continue.60 In the same way, Rokkan and Urwin 
(1982) explained ethnic/regional politics on the basis of tensions between center and 
periphery by placing ethnic variations into a general framework of geopolitical 
location, economic strength and access to decision-making processes. They also 
introduced the notion of the political power struggle to explain the emergence of 
                                                 
60 According to Lipset and Rokkan (1985), cleavages that are the products of three revolutions (the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, French Revolution, and Industrial Revolution) constitute the 
roots of mass politics in contemporary West European states. Among others, the center-periphery 
cleavage between elites in urban areas and those in more outlying areas usually explains the 
phenomenon of ‘regional nationalism’.   
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nationalism in some regions but not others. Nevertheless, their theory remained limited 
to developing a framework to understand the potential for ethnic conflict under 
specific circumstances. Consequently, both development theory and center-periphery 
theories linked the emergence of sub-state nationalist movements with failures in 
modernization and nation-building processes, thus the durability of ‘segmental society’ 
(Müller-Rommel, 1998: 21; Birch, 1978: 325).  
 
The second group of theories, or ‘conflictual modernization theories’, emerged 
as a reaction to the hitherto dominant conception of modernization. These theories, put 
forward by the scholars from a highly diverse range of schools, share the claims that 
there is no single path to modernization, and that modernization is an uneven process. 
They mainly maintain that increasing interethnic social and economic activity 
increases the likelihood of interethnic conflict (Newman, 1991 and 2000). Thus, they 
not only criticize diffusionist predictions of developmentalism but also center-
periphery explanations of ethnic conflict on the basis of failed national integration. 
These theories can be categorized into three distinct groups.    
 
3.1.2. The Ethno-Cultural Approach To Sub-State Nationalism 
According to the ethno-cultural approach, the sub-state nationalist phenomenon 
is primarily caused by the ethno-cultural distinctiveness of a given region relative to 
the rest of the state. It stresses the importance of the determining role of ethno-cultural 
markers such as ethnicity, language or religion in the development of (sub-)national 
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identities and communities. This is the key point that underpins the position of 
primordialists, perennialists and ethno-symbolists.61 Over the last two decades, the 
primordialist strand has lost its significance relative to the others.  
 
A.D. Smith’s View on Sub-state Nationalism: 
Despite not making a specialized study on the topic, A.D. Smith refers to 
‘ethno-nationalism’ as clear proof of his general theory of nationalism. Smith argues 
that the post-war revival of ethno-nationalism should be viewed as the ‘third wave of 
ethno-nationalist movements’ that bring the contrasts between state and nation into 
focus. Ethno-nationalist movements mobilize distinct ethnic communities in the name 
of cultural values threatened with extinction by the forces of modernization and the 
bureaucratic state that often serves a dominant ethnie and its elites (Smith, 1991: 124). 
In other words, third-wave ethno-nationalism refers to the movements of ‘subject 
peoples’ against dominant ethnies, involving processes of vernacular mobilization and 
cultural politicization. In this sense, there is nothing new or surprising about the 
revitalization of nationalism in industrial societies, for it is a part of the new process of 
popular vernacular mobilization that has been shaking different parts of the world. 
Nevertheless, Smith still notices dissimilarities between the ethnonationalisms of 
                                                 
61 Apart from these ethno-cultural approaches, there are also scholars who give an account of 
nationalism through political philosophy by focusing on culture. For instance, Charles Taylor, Yael 
Tamir, and Will Kymlicka share the argument that culture, especially language, has a naturally 
subjective meaning for human beings. It produces collective identities that satisfy our need to belong. 
This special role assumed by culture in social life also has political consequences. Thus, the existence 
and potency of nationalism are explained through cultural diversity and the emotional investment of 
individuals in their culture. Kymlicka explains sub-state nationalism in the same way: nationalist 
conflict often results from inescapable links between states and cultures. Nation-building is based on a 
specific culture, and sub-national groups react against the repression or extinction of their cultures 
(Kymlicka, 1999).  
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developing and developed countries. According to him, while the former pursue 
separatist goals, the latter are autonomist rather than separatist, since they recognize 
the possibility of dual identities (Smith, 1991: 138).  Like Smith, Connor relies on 
ethnicity as the key explanatory variable, although with some important qualifications. 
Since his Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding is one of the most-known 
examples of the ethno-cultural approach, it is worth a detailed examination.   
 
Connor’s Theory of Ethno-nationalism:  
 Connor explains the emergence of sub-state nationalism, which he 
conceptualizes as ethno-nationalism, on the basis of perennial ethnic identities.62 
Concurring with the conflictual modernization approach that modernization breeds 
ethnic conflict, he criticizes both diffusionist theories of national integration for 
neglecting the importance of ethnic factors and modernist theories for viewing 
ethnicity in an instrumental way regarding the emergence and development of 
nationalism.  
  
 Connor’s theory of ethno-nationalism is derived from his general approach to 
the nation and nationalism. Stressing that the literature of nationalism has been 
                                                 
62 Perennialism refers to the historical antiquity of the nation, deemed to be immemorial or perennial. In 
this view, ethnic and national communities are cognate or even identical. Perennialists accept the 
modernity of nationalism as an ideology and a political movement, but see nations as either updated 
versions of immemorial ethnic communities, or as collective cultural identities that have existed, 
alongside ethnic communities, in all epochs of human history (Smith, 1998: 159). While ethno-
symbolism is more open to including the influence of modernization on the birth of a nation, Connor 
stresses the importance of perception. According to him, the chronological history of a nation may be 
recent, yet in the popular perception of its members it is ‘timeless, eternal’ (perennial) (Connor, 2004b).  
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overwhelmingly entangled in terminological chaos, he underlines the importance of 
distinguishing between nationalism and patriotism. According to him, while 
nationalism is loyalty to one’s national group, patriotism denotes loyalty to one’s state 
and its institutions. When these loyalties contradict, nationalism proves more potent. 
This power comes from the characteristic of the bond that unites people as a nation. 
Objective criteria such as common territory, language and religion do not suffice to 
define national identity, since the essence of nation is an ethno-psychological element. 
Thus, a nation is defined as a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related 
as an extended family characterized by felt kinship ties (Connor, 1994: 196–7).63 This 
definition shows that the nation is a more developed form of the ethnic group. Being 
‘non-rational’ (not ‘irrational’), emotional and subconscious, the ethno-national bond 
that provides the members of a nation with solidarity and brotherhood also helps us 
understand the power of nationalism.64   
  
 How does an ethnic group become a nation? Despite his perennialist view of 
ethnicity, which he sees as almost identical to the nation, Connor explains the process 
of nation-formation, in which an ethnic group becomes nationally self-conscious, 
through mechanisms of modern political transformation such as the gradual 
enfranchisement of its population. In this sense, the French Revolution represents the 
turning point in terms of nationalist doctrine. It meant that the right to rule had become 
                                                 
63 It is important to state at this point that Connor adopts Weber’s definition of ethnic groups as 
characterized by a subjective belief in a common descent, thus differentiating himself from 
primordialists. 
64 Connor (1994, 204) asserts that the perennial and subconscious character of ethnicity makes the 
ethno-national bond something that can be ‘analyzed rather than explained rationally.’  
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vested with a people who were ethnically defined. In other words, popular sovereignty 
became linked with an ethnic group (that is, nation) by making the principle of 
national self-determination a revolutionary idea undermining all previous political 
structures (Connor, 1994: 82).  
   
 The problem with this, however, is that many nation-states, allegedly organized 
in terms of national self-determination, are multi-ethnic. Despite various systematic 
efforts aimed at their destruction in the process of nation-building, these ethnic 
loyalties have shown remarkable resistance and managed to survive. Furthermore, 
mass communications have spread the message that popular sovereignty is wedded to 
ethnicity. Besides the contributions of the processes of modernization, the success of 
small states and decolonization in the post-war period have each created a 
‘demonstration effect’. Hence, there is nothing surprising about the rise of ethno-
nationalist movements in Western Europe or in other parts of the world. Instead, the 
right question about them should be, why not now? These movements can be 
considered as part of a process that has been continuing since the late 18th century 
(Connor, 1994: 170). The existence of nationally conscious groups in existing nation-
states indicates that the process of national self-determination has not been completed 
yet. The fundamental factor behind ethno-nationalist movements is that they, as ethno-
national groups, want to govern themselves. In other words, their demands for self-
government are based on the principle of the ‘illegitimacy of alien rule’. Nationally-
conscious peoples think that ‘they have a natural right to self-rule over the homeland 
and its inhabitants’. 
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From this perspective, the phenomenon of ethno-nationalism has to be 
explained primarily in terms of political deprivation rather than economic or cultural 
deprivation. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain nationalisms in the Catalan 
and Basque regions that are, economically, the most developed regions of Spain.65 
Similarly, in the Basque region and Scotland, most people are not interested in using 
their languages in daily life, so cultural deprivation cannot be the cause motivating 
nationalist movements there (Connor, 1994: 177).  
  
 To summarize, Connor’s theory of ethno-nationalism is based on the idea that 
ethno-national groups should be considered as kinship groups tied by a subjective 
belief in a common ancestry. This ethno-national bond both provides its members with 
solidarity and fraternity and unites them around a common destiny. Sub-state 
nationalist movements are also explained on the basis of the endurance of ethno-
national bonds and still revolutionary idea of self-determination. Accordingly, 
criticizing theories of sub-nationalism based on economic or cultural deprivation, he 
sees the political deprivation of these groups as the fundamental motivator of ethno-
nationalist movements.   
                                                 
65 Connor states that uneven economic development between regions can be seen in many developed 
states. For instance, in comparing Maine and Quebec, he argues that both states are relatively poor 
compared to other regions in the USA and Canada. Yet, while Quebecans have developed an ethno-
nationalist movement, the people of Maine have not seen its relative poverty as being a consequence of 
‘conspirational discrimination’. Claims of economic injustice that may be real or imaginary can act as a 
catalyst, and are often found in ethno-nationalist propaganda. However, this does not mean that the 
perception of economic deprivation is a necessary precondition of ethno-nationalist tension (Connor, 
2004a). In the same way, the Central Anatolian region of Turkey is as poor as the Southeastern region, 
but it is the Kurdish nationalists of the latter region who tend to see their poverty to be a consequence of 
systematic economic injustice by the center (The DTP Party Program, 2005).  
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Connor’s thesis is unconvincing in several respects. First, even though it takes 
the effects of modernization into account, it restricts this to the communications 
technologies that contribute to the spread of nationalist messages to ethnic groups. It 
also underrates the role of economic factors. More critically, the dynamics of national 
identity formation remain ambiguous. Connor contends that nationalism is a mass 
phenomenon, and that the role of elites should not be exaggerated (Connor, 1994: 85). 
However, in his theory it is difficult to recognize the actors who promote the 
nationalist culture and politics in order to explain the diffusion of national awareness 
among the masses. Since the essential character of ethnicity is central to his theory, 
politics seems to serve ethnicity only to reveal itself. Moreover, the extra-state 
dimension is relevant only so far as to offer a ‘demonstration effect’ between different 
countries. More crucially, this approach is incapable of explaining the lack of strong 
nationalism in the Basque region of France or Galicia in Spain, which shows that 
cultural characteristics are relevant for an understanding of nationalism only to the 
extent that they are connected to political and institutional considerations (Lecours, 
2007).  
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3.1.3. The Economic (Structuralist) Approach  
While the ethno-cultural approach explains the emergence of sub-state 
nationalism through the power of ethno-national bonds, the economic approach gives a 
structural account of the phenomenon. According this perspective, sub-state 
nationalism emerges as a reaction to economic imbalances between different areas of a 
national state. If these areas coincide with with culturally distinctive units, then 
economic factors are expected to combine with cultural ones to produce demands for 
self-government. Michael Hechter’s theory of internal colonialism is one of the best 
known examples for economy-based explanations of sub-state nationalism. 
 
Hechter’s Theory of Internal Colonialism  
Hechter’s theory of internal colonialism is one of the theoretical reactions to 
diffusionist theories of national integration. Drawing on concepts of peripheral 
dependency and underdevelopment, Hechter gives a detailed account of ethnic 
revivalism by focusing on the case of the United Kingdom. Contrary to the 
assumptions of the diffusionist model, he suggests that increased contact between the 
center and peripheral regions in a single state does not lead to the development of a 
culturally homogeneous society. This is due to relationships between the core and 
peripheries being characterized by political domination and economic exploitation. 
Having gained an advantage over peripheral regions in the processes of state-building 
and early modernization, the core community uses its political and economic power to 
‘to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the 
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institutionalization of the existing stratification system’ (Hechter, 1975: 9). While the 
peripheral economy is dependent and complementary to the economy of the core, the 
core regulates the allocation of social roles according to a ‘cultural division of labor’. 
Within this stratification system, key social roles are reserved for the core community 
so as to exclude members of the peripheral communities from power (ibid).  
  
This cultural division of labor, whether put into practice legislatively or de 
facto, brings about the emergence of group solidarity of leading members of both the 
core and peripheral communities so that they identify themselves with their groups, 
thus contributing to the development of distinct ethnic identifications. ‘Ethnic leaders’ 
assume a crucial role in terms of the political mobilization of the less advantaged 
group. Two further conditions are required for the group to develop a sense of 
solidarity around ethnic identity. First, members of the group must see economic 
inequalities as resulting from systematic exploitation by the core community. Second, 
there must be adequate communication among its members (Hechter, 1975: 41–2).  
 
 Thus, internal colonialism, the ‘institutionalized mechanisms of the relationship 
between the core and peripheries’, hinders rather than facilitates the integration of 
peripheries into the nation. As the economic, political and cultural bases of ethnic 
differentiations become salient, the members of the disadvantaged group may start to 
assert that their culture is equal or superior to that of the core community, and claim 
that they are members of a separate nation (ibid). Hechter finds evidence from British 
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history between 1536 and 1966 to confirm the validity of his theory. ‘The Celtic 
fringe’, namely Ireland, Scotland and Wales, as internal colonies of the United 
Kingdom, suffered economic stagnation and cultural stratification for centuries. Their 
demands for self-government in the form of nationalist movements repeatedly emerged 
as reactions to a systemic dependence on the core.  
  
Hechter’s theory based on structural factors may be persuasive in explaining 
the persistence of backwardness in some regions of industrial countries, and the 
unevenness of political integration which contradicts the basic assumptions of 
diffusionist models of national integration. More importantly, he contributes to the 
literature on sub-state nationalism through his argument that sub-national ethnic 
consciousness develops as a conflictual consequence of internal colonialism within the 
general framework of modernization. However, he can be criticized for at least for two 
reasons. First, sub-state nationalism emerges not only in underdeveloped regions but 
also in economically developed regions, such as the Basque and Catalan regions of 
Spain or in Northern Italy. One of the central arguments of sub-state nationalist 
movements in these regions is that they no longer want to subsidize the poorer regions 
of the country in order to retain their superior resources for themselves (Kellas,1991: 
98–9). At the same time, the economic approach cannot explain why other 
underdeveloped regions, such as southern Italy or northeast England failed to develop 
nationalist movements to express their discontent (Smith, 1998). In addition, Birch 
(1978, 329–30)  suggests that Hechter incorrectly employs the case of internal 
colonialism in Scotland, to validate his thesis. Besides the fact that Scotland retained 
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institutional autonomy since its political unification with the UK in 1707, its economy 
neither depended on producing a single primary product, nor suffered from lack of 
services.66 Furthermore, Birch continues, the fact that per capita incomes in the ‘Celtic 
fringe’ have always been slightly lower than in England does not necessarily point to 
exploitation by the English, since these regions possess different structural 
characteristics that might be better explanatory factors.   
  
In fact, in general, the relative poverty of peripheries may not be always be 
engendered by the systematic dependence of the periphery on the core since there may 
be other intervening variables, such as geography, natural resources or the quality of 
management of resources (Kellas, 1991: 78). Nevertheless, despite the weaknesses 
outlined here, Hechter’s model of internal colonialism has been used by some sub-state 
nationalist movements in order to justify their cause. For instance, it is possible to see 
the effects of this thesis in discourses of pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey, which use the 
economic backwardness of the eastern and south eastern regions as an evidence of the 
internal colonization of largely Kurdish populated areas.67              
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Recognizing the factual inadequacy of his arguments concerning the Scottish case, Hechter revised 
his theory by adding ‘segmental division of labor’ as a second dimension of ‘cultural division of labor’. 
According to him, due to the mechanisms of institutional autonomy, the Scots could find jobs in 
specifically Scottish institutions, which allowed them to develop group solidarity (Hechter and Levi, 
1979:263-5).   
67 This point will be discussed in the chapter on Kurdish nationalism (Chapter 7).   
 97
3.1.4. The Political Approach 
As we have seen, both the ethno-cultural and economic approaches have 
critical deficiencies. By taking ethnicity as an independent factor to explain nationalist 
movements, the former downplays the importance of institutional factors and elite 
agency, while the latter adopts a one-sided perspective that tends to ignore the 
influences of structural factors other than economics. Moreover, there is empirical 
evidence that not only economic deprivation but also gratification may be used to 
legitimize sub-state nationalism. Nevertheless, only if there is a question of identity, 
socio-economic matters are probably rectified as the conspiracy of the state on the 
basis of identity differences. While the prosperous Basque Country does not want to 
share its wealth with Spain that Basque nationalists claim is extracting the wealth of 
the Basque Country, most Kurdish nationalists in Turkey argue that the Kurdish region 
is economically backward because Ankara has thus far intentionally prevented 
economic development in the region.  On the other hand, ethnic differences do not lead 
to sub-state nationalism on their own. This brings one point into focus once again: the 
political approach, defended here as a general guiding perspective to explain 
nationalism in the second chapter, can also provide the most convincing way of 
elucidating the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism.  
 
This position can be supported not only on the basis that sub-state nationalism, 
organized as a form of nationalism, emerges in reaction to another form of 
nationalism, namely state nationalism, but also due to the fact, that unless ethnic 
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differences are politicized, they remain too diffuse to create such types of nationalist 
movements. In addition, being aware that ethnic problems can be understood through 
the integrative efforts of nation-state and its constitutive ideology (i.e. nationalism), 
and that each nationalism combines ethnic and civic elements to varying degrees, the 
political approach pays attention to the struggle between nationalisms in order to 
comprehend the reasons for, and dynamics of, ethno-political conflicts.  
 
The political approach to sub-state nationalism sees it primarily as concerning 
power rather than culture or economy. In other words, the processes of identity 
construction and nationalist mobilization are considered as political in nature, rooted in 
power relationships. As with all forms of identity, national identity is not viewed as 
fixed or frozen in time (Catt and Murphy, 2002), but always open to challenge. Thus, 
from the political perspective, sub-state nationalism is a form of politics centered upon 
the politicization of ethnicity as a response to changing circumstances, generally the 
centralization and homogenization efforts of nation-states, and the conflictual 
consequences of modernization that may lead to the growth of ethnic awareness. It has 
produced one of the fundamental challenges to the existing state structure and 
prevalent definition of national identity.  
 
The political approach has a natural tendency to emphasize the role of elites, 
especially political elites, who play a central role in the politicization of ethnic 
identities and mobilization of the masses. However, elite-centered theories are likely to 
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underrate the role of institutions, specifically those of the state, which to a large extent 
shapes the structure in which sub-state nationalist movements emerge and develop.  
Therefore, this study aims to rely on a more balanced theoretical stance since I believe 
that neither structure nor elite agency can exclusively provide the focus for a sound 
analysis. While any strictly interpreted institutionalist perspective may fail to 
appreciate the role of elites, agency-centered theories may suffer from excessive 
voluntarism and instrumentalism.68  
Undoubtedly, the elite, quite often a single figure, play a central role in the 
development of nationalist movements through the construction of narratives, symbols 
and myths (e.g. Sabino Arana in Basque nationalism).  
 
However, it does not seem justifiable to explain sub-state nationalism solely 
through elite competition, in which the elite as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ are claimed to 
instrumentalize group identity and exploit the fear and security dilemmas of the masses 
                                                 
68 Lowndes (2002, 107–8) rightly points to the fact that political science has been continually plagued 
by the conflict between structuralists and behavioralists. According to her, stressing the idea that the 
“organization of political life makes a difference”, ‘New’ Instutionalism may provide a remedy to this 
essential problem. It may be really helpful, for it argues that “it is a matter of analyzing a behavior 
within the parameters set by institutional facts and opportunity structures”.  Thus, political scientists no 
longer think in the either/or terms of agency or structure, interests or institutions as the driving forces. 
Regarding the issue of sub-state nationalism, historical and rational choice variants of New 
Institutionalism occupy a special place. To exemplify, Lecours, in his work on Basque nationalism, 
adopts a historical instutitonalist perspective. According to him, the structure of the state and, more 
specifically, the pattern of its historical development is of key importance in terms of discovering the 
relationships among elite groups and parties that affect the likelihood of nationalist politics developing 
(Lecours, 2007: 12). However,  New Institutionalism also has its drawbacks. For instance, significant 
differences between its rational choice and historical variants show that it is really hard to find a 
conclusive theoretical balance between structuralist and behavioralist explanations. For an illuminating 
analysis comparing historical and rational choice variants of new institutionalism, see Thelen, Kathleen 
(1999) “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science 2, 
pp.369–404. 
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in their struggle for power.69 Two main objections may be raised against such ‘purely’ 
instrumentalist views. First, sub-state nationalism is a form of identity politics, thus it 
rests upon the politicization of a specific ethnic identity vis-à-vis others, especially the 
ethnic group dominating the state.  Even if there is nothing essential about ethnic 
identity, the construction of ethnic identity as national identity cannot be achieved out 
of nothing. In this sense, the nation is more than a ‘performative’ concept.70 Sub-state 
nationalist movements can develop only if there is a feeling or perception of non-
belongingness to the already existing state shared by a group of people that defines 
themselves on ethnic grounds. Thus, sub-state nationalism expresses an ethno-political 
question. Secondly, elites do not perform in a vacuum; their actions are fashioned by 
the institutional structure, especially the state structure and factors related to the extra-
state-dimension. Generally, elites act within an opportunity structure defined by a 
number of constraints on, and resources for, sub-nationalist politics. 
 
In endorsing a political approach, this study not only focuses on opportunity 
structures but also on the use of those opportunity structures in the processes of 
mobilizing and framing nationalist discourse by political parties. Thus, it seeks to 
explore the following questions: Why and how do sub-state nationalist movements 
emerge and develop? How do they relate to the state and interact with state 
nationalism?  
                                                 
69 See: Brass, Paul R. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism – Theory and Comparison, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications; Rothschild, Joseph (1981) Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
70 See Brubaker, Rogers (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and Nationalism in the New 
Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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Possible answers to these questions provide the framework for the next chapter 
in considering the following further three questions: How did the European integration 
process impact the conflict between sub-state nationalism and the nation-state? How 
do sub-state nationalist parties make use of the new context emerging with the 
European integration process in defining and reaching their goals? Has sub-state 
nationalism been substantially transformed in terms of its goals as a result of the 
European integration process?   
 
In the following section, I consider the main dimensions and characteristics of 
sub-state nationalism that emerge in response to another nationalism (that of the state). 
After this, I focus on the renewed strength of sub-state nationalism in order to analyze 
the major reasons for the rise in sub-state nationalism since the 1970s. Subsequently, I 
suggest an opportunity structure-based analytical framework to study sub-state 
nationalism. Within the framework of an opportunity structure approach,  sub-state 
nationalist political parties are the main units of analysis in this dissertation. In other 
words, the manifestations of sub-state nationalism, whose main characteristics are 
dealt with in Section II, are presented at the level of sub-state nationalist political 
parties. In so doing, the argument will focus particularly on sub-national identity 
construction, the definition of goals and strategies by sub-state nationalist parties, and 
the significance of political ideologies for them. This detailed analysis will prepare us 
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to elicit the impact of European integration on these parties in a comparative way in 
the following chapter.  
 
3.2. WHAT IS SUB-STATE NATIONALISM?   
Despite the fact that there may be different factors triggering sub-state 
nationalist activism in each context, claims of ethnic/cultural distinctiveness constitute 
the fundamental reason for such reactions to state- and nation-building processes. 
Since the 19th century, sub-state nationalism has been very common, for most-nation-
states contain larger or smaller groups of minorities. Various factors, such as 
difference from major ethnic group (s), power, size and geographical concentration, 
have contributed to the existence of ethnic minorities (Eriksen, 1991). It is clear that all 
minorities do not result from nationalism. However, it is nationalism that leads to the 
creation of new minorities and provokes their reactions to changing conditions. This 
section aims at elaborating on the main stages, defining features and fundamental 
arguments of sub-state nationalism against the nation-state through the lenses of the 
political perspective.  
 
3.2.1. Three Stages of Sub-state Nationalism 
Following Hroch’s three-level analysis of the development of small state 
nationalisms, many scholars accept that sub-state nationalist movements develop in 
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three stages.71 Accordingly, Hooghe argues that sub-state nationalist movements have 
three dimensions which follow each other: conflict, mobilization, and activity. The 
conflict dimension comprises two factors: contradictions in identity and contradictions 
in interests that mainly arise from the tensions of the nation-building and state-building 
processes. The conflict dimension is subsequently followed by mobilization, through 
which socio-cultural, economic and political resources are brought together for the 
success of the movement. The power accumulated through mobilization is then 
directed at the aims of the movement through action. Requiring ability, strategy, 
tactical strength and perseverance, the activity dimension is primarily characterized by 
the role of the elite in nationalist movements (Hooghe, 1992: 32–6). Therefore, sub-
state nationalist conflict can be explained in two ways: the leaders of nationalist 
movements are not only in pursuit of material benefits for their group members, they 
also seek to secure for members of their group (including themselves) access to 
political power (Lecours, 2007: 140).  
 
Thus, sub-state nationalism as a form of nationalism emerges as a challenge to 
the nation-state and its offical nationalism. Hence, while state nationalism is implanted 
and reproduced by the nation-state, sub-state nationalism is based on the assertion that 
it represents an ethno-cultural group with a common past, attached to a given territory 
and a will to determine its own political future (Guibernau, 1999: 2–3). Despite 
                                                 
71 Smith also sees a basic sequence in the development of ‘ethno-nationalist movements’, beginning 
with vernacular mobilization by the intelligentsia, and then continuing with the politicization of the 
ethnie. In fact, such schemes represent ideal types, while in reality the phases frequently overlap in the 
development of actual nationalist movements.    
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differing in minor aspects, all sub-state nationalist movements share a desire for 
freedom from the central authority and the right to establish new nationalisms of their 
own because they are unsatisfied nationalisms (Seton-Watson, 1977: 142). This can be 
also understood from their names, such as the Scottish National Party or the Basque 
Nationalist Party.  
 
3.2.2. Main Features of Sub-state Nationalism 
Sub-state nationalism as a form of nationalism obviously shares the main 
characteristics of nationalism, that is, identity, territoriality and mobilization (Lecours, 
2007). At the same time, it has some specificities that differentiate it from other forms 
of nationalism. First of all, as with any kind of nationalism, sub-state nationalism rests 
upon an ethno-cultural distinctiveness. Nevertheless, its most distinctive feature is 
probably the fact that it emerges not from the state but against the state; thus, it has an 
oppositional characteristic. It aims at ‘emancipation from the oppressive, alien state’ 
for the self-fulfillment, security and prosperity of a sub-state group loyalty that 
dominates any other collective identities.72 That is, it indispensably emphasizes ethno-
cultural distinctiveness.  
 
Sub-state nationalist political parties seek to provide the sense of constituting a 
distinct polity among the population inhabiting the sub-national territorial borders. For 
                                                 
72 In this regard, nationalist politics is very different from postmodernist conceptions of non-hierarchical 
multiple identity that became salient in the 1990s, and which also gave normative support to sub-state 
nationalist activism through the discourse of multiculturalism.  
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this purpose, regional parliamentary or local elections, and social policies are used, 
within the limits of regional competencies granted by the central government. 
However, sub-state nationalist movements obviously lack the power to construct a 
nation as a polity, for instance, the instrument of citizenship. These two basic facts, 
their use of ethno-cultural claims from the outset and the apparent categorical 
limitations to constructing a nation as a polity through citizenship, lead such 
movements to be labelled ethnic nationalisms. As a political strategy, the ethnic 
characteristic of these movements is continuously emphasized by central governments 
in order to delegitimize them as reactionary, divisive and anti-modern.  This is 
deliberately done at the expense of blurring the fact that all nationalisms are 
necessarily situated on a continuum of ethnicness – civicness.      
 
Territoriality constitutes the second specific trait of sub-state nationalism; the 
existence of a historically claimed, sentimentally affiliated ‘homeland’.73 Regarding 
this territorial dimesion, the specificity of sub-state nationalist claims is that the 
territory they claimed obviously already constitutes part of an existing nation-state or 
states.74 While the meaning of nationalist struggle for nation-state is for indivisible 
integrity of territory, sub-state nationalists claim defense or reappropriation of their 
ancestral lands. Besides the symbolic side of the conflict, the two conflicting groups 
                                                 
73 There can be two distinct ethnic groups: homeland societies and diaspora communities.  Ethnic 
diasporas are found in foreign countries and have mainly been caused by population migration. This 
type of community does not normally seek territorial rights in a foreign state. In contrast, homeland 
societies are long-time residents of a given territory (autochthonous communities) and thereby claim 
exclusive legal and moral rights of ownership over that land; such claims are generally supported by 
historical (factual and mythical) and archeological evidence (Taras and Ganguly, 2006: 1). 
74 Acclaimed territories may span the borders of more than one state. In this case, sub-state nationalism 
gains a trans-state character, as in the Kurdish and Basque cases for example.  
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also struggle over economic interests (natural resources such as forests, mines, energy 
sources, arable land, etc.).   
 
The third important facet of sub-state nationalism is its collective socio-
political mobilization of a specific group. This implies that sub-state nationalist 
movements follow the pattern of typical social movements. In other words, “they build 
up as large scale, widespread, continuing, elementary collective actions that affect and 
shape the social order in some fundamental aspects” (Letamendia, 2000: 2). In terms 
of mobilization, one distinguishing characteristic is that their appeal is, by the very 
nature of their goals, to a great extent limited to their potential supporters among the 
‘natives’ (autochthonous people) (Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1965: 221–2).     
 
Thus, an ethno-cultural distinctiveness lies beneath the sub-state nationalist 
phenomenon. Distance, difference, dependence vis-à-vis the central state and its 
dominant culture trigger its emergence (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982). Many scholars 
include distributive and participatory injustices from the center towards sub-national 
groups as fundamental factors inducing sub-state nationalist activism. For instance, 
Rokkan and Urwin (1982) argue that it is more likely under two particular conditions: 
first of all, sub-state territories must command cultural and economic resources in 
order to challenge the political center. On the other hand, relating to the nation-state, 
sub-state nationalism is most likely when the political center does not sufficiently 
adjust state structures to the actual dispersion of economic and cultural power 
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resources. In the same manner, Watson (1990) emphasizes geographically and socially 
uneven distribution of economic wealth, and dissatisfaction of ethno-territorially 
defined minorities with the politically and bureaucratically centralized state. However, 
although these arguments are reflected to a great extent in sub-state nationalist political 
programs, it is hard to justify the generalizations made by these researchers. First, as 
we mentioned before, some sub-state nationalist cases have made use of economic 
gratification arguments rather than economic deprivation. Second, many sub-state 
nationalist movements have continued with nationalist politics after having obtained 
politico-territorial autonomy, as can be seen in the Basque and Scottish cases.   
 
3.2.3. Justifications Of Sub-State Nationalism: Normative And Practical 
Arguments 
Despite the variety of elements prioritized in nationalist discourse, sub-state 
nationalist movements are generally justified on two particular normative and practical 
grounds. The normative arguments are based on democracy and self-determination, 
while the practical ones concern effective governance (Loughlin, 2001; Catt and 
Murphy, 2002).  
 
Drawing on the link between democracy, self-determination and nationalism, 
sub-state nationalism questions the legitimacy of the nation-state on the grounds that it 
does not represent at least one of the groups of people living within its territory. For 
this reason, the state is declared to be illegitimate and undemocratic. This argument is 
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followed by a demand for a part, or all of the powers thus far exercised at the central 
level to be transfered to a territorially defined sub-national group, which is formulated 
through the right to self-determination.75 Demands for self-determination do not 
necessarily mean secession (Guibernau, 1999; Lynch 1996); rather, they refer to a 
recognition of the right of sub-national groups to decide their own political futures. 
Nations, however, claim that this right is only recognized for themselves, and 
generally strongly oppose the option of recognition. Non-recognition by states is a part 
of their strategy to undermine sub-state nationalist efforts that seek to to project 
alternative national identities within current national territorial boundaries. Regarding 
this point, Lecours (2007: 140) reminds us of the Canadian case where state 
nationalism is grounded on bilingualism and biculturalism, but not binationalism.   
 
Sub-state nationalists justify the right to self-determination through democratic 
claims on the basis of preserving the cultural existence of an ethnic group (‘the would-
be-nation’), but cultural arguments actually underpin the nationalist political struggle. 
Sub-state nationalism and its claims for self-government are necessarily related to state 
power because nation-states constitute loci of power and the chief building blocks of 
the international political system. Having being recognized as the main units of 
political power since the 19th century, nation-states still remain the primary actors in 
                                                 
75 Self-determination is always related to self-government, whereas self-government does not always 
refer to claims for self-determination. Self-determination does not necessarily lead to secession, but it 
means that each nation has the right to determine its political destiny (Guibernau, 1996). It calls for an 
answer to the question: ‘Who is a nation?’ However, this answer is highly ambiguous, and in the last 
instance, depends on a power struggle. This study prefers to use the term ‘self-government’, which also 
includes claims for self-determination. Even if self-determination does not equate to secession, it is 
frequently seen as a strong indicator for independence. However, it may instead be a way of playing a 
maximalist card in the politics of nationalism.   
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international relations. Being a sovereign nation-state seems to be the principal 
international status symbol as well as to providing a way in to world society 
(Guibernau, 1996: 57). Independent statehood can also provide the best means of 
negotiating a favorable position in international relations. (Halliday, 1997: 536). In this 
sense, the hierarchical relationship between ethnic groups and nations, and the 
privileges granted to nation-states, provoke ethnic groups towards nationalist politics 
(Eriksen, 1991: 274). For this reason, the element of seeking state power can be seen 
as the decisive factor behind the drive for self-determination. It also now becomes 
more clear to comprehend the possible reasons for why the resentment and 
dissatisfaction on which sub-state nationalist activism are grounded are manifested as 
another form of nationalism, that is sub-state nationalism. Finally, even where there 
are strong normative arguments76, claims for self-determination are actually decided 
through power politics, as we have recently witnessed in the case of Kosovo. 77 
 
In sub-state nationalist discourse, normative arguments are supported by 
practical concerns. Sub-state nationalists claim that the central state is so centralized 
                                                 
76 The theory of secession has traditionally been conducted within normative political theory, which has 
generally focused on the moral justifications for it. More recently, non-normative, or positive, 
approaches have sprung up. These theories explain the rarity of secessions through varied combinations 
of structural factors, state responses, elite agency and the international environment. See Michael 
Hechter (1992) “The Dynamics of Secession”, Acta Sociologia 35, pp. 267–83; Stephan Dion (1996) 
“Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec, British Journal of 
Political Science 26: pp. 269–83.   
77 Synder (1992, 64) rightfully contends that, in both the formation of nation-states and the desire of 
sub-national groups for independence, power becomes the deciding element and the final arbiter. The 
existence or dissolution of nation-states depends upon the outcome of this power struggle. Where the 
central authority maintains its strength militarily, politically, and economically, demands for self-
determination are likely to remain relatively silent. Where the fulcrum of power weakens, dissatisfied 
people will tend to break their bonds. On the other hand, repression of those groups can have a heavy 
cost, even when the state is powerful enough to achieve it.  
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and cumbersome that it fails to govern effectively. Critics emphasize that the 
bureaucratic central state is unable to understand and meet the needs of sub-national 
groups, and that it fails to integrate sub-national units within global structures.78  
 
3.3. THE RENEWED STRENGTH OF SUB-STATE NATIONALISM  
Until recently, sub-state nationalism has been viewed as a matter of national 
politics, so the extra-state dimension has remained relatively unimportant. More 
importantly, ethno-politics, especially in the European context, used to be considered 
as a matter of past times. However, contrary to expectations, there has been a 
remarkable rise in the number and intensity of conflicts between nation-states and sub-
state nationalisms. In the countries where they are allowed to compete, sub-nationalist 
political parties have gradually become important since the 1960s (Lynch, 1996).   
 
There have been numerous explanations for the reinvigoration of sub-state 
nationalism since that time. All of them try above all to understand the growing 
importance of ethnic identity. While nobody rejects the significance of ethnic identity, 
its nature and link with politics, especially with nationalism, fuel deep controversies. 
While some scholars see the recent proliferation of sub-state nationalist movements as 
proof of the essential characteristics of ethnic ties, some others point to the need for a 
reinterpretation of the modernization paradigm. In this respect, scholars such as 
                                                 
78 The practical arguments that revolve around effective governance actually overlap with regionalist 
arguments, but the existence of normative arguments on the basis of ethno-cultural distinctiveness 
differentiates sub-state nationalism from regionalism (See Chapter 1).   
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Connor and Smith argue for an ethnic awakening, and they see nothing surprising in 
the renewed strength of ethno-politics. In addition, although they reject an essentialist 
understanding of ethnicity, many scholars stress the positive functions of ethnic 
identity. For instance, Guibernau (1996: 74) interprets the present re-enhancement of 
nationalism as a response to a need for collective as well as individual identity. In the 
same manner, Watson (1990) argues that sub-state nationalism is also an expression of 
broader and deeper concerns in modern society, such as the identity crisis and disquiet 
at standardization. Hroch (in Hobsbawm 1992: 7) also concurs with this argument in 
claiming that ethnic identity provides people with a safe haven, especially in times of 
‘social disorientation’. Similarly, Esman (1977: 265) argues that ethnic solidarity is “ a 
response to and a means of coping with basic human needs for affiliation, security, 
opportunity, and meaning”, implying that it has been important throughout human 
history, and there is no justification for claiming that it is doomed to fade away. 
However, the critical point about ethnicity is that there is nothing essential about it; 
thus it is always reconstructed according to changing conditions.    
 
A larger group of scholars share the position that modernization breeds ethnic 
conflict rather than assimilation of ethnic ties into a civic political culture.  For 
instance, considering that ethnic identity can be constantly created and re-created to 
suit particular economic and political circumstances and goals, Newman contends that 
modernization is not a process that totally destroys ethnic identities and institutions. 
Rather, it creates new ethnic ideologies and institutions (Newman, 1991: 452). The 
question to be asked concerns the reasons that promote an increasing politicization of 
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ethnicity during the process of modernization. Lijphart thinks that ethnic conflicts 
reemerge as a consequence of the decreasing significance of ideological conflict along 
the left-right cleavage, and to a lesser extent, the declining importance of religious 
differences. He adds that developments in communications technology result in 
contrasting effects: as well as its integrative effects at intrastate and interstate levels, it 
also facilitates disintegration through increasing ethnic divisions. Indeed, as Esman 
(1977) suggests, rapid developments in communications technologies have helped 
ethnic groups to compare their circumstances with those living in other parts of the 
country and the world. Lijphart also stresses an equally important point that 
demonstration effect is influential in the proliferation of ethnic demands (Lijphart, 
1977: 60–4).  
 
Nevertheless, Esman (1994: 13) warns that ethnic communities are not 
monolithic. Despite the fact that ethnicity seems to be the dominant underlying factor, 
cleavages based on such supra-ethnic identities as class, religion, region and ideology 
have not disappeared. It is always probable that some members will give less 
importance to ethnicity, or suggest different political agendas.  
  
Despite this complexity and variety, and the dynamic characteristic of identity 
that complicates any analysis, some environmental factors and their influence on the 
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politicization of sub-state nationalist solidarities can be detected.79 From this 
perspective, the rise of sub-state nationalism can be primarily explained by two inter-
related factors: the intensification of integrative processes, and the transformations 
affecting the nation-state (Guibernau: 1999: 17–8). This point releates to the main 
questions of this study: What are the impacts of European integration on sub-state 
nationalism? More generally, how is the interplay between state and sub-state 
nationalism reshaped in the process of integration? These questions are addressed in 
detail in the next chapter. Before that, however, we must continue to focus on the 
theoretical perspective and its analytical tools utilized in this study.     
 
3.4. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY CONTEMPORARY  
SUB-STATE NATIONALISM  
There is a widepread consensus that the national/international context and the 
dynamics of contemporary sub-state nationalism are notably different from the sub-
state nationalism of the 19th century. Views about contemporary sub-state nationalism 
immediately diverge when its nature, mechanisms and significance come into question.  
                                                 
79 Ethnicity takes on significance in the contemporary world for various reasons: political instability and 
transition, especially linked to regime change (Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998), a growing perception of 
state failure [Payton (1999) “Ethnicity in Western Europe Today”, in Karl Cordell (ed.), Ethnicity and 
Democratisation in the New Europe, London and New York: Routledge], a collective sense of grievance 
[Karl Cordell (1999) “Introduction: Aims and Objectives”, in Karl Cordell (ed.), Ethnicity and 
Democratisation in the New Europe, London and New York: Routledge], the end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of communism [Charles A. Kupchan (1995) Nationalism and Nationalities in the New 
Europe, Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press], globalization [Adam Michnik (1996) “Dignity and Fear: 
A Letter to a Friend”, in Robert Caplan and John Feffer (eds.) Europe’s New Nationalism, New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press].   
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There are two main competing views about contemporary sub-state nationalist 
movements.    
Some scholars argue that the contemporary versions of sub-state nationalist 
movements are different from the state nationalism of the 19th century, since the 
former seek secession on an ethno-linguistic basis and are not concerned about the 
unification of people within an existing state. In this sense, they are seen as 
anachronistic, backward-looking and divisive (Hobsbawm, 1990; Agnew 1989). 
Another group of scholars criticize the first argument and maintain that ethnicity is not 
necessarily bad, aggressive or separatist. McCrone (1998), for example, contends that 
Hobsbawm’s view serves to maintain larger states (or the status quo) since it views 
contemporary sub-state nationalist movements negatively in principle. However, 
ethnic identity may have a democratizing capacity to transform especially authoritarian 
states that repress ethnic minorities (Krüger, 1993; Keating, 1996; Cordell, 1999). On 
the other hand, they still continue to adopt a classical ethnic-civic dichotomy in their 
analysis. Sub-state nationalist movements in the democratic West are referred to as 
‘neo-nationalist’80, while the ethnic nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe are 
seen as having enabled the recognition of minority rights (although they sometimes led 
to ethnic conflict in other cases).  
                                                 
80 In scholarly debates, Catalan, Scottish and Quebec nationalisms seem to have a priviledged position 
vis-a-vis other examples of sub-state nationalism since they are considered to be the best representatives 
of neo-nationalism. For instance, Keating’s (1996) well-known work is a comparative study of these 
three cases; McCrone (1998) specifically focuses on the Scottish case; Smith (1991) also supports the 
same stance. Despite the existence of various distinctive factors, Lecours (2007) rightfully claims that 
Basque nationalism can be comparatively studied along with the Scottish, Quebec and Catalan 
examples. The main justification for this is that they all share the three key characteristics of sub-state 
nationalism. In the same manner, this study suggests that Kurdish nationalism can also be investigated 
in a comparative perspective.  
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Neo-nationalism 
Neo-nationalism argues that sub-national identity is defined in civic terms. 
Even if neo-nationalisms construct their national identity on the basis of a specific 
culture and with reference to a specific ethno-history, they remain civic. Actually, neo-
nationalism is distinguished in several ways: first of all, a strong civil society plays a 
critical role in the definition and pursuit of sub-national interests. Second, these 
movements are so inclusive that they endorse multiple identities. They are in conflict 
with the extant national identity, but at the same time they tend to adopt the extant 
national identity in a reformed way as a supra-identity within a multi-layered identity 
portfolio. More crucially, this suggests that neo-nationalists are not in favor of 
independent statehood because they are state-renouncing. Even if other sub-state 
nationalist movements might pursue such a goal, neo-nationalist movements are 
characterized by their autonomist agenda (Keating, 1996;  McCrone, 1998; Thomsen, 
2001). Or, to use McCrone’s (1998; 125) laconic expression, they are both “in and out 
of the state”. A final distinctive characteristic is that they avoid resorting to violence as 
a political strategy.  
 
Such a perspective is valuable, for it is based on the new context, especially in 
terms of a redefined opportunity structure and new resources of social mobilization. 
Moreover, compared to so-called neo-nationalist examples, the Basque case, for 
instance, is characterized by some noticeable differences in terms of the relative 
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exclusiveness of its sub-national identity and the adoption of violence as a strategy by 
at least as an influential part of the Basque nationalist movement.  
 
One can criticize the neo-nationalist perspective for at least two reasons. First, 
the neo-nationalist movements also politicize ethno-cultural identity. However, since 
they already enjoy a great deal of cultural, economic and political rights derived from 
autonomy or devolution, they seem to be less focused on ethno-cultural elements.81 
Secondly, even if the content of the political program of nationalism may have 
changed, it is highly doubtful that neo-nationalist movements have entirely 
relinquished a separatist agenda. This is because occasionally speaking of 
independence may be seen as a political strategy of playing a maximalist card in order 
to foster more power for the sub-national group. Or, they think independent statehood 
still matters. In this regard, referenda on self-determination that have been on the 
agenda of both Scottish and Catalan nationalists can be interpreted in both ways. 82 In 
any case, it is clear that the sub-state nationalist activism of our time also defies any 
predictions about the full satisfaction of sub-nationalist demands with a clearly defined 
                                                 
81 Within the context of Spanish ‘nationalities’, Linz observes a remarkable change in terms of the 
recreation of ethnic identities. He shows that traditional ethnic nationalist movements rooted in a 
common ancestry and language has been replaced by an inclusive, territorial conception of ethnicity as a 
result of intermarriage and migration (in Newman, 1991: 471).  
82 Although the Spanish government dismissed the result as ‘futile’, an informal referendum on the 
secession of Catalonia from Spain was held in December 2009 in order to provide more support for 
organizing a formal referendum. See:  http://www.spanishnews.es/20091214-catalan-referendum-for-
independence-sees-30-percent-turnout/id=1763/   
Although separatists have never received more than 16 percent of the votes in official elections, and that 
this effort was exerted just before Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision about granting more 
autonomy to Catalonia (http://www.mrulster.org/2009/12/catalan-referendum-mono-nationalism-
vs.html), there is evidence suggesting that this attempt need not be seen as feeble. The SNP’s separatist 
agenda will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.  
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legislative package that would leave sub-state nationalist movements without a raison 
d’etre.  
 
Consequently, sub-state nationalism seems to be preferable as a relatively more 
objective umbrella term that also takes ‘newness’ into consideration in the 
contemporary context. However, the categorizations of sub-state nationalisms as 
Western/Eastern or neo/old are exaggerated and sometimes even misleading. Instead, it 
seems more convincing to analyze their national identity construction on a civic-ethnic 
continuum. In addition, ‘neo-nationalists’ employ the usual methods and mechanisms 
of nationalism despite the fact that they stand much more towards the civic end of the 
continuum. Moreover, it is unconvincing to argue that the ultimate goals of neo-
nationalisms are no longer independent statehood. Although neo-nationalisms are well 
aware of the fact that the meaning of sovereignty has been transformed due to 
integrative processes, some of them keep independence as their ultimate goal. For 
instance, the SNP explicitly pursues the ideal of ‘Independence in Europe’, which 
immediately collides with neo-nationalist arguments.  
 
3.4.1. Contextuality And Opportunity Structure 
Can sub-state nationalism as an umbrella term provide us with a general model 
of analysis? It is almost impossible because nationalist movements diverge from each 
other substantially with respect to social composition, goals, strategies and timing. 
Considering their historical trajectories, the critical role assumed by elites and the 
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variety of fomenting factors, any clear-cut generalizations would be against the nature 
of the subject. Therefore, any logical explanation for sub-state nationalism 
unavoidably adopts a political contextual approach that integrates socio-economic 
processes and political outcomes, or combines macro- and micro-level analysis 
(Hooghe, 1992). In this respect, the nature of a sub-state nationalist movement should 
first of all be explained in terms of its relationship with the nation-state in which it 
resides. The politico-administrative institutionalization of national identity and its 
management by the center is influential in the survival, development and demands of a 
sub-state nationalist movement. Thus, contextuality unsurprisingly invites us to adopt 
an opportunity structure approach. While the need for a political contextual approach 
pertains to the notion of particularity that obstructs a general theory of sub-state 
nationalism, the opportunity structure approach takes into account the particular 
characteristics of nationalist movements and parties in light of the general 
characteristics of the phenomenon, thus making comparative analyses possible.    
 
The term opportunity structure denotes the broad political environment in 
which sub-state nationalist politics is embedded; it describes the distribution and 
structuring of internal and external resources and constraints that make nationalist 
mobilization and activity more or less likely (Hooghe, 1992: 31). These resources and 
limitations are defined politically, economically, socially and culturally. To put it 
differently, an opportunity structure is not characterized only by a politico-institutional 
dimension; it also includes economic and normative/moral aspects, which are ethno-
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culturally framed in nationalist discourse. An opportunity structure has two main 
interlocked dimensions: internal and external.  
 
In analyzing sub-state nationalist movements and parties, the internal 
dimension corresponds to endogenous factors, such as strength of ethnic identity, 
political program and policy stances, organizational capacity, leadership, existence of 
debilitating intra-party cleavages, financial and human resources, links with social 
movements and voters, and media coverage (De Winter, 1998: 222–35; Van Houten, 
2001: 16). The strength of ethnic identity can be measured by the prevalence of a 
specific language, feelings of belonging to the claimed territory rather than the nation-
state, or by the strength of the demands made for self-government (Türsan, 1998).83 
Political program and policy stances are above all concerned with the center-periphery 
cleavage, socio-economic issues, and European integration. Especially in Western 
European countries, new political issues, such as the environment including non-
nuclear energy, pacifism, participationism, third world concerns, feminism and 
decentralization also have important places in party programs (De Winter, 1998).84 
The intra-party cleavage refers to the fact that sub-national political parties may be 
internally divided over leadership, ideological objectives and the appropriate tactics to 
                                                 
83 Like national identity, sub-national identity is composed of objective and subjective elements. The 
objective elements, such as language and socio-economic status, do not explain the existence of support 
for sub-state nationalist parties. The most relevant factor is sub-state feelings of identity. However, the 
political impact of a common sub-state identity is also linked to the strength of other identities. For 
instance, most Scots feel Scots first, but they do not overwhelmingly support the SNP. This is becuase, 
besides their co-allegiance to a British identity, their political preferences are also determined by class 
and religious cleavages (De Winter, 1998: 217).   
84 De Winter (1998) observes that the parties with the strongest new politics profile are on the left of 
political spectrum, while those on the right are either less clear or silent. Indeed, an examination of the 
party programs of the SNP, the DTP and the PNV supports this argument.  
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adopt toward other groups and state institutions (Esman, 1994). The factions in these 
parties are generally expressed in terms of intra-party cleavages between ‘radicals and 
moderates’, ‘fundamentalists and gradualists’, or ‘hawks and doves’.  
 
The external dimension includes national (state) and international (extra-state) 
factors, also termed environmental (exogenous) factors. National and international 
factors dynamically interact with each other, which influences the opportunity 
structures for sub-state national mobilization. The national factors that have the most 
fundamental impact in shaping opportunity structures are the political regime with its 
extant constitution, the party system, and electoral system. The type of electoral 
system is a major factor in determining the type of political party system. For example, 
while proportional representation can help sub-state nationalist political parties to raise 
their votes, in majoritarian systems voters may refrain from voting for parties (such as 
sub-state nationalist parties) that are unlikely to win any seats (Catt and Murphy, 
2002). In addition to the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political 
system, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression also affects the opportunity 
structure.85 McAdam et al (1996: 10) also point to importance of the presence and 
stability of elite allies.  
 
                                                 
85 Considering the nature and goals of sub-state nationalisms, they are unsurprisingly evaluated as 
divisive and threatening by central governments. Depending on the nature of the state structure and the 
demands and strategies adopted by sub-state nationalist groups, states resort to two main distinct 
strategies in dealing with this ‘question’: repression or accommodation. For different forms of 
accommodation, see Catt and Murphy (2002).  
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International factors, as one of main components of exogenous factors, include 
the changed nature of the international system, the development of supranational 
organizations, and the demonstration effect of sub-state nationalist movements in other 
countries.86 Of course, this is not an exhaustive list, but refers to some of the most 
important factors that shape the opportunity structures. Environmental factors are of 
critical significance, since together they substantially affect the prospects of sub-state 
nationalist movements.   
 
As well as the factors outlined so far, a reliable analysis of sub-state 
nationalism should not overlook the significance of critical events and issues for sub-
state nationalist mobilization and activity. According to Birch (1989: 72), the 
occurence of ‘eruptive or fomenting factors’, specifically positive or negative social, 
economic or political changes, are vital for capturing mass support through the 
instigation of sub-state nationalist conflict. For instance, the Franco dictatorship in 
Spain, the 1980 military coup in Turkey and the discovery of oil in Scotland can be 
seen as eruptive factors that facilitated sub-state nationalist mobilization and activity. 
Thus, eruptive factors serve as economic, political and ideological resources. 
 
 
                                                 
86 The success or failure of a sub-state nationalist movement in one country can have significant effects 
on the fate of others in the same country or others. For instance, the success of Basque and Catalan 
nationalism has boosted the development of similar movements in other regions in Spain.    
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Internal Factors strength of ethnic identity, political program and 
policy stances, organizational capacity, leadership, 
intra-party cleavage, financial and human resources, 
links with social movements and voters, media 
coverage 
External Factors  
 
a) state dimension: state structure and 
openness/closedness of the political regime expressed 
in the constitution, party system, electoral system, 
national identity, nature of state nationalism, and the 
presence and stability of elite allies 
b) extra-state dimension: the international system, 
the development of supranational organizations, the 
demonstration effect 
Fomenting factors positive or negative social, economic or political 
changes that have catalytic impacts on the conflict 
between the state and sub-state nationalism  
 
Table 1: The Main Factors That Shape the Opportunity Structures 
 
The arguments provided here indicate that focusing on opportunity structures is 
valuable for at least for two reasons. First, through its political, economic, 
moral/normative dimensions, the opportunity structure is to a great extent determined 
by the state, because it still constitutes the center of power resources, albeit 
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significantly transformed due to supra-national integrative processes.87 Second, it 
allows the inclusion of the extra-state dimension into the analysis, such as the impacts 
of contemporary events and political/economic integrative efforts on sub-state 
nationalist movements. Nevertheless, opportunity structure approach is still a 
somewhat limited analytical tool since it fails to explain the development of sub-state 
nationalism. Although, it is clear that each sub-state nationalist movement emerges 
within an opportunity structure, there must be also organized groups that see it as an 
opportunity structure and make use of it on the basis of shared grievances and better 
future prospects.  
 
3.4.2. Social Movements And Political Parties  
Depending to a large extent on the endogenous factors of their particular 
surrounding opportunity structures, sub-state nationalist challenges are organized in 
various forms and with diverse strategies. They are basically expressed in social 
movements and political parties that may choose to compete within the system, fight 
an open war against the existing political design, or continue a struggle comprising 
both violent and non-violent strategies, implemented in highly intricate ways. Besides 
this simple violent and non-violent classification, strategies can also be differentiated 
according to the form of mobilization. These can be party, non-party, and cross-party 
in orientation, and focusing on electoral or non-electoral politics (Lynch, 1996: 6; 
Letamendia, 2000: 96).  
                                                 
87 The impacts of European integration on the nation-state, thus on the struggle between the nation-state 
and sub-state nationalism, will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 4).   
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It is highly debatable whether the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism can be 
analyzed outside the field of social movements.88 Scholars of social movements tend to 
view social movements as being completely different from political parties and interest 
groups. Their main explanation for this is that social movements are not organizations, 
but rather networks of interactions between different actors, which may or may not 
include formal organizations, depending on changing circumstances. Nevertheless, 
such scholars do not ignore the link between social movements and political parties 
and interest groups entirely. For instance, Diani (2000, 166) suggests that any 
organization that fulfils the requirements of interaction with other actors, involvement 
with conflict, and collective identity may be considered part of a given movement. 
Nevertheless, this does mean that such organizations are significantly distinct, since 
social movements, as networks of interaction, also favor the formulation of demands, 
the promotion of mobilization campaigns and elaboration and diffusion of beliefs and 
collective identities. Rather, the main particularity of political parties compared to 
other formal organizations is their function of interest representation (Diani, 2000: 
167).   
                                                 
88 Especially in the European context, sub-state nationalist movements manifest themselves as social 
movements that involve aspects of resource mobilization and cultural framing, besides an opportunity 
structure. As a corollary to this, the field of social movements has been dominated by three distinctive 
approaches that explain social movements by generally emphasizing only one of these aspects. The 
opportunity approach is deemed to be more capable of explaining the emergence stage of social 
movements, but it is not sufficient to explain the development phase. While the resource mobilization 
approach is useful for analyzing the formal and informal mobilizing structures through which social 
movements organize themselves, the cultural framing approach, to large extent, focuses on how the 
discourses of social movements are constructed through specific interpretations of constraints and 
grievances. Being aware of the fact that each approach falls short of giving a full account of social 
movements, there have been recently some efforts to synthesize them. To exemplify, McAdam et al 
(1996, 8) summarize their theory as follows: “No matter how momentous a change appears in 
retrospect, it only becomes an ‘opportunity’ when defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well 
organized to act on this shared definition of the situation”. 
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Given that sub-state nationalist movements are established as social movements 
(Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1965; Guibernau, 1999; Letamendia, 2000), and that there 
are significant differences between social movements and political parties, this study 
focuses on sub-state nationalist political parties rather than sub-state nationalist 
movements as social movements. This obviously means avoiding a bottom-up analysis 
with the inclusion of a great variety of actors. Nevertheless, such a preference is 
intentional. Firstly, in order to be able to design a comparative study involving three 
cases, choosing political parties as the main units of analysis makes the study feasible. 
Secondly, one can contend that, anyway, there is not such a clear-cut categorical 
distinction between social movements and political parties. Sub-state nationalist 
political parties do not emerge out of nothing, but as an outcome of political and/or 
social movements. In this sense, for instance, Basque nationalism implies more than 
the PNV, so there is no any reason to isolate it from the wider Basque sub-state 
nationalist social movement. Despite the fact that the meaning and role of sub-state 
nationalist political parties in terms of sub-state nationalist movements may be diverse 
and constantly redefined, the leadership of any sub-state nationalist movement usually 
coalesces around its associated political parties. Indeed, they take on crucial roles in 
initiating and mobilizing sub-state nationalist movements and in constructing sub-
national identities through their interpretation of grievances and future prospects. 
Therefore, it is valid for this study to take this focus.  
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3.5. SUB-STATE NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES  
Sub-state nationalist political parties, often also termed ethno-regionalist 
parties, have been on the agenda of European politics since the late 1960s, when they 
began to achieve noticeable electoral successes in their regions. In line with the 
debates on the renewed strength of ethnic identity, scholars have explained the rising 
popular support for them as a result of electoral dealignments in their regions caused 
by the combined effects of political centralization and modernization, and 
dissatisfaction with government and major parties. The sub-state nationalist parties, in 
contrast, were able to successfully link post-materialist issues to their identity concerns 
(Watson, 1990; Newman, 1991).  
 
Thompson and Rudolph (1989) maintain that politics and policy assume a 
linkage role between macro-level conditions and micro-level political behavior. 
According to them, besides governing institutions and public policies, political parties 
play a critical role in this, particularly regarding the formation of nationalist discourse 
and the expression of perceptions about past problems and future possibilities. In doing 
so, they basically politicize ethno-cultural cleavages, accompanied by a nationalist 
interpretation of social, economic and, sometimes, religious cleavages. The existence 
of cleavages themselves cannot explain variations in whether they become translated 
into matters for party competition. Thus, as several cleavages can coexist, the activities 
of agents are crucial in the way they become perceived and rendered salient (Newman, 
1991; Esman, 1994).  
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Conflicts of identity and interests, and territorial mobilization are three main 
characteristics of sub-state nationalism. Within this context, a sub-state nationalist 
party can be defined as a political organization that claims to represent a particular 
ethnic group and seek recognition and power for it. Therefore, the actions of sub-state 
political parties concern demands for political reorganization of the national power 
structure (Müller-Rommel, 1998; Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998). In this regard, in 
addition to the defining characteristics of identity and territory, the centrality of the 
demand for the ‘empowerment’ of the sub-national group distinguishes this type of 
party from other types of party (Türsan, 1998: 6).   
 
Unsurprisingly, sub-state nationalist political parties are marked by 
heterogenity since they are conditioned by their historical trajectories, opportunity 
structures (endogenous and exogenous factors), and capacities for attaining their goals 
through political competition. The section below specificies an opportunity structure-
based analytical framework to analyze sub-state nationalist political parties. For this 
purpose, four dimensions are elaborated on: the process of sub-national identity 
construction, the definition of main goals and strategies, the role of ideology in sub-
state nationalist parties, and their views about the European integration process. This 
four-dimensional opportunity structure-based analytical framework does not only shed 
light on different aspects of sub-state nationalist politics within the general context of 
the relationship between nationalism and sub-state nationalism in a broader 
perspective, but it also provides a consistent framework for investigating the effects of 
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European integration on sub-state nationalist political parties in the three varied cases 
studied here.  
 
3.5.1. The Construction Of Sub-National Identity 
Sub-state nationalism constitutes a question or at least a challenge to the 
existing political structure and dominant definition of national identity. Its emergence 
and evolution are closely related to the nature of state nationalism and its hegemonic 
definition of national identity. That is, the development of a nation-state affects 
national identity construction, citizenship regime, and challenging nationalisms. For 
instance, in a strong state society such as France, the centralized state is considered as 
the principal bearer of national unity and identity. In Britain, on the other hand, the 
state is not the only expression of the nation and its unity because the distinction 
between civil society and the state is not clear (Keating, 1996: 17).89 Different 
development paths predictably influence the way in which nationality and ethnicity are 
linked, and in turn citizenship regimes.  
 
In the contemporary world, three different, historically rooted, ethnicity 
regimes are seen: mono-ethnic, pluri-ethnic and non-ethnic. While pluri-ethnic regimes 
                                                 
89 Keating (1996) rightfully emphasizes the importance of the historical trajectories followed by the 
French and British states. The French interpretation of national unity and identity is rooted in the 
absolutism of the preceding monarchical regime that to a great extent overruled particularist and local 
interests. This understanding later led to the Jacobin interpretation of democratic legitimacy that saw 
national unity as concomitant of democracy and legitimacy, and the state as its principal expression. 
Unlike the French case, Brtisih constitutionalism followed a very different route defined by a balance 
among particular social interests rather than the dominance of a state as the expression and 
representation of national unity.  
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conceive of the nation as an amalgamation of many different ethnic groups, non-ethnic 
regimes define the nation on the basis of language, ideology, or religion instead of 
ethnicity. Non-ethnic (or ‘ethnic-blind’) regimes, such as France and Turkey, see 
ethnic-based claims as illegitimate (Aktürk, 2006: 37).90 Historical trajectories thus do 
not only shape opportunity structures but also the way sub-state national identity is 
constructed. To reiterate, a country’s development path is one of the major factors 
affecting all aspects of sub-state nationalism, but it is not everything. How then is a 
sub-state national identity formed?  
 
Sub-state nationalism, as a form of nationalism, constructs the sub-state 
national identity within the general code of particularity. This is actually a natural 
reflection of the ‘mimetic quality of nationalism’ (Billig, 1995). As Letamendia (2000) 
points out, sub-state nationalist movements and parties are a mirror-image of all the 
subjective mechanisms and many of the objective resources utilized by the nation-state 
in the process of national identity construction. In this sense, sub-state nationalism 
opposes state nationalism rather than transcending it because it, too, relies on the 
discourse and mechanisms of nationalist ideology. Consequently, the struggle between 
state and sub-state nationalism turns into a game of mirrors. Sub-state nationalist 
political parties, as a part of sub-state nationalist movements, take critical roles in this 
struggle. 
                                                 
90 This categorization is primarily based on the myth of common ancestry or race. Yet, when we 
remember the fact that language, religion and culture might also be used as ethnic boundary markers, it 
becomes clear that this categorization is not flawless. Nevertheless, non-ethnic regimes can be 
differentiated from the mono-ethnic type. They aim at integration through assimilation, but they are at 
the same time inclusive, unlike exclusive mono-ethnic regimes.  
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In line with this mimetic quality, sub-state nationalist parties make use of the 
usual boundary markers and symbols (e.g. language, arts, flags, diet, rituals and 
etiquette) that differentiate between the sub-national in-group and national out-group. 
First of all, considering its oppositional characteristics, the significant other(s) of sub-
state nationalist parties is/are the nation-state and/or dominant ethnic group, whose 
culture embodies the dominant national identity. Through the dynamics of 
stereotyping, the nation-state is characterized as a usurper, a colonizer or invader of the 
national homeland, and the oppressor of national identity. Unsurprisingly, positive 
characteristics such as rationality, efficiency, prowess and creativity characterize the 
in-group.91 Lacking state power, sub-state nationalism focuses on the construction of 
its sub-national identity primarily as a cultural collectivity.92 This sub-state national 
community is constructed as a distinct and unitary social, historical, cultural and 
geographic group. More precisely, a sub-state national identity is formed on the basis 
                                                 
91 Actually, despite the fact that the origins of some of them are ethnic, or even racist, as in the case of 
the PNV, sub-state nationalist parties today define themselves much more on a politico-territorial line 
mainly for two reasons. First, verifying flexible, fluid characteristic of ethnicity, intra-state or 
international migration forced sub-national groups to adopt territorial definitions. Second, any sign of 
exclusive or discriminatory discourse would be easily used by state nationalism to justify the ethnic 
label attached to sub-state nationalism.   
92 The opportunity structure, especially the politico-institutional framework, in which each sub-state 
nationalist politics is pursued, differs from one nation-state to another. In the great majority of Western 
democracies, sub-state national groups have different degrees of autonomy, which is in some cases 
furthered by the establishment of regional parliaments.  Nevertheless, they are devoid of any right to 
treat the people of that region as citizens, which is an exclusive right of sovereign nation-states. In order 
to overcome this obstacle, many parties and movements make use of social policies, through which they 
can increase the loyalty of local people to a sub-national collectivity and prove the survivability of their 
polity in case they can achieve an independent statehood. For a detailed analysis on the relationship 
between sub-state nationalist politics and social policy, see Daniel Beland and Andres Lecours (2008) 
Nationalism and Social Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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of an ethno-cultural distinctiveness that is mainly defined on two axes: temporal and 
territorial (Letamendia, 2000; Halkier 2005).93  
 
In nationalist or sub-nationalist discourse, the temporal dimension is first of all 
linked to an ethno-history that provides the ethnic group with the necessary myths of 
origin. Through selective use of ethno-cultural elements provided by historiography, 
archaeology and folklore, boundaries are naturalized as if they are permanent. Thus, 
ethno-history serves to promote a sense of continuity among members of the sub-state 
national community, as well as to legitimize sub-national demands. The temporal 
dimension does not only refer to the glorious past of an ethnic group, but also denotes 
a ‘temporal turn’ in determining the fate of the group. This is generally related to a 
specific historical event that is seen as the beginning of experienced/perceived ongoing 
grievances, inequalities and injustices. Furthermore, the temporal dimension has a 
future aspect. Sub-state nationalist parties and movements not only mobilize people on 
the grounds of past grievances but also for better future prospects. Within the context 
of this study, any evaluation of the EU impact on sub-state nationalism should deal 
with the ‘before and after the EU’ aspect of sub-state nationalist discourse.        
  
The spatial dimension, tightly interwoven with the temporal, refers to the 
‘national homeland’ of the sub-state national group. While it is always historically 
                                                 
93 Although not developed specifically for this purpose, Halkier’s three-dimensional model 
(topographical, temporal, and operational) of discourse analysis can be very helpful in analyzing sub-
state nationalist discourse.  
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claimed, its geographical boundaries are not always clearly demarcated. For instance, 
boundaries of ‘national homeland’ are to a great extent out of the question in the 
Scottish case whereas the boundaries of an imagined Kurdish homeland are a matter of 
great contention. When Kurdish nationalists, including the DTP, speak of South and 
Eastern Anatolia as ‘Northern Kurdistan’, Turkish authorities unsurprisingly react to 
such names as an open threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. Therefore, 
while the SNP spatially constructs its national identity and demands a clearly 
demarcated homeland, the boundaries of the Kurdish homeland (‘Kurdistan’) may 
expand into the heart of Central Anatolia and Black Sea region coasts of Turkey. 
Finally, the territorial dimension is also of great significance in the formulation of a 
center-periphery cleavage because the socio-economic problems of the peripheral 
region are primarily addressed through political and social hierarchies maintained by 
the political center.  
 
There are thus several factors affecting the conception of national identity, 
including the nation-state’s development path, the conception and role of the dominant 
national identity, the reaction of the state to sub-nationalism within its territory, the 
international context, and the ideological stances of sub-state nationalist parties and 
movements. Sub-state nationalism, by its nature, requires emphasizing ethno-cultural 
distinctiveness, and its conception of sub-national identity is located somewhere on an 
ethnic-civic continuum, depending on the factors mentioned above. However, there is 
no direct causal relationship between identity conceptions and these factors. Finally, 
neither state nationalism nor sub-state nationalism remain the same. Their conceptions 
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of the nation are always open to change as a consequence of the continuous interplay 
between them, along with the effects of extra-state factors.  
 
3.5.2. Goals And Strategies 
The demands of sub-state nationalist parties range from cultural autonomy to 
total independence, 94 but are difficult to classify in terms of their goals since they are 
too diverse compared to those of other types of parties. A sub-state nationalist 
movement usually includes more than one party, even if it is sometimes 
overwhelmingly dominated by one party. Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is a good 
example of this. In Spain, there are political parties representing Basque, Catalan, 
Galician and other sub-state or regional identities. These parties also vary within each 
movement. For instance, in the Basque Country, there are several Basque nationalist 
political parties that are differentiated from each other by their conception of national 
identity, ideology, goals and strategies, and their position regarding European 
integration. Therefore, these parties not only challenge the major national parties but 
also compete with their ‘co-sub-nationals’. In political competition, clearly stated goals 
bear the risk of alienating present and potential supporters of a party. This is also 
related to the nature of the nation-state; in some countries, opportunity structures do 
not allow sub-state nationalist parties to freely express their ultimate goals. Under the 
threat of state repression, some choose to moderate the assertiveness of their demands.  
                                                 
94 The common objective has been one of the major criteria for the categorization of sub-state 
nationalism. De Winter (1998: 205–207) lists four types of sub-state nationalist parties according to 
their goals: non-separatists, European federalists, independentists, irredentists. Bugajski argues that 
ethnic politics has five variants: cultural revivalism, political autonomism, territorial self-determination, 
separatism, and irredentism (in Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998).  
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Equally important, these parties’ ultimate goals may change due to the effects 
of internal and external developments. De Winter (1998, 208) emphasizes that it is 
impossible to categorize any of these parties on a fixed, permanent basis: party 
positions often move over time; moderate and radical objectives sometimes ‘cohabit’. 
For tactical reasons, more moderate claims may sometimes seem to dominate the 
agenda of these parties, but once these moderate objectives are reached, often more 
radical (and probably more genuine) demands surface. De Winter argues that most of 
these parties started as cultural-protectionist movements, then evolved into autonomist 
or federalist movements, and in the 1980s, owing to the progress made with regard to 
European integration, appealed to the idea of a federal ‘Europe of the regions’, often as 
a way of avoiding declaring themselves openly separatist.  
 
Sub-state nationalist parties seek to achieve their goals through specific 
strategies. In Europe, the strategies are predominantly peaceful. However, there are 
some that resort to violent strategies, ranging from waging an open war against state 
security forces to bombing civilian targets and kidnapping. This strategy turns them 
into terrorist organizations, e.g. the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or Kurdish 
Workers’ Party). In some cases, sub-state nationalist political parties are established as 
political wings of terrorist organizations, such as Herri Batasuna in Spain. In other 
cases, even if they are not the political wing of a terrorist organization, these parties 
refuse any calls on them to condemn violence as a legitimate strategy. This is the case, 
for example, for successive major pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey. Actually, 
this diversity is a consequence of the fact that strategies differ according to the form of 
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mobilization, including violence and non-violence. Sub-state nationalist mobilization 
can be party, non-party or cross-party in orientation, focusing on electoral and non-
electoral politics (Lynch, 1996: 6). It is also possible to observe that it makes use of 
these forms together in varying combinations.  
 
Sub-state nationalist parties utilize three main strategies (Seiler, in Lynch, 
1996): ‘anti-system strategies’ refer to the use of political violence; ‘governmental 
strategies’ seek to achieve political goals by participation in government. Most sub-
state nationalist parties, however, compete within the borders of a legal political 
system; they employ ‘tribune strategies’. In other words, rather than participate in 
government, they pursue a kind of autonomy in competition with other political 
parties.  
 
3.5.3. Ideology 
As already alluded to, sub-state nationalist parties are, above all, nationalist 
parties. That is, they are single-issue parties with all other questions are perceived from 
that angle and treated in relation to it (Meny and Knapp, 1998: 81). In this sense, their 
single issue is the claim of self-government on the basis of ethno-cultural 
distinctiveness; therefore, it is not the ideology that distinguishes sub-state nationalist 
parties from other political traditions, but the demand for autonomy based on 
historical, cultural and linguistic communities (Lynch, 1996). Nevertheless, the 
left/right distinction is still useful to understand the goals, strategies, transnational 
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cooperation of sub-state nationalist political parties, as they often espouse an expressed 
ideology in combination with nationalism. Given, as discussed in the second chapter, 
that nationalism is an empty ideology, or the fact that nationalism in itself, as Eriksen 
(1993) rightfully states, belongs neither to the left nor right of the political spectrum, 
this is not surprising. Accordingly, these parties are found scattered across the 
conventional left/right spectrum.  
 
The ideology of sub-state nationalist parties has varied considerably from one 
period to another; it has also greatly differed from one country to another. For instance, 
French sub-state nationalism was a right-wing movement until the early 1960s (Meny 
and Knapp, 1998: 81). Then, in the 1960s and 70s, it became more radical, having 
been fed by two sources: hard-line Marxist-Leninist class ideologies and anti-
imperialist theories of national liberation (Letamendia, 2000: 84). By following the 
themes of internal colonialism and dependence, several strong sub-state nationalist 
parties and movements in Ireland, Spain, France and Turkey have chosen anti-system 
strategies in the form of armed struggles against their respective nation-states. Whether 
supporting violent or non-violent strategies, sub-state nationalist parties today offer 
their supporters a combination of sub-national cultural and linguistic inheritance and 
communal solidarity, together with economic prosperity and democratic control. Half 
of the sub-state nationalist parties in Western Europe are now situated on the left and 
center-left (De Winter, 1998: 208). However, the parties subject to examination in this 
study are situated on very different parts of the political spectrum. While the SNP is 
situated on the center-left and the DTP on the left, the PNV is a center-right party.   
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3.5.4. EU-Stance And Visions Of European Integration  
While there is no consistent relation between the ideological positions and 
ultimate goals of sub-state nationalist parties, the relationship between a pro-EU stance 
and an ideological position is quite consistent. The parties on either the extreme right 
or left oppose European integration while others give strategic or full support to the 
integration process. Nevertheless, support for European integration does not mean that 
all of these latter parties are in favor of the existing EU architecture. For instance, 
while the SNP in its support of the EU envisions a ‘confederal Europe’, the PNV is in 
favor of a ‘Europe of Regions’, and the DTP gives its support to the idea of a ‘Europe 
of Peoples’.  
Today a great majority of sub-state nationalist parties have a pro-European 
stance (Türsan, 1998). This is explained mainly by the argument that these parties 
consider that  
“… the framework of a politically and economically united Europe will permit their region to achieve 
greater autonomy or even full independence and yet still prosper economically and remain integrated in 
the international political community (De Winter, 1998: 210–1).  
 
The dimensions of sub-state nationalist politics put forward above can be 
presented as follows:   
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A. National Identity (in ideal types)  
Civic Conception   Ethnic Conception 
(The most inclusive)   (The-least-inclusive) 
 
 
B. Goals:  
Cultural Autonomy   Independent Statehood 
 
 
C. Strategy of Change:  
Non-violent     Violent 
 
 
D. Ideology:   
Left-wing    Right-wing  
 
 
 
E. EU-Stance:  
Pro-EU    Anti-EU 
 
 
Figure 1: The five dimensions of sub-state nationalist politics 
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In a general sense, European integration is considered to expand opportunity 
structures, thus providing sub-state nationalist parties with new resources for sub-state 
nationalist politics. The following chapter discusses different aspects of the impact of 
European integration on these opportunity structures and its use by sub-state 
nationalist political parties. After this, three empirical chapters focus on three cases in 
terms of the five dimensions outlined here in order to analyze various examples of sub-
state nationalisms within the context of European integration.  
 
In short, despite the difficulty of arriving at a general explanation for it we can 
note that conflicts of identity and interests invariably underpin sub-state nationalisms. 
Moreover, the concept of political power struggle ultimately explains the emergence or 
non-emergence of sub-state nationalism and the way economic, political and moral 
factors are used in a nationalist conflict. 
 
Sub-state nationalism is oppositional because it challenges the nation-state in 
which it resides as undemocratic and illegitimate and seeks some kind of autonomy for 
the sub-national group it represents. Although it does not always pursue independent 
statehood, it consistently seeks to take some of the power that is normally concentrated 
in the central state in the modern period. Since political power invariably lies with the 
state that officially represents the nation, appeals for independent statehood by sub-
national movements continue to remain alive.  
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Political parties assume critical roles in the politicization of ethno-cultural 
distinctiveness and the mobilization of sub-national groups. In an ever-increasing 
confrontation with the state and its nationalism, the fate of sub-national groups is 
always determined by a set of resources and constraints, which together are termed the 
opportunity structures.   
 
Sub-state nationalism has gained a new significance in the contemporary world. 
Most studies on the phenomenon focus on cultural and economic factors, but they 
often neglect external factors, particularly the European integration process as a 
relevant variable. In the following chapter, this dissertation seeks to answer the 
following question: “What happens to sub-state nationalism within the context of 
European integration?” 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SUB-STATE NATIONALISM WITHIN THE 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS 
 
 
A great majority of sub-state nationalist parties today have a pro-EU stance 
since they conceive of European integration as a process reshaping opportunity 
structures to their advantage. They believe that European integration contributes to 
sub-state nationalism mainly in two ways. First, the emergence and development of the 
EU, the most remarkable and current form of European integration, as a supranational 
organization changes the nature of the national dimension of opportunity structures by 
transforming the nation-state and weakening its main rival, state nationalism. The 
second chief reason is that sub-state nationalist parties see the EU as a polity-making 
actor that expands opportunity structures to their advantage by forming new 
institutions, programs and funds, and enabling transnational alliances across the 
European continent.  
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Accordingly, sub-state nationalist parties have made the EU an important part 
of their calculations in nationalist politics. The EU has gradually become a significant 
factor originating from the exogenous dimension of the opportunity structure 
framework, and affecting both the exogenous and endogenous dimensions of the 
opportunity structures of sub-state nationalist parties within the European context. In 
other words, European integration has transformed the nature of the relationship 
between sub-state nationalism and the nation-state by reshaping the context of the 
conflict. Therefore, the phenomenon of sub-state nationalism today can be best 
understood within the context of a triadic relationship between nation-states, sub-state 
nationalist movements and parties, and the EU (Keating, 1996).  
 
 
In order to investigate the impacts of European integration on sub-state 
nationalist parties, this chapter discusses the restructuring of the opportunity structure 
by elaborating on the transformation of the nation-state and the emergence of new 
channels as parts of an integrative dynamic. Then, it focuses on two specific questions: 
How do sub-state nationalist parties make use of new opportunity structures in 
defining and seeking to reach their goals? What are the impacts of European 
integration on the ultimate goals of sub-state nationalist parties? Responding to these 
questions will clarify the distinctive aspects of the Scottish, Basque and Kurdish cases 
to be considered in the following chapters. In turn, a comparison of these three cases 
will provide further empirical evidence for understanding what happens to sub-state 
nationalism in this new context.   
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4.1. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
NATION-STATE  
In the interactive triadic relationship between European integration, the nation-
state, and sub-state nationalism, the European integration process has had significant 
effects on the conventional understanding of the modern state, specifically the nation-
state. In order to understand the various aspects of the complex developments 
reshaping nation-state structures, we first need to focus on the fundamental 
characteristics of European integration itself.  
 
 
The idea of European unity through economic and political integration gained 
widespread support from politicians of all persuasions in the post-war period. Despite 
having being divided roughly into Unionists and Federalists on the basis of their 
political, geographical, and cultural considerations for the desired integration, they all 
thought that European integration would secure economic prosperity within a peaceful 
co-existence of European societies. Federalists even dreamed of a United States of 
Europe, where a common European identity would replace divisive nationalist feelings 
and parochial national interests across the continent (Dinan, 1999). Starting with the 
establishment of three European Communities (The European Community of Coal and 
Steel; EURATOM; the European Economic Community) in the 1950s, European 
integration has in large part successfully developed through several waves of gradual 
deepening and widening. In 1993, the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht 
Treaty), founded the European Union (EU), declaring the institutionalization of 
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European integration beyond the marketplace towards a political integration of the 
Member States. Thus, also positively affected by broader processes of economic, 
political and cultural globalization95, European integration has reached such an 
advanced level that it has no historical precedent. This means that it is very difficult to 
define what kind of animal the EU is and to predict where European integration might 
evolve to in the future.  
 
 
In the EU’s political architecture, national governments are ‘masters of the 
treaty’. In other words, although the Member States are not the only source of its 
secondary law (regulations and directives), they still determine the EU’s primary law. 
Besides the juridical aspect, the state-like institutions of the Commission, European 
Parliament, and European Court of Justice bring about evaluations and predictions 
about its evolution through a statist analogy (Dinan, 1999). However, its state-like 
characteristics are limited to a limited set of fields, including the economy, agriculture, 
and regional policy. A lack of clear division of competence also makes it difficult to 
understand this evolving entity through the traditional parameters of the modern state. 
To illustrate, while there are issues and political questions that can be decided by a 
majority (in the Council of Ministers), others require unanimity. In a ‘Europe of 
variable geometries’, due to opt-outs and the ‘Europe of different speeds’, varying set 
                                                 
95 The relationship between globalization and European integration is a matter of contestation in the 
academic literature. While some tend to see European integration as ‘turbo-charged globalization’, some 
others consider it as a ‘protection against globalization’ (Christiansen, 2006: 587–90). This study 
endorses a more balanced view that European integration process has interacted with the processes of 
globalization, but ‘much of what happens in the course of European integration’ has remained specific 
to the European context (ibid, 595).  
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of members participate in common policies or arrangements for mutual coordination. 
Furthermore, actual decision-making is increasingly occurring in informal policy 
networks rather than in the formal institutions (Abromeit, 1998).  
On this basis, one can conclude that the EU is not a confederation of states; 
neither is it an international political regime, since its members are bound too closely 
and over too wide range of issues; yet neither is the EU a federation, since there is no 
clear intention of its becoming a state. Rather, it is a polity that is ‘horizontal, poly-
centered, infra-national’ (Weiler, 1996: 519), yet at the same time it is a polity that has 
managed to form compact hierarchies of norms in various fields (Abromeit, 1998). 
Thus, one can conclude that the EU is a sui generis political entity that is ‘more than 
national, less than supranational’ (Ohrgard, 1997). In this sense, the new European 
political arrangement is partially replacing the nation-state and partially co-existing 
with it. Yet it is not easy to predict its final destination (‘finality’, or ‘finalité’ of 
European integration) since it has no historical precedence, and it is evolving through a 
rather unpredictable process of negotiations, alternating advances and set-backs. 96 
 
 
Notwithstanding the ambiguities about the ‘finalité’ of the EU, there is no 
doubt that European integration within the broader context of globalization has led to 
significant changes in hitherto dominant political perceptions and parameters at 
different levels. In this regard, Guibernau (1999: 149) rightly looks upon the EU as ‘a 
living laboratory in which experiments about new ways to understand sovereignty, 
                                                 
96 In its short history, European integration has proved to be fragile in the face of economic and political 
crises, although, at the same time, hardships have stimulated new initiatives to move in favor of a 
deepened and enlarged integration.   
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territoriality and identity are currently being tested’. In this process, the nation-state 
stands as the main focus of debate. For this dissertation, it is especially critical to 
concentrate on the current situation of the nation-state since the nation-state to a great 
extent explains the reasons behind the emergence of sub-state nationalisms, and shapes 
the opportunity structures that such movements and parties utilize. Furthermore, since 
sub-state nationalism competes for state power as a type of nationalism, any changes in 
existing nation-state structures are expected to have influences on sub-state nationalist 
goals and strategies.   
    
4.1.1. The “Decline” or the Persistence of the Nation-state?  
The fate of the nation-state in the face of integrative processes, specifically 
those of the EU, has been one of the main issues for contemporary political and social 
sciences, resulting in at least three different views about the current situation and the 
future of the nation-state. The first group of scholars argues that integrative processes 
and increasing regional assertiveness have brought about the end of the nation-state. 
Consequently, the nation-state is being transcended, and the world is moving towards 
an era of post-nationalism. In this process, the hegemony of national identities are 
being replaced by more complex multiple identities (Ohmae, 2008; Khan, 1995).97  
 
 
The second group contends that even if the squeeze of the nation-state from 
both above and below does not amount to its demise, the power of the nation-state has 
                                                 
97 One should remember that this highly assertive view has lost its popularity since the early 2000s.   
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been significantly eroded (Keating, 1996; Marks et al, 1996). For instance, Keating 
and Hooghe (1995) maintain that, within the European context, while politics is 
regionalizing, regional politics is Europeanizing and national politics is both 
regionalizing and Europeanizing. Keating (1996) thinks that this changing nature and 
dynamics of politics shows that the form of the state is changing. Although the end 
result of this process is unclear, it gives rise to a return of the ambiguity about identity 
and authority existing before the age of nationalism. He adds that integrative processes 
lead to a decoupling of nation-state and nationalism since increasing supra-state 
control of the economies and the national foreign policies seem to render the 
conventional goal of nationalism (‘full national sovereignty’) increasingly irrelevant.  
 
 
The main argument of the third group of scholars, which also inspires this 
dissertation, is that integrative processes and regional assertiveness compel the nation-
state to change, yet these changes imply a transformation rather than the erosion, let 
alone the decline, of the nation-state. That is, nation-states are still powerful and will 
remain to be key actors. Therefore, this view presents quite different explanations for 
the changes that the nation-state has been undergoing.  
 
First, it is a reality that nation-states have had to face a dilemma for a long 
time. On the one hand, they have sought to secure their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as firmly as ever. On the other hand, they have been forced to join larger 
economic and political communities in order to ensure their own survival (Alter, 1991: 
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123). In this regard, as Milward (1992) argues, the EU can be viewed as an effort by 
nation-states to rescue themselves; the EU was just a step in the reassertion of post-war 
nation-states, and it has developed to respond to difficult problems of economic and 
social transformation in the fields of agriculture, industrial development, and regional 
discrepancies at a supranational level. In other words, this was a political-economic 
strategy of regionalism98 through which the state came to terms with globalization 
(Pasquin, 2002).99  
 
Second, it is obvious that integrative processes have yielded a range of 
remarkable changes in state sovereignty and territoriality. Globalization, as a broader 
framework of integrative processes, mainly involves immense cultural interaction 
among different societies thanks to faster and cheaper new information and 
communications technologies, and the growing importance of transnational political 
and economic cooperation and supranational integration. This is exemplified by the 
existence of organizations like the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World 
Trade Organization, Amnesty International, and the International Criminal Court 
(Keating and McGarry, 2001). Globalization has significant implications for nation-
                                                 
98 In the social science literature, regionalism has two meanings. In political science, it refers to the 
political ideology of regional units within a nation-state, while in international relations it denotes one of 
the three constituents of the international commercial system along with unilaterialism and 
multilaterialism. Here, the second usage is referred to. For more information, see Wilfred J. Ethier 
(1998) “The International Commercial System”, Essays in International Commercial System, Princeton 
University, Dep. of Economics, No.210.  
99 The relationship between the EU, as the most advanced example of regional integration, and 
globalization is double-sided. The EU has pursued policies that are both a response to globalization and 
a stimulus to it. In particular, the advent of the Single European Market and the liberalization of intra-
EU trade has both spurred globalization and improved the global competitiveness of European industry. 
At the same time, the EU has sought to achieve political consensus and the creation of supranational 
institutions that can help ameliorate some of the adverse consequences of globalization (Sweeney, 2005: 
306).   
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state structure. To generalize, the increasing cultural, economic, and political 
interconnectedness among national polities is bringing about a ‘partial denationalizing 
of national territory, and a partial shift of some components of state sovereignty to 
other institutions from supranational entities to the global capital markets’ (Sassen, 
1996); this trend is more visible, organized and deep-rooted within the European 
context. The European nation-states are not the states they used to be before the advent 
of the process of integration. Sovereignty has not been transferred to a state-like 
federation, but it is increasingly held in common:  
 
“pooled among governments, negotiated by thousands of officials through acceptance of 
regulations and court judgments which operate on the principle of mutual interference in each 
other’s domestic affairs” (Wallace, 1999: 84).  
 
Thus, the EU having both intergovernmental and supranational characteristics, 
is probably moving towards a form of co-sovereignty (or compromised sovereignty) at 
the expense of hitherto exclusively national competences, at least in some policy areas 
(Hamilton, 2004).  
 
This picture would be incomplete without mentioning regional activism in 
Europe. This has been positively affected by the process of integration in various 
ways. Integrative processes, specifically European integration, have led to two 
seemingly contradictory outcomes: deterritorialization and reterritorialization (De 
Winter and Türsan, 1998: 3). While national borders have become porous and 
relatively less significant in economic and political terms, regions and cities have 
gained power in such matters as education, cultural identity, and economic 
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regeneration. Economically, richer regions from different member states have formed 
transnational alliances, which have altered traditional understandings of the 
territoriality of modern state. On the other hand, relatively poor regions have raised 
their voices for more EU funding. Economic activism and demands have also been 
accompanied by cultural demands in the regions that are ethno-culturally distinct from 
the majority national population. Thus, in the process of integration, territorial borders 
have gained a new significance.100  
 
These developments have meant noticeable changes in traditional parameters of 
state sovereignty and territoriality. This has encouraged some of the champions of the 
‘erosion of the nation-state’ to develop a multi-level governance approach, which 
denotes the ‘dispersion of authoritative decision making across multiple territorial 
levels’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001); that is, a form of government in which authority 
and policy-making are shared across multiple levels of government – sub-national, 
national, and supranational. Consequently, while declinist arguments have declared the 
end of the nation-state, the erosion of the nation-state view contends instead that it is 
just the form of the nation-state that is changing in favor of multi-level governance. 
Nevertheless, both arguments underestimate the power of the nation-state and 
exaggerate the impacts of integrative processes to varying degrees, while they also 
overplay the power of the regions, which will be discussed in the next section.   
 
                                                 
100 Varied reflections of these dynamics can be observed in the Scottish, Basque and Kurdish cases. 
These dynamics and their impacts that lead to the transformation of the nation-state, especially within 
the context of European integration, will be analyzed in the empirical chapters that focus on each case. 
 
 151
The changes in the nation-state refer to a complex process that cannot be 
simply conceptualized in terms of a ‘pincer attack’ from above and below (i.e. the 
‘sandwich hypothesis’). Rather, it is better to conceptualize integration as a dynamic 
and interrelated process in which all actors shape each other in a changing structural 
framework. Regarding nation-states, it is clear that, not only the environment of the 
states’ actions is changing, but also nation-states themselves are being transformed. 
However, this does not mean that nation-states are withering away (Mann, 1993); they 
remain decisive actors in many respects.  
 
One can explain the persistence of the nation-state mainly on the grounds of its 
functionality and legitimacy. First, nation-states still carry out important functions. 
Despite the fact that ‘sovereignty has been de-centered and territory partly 
denationalized’, states remain key actors in implementing global processes (Suny, 
2009). The state’s withdrawal from some traditional functions, such as industry and 
established forms of public administration of welfare, has not prevented it from 
assuming new functions, such as the regulation of privatized industries (Pierson, 2004: 
162). One can even claim that governments’ abilities to tax and redistribute incomes, 
regulate the economy, and monitor the activity of their citizens has increased beyond 
all recognition (Wolf, 2001). Furthermore, the nation-state has not abandoned the 
strategic areas of the military and security; hence it continues to be the most important 
owner of systemic violence. Equally important, state institutions provide the necessary 
conditions for social existence which are territorially centered. As far as the individual 
is concerned, it remains the basic point of reference for socio-economic development; 
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it is still entrusted with the maintenance of domestic and social peace, and for 
maintenance of the rule of law. In short, as a framework for political, legal and social 
order, the nation-state still penetrates deep into the lives of its citizens (Alter, 1989: 
123).   
 
Another crucial factor to explain the persistence of the nation-states is the fact 
that they are still legitimate. They are seen as legitimate by co-nationals, not only due 
to their ongoing functionality, but also because they continue to provide collective 
identity. Through public education, the national army, police force, mass media, 
cultural and social policies, nation-states keep on inculcating national consciousness, 
which maintains the symbiotic relationship between state and nation (Billig, 1995). 
Hence, besides the critical functions it assumes, the nation-state is still powerful since 
nationalism continuously rejuvenates the idea of nation.  
 
 
The apparent difficulties facing European political integration also help us 
understand the persistence of the nation-state. Above all, Europe has never achieved 
political integration; it is an imagined area rather than a geographical one (Varenne, 
1993). The Europeanization of many areas of societal life has not led to the emergence 
of a European political identity that would underpin political unification. A. D. Smith 
(1992) argues that  Europeans differ among themselves as much as they do from non-
Europeans in respect of language (Basques, Finns, Hungarians), territory (Russians, 
Greeks, Armenians), law (Roman, Germanic), religion (Catholic, Orthodox, 
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Protestant), and economic and political system, as well as in terms of ethnicity and 
culture. Although they have some shared traditions, he thinks that Europeans constitute 
a ‘family of cultures’ rather than ‘a unity in diversity’. Second, it is doubtful that there 
is a strong and lasting dynamic favoring political union. Even though European 
integration has reached a relatively advanced level of supranational integration, the EU 
is still devoid of many of the characteristics that national polities possess. For instance, 
there is no real European newspaper, European TV channel, no European political 
party, and no European public space that deserves the name (Varenne, 1993). In other 
words, the definition and organization of interests remain national, so politics remains 
national (Laffan, 2006). Third, although there is a European Parliament (EP), there is 
no parliamentary basis for democracy in any real sense because the EP is unable to 
enforce political responsibility; that is, it does not hold a government responsible to its 
electorate. At the bottom of this intricate problem lies the fact that there is no European 
electorate in the proper sense. As a result, the legitimacy gap, or democratic deficit, 
has been one of the major factors facing European integration (Abromeit, 1998: 6), 
with the EU still needing to discover ways for linking European-level democracy and 
citizenship (Pierson, 2004: 108). Finally, the citizens of European nation-states 
continue to see their primary loyalty as lying towards their own countries. While the 
co-existence of a European identity in dual form with a national identity is a 
possibility, the replacement of national identity by Europeanness seems to be utopian, 
at least for now. Consequently, endeavors to unite the separate states into a 
supranational entity face noticeable difficulties, and these difficulties for further 
European integration also in large part help to explain the persistence of nation-
 154
states.101 As a corollary to this, European integration and the transformation of the 
nation-state do not mean that nationalism is losing power.  
 
4.1.2. European Integration and the Proliferation of Nationalism  
Indeed, the integration process that was expected by modernists/federalists to 
eradicate nationalism in the continent failed to transcend this potent ideology as a 
mobilizing force in politics, and the sense of belongingness it creates. Nationalism has 
remained a significant force that has strongly affected the course of Europe’s 
integration process. At the same time, the interactive and transformative nature of the 
process of integration has brought about noticeable changes in nationalism as well. 
Especially since the 1970s, European integration, within the broader context of global 
integrative processes and the crisis of the state, have not only significantly changed 
domestic and international opportunity structures for nationalist efforts for the sake of 
political-cultural coherence, but they have also resulted in the proliferation of 
nationalism in different forms. Csergo and Goldgeier (2004) convincingly argue that 
the EU has gradually become an arena of competing nationalisms; today, old and new 
forms of nationalism coexist and mutually reinforce one another in a complex process 
that also shapes the prospects and direction of European integration. Within this 
context, they define at least four types of nationalism in contemporary Europe: 
                                                 
101 The EU constitution was rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands. Then, the still-born EU 
constitution was replaced by the Lisbon Treaty, which fell well short of the comprehensive political 
integration that was foreseen by the Constitution. Even so, it also had to face national reactions by 
Ireland and the Czech Republic. Thus national governments have proved how jealous they are of their 
sovereignty many times. (‘Empty Seat Crisis’; Thatcher’s speech in Brussels- ‘Little England 
Nationalism against European federalism’). For more information, see Dinan, 1999.  
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traditional, sub-state, trans-sovereign, and protectionist nationalisms.102 All these 
nationalisms coexist in some constellation within individual European societies; they 
evolve in a web of interlocking relationships, in which different nationalisms react to, 
constrain, and empower one another (Csergo and Goldgeier, 2004: 30).103  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 While ‘traditional’ nationalisms aim to preserve existing nation-state structures based on territorial 
sovereignty and cultural homogeneity and/or seek statehood, ‘trans -sovereign’ nationalisms seek to 
further economic and cultural cooperation by transcending the territorial boundaries of nation-states. 
‘Protectionist’ nationalisms claim to protect the nation and its cultural underpinnings from the ‘invasion’ 
of by mass-scale immigration, especially from the Muslim world. Although it does allow us to move 
beyond a misleading East-West dichotomy, Csergo and Goldgeier’s typology cannot entirely overcome 
the terminological chaos. For example, sub-state nationalisms pursuing statehood may be classified as 
part of the traditional category, but, due to their distinctive natures and organizations, they need to be 
kept in the sub-state category. In this dissertation, the traditional type is relabeled as state nationalism, 
while all nationalist movements that challenge nation-states and their official nationalisms on the basis 
of ethno-cultural distinctiveness are termed as sub-state nationalisms. The ultimate goals of sub-state 
nationalism may vary from cultural autonomy to independent statehood, but their oppositional 
relationship to existing nation-states allows us classify them under the same category.  
103 We should note that Csergo and Goldgeier’s typology does not present an exhaustive list.  Other 
forms might always be added. For example, pan-European nationalism (Euro-nationalism), initiated by 
Kalergi, has its adherents across the continent. For Pan-European nationalism, see Synder, 1992.   
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Figure 2: Europe as an arena of competing nationalisms (schematized and modified 
version of Csergo and Goldgeier’s theoretical framework) 
 
Within this context, sub-state nationalism and state nationalism (meaning the 
officially institutionalized and reproduced form of nationalism) exist side by side in an 
ever-increasing confrontation under new circumstances. In fact, the emergence of 
European integration as the rescuer of the nation-state implies that nation-state has 
been facing important external and internal challenges. The persistence of nation-states 
proves that they are open to, and able to accommodate, economic, social, and political 
challenges over time. They are being transformed, but they have nevertheless managed 
to maintain their functionality and legitimacy to a great extent. However, nation-states 
have not been able to achieve the same success in the face of persistent sub-state 
nationalisms that have challenged their efficacy and legitimacy from within. Until the 
early 1970s, nation-states dealt with ethno-cultural demands within the general context 
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of regional socio-economic disparities that central national state governments would 
resolve through their own regional development policies. During the 1970s, regional 
policy began to be seen as encouraging the development of sub-state nationalism 
(Watson, 1990) since it unintentionally supported the visualization of sub-national 
territorial borders, and the empowerment of regional political representatives. At the 
same time, failures in the regional policies devised by central governments provided 
further arguments in favor of sub-state nationalism and induced anti-central 
government sentiment due to unfulfilled social and economic expectations in the 
regions concerned.  
 
 
More crucially, while sub-state nationalism used to be an isolated domestic 
matter that central governments could neglect or silence to a great extent, more 
recently it has gained renewed strength due to a range of factors, such as the 
proliferation of supranational and international institutions, the erosion of frontiers, 
and the increasing acceptance of local democracy. In response, within the general 
context of the transformation of the nation-state, many Western European states have 
undergone territorial, administrative and political reorganization. For instance, Britain 
set up a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, Belgium transformed itself into a 
federal state, and even France became committed to decentralization. All these 
developments highlight an obvious fact: that the persistence of the nation-state has 
been accompanied by the persistence of sub-state nationalism in a range of countries, 
such as Britain and Spain, where sub-national ethno-cultural claims date back to the 
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late 19th century. In the contemporary world, sub-state nationalist claims have been 
gaining impetus in many other European countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, 
Germany, and some central and Eastern European countries.104  
 
 
The renewed strength of sub-state nationalism cannot be explained only 
through the changes occurring in traditional nation-state structures based on undivided 
sovereignty and strictly controlled territorial borders. It also requires a consideration of 
the new opportunity structures induced by processes of integration. Besides their 
transformative effects on nation-state structures, sub-state nationalist movements and 
parties are in favor of European integration owing to new channels that enable them to 
raise their demands more effectively, not only at national but also at international 
levels, even allowing transnational cooperation.  
       
4.2. THE NEW OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES FOR SUB-STATE 
NATIONALISM  
It can be suggested that there is a place for sub-state nationalist movements in 
European integration process as long as they assert cultural distinctiveness through 
peaceful means and do not resort to violence to pursue their goals. However, it is 
difficult to contend that the EU intentionally encourages sub-state nationalist activism 
                                                 
104 At this point, one should reemphasize that sub-state nationalist claims may overlap regionalist 
claims, since they are both different forms of territorial politics. Yet they can be differentiated on the 
basis of the existence or lack of historically grounded ethno-cultural claims. On the other hand, 
regionalization may lead regions to gradually develop distinct regional identities, as occurred in Spain 
after decentralization in 1978. The diversity of sub-state nationalist and regionalist claims actually 
reflects distinctive national pressures for regionalization or independent statehood, and distinctive 
responses by national governments.  
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when one considers the fact that nation-states still constitute the building blocks of the 
EU. Moreover, respect for national territorial borders is one of the main principles of 
the international political system, which makes the nationalities (or minorities) 
question still a national question.105 Nevertheless, the crucial point is the fact that the 
dynamics of European integration are leading to the transformation of the nation-state 
structure and facilitating sub-state nationalist mobilization by redefining the political 
opportunity structures for sub-state nationalist movements and parties. When the 
process is considered in this way, it becomes clear why a great majority of sub-state 
nationalist parties support the integration process.  
 
There are several specific reasons for sub-nationalist support for European 
integration. Many sub-state nationalists see the EU as an ally in their struggle for 
autonomy from the central national state. Within the broader processes of 
globalization, processes of European integration that have put conventional 
understandings of sovereignty and territoriality into question have overlapped with 
regionalist pressures for decentralization and, in some cases, autonomy. The process of 
decentralization, in turn, has provided new resources to regional actors, allowing them 
greater control over political issues.  
 
                                                 
105 This study maintains that, as long as nation-states are the building blocks of the EU, it cannot have a 
common policy regarding the issue. At best, it may impose recognition of minority groups and/or 
protection of minority rights. However, the EU has no legal power to compel a state to recognize any 
minorities within its boundaries For instance, France and Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg have not ratified ‘Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ prepared by the 
Council of Europe in 1995 (Alan, 2006). Recently, EU member states have been divided on the issue of 
Kosovo, which has shown once again the importance of power and national interests in the politics of 
minority recognition, as well the difficulties about attaining a European policy on the ‘nationalities 
question’.  
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In relation to the first motive, European integration has made the calls for the 
independence of sub-state nationalist parties more realistic by weakening traditional 
arguments against Kleinstaaterei (Hobsbawm, 1992). In other words, by diminishing 
the benefits of belonging to a sizeable state, political and economic integration have 
increased the viability of regions (Jolly, 2006).106 Sub-state nationalists have increased 
their self-reliance by allowing people to remain powerful after secession. The reduced 
prospect of war and successful examples of small states, such as Norway, Switzerland, 
Denmark, and Iceland (De Winter and Türsan, 1998), have also contributed to the 
“small is beautiful” view (Krüger, 1993). These cases provide strong evidence for sub-
nationalists’ expectations of a brighter future. In sub-state nationalist discourse, the EU 
promises a better standard of living, reduced unemployment and better management of 
resources (Guibernau, 1999).  
 
The final reason for support for European integration is a moral argument, 
since the EU prioritizes respect for collective rights. On the one hand, the nation-state 
and state nationalism constantly reproduce the ‘great marriage of High Culture with 
the political unit’. On the other hand, it has today become difficult for nation-states to 
remain indifferent to the normative framework of the EU that promotes a plural and 
participatory conceptualization of democracy and the recognition of the cultural 
distinctiveness of sub-state national groups living in member states. Hence, sub-
                                                 
106 Jolly (2006) contends that, as predicted by the ‘optimal size of states theory’, supranational 
integration and sub-national fragmentation are not merely coincidental phenomena, but rather they are 
related in a theoretical and predictable way.  
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national demands are no longer easily brushed aside as foolish or divisive by nation-
states.  
 
4.2.1. The New Patterns of Regional Influence:  
European integration has induced not only the transformation of the state; it has 
also brought about the emergence of new patterns of influence for regions through the 
creation of new institutions and policy instruments. Hence, many scholars and 
politicians have insistently pointed to ‘regional empowerment’ as one of the defining 
characteristics of European political architecture in the making. With the evolution of 
European integration in the 1980s and 1990s towards a deeper integration, member 
states and European institutions, for different reasons, supported restructuring of 
regional policies in order to increase resources and involvement of regional authorities 
in policy-making and implementation processes. A restructured Common Regional 
Policy, the Committee of Regions, permanent regional offices in Brussels, and inter-
regional cooperation have emerged as the most noteworthy new channels of regional 
influence. These new patterns have also significantly reshaped the opportunity 
structure for sub-state nationalist parties, which have cooperated with regionalist 
parties for mostly pragmatic reasons. The new Europeanized opportunity structure has 
come to be seen advantageous by many sub-state nationalist parties in terms of both 
enhancing their claims politically and symbolically at a national level, and providing 
them with a greater say in shaping the European integration process. The following 
section elaborates on these new channels.  
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a) Common Regional Policy (CRP)  
The CRP was developed to improve conditions within regions that have lower 
economic growth, employment, or per capita income levels than other regions. EU 
members already have their own regional policies, so why did they also need a 
supranational policy? First, the integration of markets has tended to worsen regional 
economic disparities. Second, economic and monetary union (EMU) has placed limits 
on member states’ capacity to spend money on national regional policies. For instance, 
central governments can no longer manipulate their exchange rates to assist poorer 
regions; the amount of subsidies that member states can spend on their regions have 
also been limited (Bourne, 2003)  
 
The Treaty of Rome provided the seed for CRP. However, the EU’s regional 
policy really developed in several stages, commencing with the establishment of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. Then, the Single European 
Act laid the ground for a genuine EU regional policy. The Structural Funds, including 
ERDF, European Social Fund, and Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund, were 
designed as the principle mechanisms to reduce regional economic disparities and the 
‘backwardness of less favored regions’. At Maastricht, the Cohesion Fund was 
established to assist those states, though not specific regions within them, that were 
expected to find it difficult to meet the convergence criteria for EMU. In fact, EU 
regional funds served as a ‘side payment’ used by richer member states to buy the 
consent of poorer ones in order to facilitate bargains over non-regional policy-related 
issues (Allen, 2000: 245). After a decade of expansion, however, member states had to 
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reform regional policy in the face of the accession of Central and Eastern European 
countries, whose economic development level is significantly lower than most western 
European countries. Given that structural and agricultural spending consume most of 
the EU’s budget, significant budgetary increases would be needed. However, member 
states showed reluctance, which has meant that, since the late 1990s, regional policy 
funding has not been as generous as it was in the 1990s.   
 
Regarding regional authorities and sub-state nationalist actors, the CRP has had 
noticeable implications in terms of policy-making and policy-implementation. The 
1988 Structural Funds Regulations entrenched the partnership principle into the 
Community’s regional policy regime. Partnership required that, in addition to central 
governments, the regions and the Commission should have a role in the preparation of 
programs, and in the assessment and monitoring of those programs as they were put 
into practice. This new method allowed the establishment of new decentralized 
decision procedures, bringing together public and private actors from multiple levels of 
government (Kohler-Koch, 1996). In other words, regions have been drawn into direct 
contact with European policy-makers through the partnership arrangements for 
managing structural funds.107 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 For detailed information on the CRP and its political implications, see İbrahim Saylan (2004) 
“Regional Policy of the European Union: Its Development and Political Impacts in relation to European 
Integration and Regionalism”, A Master Thesis, Universitá Degli Studi di Siena and Universität 
Hannover.  
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b) The Committee of Regions (CoR) 
In 1988, the Commission established a Consultative Council of Regional and 
Local Authorities with consultative rights over the formulation and implementation of 
regional policies, as well as the regional implications of other Community policies. 
The TEU replaced this with a relatively stronger Committee of Regions with formal 
rights of consultation on proposals, but no formal initiative or veto powers. Its 
establishment was in harmony with the ongoing regionalization process and the 
requirements of recently restructured supranational regional policy (Bindi- Calussi, 
1998). Weiler (1999), however, stresses that there were more profound reasons behind 
its establishment, claiming that the EU experienced a ‘constitutional moment’ with the 
TEU and entered a ‘hearkening’ process. That is, democracy, legitimacy, identity and 
citizenship have become core issues in defining the ‘purpose’ of the EU, with the 
democratic deficit being one of the most contentious matters regarding the fate of the 
EU integration process. The principle of subsidiarity, which “aims to ensure that 
decisions are taken as close as possible to the citizen” (TEU, Article 1), was 
considered to be a remedy for the problem of participation, and the establishment of 
the CoR was complementary to such efforts.   
 
Formally, the CoR is an institution through which regional and local bodies can 
officially be involved in drawing up and implementing Community policies, and 
indeed, included in the legislative process (Evans, 2002). In February 1995, the CoR 
announced that it existed to strengthen economic and social cohesion among the 
Member states. It also saw its establishment as a significant step towards creating an 
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ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. The CoR desires a political union in 
which decisions are taken as close as possible to citizens.108  
 
c) Representation at the Council of Ministers 
  Article 203 of the TEU (formerly Article 146) opened up the possibility that 
regional ministers could represent their state, in some cases with voice and vote, in the 
EU Council and its working groups. The details, however, were left to each individual 
state to decide. It is important to emphasize that the TEU does not allow regional 
ministers to participate as representatives of their own regions’ interests. Regional 
ministers, like central government ministers, represent and must vote for their state as 
a whole (Bourne, 2003). This clause has so far been put into practice in the federal 
states of Germany, Austria and Belgium. Although it does not allow regions to 
represent themselves individually, it can be seen an important breach in the principle 
that only national governments are represented in Europe (Keating, 1999).   
 
d) Permanent Regional Offices 
Permanent offices of regions in Brussels provide them with direct links to the 
EU. Considerably diverse, the EU offices include federal ministries, regional, city, and 
local authorities or consortia of regions. The offices have two fundamental roles. First, 
they provide information to regions on forthcoming initiatives, allowing them to lobby 
their national governments. Second, they serve a symbolic role in projecting regions 
                                                 
108 See www.cor.eu.int Visited on December 20, 2010.  
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and regional politicians into the European arena and representing them as participants 
in the policy-making process (Keating, 1998).  
 
The size and strength of regional offices are not related to the degree of 
available resources, but to the degree of autonomy held by a region (Greenwood, 
2003). For example, all German regions have offices, while French regions are 
represented in a variety of ways, on their own, in joint offices, or in some cases by a 
department. Italian and Spanish regions won the right to set up offices in 1996. The 
UK, with its fragmented local system, has the most regional and local offices in 
Brussels. The British government ruled that offices for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland should be no more than platforms for regional interests, and not have any 
political role.    
 
Many regional governments are careful not to create tensions with permanent 
national delegations to Brussels. Marks et al. (1996) found that, where conflicts 
existed with central government, a region was more likely to set up an office in 
Brussels, both to monitor and to attempt to represent their interests. Indeed, many 
regional governments have attempted to be more involved in EU decision-making 
processes. The value of this strategy depends on the permeability of EU institutions 
and their capacity to respond. While the EU Commission is content to expand its own 
information sources by talking to regions, it is rarely able to respond to specific 
demands. On the other hand, the directorate-generals responsible for regional and 
structural policies have become, to some extent, allies of the regions in maintaining 
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pressure on the Council. For the same reason, the Commission encourages the 
activities of European-wide organizations of local and regional authorities (Keating, 
2001).     
 
e) Inter-regional Cooperation  
As well as the efforts exerted through individual offices, regions also combine 
their efforts to increase their influence within EU institutions and to promote their 
common interests in the institutional structure. As for inter-regional cooperation, there 
are two levels. The first is multi-purpose associations of regions. The Council of Local 
Authorities and Regions of Europe, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe, and the Assembly of European Regions are the three best-known examples. 
The second level of cooperation involves more focused alliances of specific regions, 
such as groupings of regions with a narrower geographical or sectoral focus. This kind 
of cooperation started in the 1970s, as an outcome of efforts to find solutions to the 
problems of economic restructuring. The first example of inter-regional cooperation 
came with the establishment of the Association of European Frontier Regions, founded 
in 1971, followed by the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions in 1973 and, 
later, RETI (Regions de tradition industrielle) and the Foundation of Europe of the 
Cultures. There are two types of this level of inter-regional cooperation. The first 
focuses on general sectoral interests, with the best-known example being the Four 
Motors of Europe, founded as an alliance of the high-technology regions of Baden-
Württemberg, Lombardy, Rhone-Alps, and Catalonia to exploit the advantages of the 
Single Market. The second type is cross-border initiatives, which are by far the most 
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common type of inter-regional cooperation. The logic of functionality is apparent, 
especially where economic and cultural regions are bisected by national boundaries. 
For instance, Euroregions have been established across the French-Belgian-British 
frontier and the Spanish-French frontier. Cross-border cooperations focus on common 
problems and opportunities, especially in economic development, infrastructure, 
environment, and sometimes culture, but they have also had a strong political 
component, founded on the desire of regional politicians to project themselves on a 
wider stage (Keating, 1988, 2001).109  
 
f) Other Patterns of Regional Influence:  
Besides these elements of the new opportunity structure that are directly related 
to the EU, the new opportunity structure also includes multi-purpose associations 
under the aegis of the Council of Europe such as the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities of Europe (CLRA). As an institution of the Council of Europe, the CLRA 
involves not only EU members but all states of ‘Greater Europe’, including candidate 
countries to the EU. A number of other significant institutions that cover the whole of 
Europe such as the Assembly of European Regions (AER), and Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) also participate. Of these two, although they both 
prioritize an economic logic, the former has played the more important role in 
                                                 
109 The Basque nationalist regional government, led by the PNV until 2009, is a good example of 
engaging in sub-state nationalist politics by making use of inter-regional cooperation opportunities 
within the European context. The use of new opportunity structures by the PNV, the SNP, and the DTP 
will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.       
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formulating policies and demands for regional representation in the negotiations 
leading to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties (Keating, 1999).110 
 
4.2.2. The Limits of the New Opportunity Structures  
European integration and regional activism are two main factors that explain 
not only the transformation of the nation-state but also the reshaping of the opportunity 
structure for sub-state nationalist politics. This is essentially a multi-dimensional, 
interactive process, changing the relations of power and affecting the distribution of 
resources in society. In this process, many sub-state nationalist actors have viewed 
European integration as a chance to play a part on a wider stage and to make gains for 
their ‘nations’ which are unlikely to come to them from existing states. The 
establishment of new channels in favor of regional assertiveness has been among the 
major reasons enhancing the conviction of sub-state nationalists that European 
integration positively affects their fate, since the EU facilitates access to power and 
resources, albeit through regional empowerment. Nonetheless, even though the new 
channels seem to provide ways of bypassing central states by establishing direct and 
unmediated sub-state national access to EU institutions, the potential of new 
opportunity structures is frequently exaggerated. That is, although the new channels 
collectively represent a departure from the status quo ante, there are still significant 
obstacles facing regional empowerment and sub-state nationalist politics (Jeffery, 
2000: 4). 
                                                 
110 For detailed information on each, see the following websites:  
http://www.coe.int/T/Congress/Default_en.asp; http://www.aer.eu; http://www.ccre.org/ Retrieved on 
December 1, 2010.  
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The persistence of the nation-state remains the major hindrance against 
regional empowerment. Europe’s institutional design only opens new chances for 
regional governments if they accept the rules of the game. The role of the regions has 
increased in Europe since the late 1980s, and they have won more access points to EU 
institutions, but these possibilities are strictly controlled by the nation-states. The 
political system of the EU still preserves a privileged position for member states, even 
if they are no longer the only players in the game (Nagel, 2004). This can be observed 
in many ways. First, since the 1988 reforms, there have been important changes 
significantly diluting the potential of partnership as a source of exclusively regional 
influence. In 1993, partnership was extended to include economic and social partners; 
in 1999, it was extended to include ‘any other relevant competent body’, such as 
environmental and social equality groups (Allen, 2000: 254). Second, the principle of 
subsidiarity has tended to work, not for the benefits of regions, but for the benefits of 
states (Jones, 2001: 62).111 Third, although the Commission is influential in matters of 
institutional design, such as in the development of partnerships, intergovernmental 
bargains are crucial in budgetary matters (Bourne, 2003: 289). Allen observes in the 
same way that “despite a great deal of sub-national activity associated with the 
structural funds, there is no really convincing evidence that this has weakened the 
intergovernmental character of policy negotiation (Allen, 2000: 263).112 
                                                 
111 Jones (2001: 62–3) maintains that the principle is vague and open to interpretation. While British 
Prime Minister John Major viewed it as a protection against federalism, some others see it as fully 
compatible with the logic of federalism.   
112 Other clear evidence of the persistence of the nation-state is national minority rights, which is 
directly related to the accommodation of sub-state nationalist claims. Although a set of norms has 
emerged in the EU that favors institutions allowing for the reproduction of minority cultures, and 
European institutions have been promoting these norms in their accession negotiations with candidate 
countries, the EU has no body of law for minority protection. The EU still sees states as monolithic 
political entities, and states cannot be obliged to sign up to international treaties or conventions related 
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The second main factor that limits the new opportunity structure is that there is 
a considerable heterogeneity of the regional actors, which leads to the failure of 
collective regional action. The juridical status and the degree of administrative and 
political economy of the regions differ greatly, and such differences influence the 
involvement of regions in the EU decision-making process. The range of European 
states and regions runs from the more unitarian states (Portugal, France, Greece) 
through more or less decentralized states (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) to federal states 
(Germany, Austria) (Bindi-Calussi, 1998: 227). This variety unsurprisingly 
undermines the CoR’s status, where representatives of federal units, autonomous 
regions and local councils sit together. The chances of cooperation are also reduced 
because there is competition among regions, especially for foreign investment and EU 
funding. Finally, although they are primarily defined in common by the territorial 
politics they pursue, conventional ideological cleavages might nevertheless hinder 
cooperation between regionalist and sub-state nationalist parties at national and/or 
transnational levels.      
 
In short, the potential of the new opportunity structure has been frequently 
overstated since regional access does not always imply real power. Whether regional 
governments are able to influence European policies depends on their power in their 
respective state (Greenwood, 2003), because access to power occurs through, rather 
than beyond, the nation-state (Jeffery, 2000). Hence, contrary to the expectations of a 
                                                                                                                                             
to minority rights. This shows that the EU has no legal power to compel a state to recognize any 
minorities within its boundaries, meaning that it is difficult for it to uphold a common policy for 
national minorities, since the issue of national minorities is still overwhelmingly ‘national’. In this 
sense, the idea of state rights is still intact, and the principle of state sovereignty can be still used to 
make persuasive arguments against national minority rights (Jackson Preece, 1998: 173).  
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multi-level governance approach, regions remain relatively minor actors in European 
governance (Le Gales and Lequesne, 1998),113 leaving the current institutional design 
closer to a ‘Europe with regions rather than of regions’ (Nagel, 2004: 59, emphasis 
added).   
 
4.3. SUB-STATE NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND  
THE NEW OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
Different constitutional arrangements within member states, different political 
contexts shaped by the level of sub-national identity, and the willingness and capacity 
of sub-state nationalist movements and parties to establish direct contact with the EU 
are three of the factors that make it difficult to generalize the nature of the triadic 
relationship between the EU, nation-states and sub-state nationalisms. However, there 
is no doubt that European integration process has reshaped the opportunity structure 
that to a large extent conditions sub-state nationalist politics.  
 
The new opportunity structure reflects certain characteristics of 
Europeanization.114 Member or candidate states’ commitments to the EU force them to 
                                                 
113 In the same vein, Bache (1998) argues that contemporary governance is based on flexible ‘gate-
keeping’ by central governments rather than a multi-level government. See Ian Bache (1998) The 
Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multilevel Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?, 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.  
114 Europeanization is a widespread but also a contested concept; it is used in different ways to describe 
a variety of phenomena and processes of change. Olsen (2003: 334) identifies at least five different uses 
of Europeanization: Europeanization as changes in external territorial boundaries (such as enlargement), 
as the development of institutions of governance at the European level (European-level 
institutionalization), as the export of European forms of political organization and governance beyond 
Europe, as a project of political unity, and as the penetration of European level institutions into national 
and sub-national systems of governance.  
Succinctly, Europeanization refers to the impacts of European integration on the national domain, and 
the emergence of a new political architecture which is still under construction. Regarding national and 
sub-national politics, Ladrech’s definition is illuminating: Europeanization is “a process reorienting the 
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accommodate sub-state nationalist demands through democratic means. Even though 
member states resist essential sub-state nationalist demands, those having sub-state 
nationalist or strong regionalist movements are becoming increasingly decentralized. 
Thus, the functionalist logic of off-loading the center’s burdens to regions is frequently 
intertwined with rising voices for self-government in the name of more or real 
democracy.115  
 
Regarding sub-state nationalist parties, the impacts of Europeanization on the 
opportunity structure are also obvious. They include the EU into their political 
calculations, and a great majority of them have come to frame their demands in 
European terms. More generally, the impacts of the new Europeanized opportunity 
structure can be observed as shifts in their cognition, discourse, and identity. However, 
it should be stressed that the opportunity structure is Europeanized to varying degrees 
in each member or candidate country. The abovementioned reasons that make it 
difficult to generalize the triadic relationship between the EU, nation-states and sub-
state nationalisms also imply a distinctiveness of the opportunity structure in each 
context.  
 
In order to analyze the impacts of European integration on sub-state nationalist 
parties, the following section will focus on the interpretation of European integration 
by sub-state nationalist parties, the most noticeable ways of their utilization of 
                                                                                                                                             
direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994: 6).   
115 It would be useful to note at this point that the Europeanization of sub-state nationalist conflicts 
through new opportunity structures is qualitatively different from their internationalization, which 
usually refers to interference by individual external actors (states) or international organizations.   
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Europeanized opportunity structure, and finally the effects of Europeanization on the 
ultimate goals of these parties.    
 
4.3.1. Sub-state Nationalist Parties’ Interpretation of European Integration 
The perspectives of sub-state nationalist political parties on the European 
integration process are based on their interpretation of the process in general and its 
specific impacts on both host states and the parties themselves. It can be argued that 
sub-state nationalist parties can respond to European integration in three ways (Lynch, 
1996; Nagel, 2004).  
 
First, they can fight against European integration and/or the EU. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, it was a widespread attitude to be critical of the European Economic 
Community. They attacked ‘internal colonialism’ and fought what they understood as 
a united Europe of big capital and big nation-states. However, Occitanian, Galician 
and Irish nationalism gradually gave up this interpretation, and today, an anti-
European position is very rare among sub-state nationalist parties. The best-known 
exception is the outlawed Batasuna in the Basque Country.  
 
Secondly, they can use the chances the EU offers and play the game according 
to the established rules, but with the intention of changing those rules in the long run. 
This possibility is especially appealing to sub-state nationalist movements which 
operate in a territory recognized as a region by the host state, and who have the chance 
to win an electoral majority there. This strategy fits well with an interpretation of the 
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EU as a supranational entity that will evolve towards the establishment of a ‘Europe of 
the Regions’. According to the vision of ‘Europe of the Regions’, a politically unified 
federal Europe could be established, whose integral units are ethnoculturally and 
linguistically identified regions rather than existing states. From this perspective, the 
larger European framework will ultimately weaken the relevance of existing national 
majority-minority relations. The PNV, for instance, is committed to such a vision of 
European integration.  
 
Finally, sub-state nationalist parties can aim at ‘independence in Europe’, 
giving support to the EU but claiming recognition as just another member state. If the 
EU is interpreted as a community of states, such nationalist parties think that they have 
to aim for independence, arguing that stateless nations also have the right to self-
determination. Once a state, the nation would be entitled to the same rights as other 
members, so that, for example, its national language would be recognized on the same 
grounds as the languages of other member states. ‘Independence in Europe’ may be 
attractive to the electorate, as it seems less radical than straightforward separatism and 
may dissipate fears of the economic costs of statehood (Nagel, 2004: 61). The best-
known example of this type is the SNP.  
 
If the first type of interpretation is dominant, it would be impossible to speak of 
the integration process as an opportunity structure. If the second and third 
interpretations prevail, sub-state nationalist parties seek to utilize the Europeanized 
opportunity structure to assist their domestic claims. There have been significant 
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individual efforts and, more importantly, transnational cooperation to make use of the 
Europeanized opportunity structure, in particular the above-mentioned new channels of 
regional influence. Among others, especially the European Free Alliance and 
paradiplomacy are the most significant examples out of responses by sub-state 
nationalist political actors to the new context.    
 
4.3.2. Making Use of the New Opportunity Structure  
a) The European Free Alliance (EFA) 
The European Parliament (EP) elections that have been held since 1979 have 
provided a new political space for the constitution of a European party family besides 
the ad hoc electoral alliances between sub-state nationalist parties of different regions 
and countries. The European Free Alliance (EFA) represents the most noticeable step 
taken in this direction. The EFA is a pan-European political alliance formed in 1981. It 
consists of various national-level political parties in Europe that advocate either full 
independence (statehood) or some form of self-government or devolution for their 
country or region. It has generally limited its membership to ‘progressive’ regionalist 
and sub-state nationalist political parties. Hence, not all sub-state nationalist parties are 
members of the EFA.  
 
After the 1989 EP elections, regionalist and sub-state nationalists formed a 
united group in the EP called ‘the Rainbow Group’. Among others, this group 
consisted of one MEP for the PNV and one for the SNP. However, in the 1994 EP 
elections, their vote fell significantly, and the membership of Lega Nord was 
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suspended. The PNV joined the European Peoples’ Party. The EFA stood in the EP 
with three members: the SNP, VU, and Canarian Coalition. Following the 1999 
elections, the EFA and European Green Party formed the EP ‘Greens and European 
Free Alliance’ political grouping, supplying ten MEPs, with two from the SNP, during 
this term (1999-2004). However, the number of MEPs from EFA was reduced to four 
(with two for the SNP) in the 2004 EP elections. In 2004, the EFA became a European 
political party and the cooperation with the Greens continues. In the most recent EP 
election in 2009, the EFA gained six MEPs, again with two for the SNP (Lynch, 1998 
and 2007).  
 
Codified in the Brussels Declaration of 2000, the EFA stands for ‘a Europe of 
Free Peoples based on the principle of subsidiarity, which believe in solidarity with 
each other and the peoples of the world’. The EFA considers itself as an alliance of 
stateless peoples, who are striving towards independence or autonomy. It argues that 
the EU should move away from centralization in favor of the formation of a Europe of 
Regions, according to which regions should have more power. It also wants to protect 
linguistic and cultural diversity in the EU.116 The EFA stands on the left politically, 
emphasizing the protection of human rights, sustainable development, and social 
justice. In 2007, EFA members added several progressive articles to the Brussels 
Declaration of 2000, including a commitment to the fight against racism, xenophobia, 
islamophobia, discrimination, anti-semitism, and a commitment to win full citizenship 
rights for migrants.      
                                                 
116 For detailed information, see http://www.e-f-a.org/efaactive.php?id=43 
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Despite its effectiveness, EFA representation within the EP has been limited, 
partly as a consequence of the decision of some sub-state nationalist parties to sit with 
the traditional party families. For instance, the PNV is a member of European 
Democratic Party (EDP), a centrist European party in favor of European integration117, 
while CiU (Convergencia i Unio, Catalonia) sits with the Liberal Democrats in the EP. 
In other words, two major political parties of Spanish sub-state nationalism are not 
members of the EFA. The EFA’s situation thus shows that sub-state nationalist parties 
face fundamental difficulties in terms of forming a federal transnational party. While 
they have an interest in the creation of a Europe of the Regions, they fail to advance 
any specific constitutional designs or policies and remain deeply divided regarding 
their ultimate aims and traditional ideological stances (De Winter and Gomez-Reino 
Cachafeiro, 2002).118   
   
b) Paradiplomacy  
European integration has encouraged the involvement of regional governments 
and sub-state nationalist actors in the international arena. The appearance of sub-state 
nationalist parties in the EP and the Council of Europe, the establishment of 
representations and delegations in Brussels, and their participation in bi- or multi-
                                                 
117 In conjunction with the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), the EDP forms the 
Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) parliamentary group in the EP. The EDP 
contributed nine MEPs after the 2009 EP elections, with one from the PNV.  
118 To illustrate, the SNP as a center-left party pursues full independence, the PNV as center-right party 
is in favor of co-sovereignty, while center-right Volksunie (Belgium) supports federalism, and center-
left Partido Andalucista favors regional autonomy. Hix and Lord (1997) state that sub-state nationalist 
and regionalist parties have territorial politics as their common ground but they are deeply divided on 
the left-right dimension. At the same time, most of this type of parties contain left and right wings 
within a single party, and consequently they tend to adopt a centrist position in the party system.    
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lateral discussions and relationships with their opposites across Europe all show that 
they can now implement international policy through paradiplomacy (Goldsmith, 
2003). In other words, regional authorities can act as quasi-states, although of course 
there are certain limits to this. In order to carry out paradiplomatic activities, sub-
national authorities need above all political recognition and the provision of an 
appropriate institutional design for sub-national representation. Many sub-state 
nationalist and regionalist parties in Western European countries have achieved such 
conditions through various forms of autonomy.  
 
Regional governments in different European countries, some of which are 
already ruled by sub-state nationalist parties, go abroad mainly for economic, cultural, 
and political motivations. Economically, they seek investment, markets for their 
products, and technology for modernization. Culturally, regions with their own culture 
or language also seek support in the international arena, especially where their own 
state government is unsympathetic or the homeland of the language is in another 
state.119 Alliances among cultural regions have been forged to lobby state and 
transnational institutions, for example, in the European Bureau of Lesser Used 
Languages (EBLUL). They seek to promote the use of sub-national languages in 
European and international institutions.120 Politically, regions have a variety of 
                                                 
119 For instance, Catalonia has promoted its own language in the departments of Spanish language in 
universities and academies abroad, and has sought a place for non-state languages in European 
languages (Keating, 1999) 
120 Scottish Gaelic, Euskera (Basque language) are among the lesser used languages that are recognized 
and supported by the EBLUL.  For detailed information, see 
http://www.eblul.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=118&Itemid=56 Retrieved on 
December 1, 2010. 
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reasons. For example, sub-state nationalist parties look to the international arena for 
recognition and legitimacy.  
 
Regions with distinct historical and cultural identities may also use their 
diaspora to enhance their political influence in other countries and to mobilize 
resources. For instance, the Basque diaspora in the Americas provides an arena for 
Basque nationalism (Keating 1999). The same kind of relationship is also true for the 
Kurdish diaspora in various European countries and Kurdish nationalism.121  
 
4.3.3. The Impact of European Integration on Sub-State Nationalist Strategies 
and Goals  
The European integration process has resulted in significant changes in terms 
of both the nation-state structure and sub-state nationalist political parties. Regarding 
the latter, the Europeanized opportunity structure has not only encouraged them to 
respond to the big idea of European integration but it has also reshaped their 
perceptions of political, cultural or economic self-interest.  
 
Their interpretation and utilization of European integration reveals that it has 
had both electoral and programmatic effects on sub-state nationalist parties, with the 
most crucial effect of European integration probably being on the end-goals of these 
parties. With one exception (i.e. the outlawed Batasuna in Spain), all sub-state 
nationalist political parties across Europe have modified their goals to take account of 
                                                 
121 See Vera Eccarius-Kelly (2002) “Political Movements and leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the 
European Diaspora”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 22 (1), pp. 91–118. 
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European integration. In other words, their goals have become Europeanized, either as 
staying within the context of ‘Europe of the regions’ or as ‘Independence in Europe’. 
Today, independence, autonomy and federalism are no longer the unilateral goals of 
these parties. Instead, sub-nationalist ideals and European integration have become 
intertwined (Lynch, 1996).  
 
The Europeanization of the ultimate goals of sub-state nationalist parties has 
led many scholars to argue that these parties have undergone a critical transformation 
in which they have relinquished previous goals of independent statehood.122 It has 
been claimed that integrative processes challenge the intended congruence between 
state and nation by challenging the nation-state structure itself on functional and 
normative grounds, leading to the diffusion of power through both supra-national 
integration and the creation of new layers of authority. These developments have also 
had critical effects on the goals of sub-state nationalism. Although the desire for some 
kind of institutional self-government on a nationally defined homeland has been 
fundamental to all sub-state nationalisms, the traditional aim  to eventually achieve a 
state of their own has become unfeasible for sub-state nationalist movements. 
Consequently, they have developed new concepts of sovereignty (‘co-sovereignty’, 
‘shared sovereignty’), suggesting that the goal of independent statehood has been 
replaced by the aim of more power to have more influential representation and access 
to resources. Supporters of this argument observe that there has been a noticeable 
convergence in terms of the goals of sub-state nationalist parties, in the sense that they 
                                                 
122 Therefore, the SNP’s openly declared aim of ‘independence’ (albeit in Europe) is seen as a trump 
card rather than a realistic target. This issue will be discussed in detail in the chapter on the SNP.  
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have given up the goal of independent statehood (Keating, 1996; Lynch, 1996; 
Hamilton, 2004, Thomsen, 2001). These scholars contend that, since European 
integration has altered the traditional functions of nation-states and the meaning of 
sovereignty, it no longer makes sense for sub-state nationalist parties to pursue 
independent statehood. Thus, European integration encourages sub-state nationalist 
politics, but at the same time it compels these parties to modify their ultimate goals so 
that they fall short of independence.  
  
Indeed, while an openly independentist position has become unusual, 
adherence to the regionalist-federalist ‘Europe of the regions’ has become the most 
popular choice among sub-state nationalist parties. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
ultimate goals of sub-state nationalist parties have been Europeanized in the form of 
creating a ‘Europe of the regions’ does not necessarily show that they have definitely 
relinquished the goal of independence. For instance, the PNV defends the idea of co-
sovereignty, but still seems to retain the goal of independence.  
 
Sub-state nationalist discourse is often vague, which can be explained in two 
ways. First, an openly independentist position may be very rare since the high costs of 
independence might reduce electoral support. These costs could include losing 
economic advantages, possible sanctions by the host state, or uncertainty about the 
status of a newly created state within the EU.123 Nevertheless, there are still significant 
                                                 
123 Accession to the EU depends on the unanimous vote of member states. In case of a declaration of 
independence by a sub-state nationalist party, it is highly probable that a new state born out of an 
existing EU member state would be vetoed by at least this member state, which would make EU 
membership of the new state impossible.  
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reasons for pursuing statehood. Despite its remarkable transformation, the nation-state 
is still powerful since it is considered to be functional and legitimate by the masses. 
Moreover, at supranational and international levels, nation-states still stand as the main 
building blocks of political architecture. While European integration has led to the 
diffusion of authority as a consequence of supranational integration and more regional 
involvement, the most decisive organ of the EU in terms of decision-making is still the 
Council of Ministers. It means that without the internationally recognized status of 
independent statehood, it is hardly possible to have a say in high profile policy, or even 
in decisions directly related to the sub-national unit. More generally, in the 
international arena, the society of sovereign states has been the most exclusive political 
club in the world. Politicians and polities of diverse interests, concerns, beliefs, and 
ideologies want to participate in world politics; they want their voices heard in the 
places where the activity of world politics is carried on. Thus, sovereignty based on 
state equality is inclusive: it underscores the value of representation and participation 
in world politics, and it also implies that there is no guarantee of non-sovereign voices 
getting any separate international hearing.  
 
Consequently, there is no strong evidence for the claim that European 
integration transcends nation-states in favor of a ‘Europe of the regions’.124 The 
transformation of the nation-state does not necessarily imply that independent 
                                                 
124 The developments during the Convention on the future of Europe were entirely a disappointment for 
sub-state nationalist and regionalist political actors. The Convention is a body set up in 2002 as a 
platform of debate on alternative models and visions of the EU; its main assignment was to prepare a 
draft Constitution for the EU. In this process, regionalist and sub-state nationalist actors (especially from 
Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, and the German Lander) sought to have bigger roles for regions written 
into the draft EU Constitution. These efforts were rebuffed by the Convention, partly thanks to pressure 
from Spain and France (Economist, 15.11.2003, No 369). Since then, their enthusiasm has been 
gradually replaced by disappointment about the prospects of new opportunity structure.    
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statehood has become an anachronistic goal for sub-state nationalist parties. In any 
case, sub-state nationalist parties continue to pay attention both to their imagined 
ethno-cultural communities and socio-economic rationalism. In their struggle for 
recognition and power, power has been the deciding element. They support European 
integration since they conceive that European integration does not threaten their ethno-
cultural identities, and that the Europeanized opportunity structure contains many 
elements that make them more powerful vis-à-vis their host states. Moreover, the idea 
of a ‘Europe of the regions’ provides them with the opportunity of turning the existing 
political structure into a composition of regions and nations (autonomous 
communities), rather than nation-states. Yet, they have to face the reality that nation-
states are still powerful, and the EU supports functional cooperation among regions 
rather than providing national recognition for sub-national units. In the last instance, 
the existence or dissolution of the system of nation-states depends on the outcome of 
power struggles between sub-nationalist actors and nation-states in which the capacity 
of sub-nationalist actors for transnational cooperation would be especially important.  
 
To recapitulate main arguments of this chapter, the European integration 
process has reshaped the opportunity structures that determine the resources for and 
constraints facing sub-state nationalist politics. A process of Europeanization of the 
opportunity structures has occurred through the transformation of the nation-state and 
the emergence of new channels for regional assertiveness that are also used by sub-
state nationalist political actors. Almost all sub-state nationalist parties have 
interpreted the ongoing integration process positively, and the impacts of 
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Europeanized opportunity structure have brought about shifts in their discourse and 
identity. More critically, they have come to frame their ultimate goals in European 
terms, either as a Europe of the regions or independence in Europe.    
   
Many scholars consider that European integration acts to the detriment of 
nation-states, arguing that the nation-state as the hegemonic form of the modern state 
has been losing power since its sovereign power has been diffused due to supranational 
integration and regional decentralization. According to them, nation and state have 
been decoupled and, since full sovereignty has lost its meaning, sub-state nationalist 
parties have converged on new conceptions of sovereignty that are in line with the 
ideal of a Europe of the Regions.  
 
It is clear that nationalism has proliferated and undergone significant changes 
within European integration process. Sub-state nationalist parties have made use of the 
new opportunity structure that has been to their advantage in many respects. However, 
the potential of these new opportunity structures has been overstated. Regional 
governments, some of which are occupied by sub-state nationalist parties (e.g. the SNP 
in Scotland), have only been able to influence Europe if they have power in their host 
states, since access to power occurs through, rather than beyond, the nation-state. This 
means that nation-states have undergone a transformation within the European 
integration process, but they persist.  
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Sovereignty is no longer undivided and territorial borders have become porous, 
but power continues to lie primarily with the nation-state. Sub-state nationalism as a 
form of politics seeks power for the ethno-cultural group it claims to represent, so the 
main location of its power struggle remains the state. Full sovereignty may not make 
sense in the new context; however, independent statehood still matters. As long as 
nationalist politics, grounded on conflicts of identity and interests, exist, it is always 
possible that ethno-culturally distinct groups without states will pursue a kind of 
autonomy, ranging from cultural autonomy to full independence. That is, there is no 
guarantee that they will be satisfied with an institutional structure falling short of 
independence. At the same time though, full independence may be a sincerely declared 
and pursued ultimate goal, or just a trump card against the nation-state. Nevertheless, it 
remains an appealing option, insofar as nation-states are tenacious and a ‘Europe of the 
regions’ is a far-fetched ideal.  
 
In any case, the realization of sub-state nationalist ideals depends on a 
continuous struggle against the nation-state and its officially constructed and 
reproduced nationalism. Within the politics of nationalism, European integration 
functions mainly as an external support system that provides sub-state nationalist 
parties with a more suitable framework compared to the exclusively nationally defined 
opportunity structure in the past. However, the potential of the Europeanized 
opportunity structure should not be exaggerated. As long as member states are 
‘masters of the treaty’, the EU should not be expected to develop a common policy or 
perspective on the ‘nationalities question’, which is still primarily a national question.  
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The following chapters examine the impacts of European integration in the 
light of three cases: the SNP, the PNV, and the DTP. Each chapter will focus on the 
influences of the European integration process on the national identity construction, 
goals, and strategies of these sub-state nationalist parties within the context of the 
triadic relationship between the nation-state, sub-state nationalist parties and the EU. 
The discussion will also touch on the interplay between sub-state nationalism and state 
nationalism within the new context. Analyzing these cases should allow us test the 
validity of the arguments raised in this chapter, and comparing the findings obtained 
for each case will contribute to the ongoing debate on sub-state nationalism.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY: 
‘INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE’ 
 
 
Scottish sub-state nationalism is an interesting example of nationalism that 
includes a specific combination of territorial and class politics. Dating back to the 19th 
century, Scottish nationalism has been predominantly led by the Scottish National 
Party (the SNP) since the 1960s, though it has never been the exclusive property of one 
party.125 The SNP was formed after the merger of the National Party of Scotland and 
the Scottish Party in 1934. While it was a Home Rule party in its first years, it became 
an independence party in the 1940s. While the SNP’s electoral performance has been 
                                                 
125 Scottish nationalism has had a number of manifestations. Sometimes, it has been represented in 
political parties such as the SNP, at other times through cross-party pressure groups such as the Scottish 
Home Rule Association, the Scottish Convention and the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, or through 
internal party pressure groups such as Scottish Labour Action (Lynch, 2002). In this sense, Scottish 
nationalism certainly involves more than the SNP. Besides the pro-independence wing, Britain-wide 
organized political parties, except for Conservatives, have all defended different forms of self-
government for Scotland. The Liberal Party has been committed to Scottish Home Rule within a federal 
Britain. The Labour Party previously strongly adhered to Home Rule, but this policy was abandoned 
after 1922, although the Labour Party in Scotland formally abandoned it only in 1958. It took it up again 
in 1974, in the form of devolution, an arrangement for a subordinate Scottish assembly within the 
British state, with Westminster retaining its sovereignty. The Scottish branch of the Labour Party took 
the name of Scottish Labour Party (the SLP) in 1994 to strengthen its national credentials as a 
precaution against the growing electoral support for the SNP at the expense of itself. The Conservatives 
have remained opposed to any constitutional change (Keating, 1996:180). 
For a detailed history of the SNP see Lynch (2002), and for a comprehensive analysis on the SNP see 
Gerry Hassan (ed.) (2009) The Modern SNP – From Protest to Power, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press.    
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characterized by ebbs and flows during much of its history, it only began to achieve 
significant success in the 1970s. After a period of failure in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a 
spectacular rise. As an independence party, the SNP played the key role in forcing 
major actors, namely the Scottish Labour Party (SLP) and Conservatives, to accept 
constitutional reform through Scotland’s 1997 devolution (Lynch, 1996). After the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, it became the second party, behind 
the SLP, in the 1999 and 2003 elections. The Scottish parliamentary elections of 2007 
turned out to be the peak of its electoral success, when it took first place with a narrow 
majority over the SLP. Since 2007, the SNP has formed a minority government in 
Scotland.  
 
The British state has not been oppressive towards Scottish identity, and the 
Scots have been able to retain much of their historically rooted institutional and 
cultural autonomy. These factors have accordingly shaped both the development of 
Scottish nationalism and the opportunity structures that have been relatively very much 
broader compared to its equivalents in other Western European countries. These 
relatively favorable opportunity structures for sub-state nationalist politics were 
reshaped by Britain’s accession to the EU (then European Community) in 1973, and 
the establishment of Scottish Parliament after the 1997 devolution. These were such 
critical turning points for the SNP that the party has, for more than two decades, 
defined its goal as ‘independence in Europe’, conceiving of the Scottish Parliament 
just as a springboard for this purpose.  
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In order to understand the impacts of the European integration process on the 
SNP, this chapter first gives a brief account of the particular historical context of 
British national integration and the nature of British nationalism. Then, it analyzes the 
emergence and development of Scottish nationalism, before focusing on the SNP by 
examining its construction of national identity, and its ideology, goals and strategies. 
After that, in the light of the Europeanized opportunity structure, it explores how and 
why the European integration process has been incorporated into the SNP’s nationalist 
discourse, and how it has been utilized. Finally, the chapter deals with the interplay 
among Scottish, British, and strengthening English nationalisms.   
 
 
5.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
5.1.1 THE BRITISH STATE AND NATIONALISM  
The United Kingdom (UK) is a ‘union state’126 (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982: 11), 
or, in Birch’s words (1989: 77), it is a somewhat ‘untidy state’ since it is neither 
federal nor completely unitary, and lacks a formal constitution. There are some 
                                                 
126 Loughlin (2001a: 5) identifies four state traditions in the EU, and accordingly four distinct forms of 
decentralization: Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, French, and Scandinavian. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition there 
is no legal basis for the state. State-society relations are pluralistic, while the form of political 
organization is either a union state or limited federalism. In this tradition, decentralization develops in 
the form of the devolution of political power to regional or local governments. In the French tradition, 
there is a legal basis for the state, and state-society relations are antagonistic. Because the form of 
political organization is considered as unitary and indivisible, decentralization takes the form of a 
regionalized unitary state (France, Spain before 1978). Like the French tradition, there is also a legal 
basis for the state in the Germanic tradition. However, state-society relations are organicist. 
Accordingly, political organization takes an integral/organic federalist form. The form of 
decentralization in this tradition is cooperative federalism, e.g. Germany, Spain (post 1978). Finally, the 
Scandinavian tradition is characterized by an organicist, decentralized unitary political system, with 
strong local democracies.     
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specific historical reasons that led to the formation of this particular political system, 
and the way the British state developed shaped in turn the nature of nationalism in very 
different ways to the nationalisms of continental Europe.  
 
The UK as a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of 
government was established as a Union of ‘four nations’ united under a British identity 
closely associated with monarchy, imperialism, and the ‘Union Jack’ (the British flag). 
Unlike the French case, where the centralized state was considered as the major bearer 
of national unity and identity, the state has not been the only expression of the nation 
and its unity in Britain, where the distinction between civil society and the state was 
not clear (Keating, 1996: 17).  
 
Specifically, the British interpretation of national unity and identity was rooted 
in British constitutionalism, which sought to achieve a balance among particular social 
interests. Accordingly, it did not see local and regional identities as threat to 
Britishness as a supra-identity of a British nation that included English, Scottish, 
Welsh and Irish national communities. Colley (1992: 12-3) asserts that, after the Acts 
of Union in 1707, when Scotland united with England to constitute the Kingdom of 
Great Britain, it became common for people to assume a ‘layered’ identity - to think of 
themselves as simultaneously British, but also English, Scottish or Welsh. In addition, 
British identity, in this formative period, was closely bound up with Protestantism. 
Nevertheless, after the occupation of Catholic Ireland and with the effect of the 
secularization of British society, this dimension gradually lost its primary significance.  
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Except for the deep political crisis in Ireland that resulted in the  independence 
of the greater part of Ireland from the UK in the early 20th century, the long period of 
economic and political integration since 1707 gave rise to a widespread conviction that 
the UK had become a homogeneous society on the bases of a common set of values 
(liberal democracy, the welfare state of the British people), a common history 
(imperial expansion, wars against France, two world wars fought together), and a 
nation-wide two-party system (the Labour Party, and Conservative Party) (MacMillan, 
1996). Moreover, it was considered that class politics had become the basis of British 
politics.  
 
It was true that Home Rule movements had emerged both in Scotland and 
Wales after the rise of Irish nationalism in the 19th century, but they remained 
electorally insignificant for a long time. When ethno-territorial political parties began 
to achieve significant electoral performance in the 1960s, many people found it 
surprising. Within this context, the success of the SNP was especially noteworthy. The 
answers to why Scottish nationalism did not develop before the mid-19th century, and 
why it could not gain power before the 1970s, partly lie in the nature of Scottish 
unification with England in 1707 (Breuilly, 1993: 327). An examination of this 
historical background will therefore certainly shed light on the opportunity structures 
within and through which Scottish nationalism emerged and developed.    
 
 
 
 193
5.1.2 SCOTLAND IN THE UNION 
Scotland, as an early modern European state, was able to maintain its own 
monarchical and parliamentary institutions against England until the 17th century. 
However, the Scottish Reformation changed the balance in favor of England, 
following the establishment of the Protestant religion (through the Presbyterian Church 
or Kirk) in Scotland in the 16th century.127 In 1603, the Scottish king, James VI, 
succeeded to the throne of England, thereby uniting the crowns. In 1707, the Scottish 
and English parliaments united to create a single state.128  
 
The Union of 1707 was actually a deal designed to create various key 
conditions advantageous to both parties. On the Scottish side, although political 
integration meant the loss of Scotland’s status as a sovereign state, together with the 
loss of the Scottish Parliament, the Union gave invaluable economic opportunities of 
free trade with England and opportunities in an expanding empire. In social terms, the 
educated class of Scotland gained wider opportunities in business, in government 
service and in the professions (Birch, 1989: 82). The Union was beneficial also for the 
English. Their main concern was actually strategic: the need to secure Protestant 
                                                 
127 Harvie (1998: 12) stresses the political consequences of the establishment of the (Protestant) Kirk of 
leading to an ending of the alliance of Scotland with Spain and France. The compromise of ‘Calvinism 
in one Country’, which meant the recognition of Scottish national church by England, also facilitated the 
establishment of the Union in 1707.  
128 The Glorious Revolution occurred in 1688. Whigs and Tories agreed to dethrone King James II, who 
was Catholic, as opposed to the majority of the British population, and the King of Ireland and Scotland 
as well. Instead, they offered the throne of England to William of Orange, who was a Protestant. In 
1689, William ascended the throne, and the Scottish government accepted his sovereignty. However, 
this acceptance was not made by a unified Scotland, as it had been divided into Protestant Lowlander 
and Catholic Highlander populations. The Highlanders wanted their Catholic King, James II, back. His 
supporters called themselves Jacobites (Jacobus was the Latin name for James), who rebelled against the 
Union several times in the 18th century. During the following years, William proposed a complete union 
to the Parliament twice in 1700 and 1702. But it was not until a severe economic crisis due to harvest 
failure, and the expensive failure of a Scottish attempt to establish a colony in Panama, that the Scottish 
Parliament agreed to a Union of Parliaments (Harvie, 1998; Lynch, 1997).  
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succession in both countries, and to secure its northern frontier against invasion from 
Scotland, or from France and Spain through Scotland (Paterson, 1994).  
 
The way that the Union of 1707 was established and implemented decreased 
the possibility of regional resistance. Despite the existence of resistance in some parts 
of the Highlands, the preservation of many Scottish institutions and the collaboration 
of large parts of the Scottish elite guaranteed a peaceful incorporation. Therefore, the 
political incorporation of Scotland, like that of Wales, and the destruction of peasant 
society, prevented the emergence of nationalism, because it neither involved control by 
a foreign modernizing state nor incited enmity from a wide range of elites (Breuilly, 
1993: 328).  
 
The British government did not resort to policies of forced assimilation, except 
for the suppression of Highlanders and Catholics. A gradual acculturation to English 
culture was in large part achieved through the emigration of Scots to England and the 
Empire, and by intentional neglect and repression of the Gaelic language.129 In time, as 
language ceased to be a boundary marker of Scottish identity, Scotland increasingly 
became a hinterland of English culture. The Empire allowed Scots to acquire a British 
identity and provided channels for the advancement of upwardly mobile elements of 
                                                 
129 There have long been two indigenous languages in Scotland. Gaelic, which first divided from Irish 
Gaelic by the 15th century, never spread throughout Scotland. By the 19th century, its use had retreated 
to the Highlands and islands. Being a first language only in the remote Outer Hebrides, Gaelic carries 
national distinctiveness, but it is spoken by just 60,000 people (Budge et al, 1998).  Esman states that, 
while the Gaelic language in 1707 was spoken by 30 percent of Scottish families, most of whom lived in 
the Highlands and Western Islands, it is now spoken by only 1,5 percent of Scottish families, all whom 
are bilingual (Esman, 1977: 252, f2).  Scots is the other indigenous language, a form of Northern 
English. It was the language of ‘high culture’, but it lost its prestige among the upper and middle classes 
in the face of English (Keating, 1996: 165). Scots experienced a cultural revival (the ‘Scottish 
Renaissance’) in the mid-twentieth century and remains significant.  
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the population. Class politics also helped to erase Scottish-English differences, while 
the growth of welfare was a powerful unifying force, defining a new type of clearly 
British social citizenship (Keating, 1996).  
 
The Union with England did not, however, mean the end of a distinct national 
identity. This identity survived among Scots, especially among those who remained in 
Scotland (Esman, 1977: 254-5). In response to peaceful incorporation through dynastic 
union, the English ruling class tolerated a high degree of autonomy to the ‘North of 
Britain’ (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982: 11). Thus, the major institutions through which 
Scots defined their identity remained specifically Scottish. Although scholars differ in 
their account of Scottish nationalism, in terms of its nature and development, they all 
without exception stress the importance of the retention of a body of civil society, 
including a separate legal system, educational system, the Church (these three 
institutions are together named as the ‘Holy Trinity’), and local government (Nairn, 
1977: 138).130 Thus, due to a period of steady acculturation to English norms, the 
preservation of Scottish civil society and administration enabled the continuity of a 
separate Scottish identity.  
 
Consequently, since there was consensus, the Union allowed an institutional 
differentiation that in turn led to a weak state system. Regarding Scotland, British 
policy was characterized by territorial management characterized by a series of devices 
                                                 
130 The Scottish legal system has remained a mixture of Roman and Anglo-Saxon traditions, and has 
continued to develop separately from its counterpart in England. Similarly, the education system has a 
distinct form, as seen in its curriculum and school qualifications. Religion in Scotland also developed a 
distinctive tradition, with the Church of Scotland maintaining its role as a national church (Dickson, 
1989: 58–9).  
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to accommodate Scotland within the new state. The UK allocated many functions to 
the self-regulating institutions of civil society. This permitted a degree of 
differentiation between the civil institutions of Scotland and the rest of the UK. British 
identity did not displace, but coexisted with the pre-existing Scottish identity. Many of 
the markers of Scottish identity were left intact, and others added.131 Thus, Scotland 
became a ‘hybrid society’ after the Union of 1707. Shaped by the particular historical 
trajectory of the British Union, integration and distinctiveness run throughout Scottish 
public life, through culture, values, institutions and policy (Dickson, 1989: 58).  
 
5.1.3 THE EMERGENCE OF SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND THE BRITISH 
RESPONSE 
Scotland’s loss of sovereignty over Scottish territory by ceding the Scottish 
Parliament to Westminster did not become politically important until the mid-19th 
century. Most Scots thought that they had made a ‘marriage of convenience’ 
                                                 
131 There were two major Jacobite Risings, one in 1715 and one in 1745. Rebellions by Catholic 
Highlander Jacobites were repressed and the Dress Act of 1746 was introduced to crush the Highland 
culture.  This stated that the use of Highland Dress was only legitimate in the Highland Regiments, 
which were raised and incorporated in the British Army in large numbers in the 18th century (Bingham, 
1991: 134–5). The Highland culture was male-dominated and martial. Many clansmen had no other 
profession than one of arms, and to them the Highland Regiments represented a chance to continue their 
way of life: here they could still be warriors, and still wear the kilt. The British Government was also 
content since it had found a brilliant way to pacify the Highlanders and make use of them in its 
imperialistic enterprise (ibid, 144). In fact, the Highland Regiments helped to reconcile the Highlands 
and Lowlands in an important sense: “The Gaels, from being viewed as barbarous nuisances, became 
regarded as in some ways the very embodiment of Scotland. The Kilt and bagpipes acquired popularity 
where hitherto they had enjoyed none. The new cult was mawkish and often at variance with the facts of 
Scottish life” (Nairn, 1977: 166).  The regiment changed the image of Highlanders as being backward 
and savage. Or, as Bingham puts it, “the metamorphosis of the Highlander from Wild Scot to national 
hero was complete” (1991: 145).  For a detailed analysis of the ‘invention of tradition’ in Scotland, see 
Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983) “The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland” in Eric J. 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
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(Thomsen, 2001). As a nation, they had joined the Union voluntarily132 since it was to 
their advantage. Moreover, they were able to secure the continuity of their social 
institutions and local government. They would continue it as long as they saw that 
being a part of the Union was in their favor.  
 
However, the Union began to create tension when British centralization in the 
mid-19th century took control of many functions that had been given to Scottish local 
authorities (Lynch, 1997). To counter the peripheralization of their political position in 
the Union, the Scottish elites supported the Liberal Party, which led the Home Rule 
movement from the mid-19th century to WWI. Home Rule promised Scotland, as well 
as Ireland and Wales, a regional parliament that would allow self-government over a 
wide range of internal problems, but under the roof of the UK.   
 
The British state responded to the Home Rule movement in Scotland through 
territorial management and policy and resource concessions. Scotland was given full 
access to the center of government in London and full representation in Parliament. As 
in Ireland and Wales, Scotland enjoyed over-representation after the Reform Act of 
1885 that extended the franchise, with Scottish politicians being included in leading 
positions in British politics and government. Six out of eighteen British prime 
ministers in the 20th century have been Scottish, Welsh or Irish. National public 
expenditure favored Scottish, Irish, and to some extent, Welsh territories, as 
representation of Scotland in the Cabinet has allowed it to defend its interests in the 
                                                 
132 The point that the Union was conceived not as an annexation, but as an act of association is also 
supported by the fact that the Scottish parliament was never technically abolished (Keating, 1996: 163).    
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distribution of public expenditure (Keating, 1996: 169). More crucially, in 1885, the 
Scottish Office was established, with a minister who had a seat in the Cabinet from 
1892 onwards and acquired responsibility for education, health, roads, law and order in 
Scotland.133   
 
The Scottish Office was considered to be a way for Westminster to satisfy local 
demands but still retain all control over policy issues. Despite London providing policy 
and resource concessions to Edinburgh, in Scotland restlessness continued to grow due 
to economic decline and rising unemployment, especially after WWII. Increasing 
discontent forced the British government to develop diversionary regional 
development policies and resource transfers between the 1960s and 1980s. In order to 
plan, coordinate and implement these regional policies, the Scottish Development 
Agency was established in 1975 (Halkier, 2005).   
 
A decentralized pattern of public administration was considered useful by the 
British state, in which Scotland remained an ‘economic unit’ as ‘North Britain’ 
(Esman, 1977: 256). On the other hand, it represented recognition of the distinctive 
features of Scotland’s problems. The largely unsuccessful process of devolving 
administrative power, which began with the establishment of the Scottish Office as a 
response to Home Rule demands and then diversionary regional policies (Keating, 
1988), reinforced a sense of grievance in Scotland. The ‘issue of control’ by London 
became more problematic; the creation of the Scottish ‘semi-state’ with bureaucratic 
                                                 
133 The British state established a Welsh Office in 1964 and a Northern Ireland Office in 1972 with a 
similar structure (Birch, 1989: 80).  
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powers made the democratic deficit more evident (McCrone, 1998: 132). The 
implementation of territorial management characterized by institutional and policy 
differentiation served to strengthen Scottish identity in the long run, and meant that 
political issues were seen ‘from a Scottish perspective’ (Kellas, 1991: 87; Keating, 
1996: 170). More critically, social, economic and political developments gave 
Scotland and Scottish identity through Scottish nationalism a contemporary meaning. 
Scottish nationalism became concerned with the questioning of the maintenance of the 
benefits of the Union and was able to strengthen its demands with the reconfiguration 
of the opportunity structure, especially with the effect of the European integration 
process. Under these circumstances, Scottish nationalism, particularly the SNP, 
became a significant political force in Scottish politics.  
 
 
5.1.4 THE RISE OF SCOTTISH NATIONALISM  
During the 1970s, ethno-territorial politics gained influence in Britain. 
Dissenting voices arguing that the UK was a multi-national state134 ignited disputes 
over the ‘Break-up of Britain’.135 As well as violent IRA nationalism in Northern 
Ireland, and non-violent Welsh nationalism based on ethno-linguistic claims, Scottish 
nationalism was becoming a significant challenge to the British state by bringing about 
the disintegration of the UK (Urwin, 1982).   
 
                                                 
134 Hechter (1975) even put forward that Scotland was one of the internal colonies of the British Empire. 
See Chapter 3 of this dissertation, pp. 93-6.  
135 Nairn (1977) in his path-breaking book ‘the Break-up of Britain’ predicts the end of the UK.  
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Although Scottish nationalism dates back to the mid-19th century, and 
nationalist Scottish political parties were established after WWI136, Scottish 
nationalism became a significant force in Scottish politics after the 1970s, when the 
SNP for the first time in its history gained a remarkable success in the 1974 
elections.137 The question, then, is why Scottish nationalism only began to make 
political waves in the 1970s and not earlier.  
 
Rather than being a reaction to an oppressive central government, Scottish 
nationalism has grown as a consequence of adverse economic and political processes 
and a new interpretation of changing opportunities. There were two major structural 
factors that shook the ‘marriage of convenience’ to its foundations. First, the 
dissolution of the British Empire critically reduced the prestige and appeal of the 
British imperial center, and the contraction or disappearance of imperial opportunities 
triggered political protest (Birch, 1978; Kellas, 1991; Anderson, 1996).138 Secondly, 
Scotland’s coal and steel industries went into serious decline in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Economic restructuring and deregulation in the years of the Thatcher government 
sharply increased regional disparities as deindustrialization hit industrial areas and the 
newer service industries benefited only selected locations (i.e. London and Glasgow).   
  
                                                 
136 Nationalist parties took root in the territorially redefined British state after 1922, most obviously in 
Northern Ireland, but also in Scotland and Wales. According to Urwin (1982: 51), in Scotland and 
Wales the failure of Home Rule, disillusionment with both Liberal and Labour, and the example of 
Ireland convinced nationalists that the only means of promoting interests of their territories (nations) 
was outside the traditional party structure.  
137 In 1974 two elections were held. For the SNP’s votes percentages, see Table 1 in Appendices.   
138 Anderson (1996: 15–16) finds plausible to link the renewal of sub-state nationalism with the postwar 
collapse of the colonial empires. He also adds that British, French, and Belgium decolonization process 
after the WWII removed the safety-valves that sent energetic young members of the nationalities to 
Algeria, India, or Congo.   
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Besides these structural factors related to economic downturn, rising 
unemployment, disenchantment and anger with London grew when the Conservative 
Party piloted the ‘poll tax’ in Scotland.139 Another factor that severed ties with the 
Union was a campaign by English MPs to reduce perceived Scottish and Welsh 
advantages in public spending (Keating and Jones, 1995). On the other hand, the 
discovery of oil in the North Sea in the early 1970s became a fomenting factor that was 
feeding Scottish self-confidence. This factor, which Scottish nationalists exploited 
under the slogan of ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’, provided an additional boost to the campaign 
for independence, since it appeared to allay concerns that an independent Scotland 
would not be a viable economic unit.  
 
The SNP’s electoral rise was halted by its confused position and internal 
differences over Labour’s devolution proposals in the late 1970s. The SNP’s poor 
performance in the 1979 general election was followed by factionalism and expulsions 
from which it only slowly recovered (Lynch, 2002).  
 
Consequently, an increasing number of people in Scotland developed the 
conviction that radical changes in the Scottish economy were happening but key 
decisions were being taken outside Scotland. The so-called ‘branch factory’ syndrome 
                                                 
139 The Community Charge, commonly known as ‘poll tax’, is a system of taxation introduced to finance 
local government in Scotland from 1989, and in England and Wales from 1990. It provided for a single 
flat-rate per capita tax on every adult. In the wake of riots centered in London, it was replaced by the 
Council Tax which took account of ability to pay. For detailed information about the poll tax, see Danny 
Burns (1992) Poll Tax Rebellion, London: Attack International\AK Press.  
The introduction of the Poll Tax in Scotland gave rise to widespread protests against ‘exploitation’ by a 
conservative south-east England (Keating, 1996). There is no doubt that it contributed to increasing the 
political distinctiveness of Scottish identity. Mitchell (1998) even contends that it paved the way to 
devolution in 1997. See,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/7976782.stm). Retrieved on April 
30, 2009. 
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ignited the issue of external control with a growing sensitivity and resentment among 
most Scots (Dickson, 1989: 60). Keating (1996: 176) convincingly argues that 
changing attitudes towards the Union were not simply a matter of relative deprivation 
or a result of economic differentiation. Scots’ economic profile had converged with the 
British average but their sense of political distinctiveness had increased. According to 
him, Scots became increasingly doubtful about the economic benefits of the Union due 
to the conservative neo-liberal economic policies of the Thatcher governments, which 
destroyed the social democratic consensus as well as much of Scottish heavy industry. 
Other factors included the ending of a diversionary regional policy, the Labour Party’s 
ineffective opposition to protect Scottish interests, and the positive expectations 
attached to the North Sea Oil. In other words, Scots began to realize that there was less 
prospect of extracting resources from the British state. Furthermore, the potential 
wealth to be gained from North Sea Oil could change economic fate of Scotland if it 
were used for Scotland instead of financing a declining British economy.     
 
Under these circumstances, nationalism came back from the late 1960s in the 
form of increased support for the SNP, and later, as a response to growing Scottish 
nationalism, a revival of support for home rule in the Labour Party. Despite a recession 
in the 1980s after the failed 1979 devolution referendum in Scotland, the SNP’s 
electoral performance continued to grow in the following two decades. Breuilly (1993: 
322) claims that the key explanation of the SNP’s success after the 1970s was its 
primary stress on bread and butter issues at the right time. He thinks that what has 
made the party popular is its argument that the policies of British governments will not 
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benefit Scotland, because they will not give priority to Scottish interests. The SNP’s 
‘Scotland first approach’ has underlined the necessity of national independence and the 
reassertion of control by Scots in Scottish institutions over the political destiny of the 
nation (Lynch, 2002).  
 
The next section will identify the different dimensions of the SNP’s sub-state 
nationalism, particularly its goals, strategies, ideology, and national identity 
construction, before focusing on the impacts of European integration on these 
dimensions.  
 
5.2 THE SNP 
The SNP emerged as a part of broader Scottish nationalist movement in 1934. 
Since then, it has undergone significant transformations as a consequence of intra-
party conflicts regarding critical issues, such as self-government and ideological 
stance, the transformation of the British state after the dissolution of the Empire and 
Britain’s accession to the European Community, and by using the new channels of 
regional influence provided by European integration.  
 
Within this context, the party gradually shifted nationalist movement’s 
emphasis from literature and language to practical politics. It invested in party 
organization, in constituency politics, and in economic research, without disregarding 
cultural themes. Consequently, while the image of traditional Scottish nationalism 
from the 1930s to 1980s that was largely associated with the SNP was nostalgic, 
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defensive and somewhat parochial, looking to an idealized image of Scotland totally 
independent of corrupting external influences, it has contemporarily gained a new 
form, still primarily associated with the SNP, that is more open, progressive and 
European (Keating, 1996).  
 
5.2.1 SCOTTISH IDENTITY 
Given the fact that sub-state nationalism can be best understood in terms of a 
conflict of identity and interests, a number of structural and contingent factors have 
contributed to the differentiation of Scottish interests and identity from British interests 
and identity, especially since the 1970s. Scotland, with a population of about five 
million, is one of the constitutive countries of the UK. Although their language 
(Gaelic) lost its importance as one of the crucial boundary-markers, Scottish people 
have maintained their distinct national identity thanks to the ‘Holy trinity’ mentioned 
earlier (Dickson et al, 1989) of three strong and distinctly Scottish national 
institutions. The Church of Scotland (the Kirk), an independent education system, and 
a separate legal system have enabled many Scots to be aware of their long distinct 
ethno-history which separates them from the English.140 This institutional legacy has 
been accompanied by a set of symbols and rituals as boundary-markers, such as the 
national flag of Scotland (the Saltire, or St. Andrew’s Cross), a national anthem (the 
Flower of Scotland)141, St. Andrew’s Day142, the thistle (the floral emblem), and the 6 
                                                 
140 McCreadie (1991: 39) argues that few Scots doubt that their national identity is both 
contemporaneous and historical, or that it has a political as well as a cultural aspect.  
141 The Flower of Scotland is played at events such as rugby and football matches. Except for the 
Olympic Games, Scotland has independent national representation in the FIFA World Cup, the Rugby 
Union World Cup, the Cricket World Cup, and the Commonwealth Games. Hence, sport is an important 
element of Scottish culture; the national team is seen as one of the symbols of distinct Scottish identity.  
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April 1320 statement of political independence, the Declaration of Arbroath.143 While 
Robert Burns and Sir Walter Scott have been read as national poets of Scotland, 
Tartanry associated with clan tartans, kilts, bagpipes, Scottish Gaelic and Highland 
culture have served as the chief cultural boundary markers of Scottishness. Moreover, 
unlike many cases where the geographical boundaries of the historically acclaimed 
‘national homeland’ are not clearly demarcated, Scotland historically constitutes a 
clearly defined and non-contested geographical territory. Therefore, as Hoppe (2005) 
rightly states, the situation in Scotland has been very favorable for a strong nationalist 
party since all these elements helped in the construction of a Scottish national identity 
that is shared by the majority of the population. Unlike many other sub-state nationalist 
parties, the SNP had something concrete – identity - upon which to build.144 Therefore, 
the SNP did not need to toil to manufacture a sense of distinctive identity in its pursuit 
for self-government; it politicized an already deeply-rooted Scottish identity and 
mobilized it into electoral support (Lynch, 2002: 3f). In other words, Scottish national 
identity is nothing new, but its political significance has increased.  
 
                                                                                                                                             
142 St. Andrew is the patron saint of Scotland, and St. Andrew’s Day is Scotland’s official national day 
that is celebrated on 30 November.  
143 The Declaration of Arbroath was a declaration of Scottish independence, and set out to confirm 
Scotland’s status as an independent, sovereign state. It was in the form of a letter submitted to the Pope 
John XXII, and it was a part of a broader diplomatic campaign to secure independence of Scottish 
kingdom from English incursions, and lift the excommunication of Robert the Bruce, then the king of 
Scotland. This historical document is accepted by Scottish nationalists as proof of their claims that 
Scotland was always independent (Lynch, 1997).    
144 McCrone et al (1989:5) suggest that Scotland is a country, an administrative unit (due to the Scottish 
Office), and a nation which exists at ideological level, in the minds of people, reflecting in part the 
historic residue of Scotland as an erstwhile nation-state until 1707. At this level, Scotland survives as a 
taken-for-granted reference regarding aspects of its culture (tartan, speech, anthem, and flag). Symbols 
and rituals reinforce this sense of nationhood.  
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One of the particular characteristics of the SNP compared to other sub-state 
nationalist parties is that it associates national identity with class identity. Keating 
argues that the SNP takes much of its support from the lower and middle classes, while 
the upper classes, who sympathize with the values associated with English 
Conservatism, are least likely to identify themselves as Scottish (Keating, 1996). The 
SNP experience shows that national identity has not replaced class identity, but they 
are mutually reinforcing.  
 
The SNP has never made any specific ethnic appeals to gain support; it clearly 
has a civic vision of Scottish nation that is also reflected in its open and inclusive 
approach to Scottish citizenship: “the automatic right of citizenship will be open to all 
those living in Scotland, all those born in Scotland and all those with a parent born in 
Scotland. All others are free to apply” (SNP: 2001). Since the 1990s, the SNP has also 
developed ‘identity politics’ towards Scotland’s minorities to stress that they also have 
their places in Scottish society. The party has addressed issues of ethnic and racial 
conflict within Scotland in relation to the Scots Asian Community, the Catholic 
Community, and the English (Lynch, 2002: 211).  
 
Although the cultural baggage of the SNP’s nationalism is relatively weak, it 
does not mean that culture does not matter. Keating (1996) contends that, since the 
1980s, culture has become a political battlefield; a reciprocal relationship between the 
cultural dimension and national life has been formed through cultural work, especially 
in literature and music. Craig and Reid (1999: 166) argue that while the British media, 
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which has historically presented a distorted, anglicized, inferior image of Scots (in 
general, Celtics), Celtic culture stands at the center of a new ‘post-Unionist’ self-
identity for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Consequently, elements of Scottish culture 
are more visible now, in parallel with an increasing self-confidence, unlike the 
inferiority complex of the past.   
 
5.2.2 GOALS, STRATEGIES AND IDEOLOGY:  
Since its inception, the SNP has suffered from internal divisions and 
organizational deficiencies. When it was established in 1934, it contained ‘radicals’ 
and ‘moderates’. While the latter wanted to pursue a form of Home Rule for Scotland, 
the former called for independent statehood. Before the end of WWII, the radicals 
within the party won the conflict, and national self-determination and independence 
became the core aim of the SNP (Devine and Finlay, 1996). Since then, the SNP has 
maintained independence as its constitutional preference.  
 
After having set independence as the ultimate goal for the SNP, a substantial 
disagreement about the appropriate political strategy to achieve the goal of an 
independent Scotland led to a still ongoing division within the party between two 
groups, known as ‘gradualists’ and ‘fundamentalists’. 145 While gradualists argue that a 
devolved parliament and devolution process is a more efficient route towards 
independence, fundamentalists maintain that independence can only be achieved when 
the SNP obtains a parliamentary majority through elections (‘the big-bang approach’). 
                                                 
145 Mitchell (1998: 108) claims that ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘pragmatists’ would be more appropriate 
terms to name this division.  
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They are suspicious of the impact of devolution on the ability of the SNP to gain 
independence; for them, devolution may even deflect the party from it by watering 
down the ultimate goal.  
 
This intra-party conflict is not limited to the issue of appropriate political 
strategy. The SNP has faced a problem common to all nationalist parties operating 
within an electoral system in which the principal ideological cleavage is of left and 
right. In the SNP, while the ‘traditionalists’ argue that the SNP should pursue Scottish 
independence without abiding by any certain political ideology, ‘socialists’ claim that 
the SNP should take a clear left-of-center position. As a consequence of this intra-party 
struggle in the 1980s following the inconclusive referendum in 1979, the SNP was 
finally turned into a social democratic party (Lynch, 2002: 13). In terms of political 
strategy, the party has adopted a gradualist approach to independence, accepting 
electoral competition from its very inception.146  
 
Thus, the SNP’s nationalism reflects a highly particular combination of 
territorial and class politics.  It openly declares that it is an independence sub-state 
nationalist party, which is a unique position among its counterparts, both inside and 
outside the UK. It stresses the right of the Scottish people to self-determination and to 
sovereignty over their territory and natural resources (SNP 1987 General Election 
Manifesto). Due, to a great extent, to the existence of a deeply-rooted distinctive 
Scottish national identity, the SNP takes the state, not culture, as its starting point. It 
                                                 
146 Except for the very marginal Scottish National Liberation Army, all actors of the Scottish nationalist 
movement oppose a violent strategy. In this sense, Scottish nationalism is quite different from the 
Basque and Kurdish cases, where ETA and PKK have been highly influential.  
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argues for independence in economic and material rather than cultural terms. Against 
‘the failed, outdated bankrupt Union’ (SNP 1997 General Election Manifesto), it sees 
nationalism as a modernizing project for the Scottish nation. The nation is 
conceptualized as something like a large family that provides a sense of solidarity, but 
at the same time like a large enterprise that is assumed to prosper only if it becomes a 
separate entity. In this analogy, the enterprise could be more competitive and efficient 
and thus successful within the global world when it is able to rule itself from its 
headquarters. More precisely, the SNP claims that Scotland can do much better 
economically outside the UK than by staying inside, for example, by taking over the 
oil revenues in its sector of the North Sea or securing direct subsidies from the EU. 
This position is summarized in its policies of “It’s Scotland’s Oil”147, and 
“Independence in Europe”. Thus, the SNP is aiming at a “new partnership that ensures 
Scotland and England are equal nations – friends and partners” (SNP 2010 General 
Election Manifesto). At this point, however, one should stress that the SNP is not an 
abolitionist force; it does not aim at cutting off ties with the British monarchy. Instead, 
it seeks to become an independent state in the Commonwealth, as well as in the EU 
(SNP 1987 General Election Manifesto).  
 
                                                 
147 The ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ policy is based on the claim that more than 90 % of the UK’s oil revenues 
come from the Scottish sector of the Continental Shelf. The SNP argues that “since oil was discovered, 
the UK government has ‘raked’ in £200 billion in tax revenue - £35 billion of it since Labour came to 
power. But Scotland has little to show for it”. Then, the Party compares a devolved Scotland to 
independent Norway. It is stated that Norway controls its own resources and that, since 1996, it has 
invested a share of its oil revenues in a fund for the future. Today that fund stands at £85 billion and will 
provide long-term income for the people of Norway. The SNP declares that “it is not too late for 
Scotland. With at least 28 billion barrels of oil left in the waters around Scotland, we stand to benefit 
from a £600 billion windfall.” In order to achieve it, the SNP has promised to establish a Scottish Oil 
Fund, modelled on the Norwegian Petroleum Fund, to invest a share of North Sea revenues for the 
nation (The SNP 2005 General Election Manifesto, p.12).  
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The SNP’s faith in the power of markets can easily make it seem to be a typical 
right-wing party. However, one of the clearest particularities of the SNP is its synthesis 
of sub-state nationalism with social democracy. Members of the Scottish nation are 
conceived not only as creative entrepreneurs but also as co-nationals who believe in a 
myth of solidarity and social democracy. Social democracy has not only served to 
differentiate the ‘creative, hardworking but also egalitarian’ Scots from the English 
side, where Conservatives declared ‘there is no such a thing as society’, and where 
Labour was unable to protect Scottish interests, but it also allowed the party to win 
over a remarkable proportion of Labour supporters (Budge et al, 1998). They were 
Scots, they suffered from unemployment, poor housing, and bad health, and the SNP 
promised them to construct a ‘new Scotland’, which would become both prosperous 
through independence and committed to the social redistribution of welfare (SNP 1987 
General Election Manifesto).  
 
This social democratic stance has been reflected in many party policies. For 
example, the SNP is committed to a ‘fair Scotland’, in which the party guarantees 
affordable housing, a citizen’s pension as a part of its anti-poverty strategy, 
improvements in the national minimum wage and National Health System (NHS), and 
equal opportunities to all Scots regardless of race, gender, sexuality, disability or social 
background. In addition, many issues of the ‘new politics’ (or, post-industrial politics), 
such as green issues and an anti-nuclear stance, are included in its programs. In 
practice, the SNP’s ‘left of center’ stance has been clearly displayed on many 
occasions, such as opposition to pit closures in its mid-1980s campaign, support for a 
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campaign of civil disobedience against the poll tax in the late 1980s, opposition to 
nuclear weapons, and the election of the first self-declared socialist, Alex Salmond, as 
the leader of the party in the 1990s (Cunningham, 1998: 187-8).148 
 
Consequently, there is not much debate about the distinctiveness of national 
identity in Scotland, which has been continued for centuries through the ‘Holy trinity’ 
and local government; the SNP merely politicized it by using adverse economic and 
political conditions. In this sense, ethno-cultural, historical and territorial boundary-
markers were almost taken for granted. Therefore, the SNP has sought to increase 
people’s awareness that the interests of Scots clash with those of the Union rather than 
claim there is a conflict of identities. It would also be politically unwise, as most Scots 
still define themselves as both British and Scottish. Accordingly, the SNP justifies its 
nationalism on the basis of socio-economic and political grievances. The normative 
argument that Scottish people have a right to self-determination is overwhelmingly 
supported by more practical arguments such as London’s mismanagement and 
prospects for a ‘new Scotland’.149 In this sense, it is not surprising that the party 
emphasizes ‘a better future’ rather than ‘a dismal past’ (SNP 1992 General Election 
Manifesto). Within this context, independence symbolizes the ‘temporal turn’, which 
would reinstate Scottish independence that was lost with the Act of Union in 1707.  
 
                                                 
148 Lindsay (1991: 87) argues that the understanding of nationalism as modernization that has dominated 
the SNP since the 1980s is not particularly concerned with the nature of power structures. It does not 
really have a committed ideological position on the Left-Right spectrum since it just carries on a 
‘magpie-like pragmatism’.   
149 The author’s interview with Ian Hudghton, SNP MEP; the interview was held at the EU Parliament 
on 4 April 2008.  
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Except for the disadvantageous British electoral system (a single-member 
constituency system)150 that has made it difficult for third parties to gain representation 
in Parliament and unsettled intra-party cleavages, the opportunity structures have been 
highly favorable for the SNP. Yet, it still had to convince large sections of the 
electorate over independence, since many Scots found this option unrealistic and risky, 
and a great majority of them also liked their dual national identities. However, since 
the mid-80s, electoral support for the SNP has increased151, which can be explained on 
the basis of a reshaping of opportunity structures and the SNP’s success in making use 
of them. Among other things, two developments have much significance: British 
accession to the EU, and the devolution referendum in 1997. The EU dimension not 
only allowed a reformulation of the party’s ultimate goal, but it also contributed to 
increasing the SNP’s electoral support, which in turn was able to force other political 
parties to accept the devolutionary process in the 1990s. Now we will concentrate on 
the impacts of these two developments on the opportunity structures, specifically on 
the SNP, and its utilization of the party. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 This system is also characterized as ‘first-past-the-post’: the candidate with the largest number of 
votes wins the seat, irrespective of whether this represents an absolute majority of the votes cast 
(Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998).  
151 Due to deregulation in major heavy industries and the crisis of welfarism, the social ground for class 
politics decreased and social change began to decouple voters from their traditional party ties. 
Therefore, the SNP found increasingly more ‘flyer votes’ to grab (Breuilly, 1993: 330). 
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5.3 BRITISH ACCESSION TO THE EC AND CHANGING OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURES  
The British state, traditionally skeptical about European integration152, eventually 
joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, in the hope of sharing the 
increasing prosperity of member states (Budge et al, 1998). British integration into the 
EU did not follow an even path. Widespread Euro-skepticism among major political 
actors and public opinion has shaped the way Britain has been integrated with the EU. 
For example, many Conservative MPs have tended to like the free market aspect of 
integration, but have hated the loss of national sovereignty. On the Labour side, some 
have seen it as necessary for economic prosperity, while many have also resented the 
loss of national sovereignty. In other words, the fact both main parties have their pro- 
and anti-EU wings has, thus far, made European integration a highly problematic issue 
in British politics. This reluctance and resistance of the British state has also made it a 
troublesome partner in the eyes of other member states.153  
 
Despite the high level of sensitivity regarding national sovereignty, accession 
to the EC, together with the dissolution of the Empire and broader processes of 
globalization, have eventually had deep and profound effects on the British state. To 
                                                 
152 Sweeney (2005: 29) gives a long list in discussing British reluctance to fully engage with Europe. He 
argues that Britain differentiates itself from continental Europe in terms of geography, history, 
traditional global perspective, culture and language, historical sense of importance, the notion of 
sovereignty, and social and ideological separation, with the media being a remarkable force reproducing 
British distinctiveness.  
153 Thatcher supported the Single European Act (1986) creating a single market in labor and capital, but 
was against any moves towards full political integration. John Major signed the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992), but insisted on opt-outs from the Social Protocol and the Single Currency. The British 
Government also had serious doubts about the strengthening of the EP and moves towards a federal 
Europe. On the Labour side, New Labour with Blair adopted a pragmatic attitude to Europe: they have 
supported it if there are clear benefits. However, this does not mean any political commitment to a 
European super-state at all (Kingdom, 1999).   
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illustrate, as a consequence of European integration, legal sovereignty in relevant 
policy areas has shifted from Westminster to the EU. The UK’s central government 
machinery has had to adapt itself to European affairs. Pressure groups whose interests 
are affected by the EU have responded by moving into Brussels to open lobby 
organizations. They have joined European-wide ‘umbrella organizations’. Local 
governments and regional organizations have followed the same track to form direct 
links with decision makers in Brussels (Budge et al, 1998: 137).      
 
European integration has made deep impacts, but it took time for many to 
accept the idea of EC accession and adapt to the new circumstances. The SNP was 
among them. Following the British accession to the EC, the SNP has undergone a 
remarkable transformation in terms of its ultimate goal, political strategy, 
strengthening of the European dimension in the construction of national identity, and 
clarification of its ideological position.   
  
5.4 FROM INDEPENDENCE SIMPLICITER TO  
‘INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE’  
Britain’s 1973 accession to the EC was not welcomed by all political actors. 
The issue remained controversial, so the Labour Party promised a referendum on 
continued membership, held in 1975. The referendum finally secured British EC 
membership when 67.2 % of electors voted ‘yes’ versus 32.8 % who voted ‘no’. The 
SNP supported the ‘no’ side because, while there had been some support for European 
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unity in the party in the 1950s154, the SNP had turned against the EEC in the 1960 and 
1970s. According to the party, the Common Market would exacerbate the peripheral 
situation of Scottish economy. Besides economic concerns, the EC was also seen as an 
elitist, centralized, bureaucratic community, and a threat to national sovereignty and 
cultural identity (Lynch, 1996: 35). Thus, on the grounds of economic, political and 
cultural reasons, the SNP campaigned for withdrawal from the EC. However, when 
58.4 per cent of Scots voted in favor of continued EC membership (Mitchell, 1998), 
the SNP realized that the EU was supported by most of Scots. Nevertheless, during the 
first devolution referendum in 1979, it kept its position that European integration 
would be detrimental to devolution, for Scotland would have less access to 
institutional channels of representation in Brussels than Westminster (Hepburn, 2006: 
229).  
 
The SNP’s hostility towards European integration gradually but fundamentally 
changed in the late 1980s due to a combination of domestic factors and the increasing 
importance of the social and regional dimensions of integration. As well as the 
inconclusive devolution referendum in 1979 that led to a period of crisis in Scottish 
nationalism, Thatcher government’s centralization policies,155 and especially its 
rejection of the Council of Europe’s Charter of Local Self-Government in 1985 and the 
Maastricht Treaty’s Social Chapter in 1992, that demonstrated their opposition to all 
                                                 
154 Mitchell (1999: 110–1) notes that the SNP produced a series of resolutions supporting Scottish 
membership of the European Coal and Steel Community and European integration. Conference 
resolutions in 1943 and 1948 committed the party to a position broadly similar to its current stance of 
independence in Europe. Nevertheless, debates on Europe among Scottish nationalists had limited 
significance. 
155 Harvie (1998) maintains that conservative policies were a sort of dirigisme after 1981, despite the 
ongoing neo-liberal discourse. 
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social and political dimensions of European integration, were among major reasons for 
a pro-European shift by many actors in Scotland. Within this context, Europe gradually 
became associated with the protection of regional interests and social rights, two issues 
of great importance to Scottish public and political elite. They were beginning to see 
the EC as a means to outflank a centralizing, right wing UK government, as well as an 
external support system for Scottish self-government against London (Keating, 1996: 
185). In other words, the EC was put forward as an alternative to Thatcher’s free 
market ideology and a new arena for developing the social democratic project that the 
Conservative government had tried to bring to an end (Brown et all, 1998: 231). 
Consequently, first trade unions then the Labour Party changed their anti-European 
position.  
 
The SNP followed the same path later. Thus, while the debate on British 
membership of the EC had little to do with territorial questions until the mid-1980s, 
questions of EC membership and territorial self-government came together.156 The 
SNP’s shift towards a pro-European stance, labeled ‘independence in Europe’, was 
slow and uneasy (Ichijo, 2004; Dardanelli, 2002). When Jim Sillars joined the SNP in 
the 1970s, his linkage of independence with European integration contributed to the 
party’s conversion to a pro-European stance.157 Inspired by Sillars’ Euro-nationalism, 
the SNP’s conversion to a pro-European stance was based on the claim that the EC 
                                                 
156 Plaid Cymru, the major Welsh nationalist party, in the same years adopted a pro-European position.  
157 Jim Sillars resigned from Labour Party and formed the short-lived Scottish Labour Party in 1975, 
with a policy aiming at Scottish independence in Europe. In the early 1980s, he joined the SNP. He was 
in favor of a new ‘Euro-nationalism’ that involved the sharing of sovereignty between nations within the 
EC. He argued that a pro-European position would distance the party from the political isolationism of 
the 1970s and benefit from the single market as a mechanism to avoid economic dislocation in the event 
of secession from the UK. See Jim Sillars (1986) Scotland: the Case for Optimism, Edinburgh: Polygon. 
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provides new opportunities for the SNP. Rather than being suspect towards ongoing 
integration, the SNP would seek to find ways of benefiting from the new opportunity 
structure to further its aim of independence.158 That is, this change in European policy 
and its linkage with the ultimate goal was in large part achieved by a pragmatic 
consensus of gradualists and traditionalists in the party.159 Eventually, at its annual 
conference in 1988, the party officially redefined its ultimate policy as ‘independence 
in Europe’ as opposed to ‘independence simpliciter’ (Cunningham, 1998: 188). SNP 
would pursue the goal of independence, but an independent Scotland would remain a 
part of the EU. Hence, by making the European dimension a part of its constitutional 
ideas, the SNP placed ‘Scotland’s future firmly into the EU framework’ (SNP 1992 
General Election Manifesto).  
 
The SNP’s policy of independence in Europe came to be largely based on a 
number of pragmatic justifications. Above all, it would reduce the political costs of 
secession. An independent state within the EU would avoid the problem of being 
isolated in the international community. Secondly, this policy would reduce the 
economic costs of secession by securing access to EU markets. Finally, according to 
the SNP, the European context favors small states, since they can be viable and they 
                                                 
158 Some developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s also helped both the party and public to see the 
EC in a more positive way. While the common regional and agricultural policies of the EC contributed 
to the Scottish economy, successive enlargements reinforced the idea that “the bigger it gets, the looser 
it becomes” (Lynch, 1996: 39).  
159 Lindsay (1991: 87) contends that the acceptance of ‘independence in Europe’ policy meant the 
triumph of the strand in the SNP that saw nationalism as modernization. This type of nationalism sees 
supranational developments as progressive and multinational industrial and financial institutions as an 
inevitable part of the modernization process. According to her, by having nothing to do with cultural 
distinctiveness, nationalism as modernization fits comfortably into the pro-European stance.  
A note on Lindsay:  like a few other representatives of the ‘old left’ that was against a pro-European 
stance, she was sidelined in the 1980s by a pragmatic pro-European coalition of gradualists and 
fundamentalists (Lynch, 2002).  
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can matter. For one thing, the economic success of small countries, such as Norway, 
Cyprus, and Malta, prove that size does not really matter for being an economically 
viable state. More crucially, even small states can represent the EU through the 
rotating EU presidential system. Recently, the Finnish presidency showed that small 
states can manage the EU presidency, but only statehood can provide such a right. 
Besides having a seat in the Council of Ministers, an independent Scotland could have 
as many Council votes as Denmark, send a Commissioner, delegate a judge to the 
European Court of Justice, double the members of MEPs, and send more 
representatives to the CoR (Scottish Government Yearbook, 1990: 39).    
 
In practice, the new position allowed the party to distance itself from the image 
of separatism, and provided it with a modern, realistic and progressive stance. The 
existence of the EU has made the SNP’s independence claim more credible in the eyes 
of electors (Lynch, 2002: 187). In addition, by using a pro-European stance as a 
symbolic means to distance itself from other British parties which tend to be more 
Eurosceptic, the SNP has added a European dimension to Scottish national identity. 
European integration has now become another marker in the process of national 
identity construction (Hoppe, 2005). And finally, the new position also enabled the 
party to play the European card in British politics.160  
 
                                                 
160 For instance, the SNP sought to use the Maastricht ratification process to obtain concessions from the 
British government regarding Scottish representation in the Committee of Regions. Furthermore, it 
sought to promote Scottish cause by campaigning to site the European Central Bank in Scotland (Lynch, 
1996: 48).  
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Consequently, just as the great majority of sub-state nationalist parties in 
continental Europe and Plaid Cymru in Wales did, the SNP has made European 
integration a part of its strategic calculations. The prospect of EU membership has 
given more political self-reliance to the party and credibility to its independence 
arguments. However, the SNP’s ‘independence in Europe’ policy has not been free 
from criticism.  
 
Critics have been quick to stress the apparent contradictions in SNP policy. 
First of all, they ask what, if the EU merely means a transfer of power from Britain to 
Brussels, what independence can mean. In other words, EU membership seems to 
mean replacing British Unionism with a more centralized supranationalism (Lindsay, 
1991). A different though related criticism is that when sovereignty is fuzzy, as it is in 
the EU, it makes little sense for nationalist movements to demand sovereign statehood. 
(Gray, 2000). Regarding these criticisms, Lynch (1996) suggests that they are both 
based on two flawed assumptions: that sovereignty is a zero-sum game, and that the 
EU is evolving into a supranational state. Actually, the SNP frequently argues that the 
traditional conception of sovereignty is no longer valid; at the same time, it rejects 
federalist/regionalist supranational integration.161 
 
The SNP is the only European sub-state nationalist party that explicitly pursues 
independence. This position apparently overlaps with its vision of a confederal 
                                                 
161 See www.snp.org Retrieved on April 30, 2009. 
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Europe.162 It rejects a Europe of the Regions as an insult to Scotland’s national status 
(the SNP, Scotland: A European Nation, 1992). Unlike the PNV and the DTP, the SNP 
does not wish the EU to be anything other than an intergovernmental body with some 
supranational elements. In other words, it is in favor of an association of member states 
which pool sovereignty in certain areas but do not surrender total control to an 
authoritative body. The vision of confederalism is fundamentally shaped by the party’s 
historical core aim of independence adapted to the European framework (Hoppe, 
2005). In this sense, the SNP is like a traditional nationalist party (Mitchell, 1998: 
128). This is actually a highly controversial argument, since some scholars argue that 
Scottish nationalism is an example of neo-nationalism, one of whose main 
characteristics is that it does not pursue statehood since it sees sovereignty as 
something negotiable, partly due to integrative processes (Keating, 1996; McCrone, 
1992).  
 
Nevertheless, this argument apparently contradicts the SNP’s explicitly-
declared goal of independence. It is true that the SNP’s nationalism is radically 
different from classical 19th century nationalism, considering the multidimensional and 
complex set of relations and transformation of key concepts of political life within the 
European context. The SNP views the integration process as fruitful for the party 
within certain limits. Nevertheless, as Alex Salmond, the SNP’s current leader, puts it 
                                                 
162 The SNP opposed the European Constitution that would lead to deeper political integration. 
However, the opposition was based on a specific campaign against European fisheries policy as 
entrenched in the text. Then leader of the SNP, John Swimney (2000–2004), claimed that Brussels 
would be handed exclusive power over fisheries, which would severely endanger the Scottish economy 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/3295883.stm) Retrieved on March 20, 2009. The same 
issue appeared also in the 2005 General Election Manifesto of the party in the way that the SNP was not 
Eurosceptic, but demanded the EU constitution be redrafted since it claimed exclusive competence over 
fisheries resources.  
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“independence matters in an interdependent world”163 for the SNP, which gives a clear 
idea of how the party handles sovereignty. The SNP neither desires the end of nation-
states nor does it see ongoing European integration heading towards that direction. It 
sees political power being still vested with nation-states, so it demands independence 
‘to be an equal partner of the EU’ (SNP 2010 Scottish Election Manifesto). The SNP 
criticizes the UK government, for instance, on the grounds that it has been happy to 
trade off Scotland’s fishing interests for other goals in European policy (SNP 1997 
General Election Manifesto), while Scottish interests could be better protected by an 
independent Scotland. The SNP believes that independence would give Scotland a full 
voice through which it could win concessions and guarantees in areas of importance to 
Scotland, rather as Ireland forced the EU to make changes in the recent referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty (SNP 2009 European Election Manifesto). Hence, the party’s 
position is clear: that Scotland should have a seat at the Council of Ministers, which 
can only be realized through independence.   
 
Some might assess this ‘independence in Europe’ policy as just a marketing 
strategy to sell the risky project of independence to larger sections of Scottish society. 
Yet it has proved to be successful at a mass public level, as manifested in successive 
Scottish elections (see Table 1 in Appendices), and it has forced other political parties 
in Scotland to reformulate their policies, by pushing Europe up the political agenda in 
Scotland. In one sense, as Mitchell (1998: 121) argues, the SNP has become an agent 
                                                 
163 Salmond’s speech at the University of Aberdeen, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/This-Week/Speeches/First-Minister/scotland-in-the-world, visited on 
September 15, 2010.  
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of Europeanization. In analyzing the consequences of this policy, Dardanelli concludes 
that the Europeanization of the demand for self-government was one of the main 
reasons for the increase in support for devolution in 1997, compared to the results of 
the 1979 devolution referendum. 
 
Before dealing with the use of new channels by the SNP in sub-state nationalist 
politics, we should elaborate on the devolution process in Scotland which brought 
about significant changes in the opportunity structures at a national level and improved 
those structures at a European level. To put it differently, Britain’s accession to the 
EC, and the success of a Europeanized independence policy, have been among the 
major factors paving the way for the reestablishment of a Scottish Parliament. British 
integration into the EC reshaped opportunity structures for the SNP before. Now, on 
the basis of the resources and constraints that integration process presented until that 
time, the SNP, with the Scotland Act in 1998, could find new channels that have 
fundamentally reshaped its opportunity structures once again.     
 
5.5 DEVOLUTION AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF  
THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
The reasons why Britain underwent devolution are various. Nevertheless, one 
can claim that increasing disenchantment with the centralized state, the EU’s regional 
perspective, electoral success of sub-state nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, 
and strengthening political will to give an end to Northern Ireland question all played 
important roles on the road to devolution.  
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The debate on the recent devolution was institutionalized with the formation of 
the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989, comprising MPs, MEPs and 
representatives of local authorities, churches, trade unions and other interests who 
were all in favor of a Scottish parliament (Levy, 1992). Soon after taking office in 
1997, the Labour government published white papers on devolution to a Scottish 
parliament and Welsh assembly.164 Thus, as a result of the factors above and Labour’s 
‘unity-through-devolution’ strategy165, a pre-legislative referendum was held in 
Scotland. People were asked two questions: whether they supported for the 
establishment of Scottish Parliament with devolved powers, and whether the 
Parliament should have tax-varying powers.166  
 
The response was a strong ‘Yes, Yes’: with a turnout rate of 60.4%, the support 
for a Scottish Parliament was 74.3 % while support for tax-varying powers was 
63.5%.167 In response to the majority voting for both proposals, the UK Parliament 
                                                 
164 Cunningham (1998) points to the fact that the 1997 election was significant because the 
Conservatives, the only party to oppose some form of regional or devolved government, lost their 
remaining seats. Thus, the way to devolution or independence referendum was more open now.  
165 During the devolutionary process, Liberals (SLD) continued its commitment to Scottish home rule 
within a federal Britain and supported devolution, while Labour expected to ‘kill the SNP stone dead’ 
(Brown et al, 1998). While the SNP supported devolution as a springboard to independence, the 
Conservatives remained opposed to any constitutional change.  
166 This was the second referendum on devolution in Scotland, the first being held in 1979. In the 1979 
referendum, Scottish people were asked one question: “Do you want the provisions of Scotland Act to 
be put into effect?” It was a post-legislative referendum to decide whether there was sufficient support 
for the Scotland Act 1978 among the Scottish electorate. The result was a narrow majority (51.6 %) in 
favor of devolution. However, the government had set a condition that 40 % of the electorate should 
vote ‘Yes’ in order to make it valid. Despite the turnout rate of 63,8 %, it remained insufficient to pass 
the threshold. Then, the Scotland Act 1978 was repealed in the House of Commons.  
167 http://www.bbc.co.uk/politics97/devolution/scotland/live/index.shtml Retrieved on April 1, 2009.   
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passed the Scotland Act 1998168, creating the Scottish Parliament and Scottish 
Executive, which is also called the Scottish Government.  
 
According to the Scotland Act, the Scottish Parliament (informally referred to 
as ‘Holyrood’) legislates in the policy areas covered by the former Scottish Office169; 
these are known as ‘devolved matters’ and include health services, local government, 
education, housing, transport, the police, courts and judiciary, agriculture, the arts, and 
social work. The parliament also has a right to vary the basic level of income tax up by 
to 3p. The Scotland Act at the same time lists exceptions to the legislative 
competences that are known as ‘reserved matters’. Matters reserved for Westminster 
include foreign policy, defence, central economic affairs, social security matters and 
the constitution. The Scottish Executive (the Scottish Government) is headed by a First 
Minister who is nominated by Scottish Parliament and appointed by the Queen.   
 
The parliament comprises 129 members known as Members of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSPs). Members are elected for four-year terms under a mixed member 
proportional representation system, with 73 MSPs being elected from single member 
constituencies by the first-past-the-post system, and a further 56 ‘additional members’ 
being elected from party lists from eight regions under a proportional system. The 
                                                 
168 The original text of Scotland Act 1998 can be read at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/contents. Retrieved on April 1, 2009.  
169 In tandem with the creation of the Scottish Executive in 1999 the Scottish Office was reconstituted as 
the Scotland Office, whose stated roles are ‘to represent Scottish interests at Westminster’ and ‘to act as 
guardian of the devolution settlement’ (http://www.scotlandoffice.gov.uk/scotlandoffice/30.html) 
Retrieved on April 1, 2009. To carry on inter-institutional relations on the basis of good will (i.e. loyalty 
to the devolution settlements), a MoU (Memorandum of Understanding and four overarching 
Concordats (on International Relations, the EU, Financial Assistance to Industry, and Statistics) were 
agreed between the UK Government and the Scottish Executive (Judge, 2005: 188–9).   
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introduction of an additional member electoral system was an institutional novelty that 
restrained Labour’s electoral hegemony in Scotland and simultaneously prevented the 
possibility of any future nationalist dominance (Judge, 2005: 183).  
 
5.1 DEVOLUTION’S IMPACT ON THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Devolution and the ongoing independence debate indicate that Britain has 
undergone a fundamental restructuring process. The devolutions in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales have entailed a territorial restructuring of the UK that carries 
significant implications, not just for the party system but also for the political system 
in a general sense.170 It can be argued that, while the UK was a highly centralized 
unitary state until referendums, it has now become a regionalized unitary state 
(Loughlin, 2001a: 14) in which Scotland, as a devolved unit, has strengthened its 
distinctive place. In this sense, the re-constitution of the Scottish Parliament has a 
historic significance, especially for Scottish nationalists.  
 
There is no doubt that devolution has redefined the opportunity structures in 
Scottish politics. As a whole, political parties have been faced with a new set of 
challenges, problems and opportunities. While the Scottish branches of state-wide 
parties have become more sensitive to Scottish interests, sub-state nationalist parties 
have found a favorable electoral system to get more seats and enhance their places in 
                                                 
170 Balci claims that the framework for the Scotland Act and its related institutions and legal rules 
resembles the structure of a constitution. The Scotland Act is certainly not a constitution for the UK, but 
the question remains whether that is so for Scotland. Scotland appears to be bound by Westminster 
Parliament on reserved matters. According to him, the broadness of the devolved sphere and the 
provisions provided for the judicial review of the implementation of the Scotland Act, especially before 
the Judicial Committee, however, recalls the very basic Supreme or Constitutional Courts provided to 
do the same business. See Bora Balci (2003), “Devolution for Scotland in the UK Constitutional 
Framework”,  http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/eyl/03repbora.htm, visited on 27 November, 2008.  
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the devolved parliaments or assemblies thanks to proportional representation. In 
practice, the party system is today no longer two-party, either in Scotland or in Wales. 
In Scotland, the SNP acts as the third party in the system; this has been proved three 
times with the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections.171 (See Table 1 in Appendices) More 
crucially, the Scottish Parliament and Executive have provided not only a large 
measure of self-government for Scotland, but also a forum for Scottish political 
expression and an institutional vehicle to pressure and bargain with the British center. 
In addition, the arrival of devolution has also contributed to a broadening of 
opportunity structures to provide an increased ability to develop various indirect and 
direct relationships with EU institutions, and transnational actors.  
 
5.6 THE SNP IN THE EU 
In line with the theoretical arguments raised in the third chapter, the impacts of 
European integration process on the opportunity structures that the SNP utilizes have 
occurred in two ways. First, Britain’s accession to the EC and then devolutionary 
process that was induced by the EU’s regionalist perspective led to the transformation 
of British state in favor of a Europeanized political structure and a remarkable 
decentralization process. Second, the SNP has gained new resources and channels at a 
European level to further its nationalist goals. This section focuses on these channels 
and their use by the SNP.  
 
                                                 
171 Considering that the number of Conservative party seats remained the same at between 17 and 18 
seats, the SNP increased its votes at the expense of the Scottish Labour Party 
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According to the Scotland Act 1998, relations with the EU are officially 
reserved to Westminster. Nevertheless, many important areas of competence for the 
Scottish Parliament and Executive overlap with EU powers, and EU policies in non-
devolved areas can also have significant impacts on Scotland. Therefore, it has been 
necessary to develop complex institutional arrangements to govern new types of 
relations.  
 
Scottish interests, whether about EU-related matters in Britain or in the EU, are 
represented in various ways. The Scottish Government, responsible for the 
implementation of EU legislation and obligations into Scottish law,172 is involved in 
decision-making on EU matters which are related to devolved matters. Within the 
limits framed by the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Government has also a direct 
presence in Europe through the EU Office. The Scottish Government EU Office seeks 
to improve lobbying at the Commission and other European authorities. Nevertheless, 
it has to work together with the UK Permanent Representation in Brussels, which is 
representing the views of the UK as a whole to the EU institutions. For example, its 
staff are members of UKRep, so they are civil servants employed by the British 
state.173 The interface between Scotland and the EU is not confined to the Scottish 
Executive. Scotland is represented in the EP with seven members, in the CoR with four 
members, and in the Economic and Social Committee with two members. In addition 
to these governmental channels, Scotland Europa stands as an influential organization 
to further Scottish interests in the EU. Scotland Europa is a partnership of public, 
                                                 
172 In order to scrutinize EU legislation, a European and External Relations Committee was established 
in the Scottish Parliament. 
173 For more information see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/euoffice 
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private and voluntary bodies that provides specific intelligence, policy analysis, and 
strategic funding information about the EU and contacts for Scottish organizations.174 
 
Scottish governments have shared the conviction that the their policies and 
strategies must be considered in the light of EU decisions given that over three-
quarters of the work of the Scottish Government and the Parliament is influenced by 
decisions taken in Brussels.175 This can be deduced from the apparent continuity in 
terms of active EU involvement between previous Scottish governments and the SNP 
Government since 2007. In 2004, the Scottish Executive outlined an EU strategy to 
“promote Scottish interests in Europe, maximize influence with the UK Government 
on EU issues, and enhance the profile of Scotland in Europe”.176 Accordingly, the 
Scottish Labour Party, which governed Scotland in coalition with the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats until 2007, became active in sub-national paradiplomacy. A regional office 
in Brussels (namely, Scotland House) was established to contain the Scottish 
Government EU Office and Scotland Europa, and cooperation agreements with 
Catalonia, Tuscany, North-Rhein Westphalia and Bavaria were signed. The intention 
of these agreements was to “promote government-to-government contacts between 
partner administrations, to promote exchange of policy best practice, and to promote 
awareness of Scotland and Scottish interests”.177 The Scottish Executive led by the 
SLP also developed Nordic-Scottish Action Plan, joint projects with German Lander, 
                                                 
174http://www.scotlandeuropa.com  
175http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/International-Relations/Europe/European-
Union/Scotland-in-EU , visited on September 17, 2010.    
176Scottish Executive’s European Strategy 2004: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/26487/0025763.pdf visited on March 2, 2008.  
177http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/International-Relations/Europe/Menu8,  visited on 
March 2, 2008.  
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and active participation in the Council of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe 
(CLRAE), and European Group of Regions with Legislative Powers (REGLEG) 
(Hepburn, 2006).  
 
As expected, the Scottish Executive’s paradiplomatic political activism has 
been continued more vigorously by the SNP Government since 2007. First, the ‘Action 
Plan on European Engagement 2007’, and then the ‘Scottish Government International 
Framework 2008’ underlined the party’s aim of ensuring that “Scottish interests are 
fully represented at European level while also making clear to the rest of Europe the 
wealth of experience and resources Scotland has to offer as a nation”.178 The aim of 
raising Scotland’s status as a nation is tightly associated with its ability to take full 
advantage of European opportunities. For this purpose, boosting tourism, 
strengthening trade links and best practice exchange in anything from education and 
environment are presented by the SNP as chances, not only to increase Scottish 
welfare but also Scotland’s profile as a European nation.179  
 
The SNP seeks to increase the credibility of its ‘independence in Europe’ 
policy by frequently referring to the vitality of the EU for Scottish people. Continued 
participation in the European Single Market is seen as imperative in order to make 
Scotland’s economy more dynamic, innovative, and successful. Besides its free market 
aspect, the egalitarian aspect of integration through structural funds is emphasized. For 
example, in 2000-2006, Scotland received over £1.1 billion of structural funds used to 
                                                 
178http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1071/0093889.pdf  visited on September 2, 2010.  
179http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/International-Relations/Europe , visited on 
September 17, 2010.  
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boost standards of living and regional economies through infrastructure and 
environment projects, and social and cultural programs.180      
 
Apart from its deeds in the Scottish Government, the SNP as a political party181 
especially makes use of the European Parliament elections182 and the EFA in order to 
enhance its recognition and legitimacy. While European elections are used as 
occasions to increase mass mobilization in favor of ‘independence in Europe’, the 
alliance with other EFA members is used as support for the independence of Scotland 
as a ‘stateless people’.183  
  
Consequently, compared with the pre-devolution period, the devolved Scottish 
administration has more channels of access and is applying more resources in a more 
focused way in order to exploit them. The problem is that this access is conditional on 
reaching and following an agreed position and it depends on a high degree of mutual 
trust on both sides (Burch et al, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the SNP’s paradiplomatic 
aspirations often contradict with the conditions framed by the Scotland Act 1998, since 
Scotland’s relationship with the EU has been subject to different interpretations 
                                                 
180http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/International-Relations/Europe/European-
Union/Scotland-in-EU visited on Sep 17, 2010. For detailed statistics about allocation of structural 
funds in Scotland, see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Business-Industry/support/17404/8422    
181 In practice, the SNP follows a two-track policy which creates tension. In the Scottish Executive EU 
Office as a part of government, it focuses on agriculture, fisheries, and environment. As a political party, 
it pursues independence in Europe. The author’s interview with James Johnston, Scottish Government 
EU Office, Policy Adviser, 4 April, 2008.  
182 The UK currently has 72 MEPs, with Scotland having 6. At present the Group of the European 
People's Party (Christian Democrats - EPP) is the largest party with 265 members followed by the 
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) with 184 members. The SNP 
with 2 MEPs is a member of the Greens - European Free Alliance, who have 55 members. See 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/International-Relations/Europe/European-
Union/Institutions-LegProcess/EU-Parliament 
183 For a detailed analysis of the EFA, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
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brought about by highly different positions as a dynamic part of a nationalist struggle. 
The SNP pressures the existing structure to increase Scotland’s profile as a nation that 
will one day attain its independence184, and it views and utilizes the EU as an external 
support system on the way to its ultimate goal. On the other hand, the British 
government seeks to maintain the status quo, which results in a constant political 
struggle dominated by nationalist forces having quite different agendas. 
 
5.7 THE INTERPLAY OF BRITISH AND SCOTTISH NATIONALISMS AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF ENGLISH NATIONALISM:  
On a general level, nationalism as a form of politics is displayed through the 
interaction of various nationalisms in the ‘Union of four nations’. British nationalism, 
with its anti-European (‘United Kingdom Independence Party’, and ‘British National 
Party’), and more or less Euro-skeptic but still pro-European versions (Labour, 
Conservative, Liberal Democrats), ethno-territorial Scottish, Welsh and North Irish 
nationalisms, and a relatively new English nationalism compete against one another, or 
make alliances among themselves in order to maintain or gain power in a highly 
dynamic framework in which nation-states are being transformed, supranational 
integration is proceeding, and ethno-territorial politics is increasing its importance.      
 
Although it has been an ambivalent force in British politics, British nationalism 
has contributed to the production and reproduction of Britishness as a unifying factor 
among the four nations of the Union. However, Britishness as a political identity 
                                                 
184 For instance, the SNP demands the creation of the post of a Scottish minister of European Affairs. 
See www.snp.org Visited on April 15, 2009.   
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defined through loyalty to the monarchy and support for the British state was deeply 
eroded by the decline of the British Empire (Craig and Reid, 1999). This fact has also 
been revealed and reinforced with the rise of sub-state nationalist parties. Within this 
context, the SNP’s sub-state nationalism challenges the existing structure of the Union, 
and therefore also British nationalism since it is closely associated with British 
Unionism. Britishness is also challenged because it is frequently intermingled with 
Englishness by London (Kearney, 1991). Although the British Empire meant the 
expansion of the multi-national British Isles, especially centralization and 
deindustrialization during Thatcher governments enhanced the perception that 
Scotland was a periphery of an English-dominated center. Nevertheless, the SNP’s 
nationalism is not anti-English.185 Or rather its anti-Englishness is developed against 
Thatcherite Conservatism and the central government in London. The SNP basically 
targets the structures of the British state.   
 
In response to ethno-territorial attacks by sub-state nationalist political forces, 
including those by the SNP, UK governments have resorted to a number of responses 
in order to maintain political unity in Britain. Among others, central governments have 
encouraged Britishness more vigorously. For instance, as a member of Labour 
Government in 2006, Scottish-origin Gordon Brown, declaring that the promotion of 
integration was the most important task that the UK faces since the London bombings, 
                                                 
185 Despite the existence of some fringe groups (Siol na Gaidheal, English Watch, Settler Watch, the 
Scottish Separatist Group - SSG), a diffuse anti-English sentiment does not exist within Scottish society 
(Lynch, 2002). Among them, the SSG stands out in terms of its radicalism (such as threatening to 
poison the water supply, see The Sunday Times Scotland, 10 September, 2006). The SSG was formed in 
1995 by former members and supporters of the SNLA. Both groups want to reverse English 
immigration into Scotland and promote Gaelic as the country’s national language.  
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argued that Britain should have a national day to celebrate its national identity.186 In 
2008, as British Prime Minister, Brown commissioned the former Attorney General, 
Lord Goldsmith, to prepare a report that made several recommendations for the 
purpose of promoting British identity, including a holiday to celebrate the glories of 
‘Britishness’, and a pledge of alliance to Queen Elizabeth by high school students.187 
Regarding Scottish independentist Scottish nationalism, Gordon Brown kept criticizing 
the SNP, and warned the Scots to “think big and not become parochial or obsessed 
with ‘narrow’ nationalism”. He also claimed that Scots would only be able to make a 
difference to global challenges if they remained part of Britain.188 
 
 
Despite these attempts by London to maintain the British Union, the status quo 
in the Union is also challenged from within in the form of English nationalism. It is a 
relatively recent development since there was no such a thing as English nationalism 
until the Empire collapsed (Kumar, 2006). As a political movement, English 
nationalism is based on a sense of Englishness distinct from Scottish, Welsh or 
Northern Irish identities, and it seeks self-government for England. English nationalists 
see themselves as equally English and British or more English than British (See 
Appendix Table 4). The perceived anomalies (or, unfairness) brought about by 
increased devolution of political power (or, ‘asymmetric devolution’)189 are among the 
                                                 
186 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4611682.stm. Saturday 14 Jan, 2006.  
187 Telegraph, 11 March 2008,   http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/1581354/Lord-
Goldsmith-calls-for-Britishness-day-and-oaths-to-the-Queen.html, visited on March 29, 2008.  
188 The Scotsman, 29 March 2008 
189 Guibernau’s latest publication provides a detailed analysis of devolution in various Western 
countries. See Montserrat Guibernau (2007) The Identity of Nations, Cambridge and Malden, M.A.: 
Polity.  
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major factors that ignited English nationalism. Of these, the ‘West Lothian Question’ 
has been the most-pronounced anomaly encouraging support for the establishment of 
self-governing English political institutions. The ‘West Lothian Question’ refers to the 
contradiction that, after devolution, Scottish MPs in the UK Parliament are no longer 
able to vote on Scottish domestic policies, while they are still able to vote on English 
domestic policies (Judge, 2005: 215).190  
 
English nationalism has a right-of-center position and is often associated with 
Euroscepticism, since the EU enforces regionalization and thus the disintegration of 
the UK. In this sense, English nationalism is impelled by conservative forces, either 
converted from British Unionism to English nationalism or through advocacy to 
restructure the British political system to create an English dimension. However, both 
the Conservative Party and Labour Party strongly oppose, or choose to ignore, such 
demands. On the other hand, SNP leader Salmond indirectly supports English 
nationalism by claiming that ‘only Scottish independence can solve the English 
question’.191  
 
In short, English nationalism has been based on the claim that the British 
political structure should be provided with an English dimension to correct the 
unfairness of asymmetrical devolution. In a general sense, the emergence of English 
nationalism makes the British case highly exceptional in terms of the interaction of 
                                                 
190 This question was posed by the Scottish Labour MP, Tam Dalyell, who represented the then 
constituency of West Lothian (Judge, 2005: 215).  
191 Telegraph, 20 March 2007,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3638581/Only-
Scottish-independence-can-solve-the-English-Question.html, visited on March 29, 2008.  
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various nationalisms within the territorial boundaries of the same nation-state. While in 
other cases official state nationalism gives rise to the emergence of sub-state 
nationalist movements and parties, in the British case, sub-state nationalist pressures 
on the British state and its nationalism (even if not officially declared) is invoking the 
development of another nationalism, namely English nationalism, as a further 
disintegrating force for the Union.  
 
5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We can now draw various conclusions regarding the SNP’s nationalism and the 
impacts of European integration on it.    
While the historical trajectory of the Union has brought about a particular way 
of development for Scottish nationalism, it has also shaped the opportunity structures 
that have in large part distinguished it from its counterparts in continental Europe. 
Unlike the traditional path followed by some other sub-state nationalist movements, 
such as the Basque and Kurdish cases that emerged and developed against state- and 
nation-building processes carried out by central governments threatening their interests 
and collective identities, Scottish nationalism flourished as a Home Rule movement 
seeking self-government within the borders of the Union. This developed as a response 
to increasing centralization, which was adversely affecting autonomous Scottish 
institutions protected by the Union Act of 1707, before being oriented through the SNP 
towards independence on the basis of questioning the advantages of being a part of the 
United Kingdom.  
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The SNP, which has dominated Scottish nationalism since the 1970s, defines 
itself as a modern and modernizing force in Scottish politics. Compared to its many 
counterparts, it does not heavily play on culture, history and tradition. In fact, these 
elements were almost taken for granted due to the fact that Scottish national identity 
could be maintained in the ‘Union of four nations’. By using distinctly Scottish 
political and social institutions as boundary markers, the SNP has pursued the goal of 
an independent Scottish state. In this sense, it is the only sub-state nationalist party that 
explicitly pursues independence in European context. As an independent party, 
constitutional politics, questions of sovereignty and power constitute the essence of the 
SNP’s policies.  
 
While it was a marginal force among Scottish nationalist actors for decades, the 
SNP has gradually become a significant force by achieving significant electoral 
successes since the 1970s, especially since the early 1990s. With the combined effect 
of a number of structural and fomenting factors, the SNP has found increasingly 
favorable opportunity structures for its independence policy within the European 
integration process, and through the 1997 devolution referendum that was itself 
conditioned by the general trend of decentralization in the EU, and particularly the 
SNP’s ability to make use of the new context and opportunities in favor of its goals.  
 
Having seen the European integration process as an external support system 
against the British state, the SNP has gradually adopted a pro-European stance as have 
a great majority of sub-state nationalist parties done in Europe in the same period. The 
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impacts of European integration process on the SNP have been significant. As an 
independence party, the SNP has come to reformulate its ultimate goal as 
‘independence in Europe’. It has adopted this policy from seeing Europe as a way to 
dispel the negative aspects associated with independence, such as economic disruption 
and political isolation, to improve Scotland’s economy, to assert Scottish identity 
outside Britain, and to have a more direct representation in Brussels.  
 
The SNP has also used its pro-European stance as a symbolic means to distance 
itself from other British political parties that tend to be more Euro-skeptic. Hence, 
European integration has now become another marker in the process of national 
identity construction. The SNP’s evolution towards adopting a pro-European position 
was accompanied by an intra-party conflict that also crystallized the party’s 
ideological position. Consequently, the SNP has transformed itself into a pro-
European, independentist, left-of-center political party that seeks to achieve its goals 
step by step through electoral competition.   
 
The SNP’s view of nationalism as a modernizing force with relatively weak 
cultural baggage has led many scholars to see it as one of the best examples of neo-
nationalism. It is true that the SNP, like its main rival, British national identity, 
defends a civic conception of the nation, meaning, basically, an inclusive interpretation 
of nationality at a political level. Nevertheless, it does not mean the SNP completely 
ignores the ethno-cultural aspect. Otherwise, we would not be able to mention 
nationalism. The specificity of the SNP’s nationalism is the fact it has already had a 
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deep-rooted national identity that underpinned the argument of national 
distinctiveness. Against a non-repressive British nationalism, the SNP politicized 
Scottish national identity. According to the main argument here, conditions have 
radically changed, the Union of 1707 has become outdated, and it is time for Scots to 
have their own independent states within the new context. Most scholars adopting the 
argument of neo-nationalism claim that the SNP’s nationalism is not really a state-
seeking nationalism. According to them, as an example of neo-nationalism, the SNP’s 
nationalism actually adopts the politics of economic opportunity and renounces 
separatism (McCrone, 1998; Keating, 1996). They argue that independence has lost its 
meaning due to the transformation of the traditional understanding of sovereignty by 
European integration. 
 
It is true that the SNP’s nationalism is very different from classical 19th century 
nationalism, considering the multidimensional and complex set of relations and 
transformation of key concepts of political life within the European context. However, 
the SNP neither desires the end of nation-states nor does it see the ongoing European 
integration as heading in that direction. The SNP believes political power is still vested 
with nation-states and therefore continues to demand national independence ‘to be an 
equal partner of the EU’.  
 
On the other hand, the feasibility of such a goal is quite another matter, 
considering that there are significant obstacles facing the creation of an independent 
Scottish state. There is no doubt that the SNP has critical implications for British 
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politics. It has helped in to the reconstitution of the Scottish parliament, such that 
Scottish politics is no more a two-party system. In contrast to Westminster, there are 
now at least three major parties competing for government in Scotland; the SNP’s 
policies have also encouraged public debate on, and political struggle over, national 
identity and the future of the UK as observed by the appearance of competing forms of 
nationalism.  
 
The SNP’s main difficulties in terms of reaching its ultimate goal are that most 
Scots still stick to both their Scottish and British identities at the same time (See Table 
2 in Appendices). As a corollary to this, public opinion polls show that the majority of 
Scots do not support independence (See Table 3 in Appendices). As well as these 
major obstacles, the power of opportunity structures reshaped through European 
integration and devolutionary processes should not be exaggerated. As long as nation-
states are Masters of the Treaty, the nationalities question will still stay a national 
question. In addition, the procedural ambiguity about the EU membership of an 
independent Scottish state and the probable reluctance of interest-driven nation-states 
to recognize Scottish independence against the will of the large partner of the EU, are 
other problems regarding the SNP’s ‘independence in Europe’ policy.  
     
Seeing devolution as a springboard to independence, and using the Scottish 
Parliament as a means to achieve this, the SNP’s current strategy has focused on an 
independence referendum. As promised before the 2007 Scottish Elections, the party 
(in government since then) initiated a national conversation on Scottish independence 
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and then sought to hold a referendum in 2010 with the aim of declaring Scottish 
independence in 2017 (www.snp.org). However, the Scottish Parliament, where the 
SNP currently holds only 47 of 129 seats, rejected its plans for a Referendum Bill on 
independence.192 In this sense, the British state has proved to be prepared to pre-empt 
any referendum attempt that includes the option of secession. Legally, in the Scotland 
Act 1998, the constitution is included among reserved matters, with the aim of 
preventing Scotland voting for independence; however, a referendum could hardly be 
prevented if the Scottish Parliament voted for it. 193 Hence, whether the SNP can 
achieve its ultimate goal is subject to an ongoing, highly dynamic, multi-party political 
struggle in the UK. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
192 Members of the Scottish Parliament voted by 72 to 47, with one abstention, to call on the Scottish 
Government to abandon preparing a Referendum Bill on Scottish independence. See Scotsman 
‘Holyrood vetoes SNP referendum bid’, March 5, 2009. 
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/topstories/Holyrood-vetoes-SNP-referendum-bid.5045389.jp   , visited 
on 30 November, 2009.  
193 Loughlin (2001b: 3) reminds us that there is an interesting question with regard to the basis of the 
legitimacy of the restored Scottish Parliament. “Does this derive from the Scottish people, expressed in 
the referendum of 1997, or does it derive from the Scottish Act of the Westminster Parliament by which 
the Scottish Parliament was established?” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PARTIDO NACIONALISTA VASCO AND ‘CO-SOVEREIGNTY’ 
  
 
 Vibrant sub-state nationalist movements and political parties have been one of 
the most salient forces of Spanish politics for more than a century. The politics of 
ethnoterritorial and linguistic diversity, organized as Basque, Catalan and Galician 
sub-state nationalisms, particularly challenged the prevalent national identity in Spain 
and the political structure of the Spanish state, which was either ‘weak or excessively 
and violently centralized’ (Moreno, 2001: 205), to achieve congruence between 
cultural and political units in a traditional sense. The conflict of identities has 
combined with a clash of political and economic interests, particularly in Basque and 
Catalan nationalisms, since their assertions of their claims of ‘nationness’ has been 
accompanied by a resistance to transfer a share of their wealth to finance the center 
and relatively poorer regions of Spain.194  
 
                                                 
194 The Basque Autonomous Community is the most advanced region in Spain in terms of economic 
wealth and human development index. See 
http://www.eustat.es/elementos/ele0002100/ti_GDP_per_capita_by_province_Current_prices_base_200
5__1980-2008a/tbl0002160_i.html and 
http://www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-
3872/en/contenidos/informacion/06_revista_euskaletxeak/en_ee/adjuntos/81_04_05_i.pdf Retrieved on 
January 5, 2011.  
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 Basque nationalism is one of the most studied cases among Western sub-state 
nationalist movements. It is usually investigated as a case study in itself, or compared 
with the Catalan case on the grounds that they both belong to the Spanish context, 
despite being highly dissimilar examples in terms of their emergence, development, 
ideological content and political strategies. Due to its strong emphasis on ethnic 
distinctiveness and its violent dimension, the Basque case is frequently contrasted to 
the ‘civic’ Scottish, Catalan, or Quebec cases, and often excluded from comprehensive 
multi-country comparative studies on sub-state nationalist movements and/or parties of 
Western countries.  
 
 Indeed, the complexity of Basque nationalism makes it hard to comprehend 
thoroughly. Quite differently from other sub-state societies, except possibly the Irish 
case, Basque society is a ‘divided society’; that is, politically and socially polarized as 
Basques and non-Basques, or Basque nationalists and non-Basque nationalists. 
Moreover, Basque nationalists themselves are deeply divided on the issue of violence 
as the proper political strategy. This nationalism, dating back to the end of the 19th 
century, has been dominated by several actors, among which the PNV and ETA have 
been the most remarkable. The former is the founder and still major political party of 
Basque nationalism, while the latter split from the former and developed a particular 
version of Basque nationalism defined by apparently clearly declared ideal of an 
independent Basque state and the use of a violent strategy for this aim.  
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 Since its inception in different parts of the country, the Spanish state’s view of 
sub-state nationalism has varied between evaluating it as an open to threat to national 
unity or a reality of Spanish socio-politics. Accordingly, it has resorted to a range of 
policies, oscillating between brutal oppression and accommodation through territorial 
autonomy. While the Franco dictatorship represented the former par excellence, the 
current period, initiated by the transition to democracy in 1978, is characterized by the 
devolution of vast powers to historic nationalities, including the Basque Country.  
 
There is no doubt that the transition to democracy in Spain and the subsequent 
establishment of the ‘Autonomous Communities System’, including the Basque 
Autonomous Community, have significantly widened the opportunity structures to the 
benefit of the PNV, which has always rejected violent methods since its foundation in 
1895. These widened opportunity structures became much more favorable with 
Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986, and the PNV is one of the most ardent supporters 
of European integration, enthusiastically seeking to make use of new channels to 
promote Basque national identity and interests at national and supranational levels. At 
the same time, it argues for a new political agreement with the Spanish state, since the 
existing Autonomous Community Statute is seen as an obstacle to Basques achieving 
their right to full autonomy.   
 
 This chapter seeks to understand the impacts of the European integration 
process on the PNV. In doing so, it first gives a historical background of Basque 
nationalism within the context of Spanish modernization. Then, it analyzes the 
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construction of Basque national identity by the PNV and the party’s goals, strategies 
and ideology. Then, using opportunity structure approach, it examines the impacts of 
the European integration process on the PNV’s conception of Basque national identity, 
and the meaning of co-sovereignty as the most recent goal of the party in relation to its 
interaction with Spanish nationalism as one of the main forces that reproduces Spanish 
state and Spanish national identity.   
 
6.1 THE SPANISH STATE AND SPANISH NATIONALISM 
Giving an account of the spread of nationalism through different time zones, 
Gellner (1993) claims that countries in the westernmost zone (the Atlantic coastline 
states) were least influenced by nationalism since they appeared through the 
nationalization of absolutist states of Western Europe that were already relatively 
homogeneous (see Chapter 2). It is indeed observable that nationalism in Spain, as in 
Great Britain, was not a leading force in the 19th century. Payne (1991: 479-80) even 
claims that in no other European country was nationalism weaker than in Spain, prior 
to 1936 (the end of Spanish Civil War). He suggests several historical reasons for this: 
the slow economic and social modernization prior to WWI, the traditionally confederal 
structure of the Spanish monarchy that never created fully centralized institutions, and 
Spain’s avoidance of involvement in the major wars of the twentieth century.  
 
Payne (1991) then argues that there was a particular idea and set of attitudes 
throughout pre-20th century Spanish history that can be called the ‘Spanish ideology’, 
rather than nationalism. This was above all charged with the mission to fight for 
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Christendom, complemented by monarchist traditionalism that fought for tradition and 
integrism against emerging internal threats. Until the end of the 19th century, national 
unification was enforced through religious belief and orthodoxy, though local 
institutions survived. When liberals affected by the French experiment set about 
political modernization through radical reforms, the Spanish ideology took a particular 
form of conservatism, namely, Carlism. Carlist traditionalism was a 
counterrevolutionary movement against Enlightenment, republicanism and liberalism. 
It survived from 1833 to 1975, taking an active role in the war of monarchism and 
Catholicism against liberalism and modernism. It waged three civil wars in the name 
of a unique Spanish identity based on traditional values and institutions. Although 
Carlists were defeated by the liberals, they still managed to force Spanish liberalism to 
compromise with monarchism and Catholicism (Balfour, 1995). 
 
Thus, the short-lived liberal led First Spanish Republic (la Primera República, 
1873–74) was followed by the Bourbon Restoration, which lasted until 1931 when the 
Second Republic (la Seconda República) was proclaimed. The Restoration aimed at 
political stability through a deliberate rotation of Conservative and Liberal parties in 
the government. Actually, this rotation had been built on an electoral fraud in which 
caciques, powerful local men, were used to manipulate election results. Due to the 
closeness of the political system to themselves and/or differences in ideological 
preferences, the political system in the Restoration period was opposed by republicans, 
socialists, anarchists, sub-state nationalists and Carlists (Barton, 2004). This fragile 
system went into a fundamental crisis with the loss of Cuba and the Philippines, with 
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the decisive blow coming from Spain’s defeat in the Spanish American War of 1898. 
The military and imperial debacle of 1898, El Desastre (the Disaster), and the slow 
pace of modernization, led to the emergence of the Regenerationist Movement, which 
questioned Spain’s place in the world and Spanish identity. Regenerationists were not 
overt nationalists compared with those elsewhere, but they nevertheless bore the 
elements of a sort of protonationalism (Payne, 1975).  
 
Thus, Spanish modernization followed a quite particular pathway compared 
with the experiences of other Western European countries. To illustrate, the 
backwardness of Spanish modernization made a French equivalent of centralization at 
the expense of distinct sub-national identities in Spain impossible. Moreover, the fact 
that industrial modernization first began in the peripheral regions, namely Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, and the relatively early demise of Empire, prevented a 
British-type integration that was able to occur through the migration of Scottish people 
to industrializing areas as well as to appealing job opportunities in the imperial 
enterprise.  
      
6.2 BASQUE MODERNIZATION AND ITS CONFLICTUAL 
CONSEQUENCES  
Regional identities in Spain had been always strong195 but they only began to 
take the form of sub-state nationalism in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
particularly in the Basque Country and Catalonia. These regions were pioneers of 
                                                 
195 Noting that Spain was a confederation of loosely connected states until the 18th century, Gallagher 
(1991: 121) claims that centralization of power was impeded by climate, geography and poor 
communications, which enabled the growth of strong local identities.   
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industrialization in Spain; as a consequence of economic modernization, they 
developed powerful bourgeoisie classes open to Enlightenment ideas, and they were 
deeply frustrated by the huge social problems entailed by modernization, such as 
influxes of migrants, poverty, and unemployment. Despite these similarities, 
modernization in each region resulted in the emergence and development of two sub-
state nationalisms highly differentiated from each other in terms of content and key 
actors.  
 
Unlike Catalan nationalism, which grew out of the industrialization process as 
a bourgeoisie nationalism dedicated to modernization and development, Basque 
nationalism was the product of middle-class intellectuals who wished to revive the 
Basque identity in defense of traditionalism against modernity. This particular 
trajectory had its roots in the pre-industrial period, in which town and country in the 
Basque Country represented two politically and culturally distinct social orders. 
Politically, the villas (towns) and the rural areas had different legal frameworks called 
fueros. The towns were established by the kings of Castile for military and political 
purposes and directly linked to the center. In contrast, the rural areas were governed by 
local elected assemblies (Juntas Generales) and their ties with the center were loose. 
Culturally, while the reform-minded and Hispanized Basque bourgeoisie was the main 
agent in the introduction and diffusion of Enlightenment ideas into Spain, the life of 
the euskaldun (Basque-speaking) rural areas was confined to the closed world of the 
rural neighbourhood (Heiberg, 1996).  
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In the 19th century, the centralizing attempts of the Spanish state and the 
aspirations of the Basque urban bourgeoisie to eliminate the foral institutions (the 
institutions based on fueros) that provided the rural elites with an advantageous 
position in a protected rural mode of life were countered by reaction, leading to the 
Carlist Wars (Guerras Carlistas, 1833-9 and 1873-6). They were, above all, civil wars 
between modernizers and traditionalists.  
 
The military defeat of the rural Basques resulted in the abolition of the fueros 
in 1876, which was crucial for the development of Basque industry. Heiberg (1996) 
informs us that the Basque Country was a duty-free zone that cut off Basque industry 
from Spanish markets due to heavy tariff barriers during the foral regime. In addition, 
in many areas, the rich natural resources (especially, iron) were held communally 
rather than as private property. Thus, it can be claimed that the modern Basque 
Country emerged with the defeat of Carlism. Industrialization gained momentum to 
create a radical transformation of Basque society, which not only contributed to widen 
the socio-economic and cultural gulf between Madrid and the Basque Country where 
the basis of a modern industrial economy was developed, but also reproduced this 
duality within Basque society under new conditions. Specifically, the Basque urban 
bourgeoisie was content to work with Madrid; the major Spanish banking elites were 
Basques who were bound into the Spanish state’s economic and political stability. The 
Basque language was barely spoken in urban areas. In other words, the victory of 
liberalism in the Basque Country, resulting from the Carlist Wars and enhanced by 
rapid modernization, meant the political, economic and cultural dominance of the 
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expanding urban centers. On the other hand, there were rural areas that felt threatened 
by the deep impacts of these processes of the emergence of Basque working class, the 
displacement of population from rural areas to the countryside and the arrival of large 
numbers of migrants from other parts of Spain196 (Ben-Ami, 1991). It led to the birth 
of Basque nationalism in Vizcaya (Bilbao) as the emerging industrial center of the 
Basque Country.    
 
6.3 THE PNV: THE FLAGSHIP OF BASQUE NATIONALISM  
The Early Version of Basque Nationalism: Aranism  
The alienation of the peasantry and rural immigrants to the newly 
industrializing Basque towns in the late 19th century can be considered as the major 
reason for the emergence of Basque nationalism (MacClancy, 1997). The material 
aspect of this alienation was as important as its cultural dimension. In this regard, 
Basque nationalism aimed at the generation and maintenance of ethnic boundaries in 
the competition for power with the new forces in the face of the abolishment of the 
fueros and the subsequent rapid industrialization that dramatically affected the 
distribution of political, economic and social resources in the Basque Country. Basque 
nationalism arose and recruited its supporters among the Basque middle and petty 
bourgeoisie that was caught between the Basque financial and industrial bourgeoisie 
and the large industrial proletariat (Heiberg, 1996).  
 
                                                 
196 The influx of migrants from other parts of Spain was so remarkable that Bilbao (capital city of 
Vizcaya province) more than doubled its population from 35,000 in 1877 to 83,000 in 1900. By the turn 
of the twentieth century, about 80 per cent of Bilbao’s population were immigrants and only 23,4 % of 
them were born there (Corcuera, quoted in Conversi, 1997: 197).    
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 Within this context, Sabino de Arana y Goiri (1865-1903) emerged as the 
ideologue of Basque nationalism, founding the PNV in 1895. Coming from a Carlist 
background and a native Castilian speaker, Arana created an ideology centered on the 
purity of the Basque race and its moral supremacy over Spaniards, an anti-liberal 
Catholic integrism, and deep opposition to the immigration of Spaniards (Conversi, 
1997).197 Although the PNV’s slogan of ‘God and Fueros’ displayed a Carlist 
tendency198, Basque nationalism was neither monarchist nor Unionist. Arana and his 
followers saw Basque urban society, along with modernizing industrialization and 
influxes of migration, as threatening Basque identity. Arana referred to this 
immigration as ‘an invasion by Spanish socialists and atheists’. They saw the solution 
in establishing an independent Basque state.  
 
The politicization of Basque identity required great ideological effort and led to 
the creation of a largely symbolic nationalist ideology based on two interrelated sets of 
symbols. While one set defined the elements of Basque cohesion and exclusiveness, 
consisting of the Basque language (Euskara), religion, traditional Basque customs and 
character, the other set consisted of Basque history, the fueros and the notion of 
Basque original sovereignty. Whereas the first set showed that Basques were both 
culturally and morally distinct from Spaniards, the second set demonstrated that the 
                                                 
197 Balfour also reminds us that the deep crisis resulting from El Desastre flowed into this longer-term 
crisis generated by modernization (Balfour, 1996: 113).   
198 The motto of Carlism was dios (catholic faith), patria (fatherland), fueros (old laws and charters), 
and rey (sovereignty is vested on the king not nation) (Payne, 1975). The PNV refers to itself as EAJ-
PNV, where EAJ is an abbreviation of Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, which literally means ‘Basque party of 
friends of God and Fueros’. The PNV (Partido Nacionalisto Vasco) is the abbreviation of the party’s 
name in Spanish. The French branch of the PNV is called EAJ-PNB (Parti Nationaliste Basque). This 
study prefers to use the Spanish version for practical reasons.    
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Basque country could be regarded, neither historically nor politically, as part of Spain 
(Heiberg, 1996).  
 
6.3.1 Basque Identity  
Basques, with a total population of 2.5 million,199 are the longest-established 
inhabitants of the Basque land on the either side of the Western Pyrenees; the majority 
of them live in Spain, while the others live on the French side. There has been a 
Basque culture and language for many centuries, but the concept of the ‘Basque 
nation’ was an invention of the 1890s. Built on a specific reading of culture and 
history, Basque nationalists claim that the Basque Country is totally different from 
Spain on the grounds that Basques constitute a national community within the 
boundaries of a Basque national homeland; that their history can be traced back to 
prehistoric times; and that the Basque language (Euskara) differs markedly from Indo-
European languages.200 Actually, many of these arguments were based on a creative 
invention of tradition by Arana himself.   
 
Basque nationalists maintain that the Basque national homeland consists of the 
four Spanish provinces of Alava (Araba in Euskara; capital city: Vittoria-Gasteiz), 
Guipuzcoa (capital city: San-Sebastian), Navarra (Nafarroa in Euskara; capital city: 
                                                 
199 Today Alava, Biscay and Gipuzkoa (1.4 % of total Spanish territory) constitute the Basque 
Autonomous Community (population: 2,100,000). While Navarre has 600,000 people, the French part 
has nearly 300,000 (see http://www.aztikerdb.com/dt/index.php?erakus=erroa&erro=2 ;   
http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_cifraspob.htm  ). It is predicted that Basque language (Euskara) is 
spoken by approximately 632,000 people (566,000 in the Spanish state, 66,000 in France). It means that 
nearly a quarter of the Basque population speak Euskara. See 
http://www.englishpen.org/writersintranslation/magazineofliteratureintranslat/basquecountry/basquelan
guage ). Visited on January 7, 2011.  
200 Basque is the only pre-Indo-European language in use in Europe (Guibernau, 2000).  
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Pamplona) and Vizcaya (Bizkaia in Euskara; capital city: Bilbao), and the French pays 
of Labourd (Lapurdi), Soule (Zuberoa) and Lower Navarra (Behe Nafarroa).201 
However, since the seven provinces claimed to constitute the Basque homeland had 
never formed a single discrete political unit and did not even have a name, Arana had 
to invent a name for it. His original usage of Euskalerria was shortened to Euzkadi 
(then, to Euskadi), meaning the ‘Basque land’ (Payne, 1975).  
 
Considering Euskara as one of the constituent elements of Basqueness, Arana 
made it one of the symbols of Basque nationalism. Euskaldunak (Basque speakers) 
were claimed to constitute a trans-state national community on both sides of Franco-
Spanish border. In reality, it was impossible to speak of linguistic or cultural 
homogeneity among Basques because Euskara was not widespread and had many 
dialects due to the rugged mountains, which made French or Spain the lingua franca. 
As a symbol of national unity, Arana also invented the Basque national flag (ikurriña) 
on the model of the Union Jack.202  
 
  Arana defended ‘Basque purity’203 both ethnically and culturally. He argued 
that Basque racial purity could be maintained thanks to the fueros and the integrity of 
Basque culture. He made a total distinction between the Basques and Spanish (or, 
maketo, as he termed them). He defined Spaniards as the ‘most vile and despicable 
                                                 
201 The four Spanish provinces (Hegoalde) and three French pays (Iparralde) are together also referred 
to by Basque nationalists as ‘Zazpiak Bat’ (‘Seven in One’).  
202 For a detailed explanation of the meaning of each symbol on the Basque flag, see Payne (1975).  
203 Purity of race is based on the historical experience of ‘collective nobility’ (hidalgua) as a part of 
Basque mythology. See Davydd Greenwood (1977) “Continuity in Change: Spanish Basque Ethnicity as 
a Historical Process” in Milton J. Esman (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press.  
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race in Europe’ and condemned intermarriages with Spaniards (Payne, 1975: 75).204 
According to him, Spaniards were lazy, violent and prone to drunkenness; they were 
not Christian but pagan (Conversi, 1997). Thus, he described Basqueness and 
Spanishness as two incompatible identities. Consequently, by emphasizing blood and 
origin, Arana defined Basqueness as a way of excluding those who were clearly not 
Basque by birth or descent.  
 
However, neither surnames, language nor physical character were sufficient to 
earn the Basque status. Rather, Basque nationality could only be achieved through the 
attribute of abertzalismo, or patriotism, meaning unquestioned fidelity to the political 
goal of Basque differentiation, exclusiveness and preference. The Basque ethnic 
community was thus viewed as a moral community, with the moral duty of all Basques 
being the economic, political and cultural defense of this community. In other words, a 
real Basque could only be a Basque nationalist (Heiberg, 1996).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Basque financial oligarchy and Spanish migrants were 
placed in the camp of anti-Basques, so that, unlike Spanish politics, which was divided 
broadly on left-right axes, Basque politics comprised three political wings: the non-
nationalist right (supported by the Basque economic elite), the non-nationalist left 
                                                 
204 Arana compares Basques and Maketos in an article as follows (since Basque nationalism emerged as 
Vizcayan (Bizkaia in Euskara) nationalism, Arana refers to Basques as the Bizkaian): “The 
physiognomy of the Bizkaian is intelligent and noble; that of the Spaniard inexpressive and gloomy. The 
Bizkaian walks upright and manly; the Spaniard… has a feminine air (example, the bullfighter). The 
Bizkaian is energetic and agile; the Spaniard lax and dull. The Bizkaian is hardworking (witness his 
slopes cultivated to the hilltops); the Spaniard is lazy and slothful (witness his immense plains 
absolutely devoid of vegetation). The Bizkaian’s character degenerates through contact with the 
outsider; the Spaniard needs from time to time a foreign invasion to civilize him” (Quoted in Douglass, 
2004: 106).   
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(supported by the immigrant workers and sectors of the Basque working class) and the 
nationalists (Kellas, 1991).  
 
6.3.2 Goals, Strategies and Ideology   
Despite ideological differences among themselves, Basque nationalists 
including the PNV supported the claim that Euskal Herria was the national homeland 
of Basques. They contended that suppression by the Spanish and French states had 
prevented them from being Basques, deprived them of self-realization by denying 
them self-government. Within the Spanish context, Arana, as the ideologue of Basque 
nationalism, maintained that it was meaningless to label Basques as separatists since 
they had never been really joined with Spain (‘Maketania’). What Basques needed was 
only to reassert their fundamental independence (Payne, 1975: 75). Thus, Arana 
argued that the Basques, as a sovereign nation, had a natural right to be governed only 
by Basques for the benefit of Basques (Heiberg, 1996).  
 
Fueros have been the main historical basis for nationalist arguments regarding 
the unity of the seven ‘historic territories’ and the retrieval of lost Basque sovereignty. 
The Fueros that embodied the customs of each Basque province were local statutes 
and charters granted by the kings of Castile at different times, and acted as part of the 
legal system dealing with matters regarding the political ties of the Basque Provinces 
with the Spanish crown. They gave Basque subjects a privileged position in Spain with 
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a special tax and political status (Lecours, 2007).205 The Fueros were applied by 
Juntas Generales which the kings of Castile had to swear to observe. In the province 
of Vizcaya, the ceremony of the royal oath took place in the city of Guernica under an 
oak tree that became the symbol of Basque independence.  
 
Basque nationalists consider that fueros were agreements between Basques and 
the Spanish state rather than a grant by the Spanish state. Their abolishment meant a 
direct attack on Basque rights, giving them a legitimate right to fight against the 
‘oppressive Spanish state’. Basque nationalists believed that fueros now needed to be 
reestablished in their full integrity in an independent Basque state. This emphasis on 
fueros was apparent in the PNV’s political program of 1895 prepared by Arana. The 
PNV’s slogan of ‘Jaungoikua eta lagi-zarra’ (JEL, or ‘God and the Old Laws’) 
stressed the vitality of Catholic belief and the restoration of fueros as the customs of 
their ancestors in order to form a moral, ethnic-based traditional community. The same 
program imagined the prospective Basque state as a confederation of the seven historic 
territories where Euskara would be the official language (in Payne, 1975: 72-3).  
 
Thus, the PNV offered a political program which was culturally neo-
traditionalist, politically revolutionary, and radically theocratic (Payne, 1975; 
Medrano, 1995). Despite the ambiguous definition of its revolutionary political goal of 
independence, the PNV consistently has opposed violence as a legitimate strategy.  
 
                                                 
205 Basques were not subject to a direct levee to the Castilian army, although many volunteered, 
especially in the Spanish navy. The Fueros also gave provincial assemblies the right to veto royal edicts 
(Guibernau, 2000).  
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6.4 THE LOST AUTONOMY AND FRANCO PERIOD 
In its early decades, the PNV had to face up to several difficulties regarding 
organization and mobilization. At the same time, it had to contend with emerging 
Spanish authoritarianism that became increasingly powerful in the face of the twin 
challenge of sub-state nationalism and workers’ movements. The Primo de Rivera 
(1923–1931) and Franco dictatorships (1939–75) were responses of traditionalist 
forces of Spanish society. The former stood for a kind of ‘authoritarian exaggeration of 
Regenerationism’, creating the first nationalist government in Spanish history (Barton, 
2004). The PNV survived the Primo de Rivera dictatorship disguised as cultural and 
athletic associations. In these years, Basque nationalism substituted Carlism in favor of 
the Catholic Church as a barrier against leftist anti-clericalism.  
 
  
The Second Republic (1931-6) provided greatly more favorable opportunity 
structures for the PNV. In contrast to the authoritarian integrism of de Rivera regime, 
Republicans declared that a democratic regime could not be established without 
transferring autonomy to special regions. This perspective led to the granting of 
autonomy statutes to Catalonia (1932), the Basque Country (1933)206 and Galicia 
(1936).  
 
 
                                                 
206 In 1936, the main part of the PNV sided with the Second Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War. 
The promise of autonomy was valued over ideological differences, especially on the religious matter, 
and the PNV decided to support the republican legal government. In accordance with the Autonomy 
Statute, a republican autonomous Basque government was formed in 1936, with Jose Antonio Aguirre 
(PNV) as Lehendakari (President of the Basque government) (Blinkhorn, 1974).  
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However, the autonomous communities were unable to survive for a long time. 
Combined with the ‘threat’ of secularization and a collectivist revolution, the reaction 
against the autonomy statutes gave rise to the Franco dictatorship as the most radical 
form of authoritarianism in Spain. After defeating revolutionary forces in the Spanish 
Civil War (1936–9), Franco established a nationalist regime that represented a mixture 
of fascist, traditionalist policies in the early years, although the dictatorship soon came 
to stand for a future project of its own, summarized as “reunification of the nation, 
modernization of its economy and regaining its imperial and international status” 
(Payne, 1991: 486). Hence, promoting a ‘narrow image’ of Spain emphasizing national 
unity,207 Francoism condemned all forms of cultural and political diversity in favor of 
a conservative, Catholic, centralist and Castillian Spain (Guibernau, 2000: 58).    
 
Within this context, Franco’s regime supressed all autonomous political 
institutions and laws; it prohibited the Catalan and Basque languages as well as 
symbols of sub-state identity such as flags and anthems.208 The use of sub-national 
                                                 
207 Gallagher (1991) reminds that Franco’s centralist policy was based on a supposed link between unity 
and greatness in the 16th century. However, this view was based on a misreading of Spanish history. 
During the period greatness, Spain was never a unitary state. The Union of crowns of Castile and 
Aragon by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469 had created a dynastic union in which Aragon 
(including Catalonia) and the Basque territories retained broad autonomous powers. 
208 The situation was milder in Alava and Navarra which had sided with Franco during the Civil War. 
Actually, despite the nationalist claims, Navarra had never been a supporter of Basque nationalism. 
Deprived of rapid industrialization taking place in Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, Navarra remained a largely 
rural area that was led by rural notables and wealthy landowners, and its political aspirations remained 
limited to the recognition of Navarra as a distinctive region in Spain (MacClancy, 1997). The difference 
between industrialized Basque as the cradle of Basque sub-state nationalism and Navarra’s regionalist 
claims have been revealed several times. In 1932, the political referendum on the Basque Autonomy 
was rejected in Navarra while it took support in Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava with varying degrees. 
Then, in the Spanish Civil War, Navarra and Alava supported Francoists. Regarding this historical fact, 
Blinkhorn (1974) rightly claims that the Spanish Civil War was also a civil war between the Basques.  
And as the recent example for the division, Navarra has chosen to reject calls for unification with the 
Basque Autonomous Community which was established with 1979 Autonomous Statute, and it 
constitutes a separate autonomous community by the name of ‘Foral Community of Navarra’ separate 
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languages were seen as anti-patriotic, and the regime carefully chose to refer to these 
languages as ‘dialects’. It was claimed that the non-Castillian languages were inferior, 
and they were characterized as the speech of the uneducated and peasantry (Mar-
Molinero, 1996).209 The invasion of the Basque Country by Franco’s forces and the 
ensuing repression enhanced the perception of Spain as an alien, repressive force 
among Basque people, particularly in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa provinces, where 
Basque nationalism had traditionally been an influential political force.  
 
During the Franco regime, Basque nationalists went underground, or were sent 
to prison, and the leadership fled to exile. Deprived of any chance of power in the 
Basque Country, the PNV perpetuated its nationalism by forming a government in 
exile in France. In the meantime, it began to undergo a series of transformations in the 
1930s, just after WWII and in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of the features of PNV’s 
originally racist, extreme-Catholic and ambivalently separatist political organization of 
1895 were gradually modified, first with the incorporation of part of the Basque 
bourgeoisie in the 1930s (Heiberg, 1996). Then, the party experienced a significant 
change in the post-war period by adopting a positive perspective about European 
integration after its contacts with the Christian Democratic International. By 1949, it 
had modified its independence policy to call for ‘national autonomy’ within a federal 
Europe (Keating, 2000: 36). 
                                                                                                                                             
from the Basque Autonomous Community. Nevertheless, Basque nationalists in the Basque 
Autonomous Community continue to consider Navarra as a natural part of Euskal Herria.    
209 The denial of ethnic, political, cultural and linguistic diversity has also been a policy of Turkish 
modern state until recent times and this perspective frequently proved to be repressive especially after 
the military coup in 1980. 
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In the 1950s, Basque nationalism developed from political unity to 
fragmentation. The intense social and economic transformations in this decade brought 
about another rapid wave of industrial expansion around the main Basque cities, and 
influxes of Castilian speaking migrants from other parts of Spain. Besides official 
repression by Franco regime, the Basque language and culture also suffered erosion 
due to socio-economic changes. Besides the brutal political repression, these changes 
enhanced the widespread sense of the Basque Country as a colonized country along 
with the fear of wholesale assimilation into mainstream Castilian culture, which paved 
the way for the emergence of ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ‘the Basque Homeland and 
Freedom’) that defended the use of all available means to ensure freedom from 
Spanish domination (Guibernau, 2000).  
 
ETA emerged in 1959 as a split from the PNV, which had been the only 
political party of Basque nationalism until that time. In sharp contrast to the PNV’s 
values, ideas and strategies, ETA was formed as a separatist, irredentist and 
revolutionary-socialist movement (MacClancy, 1997: 86). Influenced by Third 
Worldism210 (particularly the national liberation wars of Cuba, Vietnam and Algeria), 
it aimed at gaining an independent socialist Basque Country through violence. Unlike 
the PNV, ETA advocated class struggle, the overthrow of the dictatorship and 
solidarity with Spanish migrants. Combining nationalism with socialism, they defined 
a Basque as someone who sold his labor in the Basque Country, thereby including 
migrants from other parts of Spain who came to work in the Basque area. Their 
                                                 
210 For detailed information about Third Worldism see Erkan Doğan (2010) Articulating Socialism with 
Nationalism: A Critical Analysis of Nationalism in the Turkish Leftist Tradition in the 1960s, PhD 
Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara.  
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conception of Basqueness stressed speaking Euskara, rather than people’s surnames or 
physical appearance (Ben-Ami, 1991). Thus, while nationalists had previously had 
declared socialism and socialists as anti-Basque and anti-Christ, ETA members 
proclaimed themselves socialists as well as nationalists from the effect of Third World 
anti-colonial struggles. Nevertheless, one should stress the fact that, although PNV and 
ETA differed in terms of their political ideologies, strategies and definitions of Basque 
identity, they both stood for Basque nationalism. That is, despite their apparent conflict 
over many terms, they did in large part continue to share the two sets of symbols that 
underpin Basque nationalism, and abertzalismo has kept its central importance for both 
groups.      
  
 While ETA seized the initiative of Basque nationalism during the 1960s and 
1970s211, the PNV suffered from the division of its leadership between those in exile 
and the others in clandestine groups in the Basque Country, and fierce competition 
against ETA’s increasing popular support. Nevertheless, the PNV, in large part, 
remained loyal to the ideological framework of Arana’s thoughts for decades, and 
internal divisions became only visible after the death of Franco in 1975 (Ugarte and 
Pérez-Nievas, 1998).   
  
 
                                                 
211 During the Franco years, Basque resistance did not only include armed struggle but also linguistic 
recovery. Ikastolas, schools charged with educating and socializing new generations in Euskara were 
created in collaboration with the Basque Church. While the number of ikastolas was only three in 1960, 
the figure reached 160 in 1975 (Montaña, 1996: 226).    
 
 261
6.5 THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASQUE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY  
The death of Franco in 1975 opened the door to democratization in Spain. The 
pace of the transition to democracy was amazing and its success was remarkable. 
Actually, the political change that began with the death of Franco had significant 
underlying structural factors. Economic and social modernization since 1960 (the 
establishment of heavy industrial zones, the growth of urbanization, rising literacy 
rates, the rise of a new secular society with the emergence of a new middle class) 
created new demands for political participation and social reform (Hopkin and van 
Biezen, 2007). In addition to these domestic changes, the changing international 
conjuncture encouraged the Spanish bourgeoisie and middle classes to embrace 
Spanish integration with the European Community. However, this would only be 
possible if Spain embraced democratic values (Guibernau, 2000). 
 
 Unlike the Portuguese experience, political change in Spain came with reform 
through elite negotiations and compromises.212 The political establishment opted for 
reform, but even this meant a fundamental break with the past. During the transition, 
two basic problems emerged. First was the question of how to establish a democratic 
political system similar to that of Western countries, where the Left and Right would 
be reconciled on the basis of political pluralism. On the other hand, there was the need 
to respond to demands for self-government (Montaña, 1996: 229). In the negotiation 
process, recognizing the political and ethno-cultural diversity of Spain, Spanish elites 
                                                 
212 Constitutional negotiations were held between the major political actors which won parliamentary 
representation in the first post-Franco elections in 1977: socialists, communists, moderate conservatives, 
sub-state nationalist and regionalist parties (Hopkin and Van Biezen, 2007).   
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came to view democratization and devolution as two sides of the same coin (Kellas, 
1991). This meant establishing a political and administrative structure different from 
the centralist state imposed during the Franco regime. Eventually, the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 emerged, based on a double consensus: the transformation of 
Spain into a democratic state, and recognition of the fact that the country was 
composed of nationalities and regions.213 Accordingly, the Spanish state was 
restructured as the ‘State of Autonomies’ (Estado de las Autonomías) of seventeen 
autonomous communities.214  
 
The Autonomous Communities System created by 1978 Constitution was 
based on two key prerogatives that each autonomous community could exercise 
regional control (through a unicameral parliament) and raise their own taxes to manage 
services in education, healthcare, culture, housing, agriculture, and police protection. 
In this model, central government retained its powers of exclusive jurisdiction over 
defense, the administration of justice, international relations and general economic 
planning. A Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial) 
administered by central government constituted the core of financial aspect of this 
model.215 This Fund allocated special resources to poorer regions and was intended to 
                                                 
213 Nationalities and regions are the constituent territories of Spain according to the 1978 Constitution. 
Although it is not easy to distinguish conceptually the term nationality from the nation, Moreno (2001: 
204-5) defines nationality as a minority nation which has acceded to a degree of institutional autonomy 
or independence within a multinational state and which competes or coexists with a majority nation 
and/or other ethnoterritorial groups.   
214 To see a full text of ‘The Spanish Constitution of 27 December 1978’ visit 
http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Specifically, Part VIII, Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution establishes the territorial organization of the state. Retrieved on December 10, 2010.  
215 The Basque Country, Catalonia, Madrid and the Balearics are not eligible for funding since they have 
higher GDP per capita than the Spanish average (Magone, 2004).  
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promote equilibrium and solidarity among all autonomous communities (Magone, 
2004; Guibernau, 2007).  
 
One should stress the fact that the Autonomous Communities System that 
restructured the state on quasi-federal terms216 was essentially put into effect as a 
‘model of integration’. In this regard, Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution carefully 
emphasizes that:  
 
“The constitution is founded upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common 
and indivisible part of all Spaniards and recognizing and guaranteeing the right to autonomy of 
the nationalities and regions integrated in it and the solidarity among them”.217  
 
Thus, although it guarantees nationalities and regions the right to autonomy, it 
precludes them from declaring their national status. Instead, the absence of any right to 
self-determination was intended to reaffirm the idea of Spain as one nation. 
Consequently, by reaffirming Spain as a single nation, the 1978 Constitution, through 
the Autonomous Communities System, established a ‘regionalized state’ (Bullman in 
Jenkins, 2000). There is no doubt that the regionalization of the Spanish state provided 
sub-state nationalist forces with wide opportunities at political, institutional, economic 
and cultural levels. Indeed, the new Constitution radically transformed the centralist 
                                                 
216 In the Spanish political structure, each Statute of Autonomy defines the institutions of the region in 
question. All seventeen Autonomous Communities have a president, an executive and unicameral 
parliament, together with their own administrative organizations and a High Court of Justice. In this 
sense, there are many similarities with federalism. However, in contrast to federal state structures in 
which the component states or regions of the federation enjoy clearly defined sovereignty, Spain’s 
system of Autonomous Communities allows for variable competencies, not only between different 
regions, but also within the same region over time. Accordingly, the Spanish Senate (Senado) is not 
designed as a chamber for representation of the regions. (Heywood, 1995).  
217 http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Retrieved on December 10, 2010.  
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non-democratic socio-political regime, but its ratification process showed that it had 
significantly failed to satisfy maximalist Basque sub-state nationalist aspirations.  
 
6.6 THE PNV IN THE BASQUE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY  
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was ratified by the majority of Spaniards, but 
most Basque nationalists opposed it on the ground that the new constitution was 
ambiguous about Basque rights. While ETA-linked political forces did not recognize 
the 1978 Constitution, the PNV was excluded from the constitutional negotiations 
(Heywood, 1995), and in the end the PNV recommended its voters to abstain in the 
constitutional referendum. The PNV defended its position on the ground that the 
constitution denied the fact that foral rights were prior to the constitution. In other 
words, their legitimacy is derived from their historicity rather than the Spanish 
Constitution. The high levels of abstention rates of around 56 per cent in Guipuzcoa 
and Vizcaya showed that the PNV was the most influential political party in the 
Basque Country.    
 
In accordance with the Constitution, negotiations over the Statute of Autonomy 
of the Basque Country began as soon as the Constitution was passed. The outcome of 
the constitutional referendum, and the increased anti-systemic electoral support for 
Herri Batasuna218 as ETA’s political wing, provided the PNV with greater bargaining 
power during the negotiation process. This allowed the PNV to include two of its most 
controversial demands in the Statute of Autonomy: the provision of an autonomous 
                                                 
218 Herri Batasuna won nearly 20 % of the total vote in the 1980 Basque regional elections (Ugarte and 
Pérez-Nievas, 1998: 91)  
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police force for the Basque Country (Ertzaintza) and the Concierto Económico, an 
economic agreement providing the Basque Country with full fiscal autonomy.219 The 
final version of the Statute was considered satisfactory by the PNV, and the Statute of 
Autonomy of the Basque Country (also known as Gernika Statute)220 was ratified by a 
referendum in 1979, with 61 per cent turnout and 89 per cent voting in favor 
(Guibernau, 2000).  
  
In the same year, the PNV achieved a vital settlement between its modernists 
(the ‘Christian Democrats’) and traditionalists (‘Aranists’). Actually, intra-party 
conflict had become observable with the party’s first congress in the post-Franco 
period. The 1977 Congress demonstrated that PNV was tending to transform itself into 
a Christian democrat political party, combining its aspiration for the reestablishment of 
the fueros with a vision of future integration into the European Community. Moreover, 
as a crucial part of this modernization attempt, language was replacing lineage as the 
basis of Basque identity. In the socio-economic sphere, it now offered a ‘third way’ 
perspective between socialism and capitalism. Hence, the PNV with the 1977 
Congress moved to a more open, Christian democrat stance from the more radically 
nationalist, socially conservative, and mildly anti-capitalist Aranist program 
(Zirakzadeh, 1991). The new political vision triumphed decisively with the expulsion 
of a number of Aranists from the party in 1979.    
                                                 
219 In the autonomy process, only the Basque Country and Navarre could obtain full fiscal autonomy 
among other autonomous regions. According to the Concierto Económico between the Spanish state and 
the Basque Country, the latter is allowed to raise its own taxes. Levied under the Basque system, all 
taxes are managed and collected by the provincial treasuries. At the same time, the Basque Autonomous 
Community has to transfer a certain amount of money from its tax income to Madrid to pay for services 
delivered by the state (Nordberg, 2005).    
220 For the full text of the Statute of Basque Autonomy, see http://www.basques.euskadi.net/t32-
448/en/contenidos/informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_455/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf  
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Subsequently, the PNV won 38 per cent of votes in the first elections for the 
Basque Parliament in 1980 (See Table 5 in Appendices). Along with this electoral 
victory, Herri Batasuna’s decision not to take up its seats in the Basque Parliament 
implied that over the next four years the PNV could govern the Basque Autonomous 
Community as if it had an absolute majority and strengthen its institutional position. 
Hence, the new opportunity structures for the PNV were incomparable with those of 
the Franco period. Nevertheless, there were still many significant constraints to be 
overcome.    
 
During the 1980s, the PNV had to face up two remarkable external and internal 
difficulties. The constitutional compromise had entailed recognition of historic 
nationalities and the regions’ rights to some form of autonomy, but with no statement 
on the definition of such autonomy. Furthermore, the ultimate aim of the autonomy 
process was the establishment of a virtual homogeneity (café para todos) in terms of 
the powers enjoyed by all seventeen Autonomous Communities (Guibernau, 2000). 
Therefore, the autonomy process required a complex mechanism, dependent on the 
particular route (either Article 143 or 151), the negotiations between Madrid and each 
autonomous community, and finally approval by the Constitutional Tribunal (Newton 
and Donaghy, 1997). Along with Catalonia and Galicia, the Basque Country followed 
the fast track to autonomy, which was the privileged way recognized only for 
‘historical regions’ as defined by Article 151 of the Spanish Constitution. Other 
regions had to set about regional institutionalization in accordance with Article 143, 
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which allowed for a slow route to autonomy with lesser powers.221 However, as part of 
Spanish democratization, the autonomy process brought about new tensions while 
feeding the existing ones. The ‘artful ambiguity’ of the Constitution, drafted for the 
sake of consensus, and the practical difficulties of institutionalizing regional 
authorities,222 were accompanied by right wing discontent – especially in the military - 
associated with the perceived probable dissolution of the country.  
 
Eventually, the abortive military coup of 23 February 1981 (‘23-F’) placed the 
autonomy process at the top of the political agenda. Fearful of a military conspiracy, 
the governing right-wing UCD (Union de Centro Democratico or, the Union of the 
Democratic Center) reached an agreement with the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español, or Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) to the much debated LOAPA (Ley 
Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómica, or the Organic Law on the 
Harmonization of the Autonomous Process) in September 1981. LOAPA was designed 
to eliminate any discrepancy or legal dispute between the provincial and national 
governments by making state law always prevail over regional law wherever there was 
conflict, even in the privileged ‘historic’ regions (Magone, 2004). Unsurprisingly, 
LOAPA was rejected by the autonomous communities, and it was finally revoked by 
the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in 1983 for contradicting the Constitution. 
LOAPA provoked strong opposition in the Basque Country, and although it was 
                                                 
221 In the process, besides the three historic regions, a further four – Andalusia, the Canary Islands, 
Navarre and the Valencian Community - were able to obtain the same status as the three most prominent 
historical regions (Magone, 2004).    
222 Politics through legal disputes became a remarkable part of Spanish politics in the 1980s. Heywood 
(1995: 147) records that, between 1981 and 91, the central government appealed to the Constitutional 
Court against 120 laws (out of 1,500) approved by regional governments. In the same period, regional 
governments appealed against 127 of 528 laws approved by the central government. The great majority 
of these disputes involved the historic regions.    
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subsequently revoked, it increased the suspicions of Basque nationalists regarding the 
Spanish state. 
   
Besides these state-level external problems, the PNV experienced a severe 
internal crisis in the mid-1980s. A leadership crisis and ideological confrontations 
resulted in another division in 1986 after ETA’s split in 1959. Forced to resign from 
the party leadership, Carlos Garaikoetxa (the first lehendakari) led the split from the 
party and established Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)223 as a more radical but non-violent, and 
more pro-separatist Basque nationalist party.   
 
Actually, EA was not the first competitor of the PNV in Basque politics. With 
the transition to democracy in Spain, Basque politics witnessed the reestablishment of 
plural politics in which political parties played a major role. Among many 
representatives of Basque nationalism, leftist Basque nationalists created the already 
mentioned Herri Batasuna (HB, 1978-1998)224 as the political wing of ETA, and 
Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE, 1977-1991). On the side of non-nationalists (or Spanish 
nationalists), Partido Socialista de Euskadi - Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basqueland Socialist 
                                                 
223 The EA emerged in 1986 as a schism of the PNV.  It describes itself as a Basque nationalist, 
democratic, popular, and progressive party. Adopting the subtitle ‘Euskal Sozialdemokrazia’ (Basque 
social democracy), the EA seeks to achieve ‘full national and social freedom in and for the Basque 
Country’. It is in favor of an independent Basque Country, but sees it as achievable through the EU as a 
union of peoples, a federation of nations, not states. It currently has one MP in the Basque Parliament 
and four MPs in the Navarrese Parliament, elected as part of the coalition NaBai 
(http://www.euskoalkartasuna.org/?l=es&lang=es ).  
224 HB was succeeded by Euskal Herritarrok (1998–2000) and Batasuna (2000-2003). Batasuna was 
outlawed in 2003 by a court ruling declaring that the party had been proven to finance ETA with public 
money. The Spanish ruling was also confirmed by the ECHR. It was also included in the EU’s list of 
terrorist organizations as a component of ETA. In the meantime, prior to the outlaw efforts, a dissenting 
minority left the party to form Aralar that shares the independentist aims of ETA but opposes its violent 
methods. See www.aralar.net 
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Party – the Basque Left, PSE-EE)225 was formed as a branch of PSOE in 1977. As well 
as Spanish socialists, the Spanish right-wing Alianza Popular (The Popular 
Alliance)226 established its provincial organization in the Basque Country; however, 
chose not to form a separate branch of the party in the Basque territory, as this would 
contradict its strictly unitarian conception of Spain.      
 
 
The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Community redefined the opportunity 
structures for all political actors in the Basque Country. By reestablishing the lost 
Basque autonomy under new circumstances, the Gernika Statute provided Basque 
people with self-government, and meant they were recognized as a nationality. On the 
basis of foral (historical) rights, the Basque Autonomous Community was provided 
with a wide range of political, economic and cultural autonomies, which included 
political organs (the Basque parliament and government) with wide competences to 
develop distinct policies and public administration227 with a decision-making capacity, 
an autonomous police force (Ertzaintza), a high degree of fiscal autonomy (Concierto 
                                                 
225 The Socialist Party of the Basque Country – Basque Country Left (Partido Socialista de Euskadi): is 
the Basque affiliate of the PSOE. Although local socialist groups had been active since 1886, and many 
affiliated with the PSOE, the PSE-EE was established as a branch of the main party only in 1977, during 
the Spanish transition to democracy. It has local associations in three provinces of the Basque Country. 
With 25 seats in the Basque Parliament, it is currently the second-largest party in the Basque 
Autonomous Community behind the PNV (http://www.socialistasvascos.com/home ).  
226 In the transition process, UCD and the AP (Alianza Popular or Popular Alliance) were major 
representatives of the Spanish center and right wing. In time, as the AP increased its support at the 
expense of UCD, it moderated its hardline conservatism, before being refounded as the PP (Partido 
Popular or the People’s Party) in 1989 (http://www.pp.es ). After having governed Spain for two 
legislative terms between 1996–2004, the PP has been the major opposition political party in the 
Spanish Parliament since 2004.    
227 Magone (2004: 130) notes that the Basque public administration employed 60,237 civil servants by 
2001.  
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Económico), and the recognition of the co-official status of the Basque flag, anthem 
and language228 along with the Spanish national identity boundary markers.  
 
On the other hand, the Statute of Basque Autonomy left Basque nationalists 
unsatisfied by having fallen short of their ultimate aim of independence. It was also 
frustrating since Navarra, seen as an inalienable part of the Basque homeland, was 
defined as a separate entity from the Basque Autonomous Community.229 Whereas 
ETA insisted on its violent strategy by rejecting any new statutes from central 
government in the name of Basque national liberation from the ‘invader’ Spanish state, 
the PNV has maintained its commitment to greater autonomy through electoral 
strategies by avoiding the word ‘independence’. In the transition to democracy, the 
party’s modernist stance became crystallized in the late 1970s, and it became part of 
the Christian democratic family. Thus, its nationalist politics has been accompanied by 
the promotion of traditional, religious values and European integration. Since the 1980 
regional elections, the PNV has gradually enhanced its major role in Basque nationalist 
politics.  
                                                 
228 While Article 3 of the 1978 Constitution accepts Castilian as the official language of the state, it 
recognizes that regions have the right to make other languages co-official languages within their 
territory in accordance with their statutes of autonomy. In this regard, Euskara has official status in 
Basque-speaking and mixed areas, delimited by a 1986 Language Act. Accordingly, Basque public 
education is also based on bi-lingualism; all schools teach Euskara as a subject or have it as a medium 
of instruction (Model A, B, D) (Mar-Molinero, 1996). Thanks to the promotion of Euskara at all levels 
of education, and the obligation that all civil servants are required to speak Euskara in Euskadi, the 
number of Euskara-speaking people has grown by over 14 per cent. Bilingualism has grown noticeably 
among youngsters between 16–24 years old. Today, 57 per cent of this population group can speak both 
Castilian and Euskara fluently. See  www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59738    
229 Article 2.2 of the Statute of Basque Autonomy recognizes Navarra as a part of the Basque Country; 
however, the Basque Autonomous Community includes just the three provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa 
and Alava. The province of Navarra was given the right to decide whether to join the Basque 
Autonomous Community. However, Navarra, where Navarrese regionalism rather than Basque 
nationalism has been strong, opted to establish its own Autonomous Community in 1982 (see also 
footnote 207 in this chapter).     
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Nevertheless, these highly favorable opportunity structures were still seen as 
restricting the full achievement of Basque self-determination. Within this context, 
Spanish integration into the EU in 1986 appeared to promise the chance to further 
Basque economic and political interests, and undoubtedly, Spanish EU membership 
added a new dimension to Basque nationalism and its interaction with the Spanish 
state. Like the SNP in the UK and the DTP in Turkey, the PNV has given open support 
to this process and sought to make the optimum use of the new channels of influence at 
national and continental levels.      
 
6.7 THE PNV IN THE EU 
Spanish application for full membership to the then EC in 1977230 showed that 
European integration was seen as an external support system for the emerging 
democracy, economic growth and social modernization. Indeed, the EU made a great 
contribution to democratization process in Spain. It helped convince conservatives of 
the need for political reform if they were to benefit from the common market, while it 
strengthened the position of democratic reformers. European membership brought 
about huge economic benefits in the form of economic growth and flow of structural 
funds for infrastructural investments; it also helped Spain increase its political 
influence on the world stage (Hopkin and van Biezen, 2007). From the perspective of 
sub-state nationalists and regionalists, European integration meant the emergence of 
new EU-wide policies with funds, chances to make cross-regional cooperation and to 
increase political profiles through EP level representation and paradiplomatic 
                                                 
230 For documented information about Spanish integration to the EC, see http://www.ena.lu/ Visited on 
September 13, 2010.   
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activities. On the other hand, the integration process brought about the loss of some 
autonomous powers gained through the Constitution of 1978 to supranational EU 
institutions that have given quite limited roles for regions in the construction of EU 
policies. On the whole, Spanish regional and sub-national authorities, all of which are 
organized as autonomous communities, have given enthusiastic support for ongoing 
European integration on the basis of their particular concerns.  
 
The PNV has been one of the consistent supporters of European integration 
compared to other representatives of Basque nationalism. Unlike the ETA-linked 
political parties that have rejected the integration process as a project of capitalists, the 
PNV has sought to harness the process of European integration to assist its domestic 
political demands. Accordingly, it has pursued positive linkage policies within the 
integration process and utilized the new opportunity structure in order to bolster its 
ultimate aim of independence, which is ambivalently defined and defended. That is, 
the modernized PNV has been willing to incorporate integrative processes.231 Seeing 
both globalization and European integration as irreversible processes, it has developed 
new strategies, particularly within the European context. Actually, this perspective not 
only stemmed from the PNV’s acceptance of the inevitability of these processes, but 
also from seeing the possible advantages that they offer for the Basque Country.  
 
                                                 
231 Actually, the PNV’s support for European integration dates back to the post-WWII period. At that 
time, the PNV in exile actively developed contacts with the Christian Democratic International before 
modifying its independence policy in 1949 to call for national autonomy within a federal Europe. See 
http://www.eaj-pnv.eu/docs_estaticos/historia.pdf  and also http://web.eaj-
pnv.eu/minisites/pde/documentos_des.asp?id_documento=5511 Retrieved on December 10, 2010.  
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Ibarretxe, the president of the Basque government (lehendakari) from the PNV 
between 1999-2009, succinctly explained why the PNV has a pro-European 
perspective, stating that the EU was the focal point of Basque foreign policy, and that 
the Basque Country had five objectives within the European context: “direct 
representation in EU bodies, the direct defense of its own interests and competences 
throughout all processes taking place within the European Union, including the 
possibility of appealing to the European Court of Justice, transposition of Community 
directives in its areas of competence, the constitution of a single electoral constituency 
in European Parliamentary elections, and the promotion of cross-border and inter-
regional co-operation within the European Union by applying the principle of 
subsidiarity”.232   
 
Within this perspective, like its counterpart the SNP in the UK, the PNV has 
made use of the new European framework in various ways. First of all, the ongoing 
integration process has provided the party with new discursive opportunities to 
formulize and pursue its aspirations for Basque self-determination in new ways 
without directly confronting the Spanish state. On the basis of the idea of limited 
sovereignty and subsidiarity, which are seen as constitutive principles of ongoing 
European integration, the PNV has argued that the integration process makes the idea 
                                                 
232 Ibarretxe’s speech in November 2006 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the opening of the 
Brussels Delegation of the Basque Country, available at: 
www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=fb9c0e94-23df-4bf9-9032-
713555dc7411 see also http://collections.europarchive.org/ea/20050224203348/eaj-
pnv.com/noticias_des.asp?id_contenido=7673  
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of absolute sovereignty less tenable.233 Accordingly, the PNV has offered a new idea 
of sovereignty234 based on the notion of having access to power, rather than possessing 
absolute power within a specifically bounded territory. This idea has also been 
complemented by a discourse of the ‘Europe of the Regions’, which suggests that the 
European integration process should lead to the replacement of the existing nation-
state structure with a new political system as composed of autonomous regions and 
nations. Thus, the EU context, with its new conceptions of sovereignty and complex 
institutional structure, has enabled the PNV to maintain its calculated ambivalence 
about its ultimate constitutional aspirations through engaging in complicated strategies 
and maneuvers.     
 
Second, while it was the governing party between 1980-2009,235 the PNV 
utilized the integration process to engage in para-diplomatic activities on behalf of the 
Basque Autonomous Community. The Delegation of the Basque Autonomous 
Community government in Brussels236 was founded in 1986, and in accordance with 
                                                 
233 In the author’s interview with Mendelzebua, the head of Basque Delegate in Brussels, he clearly 
stated that they were in favor of European integration since it hollows out the Spanish state.  
(01.04.2008, at the building of the Basque Delegate in Brussels) 
234 As a particular variant of co-sovereignty, the Ibarretxe Plan defends a ‘free association’ with Spain. 
This point will be discussed in the following section.   
235 It should be noted that, during its two-decade governing period, the PNV frequently benefitted from 
the proportional electoral system in the Basque Country that enabled the party to sustain minority 
governments in coalition with, or with the support of other Basque nationalists or non-Basque 
nationalists in the Basque Autonomous Community.   
236 Following Spanish EU accession in 1986, the Basque government established an official delegation 
in Brussels the same year. The Spanish state questioned its legitimacy on the grounds that it challenged 
the unity of Spain’s position on foreign affairs. In response, the Basque government argued that, in the 
context of the EU, sub-state entities have the right to defend their interests, gather information and 
maintain a presence before EU institutions that legislate on questions over which they have exclusive 
rights. The ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in 1994 allowed certain activities by 
Autonomous Communities provided that they do not create obligations to foreign powers and they do 
not impinge on Spain’s foreign policy (available at: www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-
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the decision of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, it has mainly acted to lobby for 
Basque interests and concerns, collect information about EU affairs and represent 
Basque identity. Besides the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels, the PNV 
has several extra-territorial offices (‘extraterritoriales’) in Argentina, Chile, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Uruguay, the USA237, and Madrid. Is the latter office symbolically 
asserts that Madrid is an extraterritorial location for Basque representation.238  
 
Third, the EP elections have been considered as a springboard for sub-state 
nationalist mobilization.239 They have also provided the opportunity to make coalitions 
with other sub-state nationalist or regionalist political parties that necessarily compete 
separately in general elections in different autonomous communities. Given the nation-
wide constituency used for these elections, forming such coalitions has been the best 
way to win as many seats as possible in the EP (De Winter, 2001). The PNV took part 
in the recent 2009 EP elections as a partner of ‘Coalition for Europe’, a seven-party 
coalition that also included the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, the Democratic 
Union of Catalonia, the Valencian Nationalist Bloc, the Majorcan Union, the Canarian 
Coalition, and the Andalusian Party (see Table 5 in Appendices). In the EP, the PNV 
with its two MEPs is a partner of the European Democratic Party, which defines itself 
                                                                                                                                             
10572/en/contenidos/informacion/del_euskadi/en_11165/del_euskadi.html). Retrieved on October 30, 
2010. 
237 There are particularly cohesive groups of the Basque diaspora in these countries of American 
continent. See the article by Gloria Pilar, “Basques Around the World: Generic Immigrants or 
Diaspora?” at http://www.euskonews.com/0072zbk/gaia7201es.html  
238 See http://www.eaj-pnv.eu/esp/conoce_organizacion.asp  
239 In order to see a detailed version of the PNV’s vision of European integration, visit the PNV’s 2009 
EP Elections Manifesto: http://www.eaj-pnv.eu/documentos/documentos/8515.pdf  
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as neither conservative nor socialist.240 The PNV is also represented at the CoR 
through the group of the Alliance of Democrats and Liberals for Europe.241    
 
Fourth, the PNV has established inter-regional co-operations at national and 
continental levels. At a national level, it has sought to reach a common strategy in 
Spain and Europe with political representatives of two other historic nationalities (CiU 
- Convergència i Unió - of Catalonia, and BNG - Bloque Nacionalista Galego - of 
Galicia). Through the declarations of Barcelona, Santiago, and Vitoria in 1998, they 
demanded the amendment of Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution, which contained the 
clause referring to ‘one nation-one state’.  They argued that Article 2 ignored the issue 
of their national identity (Guibernau, 2000: 63). In its place, they demanded a new, 
plurinational and confederal state, and recognition by Europe of their national reality 
and of their languages, and greater participation in the institutions of the EU (Keating, 
2000: 40).242 Accordingly, the PNV has recently also pressed its demand that Article 
146 of the Maastricht Treaty243 be extended to Spain. At a continental level, the 
Basque Country has been involved in various inter-regional co-operations, such as the 
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions and Arco Atlántico, which unites 
peripheral regions on the Atlantic Coast, including Asturias, Cantabria, Galica and the 
Basque Country (Closa and Heywood, 2004).    
 
                                                 
240 See http://www.pde-edp.net/main/_pde/index.jsp  
241 ibid.  
242 One should note that this cooperation did not change the fact that these sub-state nationalist forces of 
different autonomous communities were not able to form a strong union among themselves, and their 
relations generally occurred via Madrid.  
243 Article 146 (current Article 203) of the Maastricht Treaty allows ministers of sub-state governments 
to represent the state in the Council of Ministers. For further information, see Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation.  
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Fifth, in spite of its high level of GDP compared with the Spanish or EU average, the 
Basque Country received €3,845 million in cohesion and structural funds between 
1986-2006.244 For the period of 2007-2013, the Basque Country has been guaranteed a 
quarter billion Euros from ERDF.245 Within the context of ERDF as a part of European 
regional funds, particularly cross-border co-operations (INTERREG projects) have had 
a special meaning for sub-state nationalists. Two projects are especially remarkable: 
the project to unite the urban area of Donostia (San Sebastian) in the Basque Country 
and Hendaye in France, a town populated by people of Basque origin, and a more 
ambitious project to create a Euro-region with the French region of Acquitaine, which 
also includes the Basque region of Iparralde. Besides the aim of improving 
infrastructure and getting benefits of scale, these projects246 are of symbolic 
importance for Basque nationalists in that they may make the territory of the Basque 
Country more visible (Ibarra and Filibi, 2006: 3).  
 
Finally, the PNV has benefited from the Convention on the Constitutional 
Treaty of the European Union as a platform to voice its support for a federal Europe on 
the basis of ‘Europe of the Regions’, in which “all nations could realize their will not 
                                                 
244 This amount is equal to only 3.25 per cent of total funds received by Spain although the population of 
the Basque Country accounts for 4.67 per cent of the total Spanish population. See Boronska-
Hryniewiecka (2010) and also 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=ES&gv_reg=682&gv_PGM=1
33&LAN=7&gv_PER=1&gv_defL=7  
245 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=ES&gv_reg=682&gv_P
GM=1113&LAN=7&gv_PER=2&gv_defL=7  
246 Bray (2006: 540) points to the development that thanks to interregional integration, there is a growth 
in the numbers of people living on the one side of the frontier and working on the other.  
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at the expense of others”.247 It has supported a European Constitution based on the 
principles of  
 
“[p]eace, democracy, the guarantee of fundamental rights, including the right to self 
determination of Peoples, freedom, solidarity and subsidiarity, linguistic and cultural pluralism 
as well as the protection of minorities…”248 
 
 
In the same text, on the prompting of constitutional debate, the PNV repeated 
its adherence to a vision of a federal Europe based on divided, reserved and shared 
sovereignties, establishing four significant levels of government (at the levels of 
European Union, member state, internal territory in the case of nations and historical 
constitutional entities, and local authorities). Thus, within the existing political 
structure, it has sought to provide a niche for nations without states and historical 
constitutional entities. In the name of federalism, it wants the EU to be provided with a 
strengthened European Parliament and CoR, and a fiscal capacity to prevent its 
subordination to the member states (ibid.). Although declaring that the Constitutional 
Treaty of the European Union fell short of fulfilling its expectations, the PNV voted 
‘Yes’ for the treaty in the referendum, and supported the following Lisbon Treaty in 
the Spanish Parliament. 249   
 
                                                 
247 The PNV’s view of European integration can be found in various party documents in detail. See 
“Posición De Eaj-Pnv Ante El Tratado Por El Que Se Instituye Una Constitución Para Europa” at  
 http://www.noticias.info/archivo/2005/200502/20050201/20050201_46820.shtm ; “El Problema de las 
Nacionalidades ante la Federación Europea” at  
http://deia.com/index.php/opinion/foros/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=2774&start=0#p25902  
248 EAJ-PNV Documents, “The Contribution of EAJ-PNV to the European Convention” Bilbao, 
Februrary 6, 2003.  
249 For a detailed analysis of the referendum in Spain on the European Constitutional Treaty see 
http://www.democracy-international.org/fileadmin/di/pdf/monitoring/di-spain.pdf  
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Overall then, Spanish EU membership has offered the PNV new opportunity 
structures, but with new constraints. Thanks to the ambiguity of the Spanish 
Constitution, the Statute of Basque Autonomy that has provided the Basque 
government with competences in particular areas, and the constraining but still positive 
attitude of the Constitutional Tribunal, the PNV has been able to acquire a growing 
role in EU affairs in particular, and international affairs in general. The general 
principle of subsidiarity adopted for a more democratic Europe, the principle of 
partnership in the planning and implementation of common regional policy, the CoR, 
and inter-regional cooperations, have all reflected the relatively wide extent of new 
opportunities available for the PNV’s sub-state nationalism. On the other hand, the 
PNV has had more limited success in expanding the competences of the Basque 
Autonomous Community, especially in terms of engaging in EU affairs as a distinct 
political entity. In short, Spanish state continues to have the final word on EU affairs.  
 
Accordingly, Spanish EU membership has reduced regional competences in the 
areas of agriculture, fisheries, industrial policy, regional planning, environment, 
transport, energy, fiscal and cultural policies, where the Spanish state has the exclusive 
right to decide on these issues within EU bodies. Hence, the EU offers the Basque sub-
national government new channels of influence on its own policies, yet only with the 
consent of, and in cooperation with the Spanish government. In this sense, it has been 
out of the question for the PNV to transform the Basque Delegation in Brussels into a 
kind of Basque embassy from its current lobbying office status.  
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Nevertheless, while being partly disappointed by the evolution of European 
integration250, the PNV continues to view the EU as a crucial external support system 
that enabled the PNV to transcend the Spanish state that restrains the self-realization of 
the Basque nation. At the same time, it is aware that EU member states, as nation-
states, are still very powerful and its ideals can be achieved only if a Europe of the 
Regions is established. In this sense, neither the devolutionary process in Spain nor 
Spanish accession to the EU has ended sub-state nationalist aspirations in Spain. 
Rather, they have reshaped the interaction between sub-state nationalist political 
parties and the Spanish state under new circumstances. Within this context, while the 
PNV continues to challenge the Spanish Autonomy System in a complex interaction 
with other Basque nationalist parties and Spanish parties, it has modified its ultimate 
goal through new formulations, albeit while still retaining its ambivalently expressed 
aspirations for an independent Euskadi.   
 
6.8 THE INTERPLAY OF BASQUE AND SPANISH NATIONALISMS 
Spain’s transition to democracy, accompanied by territorial restructuring of the 
state and European integration, has provided an advanced democratic model for the 
accommodation of ethno-territorial differences. However, it has simultaneously 
enhanced the institutionalization of Basque nationalism by providing it with new 
opportunities, including the Basque parliament, government, administration and 
financial autonomy. This fact reflects one of the most interesting dilemmas presented 
by nationalism in the contemporary world: both repression and democratic 
                                                 
250 To see an interesting criticism by the PNV about the current evolution of the European architecture: 
http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/11409/the-committee-of-the-regions-is-a-joke.html  
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accommodation by nation-states can serve sub-state nationalisms in different ways. In 
this sense, it is illusory to speak of ‘solving’ the national question in the Basque 
Country. Rather, the Statute of Basque Autonomy has actually served to regulate the 
conflict. Alongside other autonomy statutes for other historic nationalities, it has also 
been a part of the rehabilitation of Spanish nationalism. In this regard, the transition to 
democracy in Spain has also meant the promotion of a strong and united Spain that has 
adopted political and institutional approaches designed to manage, rather than 
supersede, the Basque and other nationalities (Lecours, 2007: 142). 
 
Nevertheless, this new united Spain has been founded on autonomous 
communities that are to have symmetrical powers in the long run in the new political 
architecture, and it is a model based on a multicultural rather than a multinational 
foundation. Therefore, the non-recognition of the nationness of historical nationalities 
has led to the continuation of ethno-territorial tension in Spain. In particular, Basque 
and Catalan sub-state nationalist parties, by using their political power in their 
community governments and the key roles they can frequently assume in the formation 
of the central government in Madrid251, have continuously sought opportunities to 
revise the existing institutional structure. When PSOE won the election and was only 
able to form a government with the support of Catalan nationalists in 2004, it declared 
it was ready to renegotiate the terms of Spain’s territorial settlement, extending the 
                                                 
251 Since the 1990s, both PSOE and the PP have frequently failed to gain sufficient seats to govern alone 
and have needed to rely on the support of Basque and Catalan nationalist deputies to form a government 
or pass legislation. For instance, the PP (Aznar government) was only able to form a government in 
1996 with the support of the PNV, CiU (Catalan nationalists) and the Canary Coalition.   
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degree of self-government enjoyed by Catalonia.252 This paved the ground for the 
PNV’s claims for renegotiation of the Statute of Basque Autonomy.  
 
Actually, these claims were not new since Basque nationalists have never 
accepted the legitimacy of the Spanish Constitution, which defines Spain as the ‘one 
and indivisible nation’.253 For instance, Xabier Arzallus, then president of the PNV, 
proclaimed as late as 1994 that “We are not, and we will never be, loyal to the 
Constitution” (in Heywood, 1995: 46). Like other Basque nationalist forces, the PNV 
contends that the fueros that signify the powers conferred by the granting of autonomy 
in 1979 are actually rights that predate the 1978 Constitution. It suggests that Article 1 
of the Additional Provisions of the Constitution,254 which ‘protects and respects the 
historic rights of the territories with fueros’, establishes the recognition of the extra-
constitutional status of the fueros system. Thus, asserting the historical and cultural 
primordiality of the Basque nation, the PNV, along with other Basque nationalists, 
distances itself from the past and future of Spain. Since it refuses to be bound by a 
constitution it never endorsed, the PNV makes use of each opportunity to make the 
Spanish state accept the Basques’ nationness.   
  
In this regard, the most recent attempt has been the Political Statute of the 
Community of the Basque Country (known as the Ibarretxe Plan), named after the 
                                                 
252 The Catalan Statute of Spain of 2006 recognized the status of nation for Catalonia. However, in 
2010, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal declared certain parts of the Catalan Statute unconstitutional, 
annulling the nationness of Catalonia (El Pais, 05.07.20010). This decision was met with anger by 
Catalan nationalists who argued that “The Spanish Constitutional Court has acted in a way that is legally 
questionable, juristically incompetent and politically unacceptable” (El Punt, 30.06.2010).    
253 The Basque Country had the highest abstention rate in the 1978 Constitutional referendum.  
254 This article was a concession obtained by the PNV from the Spanish state in return for non-
entrenchment of the right to self-determination in the constitution.  
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former president of the Basque government (lehendakari Ibarretxe) in 2003255. The 
Ibarrextxe Plan aimed at radically replacing the existing Statute of Basque Autonomy 
with a new statute that would make the Basque Country a ‘free state’ associated with 
the Spanish state on an equal footing. Including a right to self-determination, the plan 
suggested that population of the Basque Country would remain Spanish citizens but 
divided into two categories of Basques, defined as ‘citizens’ and ‘nationals’. Since the 
present Statute of Basque Autonomy does not involve judiciary powers, the plan 
provided for a Basque court system that would be largely separated from the Spanish 
one. In addition, it would give the Basque government the right to call referendums 
while removing the Spanish state’s right to suspend the Basque government’s power. 
Although a majority approved the project in the Basque Parliament, it was finally 
rejected by the Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) on the grounds that it 
contradicted the Spanish Constitution.  
 
Compared with the SNP’s openly declared ultimate goal of ‘independence in 
Europe’, the Ibarretxe Plan suggested a project falling short of full independence 
within the EU. Supporters of theories of neo-nationalism (or neo-regionalism), find 
this plan significant in terms of their thesis that sub-state nationalisms no longer pursue 
independent statehood (Keating and Bray, 2006; Guibernau, 2006). On the other hand, 
this attempt can also be interpreted, not just as supporting an alternative model of the 
Spanish state based on an asymmetrical devolution, which would entail the recognition 
of the distinct status of historical nationalities, but at the same time as a springboard 
                                                 
255 The plan was put forward by the PNV, the EA and the post-communist EB (Ezker Batua, or United 
Left). To reach the full text of Ibarretxe Plan see http://www.konpondu.net  
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towards the goal of full independence. There is also clear evidence for this. The fact 
that most sub-state nationalist political parties are, for political purposes, characterized 
by a carefully studied ambivalence about their ultimate goals makes it difficult to 
decide whether they have entirely given up the aim of independent statehood within 
the European integration process, which is still dominated by the nation-states. 
Accordingly, the PNV has presented statehood as a rather vague long-term goal that 
would be the natural culmination of a series of steps towards independence, of which 
political autonomy would be the most immediate important goal (Mees, 2001: 807). 
The Ibarratxe Plan can be considered as one of the major steps towards this end.  
 
In addition, despite the incorporation of transnational, postmodern elements of 
neo-regionalism, it is still hard to claim that the PNV has moved to an inclusive 
conception of Basqueness for all people living in the Basque Country. The Ibarrextxe 
Plan still insists on a differential relationship between Basques and non-Basques. In 
other words, despite the significant movement of the PNV into the Christian 
democratic political family with a pro-European stance, and its condemnation of 
ETA’s violent methods and ETA’s blending of nationalism and socialism, Basque 
nationalists, whether on the right or left, perceive themselves as forming one political 
family bonded by a shared moral cause, and they converge in polarizing Basque 
society as abertzales and españolistas. The non-ethnic residents of the Basque Country 
have had access to the Basque Community through abertzalismo since the 1950s, but 
the ones who did not rely on the Basque nationalist cause are not still accepted as 
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Basques. Instead, they are called españolistas, whose identity and interests are viewed 
as being in direct contradiction with those of Basques.256  
  
 Within this context of nationalist politics, while the division of abertzale and 
españolista has been used to control the resources of the national territory by natural 
right, the non-Basque side rejects this labeling and complains that they have been 
systematically deprived of key positions in Basque administrations. Non-Basque 
nationalist political parties view Basque nationalism as seeking to impose hegemonic, 
illegal and anti-constitutional projects on them. Actually, PSOE and the PP differ in 
terms of their vision of the Spanish state and national identity. While the latter favors a 
plurinational, federalized Spanish state, the PP defends the necessity of maintaining 
the status quo in the name of a united Spain.257 However, despite their different visions 
of Spain, they have both reacted against the Ibarretxe Plan for being unconstitutional. 
They added that if the plan led to secession, the Basque Country would have to re-
enter the EU only after a complex negotiation process, in which all member states, 
including Spain, would have a veto right. Thus, they resorted to the arguments that the 
Labour Party and Conservative Party in Britain have made use of against the SNP’s 
ultimate goal of ‘independence in Europe’.  
     
                                                 
256 La Pelota Vasca (Euskal Pilota, or The Basque Ball), a documentary on the Basque question by Julio 
Medem (2003) is highly illuminating in order to understand the extent of polarization in Basque politics 
and society, as well as the origins and development of Basque nationalism.  
257 Approaches to Basque nationalism have been also a matter of contention between the PP and PSOE. 
In the 2004 elections, the PP accused PSOE of threatening the unity of Spain by planning to give 
concessions to sub-state nationalists. On the other hand, the PP’s view of all Basque nationalists as 
either terrorists or legal brothers of terrorists has been criticized by the PSOE on the grounds that it is 
just such an attitude that really threatens the unity of Spain (Lecours, 2007). It is also argued that the 
PP’s hardline policies towards sub-state nationalists in 2000–4 were one of the major reasons giving rise 
to the Ibarretxe Plan (Guibernau, 2000).   
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 Consequently, the conflict between Basque nationalists and non-Basque 
nationalists is an atypical political contention since there are large groups on each side 
that refuse to recognize the legitimacy of each other. This brings about an extreme 
polarization of Basque politics and, to a lesser degree, of Basque society (Lecours, 
2007: 167). Nevertheless, neither an independent Basque state nor the PP’s promotion 
of a mono-national indivisible Spanish nation is likely to succeed given the 
sociological realities. According to the most recent survey by Euskobarometro, while 
around 60 per cent of the Basque population feel both Basque and Spanish to varying 
degrees, only 34 per cent hold monolithic identities as only Basques (29 %) or only 
Spanish (5 %) (See Table 6 in Appendices). Regarding the constitutional preferences 
of the respondents, only 25 per cent of the population support independence, while 28 
per cent are in favor of a federal Spain (See Table 7 in Appendices). It means that the 
number of respondents who are not satisfied with the present Statute of Basque 
Autonomy is more than 50 per cent. In addition, 87 per cent of the population agree 
with the statement that ‘[T]oday in Euskadi it is possible to defend all political 
aspirations and objectives without the necessity of resorting to violence’258  That is to 
say, the use of violence for political purposes in the Basque Country has a low level of 
popular support compared with that in the Franco period. It is obvious that the 
devolutionary process has enhanced dual identities, which contributes to opportunities 
for peaceful cohabitation. On the other hand, the similar percentages of independence-
/federalism seekers versus adherents of the status quo/centralism suggests that 
significant political polarization still dominates Basque society. One should always 
                                                 
258 See 
(http://alweb.ehu.es/euskobarometro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=103), 
p.56.   
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remember that (sub-state) nationalism is not only related to the conflict of identity but 
also to that of interests. Therefore, sub-state nationalists, having occupied the Basque 
government for three decades, are unlikely to willingly share key positions with ‘non-
Basques’.  
 
All these statistics suggest that sub-state nationalism in the Basque Country is 
growing on fertile ground. There is no doubt that the devolutionary process and 
European integration has contributed to a more peaceful Basque society where 
relatively stronger dual identities have undermined the feasibility of ‘only Spanish’ or 
‘only Basque’ options. Within this context, the PNV has pursued a confederal Spain, 
through projects like the Ibarretxe Plan, and it seeks to sustain its major party position 
in Basque politics. On the other hand, by rejecting the use of violence, it retains its 
carefully studied independence ideal with other Basque nationalists on the basis of 
abertzalismo. In contrast to the 1980s, when the combined votes for Basque 
nationalists always exceeded fifty per cent, this support has not been guaranteed since 
1991. Although the PNV was able to maintain its governing party status until 2009, the 
Lehendakaritza (Basque presidency) was transferred to the PSE-EE (The Basque 
Socialist Party) after its unprecedented agreement with the conservative Popular Party. 
Thus, the PNV’s 30-year presidency of the Basque government was ended. This will 
no doubt push the PNV to look for new alliances around new formulations for at least 
more autonomy for the Basque Country.   
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6.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 The politics of ethnoterritorial and linguistic diversity has been one of the 
influential forces in Spanish politics for more than a century. Specifically, the sub-state 
nationalisms of the economically developed Basque Country and Catalonia have 
challenged the Spanish state and the predominant national identity conception in 
Spain. Having emerged in the late 19th century, Basque nationalism found its political 
expression with the PNV, which has continued to be the major political party of 
Basque nationalism in terms of electoral support. Having been founded in reaction to 
the consequences of rapid modernization, the PNV was originally provided with a 
racist, traditionalist, extreme-Catholic identity and independentist aspirations by 
Arana, as the founder and first ideologue of the party. By making use of various 
methods of the ‘invention of tradition’, Arana created a history, name and flag for the 
Basque Country, although it had never actually been a homogeneous and united entity 
in terms of its territory, language, culture or economy. Arana’s PNV defended a clear 
division of Basque society into Basques and non-Basques on ethnic, cultural and moral 
grounds. According to him, Basque society was severely endangered by Hispanization, 
and his solution was the establishment of an independent Basque Country, through 
non-violent methods.  
  
 Except for a short-lived Republican period that provided the Basque Country 
with political autonomy, until the transition to democracy in Spain after the death of 
Franco, the Spanish state’s reaction to Basque nationalism was based on denial and the 
repression of the Basque sub-national identity. The repressive policies in the name of a 
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united and strong Spain proved to be a fomenting factor that not only contributed to 
the emergence of ETA in the 1950s, but also increased the sub-national and 
international legitimacy of Basque nationalism. The Franco years were especially 
troublesome for the PNV in many respects. While ETA increased its power at the 
expense of popular support for the PNV, the PNV also suffered crucial organizational, 
leadership and financial problems, given that opportunity structures for its approach 
were least favorable during this time.  
  
 However, Spain’s transition to democracy and application for EU membership 
in the second half of the 1970s dramatically changed the picture for the PNV. The 
Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the resulting Statute of the Basque Autonomous 
Community in 1979 not only meant official recognition of Spain’s multiethnic nature, 
but it also provided the Basque Country with a wide range of political and financial 
powers through which it could develop policies regarding almost every aspect of 
Basque society. Furthermore, these developments entailed the restoration of plural 
politics in the Basque Country, as is in the rest of Spain. Since politics in Basque 
society had primarily been nationalist politics, this meant an inexorable competition of 
Basque nationalists among themselves, and also with political representatives of non-
Basque nationalists. Within this context, popular support for ETA’s violent methods 
gradually decreased while the PNV enhanced its first party position in the Basque 
Country. Forming the Basque government after the 1980 elections for the Basque 
Parliament, the PNV ruled the Basque Autonomous Community without a break until 
2009, when PSE-EE took power. Meanwhile, modernists in the PNV prevailed over 
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traditionalists, and as a consequence, the party emphasized its Christian democratic 
persuasions and, more crucially, replaced race with language as the main ethnic-
boundary making marker. Nevertheless, the emphasis on ethnicity has remained 
important and the PNV has continued to support the Basque versus non-Basque 
division as other Basque nationalist parties do.  
  
 Like the SNP and the DTP, the PNV has adopted a pro-European stance. The 
EU has been seen as an external support system that serves to hollow the Spanish state 
and enhance stateless nations and regions on the way to a ‘Europe of the Regions’ that 
may characterize the EU of the future. The Spanish accession to the EU has 
concretized this external support system, which has been made use of by the PNV in 
various ways: representation at the EP and CoR, the Basque Delegate of the Basque 
Government in Brussels lobbying for Basque interests and the promotion of Basque 
identity, interregional cooperation at a transnational level to visualize the Basque 
homeland as well as to develop economic opportunities, and the flow of EU money 
through structural funds to improve the infrastructure of the Basque provinces.  
  
 
 Nevertheless, the new opportunity structures enabled by the Statute of Basque 
Autonomy and European integration have still fallen short of the PNV’s expectations. 
The PNV demands that the Spanish state recognize the Basque Country as a nation. 
Parallel to its view of the SNP case, the EU sees the Basque question as an internal 
issue of the Spanish state. Being disappointed by the ongoing course of European 
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integration, in which the member states maintain their strength, the PNV also suffers 
from the lack of effective political cooperation among sub-state nationalist forces, both 
at national and supranational levels. Sub-state nationalist parties face the dilemma that 
most of them, including the PNV, back a Europe of the Regions, but they do not have a 
clear definition this ideal. More crucially, , they constitute a highly heterogeneous 
group even at national level, let alone at the European level, due to divisions regarding 
their ultimate goals and left-right cleavage.  
 
 Thus, European integration has provided new opportunities for the PNV, but 
the main axis of conflict is still between Basque sub-state nationalist forces and the 
Spanish state. Within the Europeanized context, the PNV seeks to revise constitutional 
arrangements so as to restructure them as a free-association of the Basque Country 
with the Spanish state, which can be seen as a springboard to Basque independence. In 
this struggle, the PNV’s difficulties are not limited to resistance by the Spanish state 
and the EU. There are also several crucial constraints at the sub-national level. As well 
as the growing strength of dual identities, popular support for the option of 
independence is favored by only a quarter of the Basque Autonomous Community 
population. Furthermore, a majority of the population living in the historic territories 
of Navarre and in France do not support Basque nationalism. Thus, the Spanish 
political structure and European integration has provided fertile ground for the success 
of the PNV. Nonetheless, as well as the lack of enough popular support at sub-national 
level, the new European context, in which nation-states are still very powerful, 
imposes significant constraints on the PNV’s political aspirations.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DEMOKRATİK TOPLUM PARTİSİ (DTP): 
IN SEARCH OF ‘DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY’ 
 
 
          Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is based on and nurtured by the Kurdish question 
as a multidimensional yet primarily as an ethno-political question. Its emergence is 
quite typical in the sense that it is based on politicization of an ethno-cultural identity 
against continued repression by a nation-state aiming at congruence between political 
and cultural units in accordance with the general premises of modernist paradigm. 
Dating back to the late 19th century, Kurdish nationalism as the most obvious political 
expression of Kurdish question has undergone several phases of development, having 
become a modern nationalist movement in the 1960s. The PKK adopting violent 
strategy against state and civilian targets has dominated Kurdish nationalist movement 
since the early 1980s. In the 1990s and the first decade of 2000s, the movement 
experienced a painful and unstable process that gave way to a series of Kurdish sub-
state nationalist political parties. At the time of devising this comparative research on 
sub-state nationalist parties including the Kurdish case, the DTP had been formed as 
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the last chain of PKK-linked political parties in 2005.259 The DTP’s short lifetime 
coincided with toilsome efforts of Turkish state in order to meet Copenhagen criteria 
for the sake of its EU bid. In this process, while Turkish state has undergone a radical 
transformation towards a more democratic country, the DTP could find new 
opportunities for Kurdish nationalist politics. Until it was shut down in 2009, the party 
unsurprisingly became the focus of political contention over founding principles of 
constitutional order including national identity, political and administrative system. 
The controversy became more critical when the DTP could form a political party 
group in Turkish Parliament. Legally, it was impossible to form a region- or ethnic-
based political party, but now the DTP was in the Parliament where it overwhelmingly 
stressed the Kurdish question. And the political system has come to recognize Kurdish 
ethnic identity and has given a number of cultural rights, which was inconceivable 
until a decade ago. 
 
          Thus, besides significant impacts of internal (Justice and Development Party’s 
coming to power in 2002) and external (US invasion of Iraq in 2003) developments in 
this time period, there is no doubt that European integration has brought about 
noticeable impacts that directly or indirectly affected Kurdish nationalism, especially 
the DTP. Transformation of Turkish state has put conventional understanding of 
Kurdish question under stress and imposed a more inclusive interpretation of national 
identity in accordance with the main norms of a plural democracy. Equally important, 
                                                 
259 On 11 December 2009, it was banned by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, ruling that the party has 
become “focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country, and the nation” 
(http://www.resmi-gazete.org/tarih/20091214-4.htm). On its closure, the ex-DTP MPs, except for the 
two having lost their MP status (Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk), joined Peace and Democracy Party 
(Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) that is the successor to the DTP. 
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the DTP has gained new channels in the process of European integration. These both 
together have actually meant reshaping of opportunity structures for Kurdish 
nationalists.   
 
           This chapter aims at analyzing impacts of European integration process on 
Kurdish nationalism by focusing on the DTP as the major Kurdish nationalist political 
party between 2005-2009. In doing this, it first covers historical background of the 
Kurdish question within the light of Turkish modernization and development of 
Turkish nationalism. Secondly, it focuses on the impacts of European integration on 
Turkish nation-state by concentrating on the reforms for democratization since 1999 in 
order to comprehend how the reform process has changed perceptions and parameters 
of the conflict on both sides. Then, within the light of historical context and recent 
reform process, impacts of European integration on the DTP are analyzed in terms of 
identity construction, goals, strategies and ideology. While examining the relevance 
and meaning of European integration for the DTP, the party’s utilization of new 
opportunity especially sheds light on the DTP’s interpretation of integration process. 
The subsequent section on the interplay of Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms as two 
competing forms of nationalism aims at revealing dynamics of the nationalist conflict 
by way of critical political disputes among the DTP and the major political actors 
representing different versions of Turkish nationalism. This will not only allow us to 
evaluate the subject matter in a dialectical way but also to question how far the 
nationalist conflict has been transformed with the impact of European integration, and 
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specifically whether European integration process has had a transforming effect on 
Kurdish sub-state nationalism. 
 
7.1. TURKISH MODERNIZATION AND KURDISH QUESTION 
It is clear that to discuss Kurdish question is to speak of Turkish modernity 
with regard to the making of modern Turkey as an organic, homogeneous national 
society. Thus, the Kurdish question in Turkey can be best understood as an integral 
part of the building of the modern secular Turkey as a modern nation-state. As a 
corollary to this argument, one can claim that Kurdish question in Turkey has never 
been a matter in itself; so, its roots and evolution can only be comprehended within the 
context of Turkish modernization. 
 
By taking modernization almost synonymous with westernization, Turkish 
modernization, led by the official ideology of Kemalism with the foundation of 
Turkish Republic in 1923, aimed at reaching the contemporary level of (Western) 
civilization. This meant that the new country would be independent, industrialized, 
secular and modern (Berkes, 1998). Thus, Turkish modernization emerged as a project 
that would be applied ‘from above’ by Kemalist elites to transform Anatolian 
population into secular members of emerging Turkish nation.260  
 
                                                 
260 As Zürcher (2004) states among the fundamental principles of Kemalist ideology symbolized with 
‘six arrows’, nationalism and secularism constituted its core. 
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As one of the core tenets of Kemalism, Turkish nationalism261 was mainly 
shaped by two factors which to a great extent highlight the path followed by Turkish 
modernization and Turkish official view of Kurdish question since the inception of 
republican era. The gradual demise of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing Sevres 
Treaty while dissolving the Empire and partitioning the Anatolian territory among the 
European powers brought about a nation-state tradition that has had strong survival 
instincts and threat perceptions. While the West was the ‘Other’ having had designs 
upon Turkish homeland, it simultaneously represented the model that should be 
adopted to attain contemporary civilization.262 Nevertheless, the anti-western (or at 
least Euro-sceptic) elements263 in Turkish nationalism were overshadowed by the 
ultimate objective of Kemalist project. This ambivalent stance towards the West has 
been one the major factors that has given rise to a self- perception and a perception of 
the West full of contradictions and tensions. Consequently, while these perceptions 
embodied a particular mindset shaping the way in which Turkish nationalism and 
Turkish national identity were molded, they also substantiated a specific structure of 
power relations dominated by the Kemalist elite.264  
                                                 
261 By rightly maintaining that it is neither a fixed nor a homogenous discourse, Bora (2003) 
distinguishes five variants of Turkish nationalism, namely official (Atatürk), Kemalist left-wing, liberal, 
ultranationalist, and Islamist. In this dissertation, Turkish nationalism refers to official nationalism, or 
Ataturk nationalism, focusing on the mission to establish and perpetuate the nation-state.   
262 In contrast to the anti-colonial sentiment that fueled the majority of third world national movements, 
Turkish nationalism did not exhibit an anti-Western nativism. Instead, it aimed to locate a Turkish 
presence in an already accomplished model, rather than challenging the text in a civilizational relativism 
(Keyder, 2005: 12).  
263 Anti-Europeanism has been most conspicuous among Turkish ultra-nationalists, for more 
information see Nergis Canefe and Tanıl Bora (2003) ‘The Intellectual Roots of Anti-European 
Sentiments in Turkish Politics: the Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
pp. 127-48.    
264 The term ‘establishment’ denotes all those actors within the executive and the administration, the 
judiciary, the military, the security services and intelligence community, political parties, the media and 
academia, which subscribe to the Kemalist republican values. The establishment is so heterogenous that 
it consists of actors clinging to different political ideologies ranging from liberalism to ultra-
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The nature and ultimate objective of Turkish modernization as put forward 
above thus imply at least two facts about Turkish nationalism. As an historical fact, the 
state preceded the nation in Turkish context (Kadıoğlu, 1995: 92). Therefore, national 
identity did not appear as an outcome of long historical processes. Instead, it was 
forged by the state as a prerequisite of modernization. Turkish nationalism, on the one 
hand, set about reinvigorating the national ‘essence’ through ‘invention of the 
tradition’ attuned with ‘general code of particularity’.265 The second fact that is that 
Turkish nationalism has had a state-centric character: it was first and foremost 
employed as “instrument for purposes social control and mobilization towards 
modernization” (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 12).  Kemalist elite conceived the state 
as an active agent that shapes and reshapes the nation to the level of contemporary 
civilization: “the Kemalist idea of the state was embedded in the question of how to 
activate the people toward the goal of civilization, that is, how to construct a national 
identity compatible with the will to civilization” (Keyman, 2005: 275). Thus, state-
centrism could not only be explained with the notion of survival and threat. Kemalist 
attempt to forge a national identity was also attuned with ‘from-above’ character of 
Turkish modernization.266  
                                                                                                                                             
nationalism. In this sense, as Bozarslan maintains, Kemalism constitutes a meta-ideology in Turkey 
(Bozarslan, 1999: 20).     
265 One of the most fundamental characteristics of nationalist ideology is the fact that it combines 
cultural particularism of invidual nations with the universal view of a ‘world of nations’. In other words, 
it is based on the idea of uniqueness of each nation. However, the way particularity of nation (‘us’) is 
asserted is commonplace. In general sense, our identity, history, and flag make ‘us’ distinct from 
‘others’. Thus, nationalist rhetoric everywhere speaks through a universal code of particularity (Billig, 
1995: 73).  
266 Activation of people here does not refer to encouragement of any kind of voluntaristic action from 
below. Rather, it denotes expectations from the ‘citizens of republic’ to think, feel, and act in the way 
the state laid out.  
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Having an organic vision of society which was seen essential for survival and 
modernization, Turkish nationalism considered the ‘duties and services’ of different 
occupation groups to the state as the basis of the society (Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 
1981). More crucially, this view has underlain the official doctrine of the ‘indivisible 
unity of the state with its territory and its nation’ since the founding of the republic. 
According to this doctrine, there is only one people in Turkey, and it comprises the 
totality of the country’s citizens, who enjoy the same rights and have the same 
obligations. Nonetheless, despite official rhetoric of civic nationalism, the state-
centered Turkish nationalism has had a hybrid character, combining a French-style 
civic nationalism based on the principle of citizenship and territoriality with ethnic 
nationalism of German type (Kadıoğlu, 1995; Bora, 2003). While its civilizationist 
dimension suggests Turkish nationality is an expression of politico-territorially defined 
common will, its culturalist aspect has so far aimed to achieve a centralist, absolutist 
and monist national identity.267  
 
The civic dimension of the emerging sense of Turkish citizenship de-
emphasized the ethnic background of heterogeneous Muslim communities in Anatolia. 
Because, according to the official doctrine, there were no ethnic minorities other than 
those non-Muslim ones recognized with the Treaty of Lausanne (Aktürk, 2006: 51). 
The state therefore pursued an active policy of assimilation based on a 
conceptualization of Turkishness as a part of a common national, linguistic and 
territorial identity. Not surprisingly, the Kemalist mission to create a centralized, 
                                                 
267 Ziya Gökalp is the well-known ideologue of this two-track conceptualization of Turkish national 
identity. See Ziya Gökalp (1976) Türkçülüğün Esasları [Foundations of Turkism], Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Yayınları.    
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secular and homogeneous Turkish nation-state met the active opposition of religious 
conservatives and ethnic Kurds. Resistance to centralization and nation-building was 
strongest in the traditionally semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces, which had little 
exposure to taxation and regular conscription during Ottoman times (Taşpınar, 2005). 
Consequently, the new republic witnessed a long series of Kurdish ethno-religious 
rebellions between 1923 and 1938. These rebellions fed the cumulative image of the 
Kurdish people in the eye of the state as “socially, tribally, religiously fanatic, 
economically backward and most important, a threat to the national integrity of the 
Turkish state” (Yavuz and Günter, 2001: 34). Thus, they enhanced Kemalist 
perspective that Kurdish ethnicity was an impediment “to both objective of 
homogenizing national territory and the Turkish nation’s civilizing mission” 
(Moustakis and Chaudhuri, 2005).268  
 
After crushing of the Kurdish-led Shayk Said Rebellion in 1925, Turkish state 
put a comprehensive policy of assimilation with a goal of Turkification (Van 
Bruinessen, 2000; Kirisci and Winrow, 1997).269 Therefore, existence of Kurdish 
                                                 
268 The report, based on observation and investigation in the southeastern and eastern regions and 
prepared by İsmet İnönü (then prime minister of Turkish Republic) reflects this type of image of the 
Kurds and the impending ‘Kurdish threat’ against ongoing republican project. For instance, İsmet İnönü 
states in his report that “if Erzincan becomes a center for the Kurds, I fear that Kurdistan would be 
established”. Saygı Öztürk (2005) İsmet Paşa’nın Kürt Raporu [Ismet Pasha’s Kurdish Report], 
İstanbul:  Doğan Kitap, p. 51. This statement typically reflects survival and modernization concerns 
together. Another influential work in terms of official ideology belongs to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (one 
of the heroes of National Independence War). In his ‘Kurdish Question’, he underlines the main role of 
foreign conspiracy in Kurdish insurgencies Kazım Karabekir (1995) Kürt Meselesi [Kurdish Question] 
(2nd edition), İstanbul: Emre Yayınları. For detailed information on major reports on Kurdish question 
see B. Akçura, Devletin Kürt Filmi 1925-2007 Kürt Raporları [State’s Kurdish Movie 1925-2007 
Reports on Kurdish Question], (Ankara: Ayraç, 2008).    
269 Criticizing the widespread theses of assimilation of the Kurds by the Turkish state, Heper contends 
that a theory of acculturation better explains the real nature of the interaction between the Turkish state 
and the Kurds. For further elaboration, see Metin Heper (2007) State and Kurds in Turkey, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.    
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ethnicity was simply denied. Besides typical means of national integration such as 
nation-wide standardized (national) education and military service, the state developed 
specific policies aimed at forced assimilation such as ‘Citizen, speak Turkish’ 
campaigns and the Resettlement Law of 1934. While the Kurds deemed as ‘Mountain 
Turks’ who forgot their Turkish origins, civilizing mission of the state was repeatedly 
confirmed. While the term “Turk” was gradually ethnicized in constitutions of 1961 
and 1982 (Yavuz and Günter, 2001: 34), any attempt to express Kurdish identity was 
harshly repressed by state authorities especially after 1980 military intervention. Until 
democratization reforms in the early years of 2000s, denial and suppression of Kurdish 
identity has been the established state policy (Oran, 2004).  
 
Albeit gradually being ethnicized, official definition of Turkish national 
identity has so far kept its hybrid character. Race never became a criterion in terms of 
policies of assimilation (Yavuz and Günter, 2001: 34). Ethnicized Turkish national 
identity both invited and forced all ethnic groups to assimilate in Turkish culture and 
language.270 In this sense, official discourse has never refused to accept Kurds as 
Turkish citizens. But this acceptance was accompanied by the voluntary or involuntary 
inclusion of Kurds into the community of Turks, so the problem of Kurds in Turkey 
has not been exclusion (Kymlicka, 1999: 134-5). 271  
 
                                                 
270 Paul Dumont (1984) states that rejecting criterion of race, Kemalists hoped coalescence of different 
ethnic groups into a single Turkish nation through policies of Turkification based on culture and 
language.   
271 Nevertheless, this is not to argue that ultra-nationalist version of Turkish nationalism has been totally 
rejected by official nationalism. There have been always osmoses and syntheses, which makes 
impossible to elicit a pure form of nationalism (Bora, 2003). But even this articulation did not severe the 
invitation to Kurds.   
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Within this perspective, Turkish state has never seen Kurdish question as a real 
problem. It viewed it as ‘a matter of reactionary politics, tribal resistance or regional 
backwardness and foreign conspiracy but never as an ethno-political question’ 
(Hirschler, 2001: 148). Thus, Turkish state saw any calls for recognition of Kurdish 
identity and cultural rights as separatist, terrorist acts, which should be suppressed 
severely. Consequently, insistence on repression not only fueled a more militant and 
separatist Kurdish movement led by the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdish 
Workers Party) and contributed to the maturing of the Kurdish national identity in the 
course of resistance to this policy (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 1999: 9), it also severed the 
legitimacy of the state inside and became one of the major problems of Turkey in its 
relations with the Western world after gradual internationalization of the issue.272  
 
Besides these factors that lie beneath the ‘mentality structure’ on which official 
nationalism was based, one should also not ignore the fact that official form of 
nationalism reflects a power structure.  Hybrid conception of official nationalism led to 
a double discourse that has served to extend the capacity of political maneuvering 
(Bora, 2003b: 437). It does not mean that nationalism has been solely an instrument 
manipulated by Kemalist establishment, but it has so far served it in its efforts to 
perpetuate the status quo. Therefore, nationalism forms a legitimizing principle, but at 
the same time by defining the nation, it serves the establishment to maintain its power. 
Given that the army could consider itself for a long time to be the ‘true owner’ and 
personified symbol of nationalism (ibid), then securitization of Kurdish question, 
                                                 
272 For a detailed analysis of internationalization of Kurdish question see E. Kurubaş, Kürt Sorunun 
Uluslararası Boyutu ve Türkiye Cilt 1-2 [International Dimension of Kurdish Question and Turkey, Vol. 
1-2, Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2004].   
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which has been also attuned with the general context of official doctrine of indivisible 
unity of the state with its nation, becomes easier to understand.273 
 
It is clear that that Kurdish question is a ‘trans-state issue’ (Kirişci and 
Winrow, 1997) having many dimensions, including terrorism. It is above all related to 
the democratization question of Turkey in terms of the regime’s recognition of 
different ethnic groups. However, the recognition of the cultural rights of Kurds would 
mean “fundamental revisions of both the constitution and prevailing notions of the 
nation-state (Özbudun, 2000: 144) and lead to a revision of power status quo. 
 
Kurdish question has evolved through different stages and has assumed specific 
connotations. Since it has been intertwined with different opportunities, constraints and 
problems, its focus has accordingly changed. Yet, Since the beginning of the 1990s, as 
Turkey has been under the influence of globalization, Kurdish nationalism has been 
affected and shaped by its original character which  has been above all ethno-political 
(Yeğen, 2001\2002: 183). Besides the erosion of the nation-state, dominance of human 
rights discourse and European integration as exogenous factors responsible for its 
reawakening, the 1990s witnessed remarkable developments at domestic level such as 
mass internal immigration, economic backwardness, uneven development and 
increasing poverty enhanced by globalization which spurred the conflict further 
(Yeğen, 2001\2002: 187).  Turkey’s bid for the EU  has played a remarkable role in 
                                                 
273 Bora underlines the importance of survival and threat perception as mentality structure of official 
nationalism while he underplays political aspect of nationalism in struggle for power. I think Bora’s 
perspective showing ideational side of official nationalism does not exclude the fact that nationalism as 
the constitutive and reproducing ideology of nation-state also underpins a power structure in national 
homeland.   
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providing Kurdish nationalist movement with new opportunities towards the 
recognition of Kurdish identity and by broadening the political system and by enabling 
the  Kurdish nationalism to compete with various forms of Turkish nationalism, 
including the official version. The acceleration of Kurdish nationalist demands became 
possible only as a consequence of a highly complex and interrelated dynamics of 
domestic and international developments since the year 1999, which is also called the 
post-Helsinki period.    
  
7.2. TURKISH STATE, THE EU, AND THE KURDISH QUESTION IN THE 
POST-HELSINKI PERIOD  
Turkey witnessed the rise of Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s due to a number 
of domestic and international developments. Harsh repression of Kurdish identity after 
1980 military coup did not only stimulate a long-term bloody conflict between the 
state and the PKK, but it also gave rise to growing criticisms by Western countries that 
were amplified in the 1990s. These were actually indicators of then poorly 
comprehended fact that the circumstances had become highly unfavorable for the 
states to forcefully assimilate challenging ethnic identities within their boundaries. 
With the 1990s, many things had changed, but the Turkish state fell short of adapting 
to the new circumstances. 
 
First of all, while the end of cold war opened the way for reintegration of 
Europe, Copenhagen criteria (1993) defined minority rights as one of the preconditions 
to be fulfilled in order to get full EU membership. Thus, the end of cold war implied 
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no more tolerance to aggression of minority rights that were neglected as primarily 
being domestic issues before. Therefore, human rights and minority rights could 
become a leading issue in international relations.274 More crucially, they were 
entrenched as a part of political criteria to be met on the way to EU membership. 
Regarding specifically Kurdish question, the 1980s and 1990s saw growing 
importance of Kurdish diaspora in European countries. These groups have not only 
promoted awareness of Kurdish ethnic identity, they became a very influential 
component of Kurdish nationalist movement. Moreover, the first Gulf War gave rise to 
increasing awareness among European public about Kurdish issue. Especially, 
tragedies lived in Northern Iraq during Saddam regime created a widespread feeling of 
sympathy for ‘Kurdish cause’. Consequently, these general and particular factors 
severed domestic and international legitimacy of Turkish state in handling Kurdish 
issue.    
 
The Post Helsinki Period 
Post-1999 period has been decisive since acceptance of Turkish candidacy for 
EU membership in Helsinki summit marked a ‘categorical jump’ regarding its 
relations with the EU. In addition to that, cessation of large-scale violence after the 
capture of PKK’s leader Öcalan275 provided Turkey with a new opportunity to handle 
Kurdish question in a non-military way. Thus, Turkish government set about a series 
                                                 
274 In fact, human rights issues became a subject of legitimate concern to all participating states with the 
signing of Helsinki Final Act of OSCE (then CSCE) in 1975. The signatory states of the Helsinki Final 
Act accepted that they would no longer disallow international scrunity regarding human rights violations 
by claiming that they were internal affairs (www.osce.org/who/43960, visited on May 25, 2011).  
275 Upon his capture in Kenya, Öcalan was brought to Turkey on February 16, 1999. He was sentenced 
to death, and his sentence commuted to life-long imprisonment without parole when the death penalty 
was abolished in Turkey in August 2002.    
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of constitutional amendments and harmonization packages in order to fulfill 
Copenhagen political criteria.276 While the accession process has proved to be a key 
anchor in supporting democratization and modernization in Turkey, this 
‘unprecedented’ reform process also brought about remarkable improvements in terms 
of Kurdish question.277 Particularly, third reform package in August 2002 provided 
crucial changes by allowing education of Kurdish in private institutions and 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (Ulusoy, 2007). Moreover, Turkey ended 
emergency rule in southeastern provinces in 2002, and it ratified certain parts of the 
international law dealing with minority rights and cultural rights.278 This period also 
witnessed the start of broadcasting in Kurdish by the state TV channel (TRT) in 2004. 
Even though it was no more than half an hour a day, its symbolic importance was very 
high. These openings have been recently followed by the establishment of a 24-hour 
broadcasting in Kurdish state TV channel (TRT 6) and opening of Kurdish language 
department at public Mardin Artuklu University.279 
 
As Turkey has undergone an unprecedented and profound transformation in the 
post-Helsinki period, the EU as anchor has played the role of external support system. 
There is no doubt that EU’s severe criticisms leveled against Turkey’s insistence on 
                                                 
276 Tocci (2005) convincingly argues that there is no linear relationship between domestic change in 
Turkey and EU conditionality. She claims that domestic change has been spearheaded by domestic 
actors that have used and been strengthened by the external EU anchor. See also Kıvanç Ulusoy (2007). 
277 The realignment in domestic politics, increasing effect of flourishing civil society and some signs of 
alteration in military’s perspective of Kurdish question (for the signals from the military, see F. Bila, 
Komutanlar Cephesi [the Commanders’ Front], (İstanbul: Detay Yayıncılık, 2007).  
278 Nevertheless, Turkey has kept its sensitivity about recognition of any minorities other than those 
recognized with the Treaty of Lausanne. So, it ratified OSCE conventions with certain reservations 
grounded by this attitude. For details see Sarigil, 2007, pp. 186–7.  
279 The Institute of Living Languages at Mardin Artuklu University hosting the department of Kurdish 
language as the first institution of Kurdish language at university level was opened in 2009.   
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military solution to the Kurdish question  and political criteria to be met to start 
accession negotiations have  been  influential factors that forced\encouraged Turkey 
for democratization. Yet this is not to suggest that the EU has and could act as the 
principal, let alone the only determinant of the transformation of the Kurdish question.  
 
Domestic factors have been the main determinants of change. To begin with, 
by having forced the PKK to suspend armed conflict with Turkish security forces, the 
capture of Öcalan provided a relatively more appropriate context for democratization 
reforms, specifically regarding to the Kurdish issue. Secondly, the election of the AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party), a ‘pragmatic-
conservative and Islam-sensitive party’ (Cizre, 2008: 1), in November 2002 provided 
Turkey with a one-party government having a clear parliamentary majority after a 
decade of fragile coalitions. Siding with a civic conception of nationalism, the AKP 
government has argued for redefinition of national identity in relation to Turkish 
citizenship without any ethnic connotations. Thirdly, thriving civil society could 
contribute to the reform process by opening various channels of dialogue for the 
expression of different aspects of the Kurdish question.   
 
Within this process, compared to the influence of domestic factors, the impact 
of the EU on Kurdish solution has been limited; proposals for solution by the EU have 
been highly vague (Tocci, 2005). Beginning with its 1998 Progress Report, the 
Commission has called for a ‘political and non-military solution to the problem of the 
southeast’, without specifying what such a solution entailed- it simply stated that “a 
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civil solution could include the recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural 
identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided it does 
not advocate separatism or terrorism” (Tocci, 2006: 122). The EU’s vagueness 
regarding a concrete proposal for the solution of Kurdish question can be explained 
mainly on two grounds. First, EU’s possible proposal would be within the scope of 
protection of minority rights.280 Nonetheless, both Turkish state and Kurdish 
nationalist have opposed it for different reasons. According to the Turkish state, 
minority groups in Turkey were determined by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923; any 
attempt to define the Kurds as minority is artificial and malicious. For Kurdish 
nationalists, they are one of the constitutive elements of Turkish state rather than being 
a minority group. Second, the EU sees the states as monolithic political entities, and 
states cannot be obliged to sign up international treaties/conventions related to 
minority rights. This fact shows that the EU has no legal power to compel a state to 
recognize any minorities within its boundaries 281 and it is difficult for it to uphold a 
common policy for minorities or sub-national groups, since the issue of national 
minorities is still overwhelmingly ‘national’. In this sense, the idea of state rights is 
still intact, and the principle of state sovereignty can be still used to make persuasive 
arguments against national minority rights (Jackson Preece, 1998: 173). 
 
                                                 
280 European Commission’s Turkey 2005 Progress Report, ‘Criteria for Membership – Human Rights 
and Protection of Minorities- ‘ states that “… The minorities usually associated by the authorities with 
the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians and Greeks. However, there are other communities in 
Turkey which, in the light of the relevant international and European standards, could qualify as 
minorities” (p.35).   
281 For instance, France and Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Luxembourg do not ratify 
‘Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ prepared by the Council of Europe since 1995. 
See Phillips Alan (2002) “The Framework Convention for the Protection of Minority Rights” A Policy 
Analysis by Minority Rights Group International, www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=36.   
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As a result, the EU’s vagueness about any proposal in favor of a concrete 
solution to the Kurdish question can be explained by the fact that the EU is devoid of 
any capacity to develop a common policy regarding ethno-nationally grounded 
conflicts. Nevertheless, the EU is supported by sub-state nationalist groups for various 
reasons. Above all, they consider the EU weakens nation-state’s sovereign authority. 
In addition to that, in the new European architecture, they are now able to develop 
transnational economic cooperation and paradiplomatic political activities.   
 
Kurdish nationalists are on the same wave with many other sub-state nationalist 
groups in Europe in terms of its pro-EU stance. They have benefited from EU-
anchored reforms given that opportunity structures have been relatively widened with 
the effect of European integration process. Nevertheless, there are still significant 
obstacles before Kurdish nationalist politics. For instance, according to the Law on 
Political Parties, the use of languages other than Turkish remains illegal in political 
life. Even when they are not engaged with violent activities or do not extol violence, 
political parties still run the risk of dissolution. Equally importantly, 10 % national 
election threshold to enter the Turkish Parliament still constitutes a huge obstacle 
before a just representation system. 
 
Now, we will first explore different dimensions of the DTP and then impacts of 
European integration process on the party.  
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7.3. THE DTP: IDENTITY, GOALS, STRATEGIES AND IDEOLOGY   
Turkish modernization has led to seemingly contradictory consequences: on the 
one hand, it contributed to a growing awareness of Kurdish identity among Kurds; on 
the other hand, it has promoted integration of the Kurds with other ethnic groups in 
Turkey (Akyol, 2006). Whereas great majority of Kurds have been integrated with the 
rest of the country due to mainly inner-migration and interethnic marriages, it has 
gradually become an open secret that today it is impossible to assimilate the Kurds into 
Turkishness (Oran, 2004). Kurdish ethnic demands were to a great extent kept alive by 
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey that has experienced four broad phases since the early 
republican period (Hirschler, 2001). While Kurdish nationalism dates back to the 19th 
century, and had an ethno-religious character in the 1920s and 1930s, it appeared as a 
modern nationalist movement in the 1960s, and then it has turned to be a mass 
movement in the 1980s (McDowall, 2004). The post-1980 phase has witnessed the 
acceleration of Kurdish identity formation due to mainly state repression, long-term 
mobilization and Kurdish diaspora in Europe (Hirschler, 2001: 146).282 Despite the 
fact that there have always been alternative voices in it, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey 
has been dominated by the PKK since the early 1980s.  
 
The PKK’s stated aim was in the past to create an independent Kurdish state in 
Kurdistan, which consisted of parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, 
northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran. Its ideological foundation is a combination 
of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism. However, after the fall of Soviet Union, it has 
                                                 
282 For a detailed analysis of political activism of Kurdish diaspora in Europe, see V. Eccarius-Kelly 
(2005) ‘Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora’, 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.  22, No. 1, pp. 91–118.  
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somehow reduced its emphasis on Marxism. In recent years its focus has shifted from 
ethnic secessionism to obtaining equal cultural and democratic rights, and recognition 
of Kurdish identity in the Turkish Constitution. Nevertheless, although its principal 
goal seems to have shifted from a separate Kurdish state to ‘democratization of 
Turkish Republic’, it has never relinquished the strategy of violence. Apart from 
violent actions of the PKK, the PKK-linked political parties have sought to persuade 
the state to recognize Kurdish identity and accordingly restructure the political system, 
since the early 1990s.  
 
The DTP that was founded in 2005 as the last chain of Kurdish nationalist 
parties, linked with the PKK. It emerged as a political outcome of Democratic Society 
Movement. Although the DTP presented itself as a nation-wide party283, it was 
principally a regional party both in terms of focus of its program and popular electoral 
support. It was the dominant representative of Kurdish nationalist movement in 
political arena until its dissolution in 2009.284  
 
Rejecting to use the concept of nation deliberately, the DTP asserts that 
‘Kurdish people’ with 40 million population285 living in mainly four countries 
                                                 
283 Neither the Turkish Constitution of 1982, nor the Political Party Law allows establishment of 
political parties on ethnic or regional grounds.  
284 Kurdish nationalist activism is reflected in the workings of human rights organizations, cultural 
associations, political parties, self-help organizations, local administrations, and movements of different 
political stripes, ranging from the traditional left to Islamic movements. Therefore, Kurdish national 
movement expresses more than the DTP and the PKK. Other than the DTP, the other pro-Kurdish 
political parties are HAK-PAR (Rights and Freedom Party) and KADEP (Participatory Democracy 
Party). Unlike the DTP, both of these parties openly reject use of violent methods, yet they both back an 
ethnic-based federation of Turks and Kurds. See www.hakpar.org.tr, and www.kadep.org.tr .   
285 Population of an ethnic group seeking self-government is often a matter of speculation for 
competing parts. ‘The number of 40 million Kurds, 25 million of whom live in territorial boundaries of 
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constitutes one of the historical peoples of the Middle East. Kurdish history, culture 
and especially Kurdish as an Indo-European language are considered to be main 
elements of distinct Kurdish identity. Against Turkish state’s systematic policy of 
denial of Kurdish ethnic group, Kurdish national community is historicized through 
ethno-historical myths, especially for the pre-Islamic period.286 Language and festivals 
such as Newroz287 have been especially underlined and made use of as ethnic 
boundary markers by the DTP. Since Kurdish nationalism emerged as a reaction to 
assimilation, ethnic color of Kurdish national identity has been more obvious. 
Nevertheless, this fact did not lead the DTP to make an exclusive definition of 
Kurdishness. In contrary, the DTP has pursued official recognition for Kurdish ethnic 
identity and accepted Türkiyelilik (‘being a member of Turkey’) as a politico-
territorial supra-identity that would cover all ethnic groups living in Turkey. As a last 
point regarding the identity issue, territorial dimension of Kurdish identity is a 
contested issue. The ‘map dispute’ over territorial boundaries of ‘Kurdish homeland’ 
has been a part of autonomist claims of nationalist struggle.288  
                                                                                                                                             
Turkish state’ was uttered in the author’s interview with Ahmet Türk, 21 January 2009. Nevertheless, 
many public opinion polls show that almost 15 percent of population in Turkey identify themselves as 
Kurds. According to results of two different research projects conducted by KONDA, there are nearly 
11-12 million Kurds living in Turkey (2 million in Istanbul).  See 
http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf and 
http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/kurtler.pdf   
286 For a detailed analysis of Kurdish intellectuals’ efforts on the creation of a Kurdish ethno-history, see 
Hirschler (2001).  
287 For the construction and the use of Newroz as an ideological means for mobilization by Kurdish 
nationalism see Delal Aydın (2005) Mobilizing the Kurds: Newroz as a Myth, METU Master’ Thesis.    
288 Although the DTP has never expressed irredentist claims, Kurdistan maps used in the party’s 
congresses, meetings or conventions have often displayed ‘Greater Kurdistan’ including Kurdish 
sections of Iraq, Iran, and Syria. For an exemplary incident about the ‘map dispute’ see 
http://www.aktifhaber.com/parka-kurdistan-havuzu-yaptirdi-103381h.htm DTP Kayapinar Mayor faced 
charges for building Kurdistan-shaped pool. The pool was destructed and its construction became one of 
the charges levelled against the party in the closure case. See also  
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=667543&title=dtpnin-nevruzunda-kurdistan-haritasi-
skandali  21 March 2008; 
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The DTP’s sub-state nationalism can be much more specified by taking into 
consideration its social democratic position. As an observer political party to Socialist 
International and the Party of European Socialists, the DTP combined traditional 
nationalist policies of self-government with a post-industrial agenda. Positive 
discrimination to women, protection of ecological balance, and a sustainable economic 
development are some of the party’s polices that reflect its left-of-center position (DTP 
Party Program 2005).   
 
In terms of political goals, the DTP’s specificity compared with its 
predecessors lies in its policy of ‘democratic autonomy’ that was entrenched in the 
party regulation in 2007. According to the DTP, Kurdish question arose from the fact 
that Turkish Republic denied its foundational principles with 1924 Constitution by 
which the Republic disclaimed ethnic and religious diversity for the sake of a 
homogeneous Turkish nation although it was founded through a true collaboration of 
Anatolian peoples. Thus, Turkish Republic has been an anti-democratic since 1924 
Constitution that symbolizes a ‘temporal turn’ for Kurdish people whose existence was 
denied.289 It is claimed that subsequent constitutions served to worsen the situation.  
 
On the basis of this premise, the DTP advocates that Kurdish question has been 
one of the major problems of Turkey and it can only be solved through extensive and 
                                                                                                                                             
http://www.cnnturk.com/2009/turkiye/05/31/diyarbakirda.tartismali.harita/528912.0/index.html  1 June 
2009.  
289 See for instance, Ayna (Vice President of the DTP): Atatürk’ün Verdiği Sözler Tutulmalı [The 
promises given by Atatürk should be kept] Radikal 11 July 2009  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=944628&Date=13.07.2009&
CategoryID=78 
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real democratization. Excluding separatist agenda, the DTP claimed to have been 
struggling for ‘establishing the brotherhood of peoples and democratic co-existence on 
the basis of equality and freedom’ (DTP Party Program 2005: 16).290 However, it 
seems difficult to observe consistency in terms of the solutions it offers. The motto of 
democratization of Turkish Republic occasionally refers to a federation of Turks and 
Kurds, thus an ethnically re-structured state, or to gaining cultural and language rights 
within the unitary state structure (DTP Party Program, 2005: 34; DTP, 2008: 50-55). 
Its project of a democratic solution to Kurdish question was eventually concretized as 
‘democratic autonomy’. In accordance with the policy of democratic autonomy, the 
DTP’s goal of democratization of republic is based on a kind of territorial autonomy as 
well as constitutional recognition of Kurdish people with a series of cultural and 
political rights, especially education in Kurdish language (DTP, 2008). In institutional 
sense, the party argues that over-centralized Turkish political and administrative 
system should be subject to a process of devolution that refers to a comprehensive 
regionalization. Regions including the region of ‘Kurdistan’ (in southeastern Anatolia) 
would have regional parliaments formed through elections. They would be competent 
in all areas except for foreign affairs, defence, and finance; and they would share 
authority with central government in judiciary and police services. Organized as 
                                                 
290 The DTP’s vision of European integration is consistent with this view. It as a left-wing mass party 
supports the idea of ‘People’s Europe’ against the ‘Europe of businessmen’. This emphasis implies not 
only an egalitarian society understanding but also a view that the European integration is seen as a 
proper political framework for the peaceful co-existence of peoples in a democratic Europe (The DTP 
Party Program, 2005: 49-50).   
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people’s assemblies these parliaments would also enable a real participatory 
democracy (DTP Party Congress Declaration, 2007).291     
 
As a political party, the DTP adopts electoral strategy in order to attain its 
goals. Electoral support of the Kurds to the DTP amounts to almost one third of all 
Kurds in Turkey, concentrating southeastern Anatolia292, which also denotes the fact 
that most of the Kurds reject Kurdish nationalism on different grounds. This fact also 
shows that the DTP is a regional party whose supporters are concentrated in a specific 
region. For this reason, the DTP like its predecessors could maintain a strong foothold 
in local governments by winning nine provincial municipalities (see Table 8 in 
Appendices). While local governments were the center of sub-state nationalist politics 
until 2007 when the DTP could enter the Turkish Parliament by surmounting national 
election threshold obstacle indirectly, the DTP parliamentary group became the focus 
of party’s self-government claims until its closure in 2009.   
 
Compared to its counterparts in the EU, the DTP could benefit quite narrow 
opportunity structures. This fact did not only result from state-level constraints but 
intra-party cleavages and its link with the PKK constricted its maneuvering area. One 
could argue that the DTP emerged as an outcome of Kurdish nationalist movement and 
                                                 
291 The BDP, successor of the DTP, continues this policy. Osman Baydemir has recently summarized 
democratic autonomy as “the Kurds would have a parliament in southeastern Anatolia and fly their flag 
next to the Turkish flag (Today’s Zaman, 2 August 2010. Gülten Kışanak, co-chair of the BDP, has 
stated that the party has been already implementing the model of democratic autonomy in municipalities 
hold by the BDP mayors. She expresses that the BDP strengthens civil society in the name of a 
participatory democracy by establishing women’s, youth, and neighborhood assemblies (1 July 2010, 
bianet.org). See http://bianet.org/english/local-goverment/123087-possible-solution-for-kurdish-
question-suits-eu-accession-process.   
292 M. Türköne, ‘Turkish and Kurdish Nationalism’, Turquie Europeenne, 22 Aug. 2007. 
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suffered from being a movement party.293 As a movement party, it has been a coalition 
of political activists who have diverged on proper solutions to Kurdish question and 
political strategies to be pursued. The party existed as a alliance of ‘doves and hawks’. 
The former advocated a solution to the Kurdish question in unitary system, the latter 
insisted on democratic autonomy. While the former was condemned by the latter as 
pacifist and conciliatory, the doves criticized the hawks as pursuing an ethnic-based 
federation.294 Intra-party cleavage essentially prevented the party to have a complete, 
stable collective preference schedule. Furthermore, its non-transformation to an 
institutionalized political party allowed it to follow a dual track activism by combining 
activities within the arenas of formal democratic competition with extra-institutional 
mobilization. It has become commonplace to witness that one day legislators of the 
DTP295 debate bills in parliamentary committees, but the next day, they participate in 
disruptive demonstrations.  
 
The DTP’s another main problem was that it failed to distance itself from the 
PKK. The leadership occasionally stressed that the DTP’s grassroots was common 
with the PKK296 and   that the PKK was the right address to the solution of Kurdish 
question by calling the state to dialogue with it at the expense of undermining reason 
for their autonomous existence in the parliament.  For instance, Emine Ayna, the DTP 
deputy leader, clearly stated that the genuine addressee of the Kurdish isuue was the 
                                                 
293 For detailed information about movement parties see Kitschelt (2006) 
294 9 Nov. 2007, ntvmsnbc.com. see  http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/425637.asp  
295 In general election of 2007, the DTP run independent candidates in order to circumvent 10 % 
national threshold. Since 2007, the DTP has a parliamentary group (21 MPs) in the national assembly. 
This is the first time that a pro-Kurdish political party formed a parliamentary group in the history of 
Turkey.   
296 Ahmet Turk’s, the leader of the party, statement: “Our grassroots is in the mountain” (Sabah, 22 
April 2006).  
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PKK. She demanded a general amnesty for all PKK militants, including Öcalan, and 
implied that PKK had to be invited to take its place in the Turkish parliament if the 
government was sincere about solution.297 Indeed, despite his confinement in prison, 
Öcalan kept his significance for Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. As a part of 
this movement, the DTP also frequently made a point of his ‘leadership’. While the 
party’s ‘Mr.Öcalan’ policy underlined its link with the PKK298, some of party 
supporters’ opening his posters in the DTP congresses became one of the main 
elements of symbolic struggle against the state. Even though it is improper to see the 
DTP as the political wing of the PKK, there is a link ‘in a way’ between the two.299  
This link with the PKK has not only put extra constraints upon the party in a relatively 
narrow political opportunity structure, it has also become one of the major hindrances 
before the further democratization steps in Turkey.  
 
7.4. THE DTP AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
Two basic facts determine the limits of EU dimension for the DTP’s sub-state 
nationalism. First, since Turkey is not a member state of the EU, the DTP has been 
deprived of many channels open to other sub-state nationalist parties in member states. 
Secondly, there are no established regional authorities through which the DTP could 
                                                 
297 ‘Emine Ayna, says the PKK, Öcalan key to peace’ (Hürriyet Daily News, 12 Aug. 2009) 
298 To illustrate, the DTP organized a mass meeting in Diyarbakır in 2007 under the name of ‘Mr.Öcalan 
meeting’ (Hürriyet , 25 Nov. 2007) The DTP MPs often referred to Öcalan as ‘Mr.’ in their interviews 
and speeches to emphasize they saw him as respectable and key to solution of the Kurdish question. To 
illustrate, Sabahat Tuncel, Istanbul MP of the DTP,  “Sayın Öcalan’ın fikri alınmalı” (The state should 
ask Mr.Öcalan’s  opinion”, Yeni Şafak, 1 March 2008); Aysel Tuğluk, Diyarbakir MP of the DTP, 
“Çözümün muhatabı Sayın Öcalan’dır” (“The addressee of solution is Mr. Öcalan”, Radikal, 28 Aug. 
2009).   
299 A report prepared by European Union Institute for Security Studies states that “it is an obvious secret 
that DTP is connected to PKK in a way, and PKK is a terrorist organization”,  
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=8226  
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differentiate itself from other regions at national and EU levels. Thus, unlike its 
counterparts in the Basque Country and Scotland, the DTP lacks a favorable 
institutional design neither for paradiplomacy300 nor for transnational cooperations 
with other sub-national actors in the EU.  
 
Nevertheless, one can easily predict that the DTP has benefited from EU-
anchored democratization reform process in Turkey.  While party members rightly 
expressed that any solution to Kurdish question could be solved within domestic 
dynamics above all301, the DTP stressed importance of the EU membership process of 
Turkey for the general purpose of democratization in the country (DTP Party Congress 
Declaration, 2007). In line with this assessment, through a declaration, just before the 
European Council meeting in December 2004, a group of Kurdish intellectuals and 
politicians including some members of the DEHAP and present the DTP, expressed 
their demands from the Turkish state. Defining the Kurdish question as a fundamental 
problem before Turkish accession to the EU, the declaration emphasized that “Turkey 
must guarantee its Kurdish citizens the same rights the Basques, Catalans, Scots, 
Lapps, South Tyroleans and Walloons enjoy in the democratic countries of Europe…a 
new and democratic constitution, recognizing the existence of the Kurdish people, and 
guaranteeing it the right to a public school system and media in its own language and 
the right to form its organizations, institutions and parties with the aim of contributing 
                                                 
300 DTP had a representation bureau in Brussels, which basically lobbyed EU institutions about Kurdish 
rights in Turkey. Author’s interview with the DTP Brussels representative, Fayık Yağızay, 02.04.2008, 
Brussels. Compared to Basque Representation in Brussels or Scottish Executive EU Office, DTP’s 
representation’s effectiveness has been highly limited since unfavorable institutional design in Turkey. 
Compared to its many counterparts in Brussels, this Office was officially unable to represent Kurdish 
sub-national identity and interests.   
301 Author’s interviews with Ahmet Türk (DTP’s leader) and Bengi Yıldız (DTP’s MP of Batman) (21 
Jan. 2009, Turkish Grand National Assembly).  
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to the free expression of its culture and its political aspirations”302 This declaration 
clearly showed early expectations from Turkey’s EU integration process. Since then, 
there is no doubt that democratization reforms have provided Kurdish movement, 
specifically the DTP, with new and genuine political opportunities.  
 
In the 1990s, governments occasionally mentioned ‘Kurdish reality’ in Turkey, 
and the need for a peaceful solution to it. A political leader, Mesut Yilmaz, even made 
a clear connection between finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question and 
Turkey’s accession to the EU.303 However, this kind of statements did not yield any 
palpable results. Unlike these fruitless expressions of the 1990s, the AKP 
governments, especially between 2002-04, materialized critical political reforms in the 
name of Turkey’s EU bid. Democratization reforms have directly and indirectly 
affected perception and definition of the Kurdish issue.  
 
Considering that PKK terrorism empowers status quo- oriented actors and by 
using the advange of the end of large-scale conflict in southeastern Turkey with the 
capture of Öcalan, the AKP government has redefined the Kurdish question primarily 
as a problem of democracy rather than security. This was a crucial step taken for 
desecuritization of the issue, which was in conformity with its comprehensive attempts 
for civilianization of political system. EU-anchored democratization reform packages 
lifted the state of emergency that was in force in southeastern provinces since 1987, 
                                                 
302 Full text of the declaration is available at: 
www.institutkurde.org/activites_culturelles/appels/what_do_the_kurds_want_in_turkey/   
303 “Yilmaz: road to EU passes through Diyarbakir” [a mostly Kurdish populated province in 
southeastern Turkey] Turkish Daily News, 17 Dec. 1999.  
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and dramatically reduced the power of National Security Council through which the 
military could have strong influence in politics. As well as the curtailment of the 
military’s effect in political life to a remarkable degree, EU-anchored democratization 
reform packages allowed some significant individually-based cultural rights for the 
Kurds. The reforms mainly extended cultural rights by enabling mainly education and 
broadcasting in the Kurdish language. Nevertheless, these amendments did not amount 
to abolishment of village guard system, permission to education in Kurdish, or 
reduction in the 10 percent threshold for general elections. Even so, reforms have been 
of great significance since they were reflection of a paradigmatic change in the view to 
Kurdish issue. Despite significant constraints such as a clear ban on ethno-politics in 
the Parliament, these reforms have all paved the way to representation of Kurdish 
demands by a pro-Kurdish political party in the national assembly for the first time in 
republican history. Therefore, it was no less important that a pro-Kurdish political 
party, the DTP, could have a parliamentary group in the national assembly in 2007 
thanks to relatively more democratic atmosphere compared to previous years when it 
was a taboo even to speak of Kurdish identity and Kurdish question.    
 
Deprived of opportunity windows provided by the EU institutions, the DTP 
frequently sought to make use of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in 
the Council of Europe. It could speak its demands in the Congress loudly and attracted 
the Congress’s attention to the ban of multi-lingual municipal services presented by 
Diyarbakir Sur Municipality and subsequent prosecutions by Turkish state. The 
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Congress formed a fact finding mission304 to investigate local democracy and situation 
in Sur Municipality, and then it prepared a detailed recommendation to Turkey.305  
 
Despite its continued significance for the DTP, the EU gradually lost its 
position of the primary external support system in the eyes of the DTP. There are 
several reasons for it. The PKK has been on the EU’s terrorist organizations list, and 
European countries demanded that the DTP declared it would cut its links with the 
PKK306, which was seen unacceptable by the party. Parallel to Turkey, the EU’s 
demand from the DTP to denounce PKK terrorism led the party to question the EU’s 
possible contribution to its strategy.307 As a second factor, negotiation process of 
Turkey has lost impetus, and it was not clear that whether Turkey would be a member 
of the EU, since the process has been defined as open-ended in the 2004 European 
Council meeting. The open-endedness of negotiations has not only negatively affected 
Turkish efforts for more democratization; it has decreased the credibility of the EU 
perspective for the DTP. More critically, empowering Kurdish regional autonomous 
                                                 
304See 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1183385&Site=Congress&BackColorInternet=e0cee1&BackColorI
ntranet=e0cee1&BackColorLogged=FFC679  
305 Although the Recommendation 229 does not have any compelling power on Turkey, it is still a 
valuable document since it shows that Turkey needs to undergo a comprehensive process of 
decentralization\devolution. See 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=
1458880&SecMode=1&DocId=1167298&Usage=2           
306 The interview with the ambassador of Germany to Turkey, Milliyet 6 April 2005, available at: 
http://www.milliyet.com/2005/04/06/yazar/idiz.html   
307 DTP MPs have occasionally criticized the EU’s stance on Kurdish question. But, most harsh 
criticisms come from Öcalan, PKK’s leader who has been in prison since 1999. His statements since 
2005 coincide with official view of foreign conspiracy dimension of Kurdish question. For instance, 
Öcalan claims that Kurdish question is a trump card in the hands of Europe. European countries do not 
really want see that Kurdish question is solved; they carry on policies that contribute to the protraction 
of conflictual situation. Europe is an old enemy of Turkey. Turkey has a flawed idea that it thinks to end 
Kurdish question with European assistance. Europeans wanted to use the PKK, but they were refused by 
the PKK. Then Europeans put the PKK on the list of terrorist organizations (Online Gündem, 10 Feb. 
2007).     
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authority in Northern Iraq contributed to revitalization of the ideal of Greater 
Kurdistan308, or at least they have broadened opportunity structure so as to enforce the 
Turkish state to accept Kurdish demands in Turkey.309 
 
Consequently, EU-anchored democratization reforms have brought about an 
unprecedented change in the political system of Turkey.310 Although there are certain 
constraints before pro-Kurdish politics, opportunity structures have been remarkably 
broadened as to include recognition of Kurdish identity and to provide it with a 
number of cultural rights by Turkish state. The EU’s vagueness in terms of offering 
certain solutions to Kurdish question for various reasons may not have eventually 
contradicted with the DTP’s territorial autonomy-based solution. However, the EU’s 
policy that saw the PKK as a terrorist organization was apparently incompatible with 
the DTP’s perspective. While the party supported the EU as an external support 
system, the EU implicitly demanded the DTP turn into a real, institutionalized political 
party that competed for elections. It is clear that this would be only possible through a 
thorough transformation of Turkish political system, which would also mean a radical 
transformation in both Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms.  
                                                 
308 For instance, declarations of Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq regarding the right of Kurds living 
in neighboring countries to self-determination fueled the debate. Barzani, the president of Kurdish 
regional government in Iraq, stated that when the time comes, Kurds in Turkey and Syria would 
normally use their right to self-determination (Hürriyet, 2 Feb. 2007). Pan-Kurdish perspective of 
Kurdish authorities in Iraq were also accompanied by declarations of the DTP representatives 
emphasizing pan-Kurdish solidarity. For instance, against the possibility of Turkish military intervention 
into Kirkuk, the DTP Diyarbakir branch leader declared that any attack on Kirkuk would be tantamount 
to an attack to Diyarbakir (Turkish Daily News, 24 Feb. 2007).  
309 In volatile circumstances of the region, Turkey has gradually changed its policy against Kurdish 
regional government in Northern Iraq which brought about apparent improvement in relations. 
Consequently, Kurdish authorities emphasized the importance of good relations with Turkey by 
gradually playing down Pan-Kurdish dimension of their policies.    
310 Turkish governments have occasionally made declarations about ‘Kurdish reality’ and the 
importance of finding a democratic solution to Kurdish question in terms of Turkey’s EU bid. But until 
recent reforms, none of these declarations had been materialized.  
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7.5. THE INTERPLAY OF TURKISH AND KURDISH NATIONALISMS 
The EU process has made clear not only the unstable, undemocratic dimensions 
of Kurdish nationalism311 but also the inherent tensions and conflicts of official 
nationalism. Democratization reforms compelled the establishment to face up to the 
dilemma. It was either to oppose those reforms in order to maintain status quo. Yet this 
would have probably developed at the expense of annihilating Turkey’s hopes for EU 
accession, thus contradicting with the ultimate goal of Kemalist modernization (i.e. 
becoming an equal member of the Western world, which might correspond to EU 
membership in contemporary circumstances). The alternative road was to support EU 
process in acceptance of a significant departure from status quo. The Kemalist 
establishment has chosen an in-between strategy of stressing the ongoing threat in the 
disguise of democratization rather than supporting a radical rupture from the EU 
project. This choice has unsurprisingly fueled Turkish nationalism that has become 
more and more Euro-sceptic.312 On the other hand, the EU’s political conditionality 
has become an opportunity for the rising AKP in its domestic struggle against the 
establishment. Thus, within the particular context of relations with Europe, Kurdish 
question has remained to be a critical issue that has contributed to the ‘rise of 
nationalisms’ within the negotiation process. In other words, EU reforms have both 
                                                 
311 For undemocratic aspects of Kurdish nationalism see O. İmga, ‘Türkiye’de Kürtler Ne İstiyor?’ 
[What do Kurds want in Turkey?] Birikim, No. 195, (July 2005), pp.71-3. To generalize, Kasaba (1997) 
suggests that Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish nationalist ideologies have an ideological a common point 
that they share a strong intolerance for competing nationalist projects.   
312 Indeed, long-lasting low-intensity war with the PKK, growing concerns about the feasibility of 
assimilation of the Kurds into Turkish national identity, and European pressure about the Kurdish 
question have apparently contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism in the same period. In addition to 
these factors, the end of real socialism, independence of Turkic republics, the rise of ethno-cultural 
identity politics throughout the world, and the emergence of new opportunities for reproduction of 
popular\banal nationalism through consumption and media culture have also fed the revitalization 
process of Turkism in the post-90 period (Bora, 2003: 21).   
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contributed to reinvigoration of Turkish nationalism and influenced the interplay 
between official and Kurdish nationalisms.  
 
While most of the EU-anchored reforms were opposed by the nationalist right 
and left in both the civilian and military establishments, the rhetoric of these critics has 
been marked by resistance to changing the status quo, for fear that this would 
undermine Kemalist republican project. The Kemalist establishment has believed that 
the EU wants to divide and rule Turkey. According to nationalists, except for its 
decidedly pro-EU liberal variant, Turkey should be very cautious in passing potentially 
dangerous reforms as Europe has so far used a human rights discourse to threaten 
Turkey. Moreover, given that ‘Europe’ will never accept Turkey into the EU, the 
negotiation process is considered to be a threat rather than a valuable gain (Tocci, 
2006: 136). Within this context, Kurdish support to Turkey’s EU bid is seen as another 
proof to foreign conspiracy, and Kurdish nationalists and the EU became natural allies 
as they did in the preparation of Sevres Treaty.  
 
In contrary to large sections of the establishment, the AKP has staunchly 
pursued EU-anchored reforms in cultural rights in order to meet Copenhagen criteria. 
As the major actor of anti-establishment bloc, the AKP has given a strong support to 
the EU project not only for the sake of continuation of the project, but also (probably 
more importantly) as an external support system in its struggle against Kemalist 
establishment. Although the AKP’s handling of the issue has not developed free from 
its occasional authoritarian reversals, it has developed and thus far embraced its policy 
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of ‘democratic opening’, which denotes the recognition of Kurdish identity and 
providing the Kurds of Turkey with certain cultural rights.  
 
Accordingly, as part of attempts to democratize national identification, the 
government supported the preparation of a report on the issue, Minority Report, which 
was an attempt initiated and supported by the government to redefine Turkish national 
identity. The Report suggested “Türkiyelilik’ as a politico-territorial name for national 
identification to replace ‘Turkishness’ that has ethnic connotations as well. It was 
severely criticized by the establishment and eventually put on the shelf.313 In time, the 
AKP government has made more openings regarding Kurdish issue such as the 
establishment of TRT 6. On the other hand, the process was not free from ironic 
contradictions. For instance, while the state TV channel (TRT 6) broadcasts in Kurdish 
in 24 hours, attempts to speak in Kurdish by the DTP was severely criticized, and 
Kurdish sentences were recorded as sentences uttered in an ‘unknown language’ in the 
minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The DTP has sought to keep 
Kurdish issue on agenda through legislative proposals such as inclusion of forbidden 
letters of “w, q, and x’ into the alphabet, or restitution of the name of Dersim. In 
addition to legislative activities, the DTP actively engaged in street demonstrations that 
sometimes turned into violent conflicts.  
 
Despite democratic openings regarding the Kurdish issue, both the 
establishment and the AKP continued to criticize the DTP since it did not denounce the 
                                                 
313 For a complete version of the report see Oran, 2004.  
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PKK as a terrorist organization. The AKP has been prone to recognize Kurdish ethnic 
identity whereas the establishment continues its policy that “I am not yet ready to 
officially recognize Kurdish identity” (Yeğen, 2001\2002). As a critical point, the 
dissolution of the DTP by the Constitutional Court 314 with the claim that it supported 
the PKK raised questions about the depth of transformation regarding this long-
standing conflict.  
  
7.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The contentious relationship between sub-state nationalism and nation-state has 
become more intricate within the European integration process that provides a new 
opportunity structure for sub-state nationalist political parties. These parties develop 
and pursue ‘linkage politics’ according to their interpretation of the integration 
process. Although a great majority of these political parties upholds the process, their 
support should not be seen as constant and unconditional. The European integration 
process serves as external support to enrich sub-state nationalist strategies rather than 
unavoidably leading to the transformation of goals of sub-state nationalist parties. It 
also affects the interplay between official nationalism and sub-state nationalism.    
 
                                                 
314 Koğacıoğlu correctly puts forward that the dissolution decision in the case of the HEP (pro-Kurdish 
People’s Labor Party) was not simply a reflex of the constitution per se but rather a dialogical process of 
contesting political power in Turkey. Following the same argument, we can maintain that the case 
against the DTP is also a part of political contestation. Thus, while Kurdish issue has been securitized 
for a long time, the political domain has also been delimited judicially.  Dicle Koğacıoğlu (March 2003) 
‘Constitutional Court in Turkey- Judicial Delimitation of the Political Domain’, International Sociology, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 258-76.  
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The relationship between Turkish nationalism and Kurdish sub-state 
nationalism is not free from the effects of this process. Within the context of Turkish 
modernization, Turkish state and official nationalism as one of core principles of 
Kemalist ideology has viewed Kurdish question as an artificial problem provoked by 
foreign conspiracy. It was not an ethno-political matter; at best, it was a problem of 
socio-economic backwardness and terrorism. In accordance with the aim of creating a 
homogeneous and secular nation, the existence of Kurdish identity was denied and 
repressed. Not surprisingly, political opportunity structures were highly restricted for 
sub-state nationalist politics. Nevertheless, the situation has gradually changed with 
EU-anchored reform process since the Helsinki summit in 1999 when Turkey was 
granted candidacy status. In post-Helsinki period, Turkey has witnessed a process of 
unprecedented reforms some of which were directly or indirectly related to Kurdish 
question. Although the EU has tended to be vague in terms of its suggestions regarding 
a solution, it has seen Kurdish question as a minority rights issue. Therefore, it has 
adopted a rights-based perspective. While it has encouraged Turkey to find an 
alternative solution other than the military one, it has recently demanded the pro-
Kurdish DTP cut off its links with the PKK, which was declared a terrorist 
organization in 2002. However, it proved to be unacceptable by the party. 
Nevertheless, the DTP supported EU integration process as offering an external 
support to broaden opportunity structures. In this sense, the EU perspective kept its 
significance for the DTP, but the EU integration process has not created a 
transformation in the party so that it would denounce PKK’s violent strategy. On the 
other hand, the party articulated self government claims with an individual rights-
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based perspective and a post-industrial agenda, thus enhancing its social democratic 
stance. Nevertheless, it did not amount to the level of an ideological crystallization as 
experienced in the SNP. 
 
On the side of Turkish nationalists, the DTP’s support for Turkey’s EU bid and 
EU’s pressure on Turkey about finding a political solution to Kurdish issue has fueled 
the rise of Turkish nationalism and increasing Euro-sceptism. On the other hand, EU 
project which symbolizes ultimate aim of Kemalist modernization has proved to be not 
easily relinquished.  It is possible to observe remarkable changes regarding recognition 
and cultural expression of Kurdish identity such as the opening of state-sponsored 
TRT-6 and Kurdish language departments in state universities. These changes realized 
by the AKP governments have showed that the party has got initiative against status 
quo oriented elites. They have also recently proved to be elements of the AKP’s 
gradualist strategy in its search of a solution to the Kurdish question rather than 
symbolic steps to satisfy Kurdish electors before elections. It is now more obvious that 
Turkish national identity as defined by Kemalist ideology has been redefined as a part 
of broader process of transformation of Turkish state under the AKP. The AKP sees 
Kurdish question as Turkey’s major problem since it has threatened political and 
economic stability and social peace in the country for decades. At the same time, the 
DTP and now the BDP have been main rivals of the AKP in Southeastern Anatolia. 
Resolution of the Kurdish question would serve the AKP to increase its electoral 
support not only national but also at regional level. Nevertheless, there is no such a 
magical formula. After the DTP’s victory in southeastern Anatolian regions in 2009 
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local elections in 2009315, the AKP has seen it cannot proceed unless it takes Kurdish 
nationalists as an addressee in seeking a solution to the question. On the other hand, 
the party needs to be very careful since it can provoke large sections of its electors who 
have been conditioned for decades to see the question just as a matter of terrorist 
separatism. It is needless to question the AKP’s intimacy about its efforts of finding a 
solution to the Kurdish question. AKP’s pro-islamic stance interwined with ‘neo-
Ottomanism’ may explain its efforts to redefine Turkish national identity. And, this 
stance may eventually lead to a civic nationalism that would be attained from a highly 
particular route. Nonetheless, the problem is that AKP’s Kurdish policy stressing ‘one 
state, one flag, one language’ completely contradicts with ‘democratic autonomy’ 
policy of Kurdish nationalists. A process of decentralization in the form of 
regionalization would serve Turkey’s integration with the EU and at the same time it 
may address Kurdish demands to a certain extent.  
 
Consequently, even EU dimension seems to have lately lost its primary 
significance both for Turkish state and Kurdish nationalists, it has had remarkable 
impacts on both parts. It is clear that Turkey has being experiencing an historic period 
in which many fundamental questions accumulated since the inception of the 
republican regime have now been freely discussed. How or whether they will be 
resolved is a matter of multi-actor political struggle in which nationalist rhetoric are of 
great significance, and several remarkable steps toward a democratic solution to the 
Kurdish question have been taken. Even so, time will tell whether they are substantial 
                                                 
315 2009 local election results have turned to be a tour de force of the DTP in southeastern Anatolia: The 
party took 65.58 % of total votes in Diyarbakır, and its votes reached up to 78.97 % in Hakkari 
province. See www.yerelnet.org.tr  See also Table 8 in Appendices.   
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changes that will lead to a democratically-inclusive conception of national identity and 
a plural democracy.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Sub-state nationalism has become one of the most remarkable political forces 
in the contemporary world, especially in the European context. The European 
integration process, together with the processes of globalization, have significantly 
contributed to the rise of sub-state nationalism. In this process, the opportunity 
structures that determine the resources for and constraints on sub-state nationalist 
political activism have been reshaped, mainly due to the transformation of the nation-
state and the emergence of new channels for regional assertiveness that are also 
utilized by sub-state nationalist political actors. Sub-state nationalist actors, 
specifically political parties, have found the process of European integration highly 
supportive   for their purposes. It has not only eroded the host states that are their main 
rivals in the nationalist struggle, but it has also been promising to rebuild European 
political structure.  
 
Therefore, almost all sub-state nationalist parties have adopted a pro-European 
stance, and have reformulated their discourse and identity in accordance with their 
programmatic and practical efforts to make use of the new opportunity structures. 
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More critically, they have come to frame their ultimate goals in European terms, either 
as a ‘Europe of the regions’ or ‘independence in Europe’. As a result, the European 
integration process has brought about remarkable impacts on sub-state nationalist 
political parties.   
 
Within this framework, this dissertation has set out to discover the impacts of 
the European integration process on Kurdish sub-state nationalism in Turkey, while the 
Turkish state has been undergoing an unprecedented transformation in pursuit of its 
EU bid. Since the comprehension of a single case is linked to the understanding of 
many cases, a comparative study was called for in order to increase the possibility of 
explaining these impacts in a more reliable way. At the same time, a comparison of 
cases from highly different contexts would contribute to responding to the broader 
question of what happens to sub-state nationalism within the European integration 
process. For this purpose, besides the Kurdish case, the Scottish and Basque examples 
have been explored. Specifically, the study has focused on the SNP, the PNV and the 
DTP, as the major political parties of Scottish, Basque and Kurdish nationalisms, in 
order to understand the impacts of European integration on their national identity 
construction, ideological stance, goals and strategies.   
 
In doing this, the political approach to nationalism has theoretically 
underpinned the study, meaning that, without neglecting the fact that nationalism has a 
psychological dimension, its political and ideological aspects have been stressed. 
While the political dimension has enabled us see nationalism as ‘a form of politics’ 
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among various elites competing to control or maintain economic and political power 
that primarily resides with the nation-state in modern times, its ideological aspect has 
explained how nationalist ideology is used to legitimize and reproduce existing nation-
state structure and prevalent national identities, as well as sub-state nationalist 
demands. In contrast to culturalist approaches, this perspective sheds light on the 
dynamic nature of sub-state nationalism, depending on the maintenance of power and 
power shifts between different social and political groups in a society. Within this 
perspective, the emergence and development of a sub-state nationalism that challenges 
the existing nation-state structure and hegemonic definition of national identity has 
been explained on the basis of the conflict of identity and interests.  
 
The political approach has also enabled comprehension of the ‘ethnicness’ of 
sub-state nationalism from a broader perspective. Sub-state nationalism is 
oppositional, and generally referred to as ethnic nationalism. This study has argued 
that, although the politicization of ethno-cultural distinctiveness based upon the belief 
in a common ethnic origin and a sense of shared ethno-history is essential to sub-state 
nationalism, this is not unique to sub-state nationalism. Nationalism is necessarily 
related to ethnicity because it provides a historical pedigree to national identity. In this 
respect, established nation-states cannot be seen as ethno-culturally free; civic and 
ethnic conceptions of nation are actually two ends of a continuum. Therefore, unless 
they are seen as mutually exclusive categories (‘false opposites’), the ethnic-civic 
distinction still has analytical significance since it plays a role in the construction of 
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nationalist discourses and in the struggle between state and sub-state nationalisms. 
This study has shown how these two conceptions are used in the nationalist struggle.   
 
 The political approach to nationalism has provided a general explanation but it 
had to be complemented by a more specific analytical structure, considering the fact 
that each case is embedded in a particular context. For this purpose, the opportunity 
structure approach has provided an articulated conceptual framework that allows us to 
analyze each case within a general schema in order to define the similarities and 
differences among the three cases. As a combination of internal and external factors 
shaping resources for and constraints on sub-state nationalist politics, the opportunity 
structures have enabled us to comprehend the nature and dynamics of each case in 
interaction with its host state and its nationalism. Clarifying the interrelationship 
between sub-state nationalism and its host state, made it easier to analyze the impacts 
of European integration on each case. In addition, the opportunity structure approach 
has provided a more balanced perspective regarding agency and structure.   
 
Having Chapter 3 outlined the various dimensions and elements of opportunity 
structures, Chapter 4 argued that European integration did not bring about either the 
end of nationalism or the nation-state, contrary to expectations. While nation-states 
still persist, nationalism has not declined, but has instead proliferated during the 
process of integration. Due to the transformation of the nation-state and the new 
channels of influence for sub-state nationalist politics, sub-state nationalist forces have 
gained new opportunities against their host states. Nevertheless, high expectations 
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about integration have proved to be exaggerated so far, since nation-states continue to 
be the masters of EU treaties, and the EU is still far from becoming a political union.  
  
After this brief review of the theoretical chapters, I would now like to 
summarize, from various perspectives, the main findings of this study’s three-case 
comparison.   
 
8.1. EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUB-STATE NATIONALISMS  
Our research shows that the particular context into which sub-state nationalism 
is born does not only influence the way it emerges, it also informs the limits of 
opportunity structures for sub-state nationalist political struggle and the strategies it 
can make use of. The fate of sub-state nationalism is shaped by a complex interaction 
of the processes of modernization, the capability of sub-state nationalist forces, the 
structure and reactions of its host state, the content and practices of the state 
nationalism, as well as by international and fomenting factors.  
 
Within this framework, the Scottish, Basque and Kurdish nationalisms have 
followed markedly different historical trajectories. Scottish nationalism flourished as a 
Home Rule movement that sought self-government within the borders of the union 
against the centralization which had adversely affected the autonomous institutions 
protected by the Union Act of 1707. This was then oriented through the SNP towards 
independence, on the basis of questioning the advantages of being a part of the UK. 
Basque nationalism emerged in one of the most developed regions of Spain as a 
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reaction to the threatening effects of rapid modernization on traditional Basque society. 
The emergence of Kurdish nationalism followed the most traditional way, in the sense 
it appeared and developed against state- and nation-building processes carried out by 
the Turkish state that threatened Kurdish collective identity and interests.  
 
While nationalism in Britain has not been a strong political force compared 
with its counterparts in continental Europe, Spanish nationalism was never able to 
develop the power to force an alignment of political and cultural units, given that the 
peripheral regions of the Basque Country and Catalonia had led Spanish 
modernization. The British state was founded as a marriage of convenience, and has 
never repressed Scottish identity except for the suppression of early Jacobite risings in 
Northern Scotland. In contrast, with the Franco dictatorship, Spanish nationalism 
obviously gained a brutal character regarding ethno-territorial and linguistic diversity. 
In the Turkish case, in accordance with the aim of creating a homogeneous and secular 
nation, nationalism assumed a critical role in top-down Turkish modernization. 
Therefore, the existence of Kurdish identity was denied and repressed. Thus, unlike 
Scottish identities, Basque and Kurdish identities have been threatened by central 
governments. Within this context, the British state never bothered to label the state as 
the ‘Union of Four Nations’, but Spanish state policies oscillated between repressing 
ethno-cultural diversity and providing ethno-cultural groups with a wide range of 
autonomy; the Turkish state has, until recently, strictly denied the existence of 
different ethno-cultural groups.  
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Therefore, the opportunity structures for each sub-state nationalism have varied 
remarkably. Just as the British state structure and strong civil society tradition 
provided highly favorable conditions for Scottish sub-state nationalism, so too was 
Basque nationalism able to find wide opportunities before and after Franco period. In 
Turkey, however, until recently, any political means to the expression and organization 
of the Kurdish sub-national identity remained closed.    
 
Scottish sub-state nationalism developed as a Home rule movement aiming at 
self-government for Scotland. However, the lack of state repression meant that the 
SNP failed to increase its electoral support until the early 1970s. Compared to its 
Basque counterpart, the SNP did not heavily play on culture, history and tradition. In 
fact, these elements were almost taken for granted, due to the fact that Scottish national 
identity could be maintained thanks to the ‘Holy Trinity’.  
 
In a completely different way, having been born as a reaction to the 
consequences of rapid modernization processes, Arana, as the founder and ideologue 
of the PNV, provided the party with a racist, traditionalist, extreme-Catholic identity 
with independentist aspirations. By using various methods of the ‘invention of 
tradition’, Arana created a history, name and flag for the Basque Country, although it 
had never actually been a homogeneous and united entity in terms of its territory, 
language, culture or economy. Arana’s PNV defended a clear division of Basque 
society into Basques and non-Basques on ethnic, cultural and moral grounds. 
According to him, Basque society was severely endangered by Hispanization, and the 
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solution was the establishment of an independent Basque Country. This goal was to be 
achieved through non-violent methods. By abandoning its original racist definition of 
Basque identity, the PNV gradually transformed itself into a center-right Christian 
democrat party pursuing an ambivalently defined goal of co-sovereignty. However, the 
Franco years not only led to the establishment of ETA as a split from the PNV, they 
also served to deepen the Basque and non-Basque distinction in the eyes of all Basque 
nationalists. Therefore, Basque society has remained a society that is largely divided 
according to national identification.   
 
Although Kurdish nationalism dates back to the 19th century, it became 
politically significant in the 1980s when the PKK started its violent nationalist 
campaign inspired by Third World national liberation movements. Expansion of 
Kurdish nationalism to the party political level occurred in the 1990s. Even though 
Kurdish sub-state nationalist parties were not the political wings of the PKK, they have 
some relationship to the group. In this sense, the link with, or at least their non-
condemnation of political violence, has differentiated these parties from the SNP and 
the PNV. One of the PKK-linked political parties, the DTP, stressed the ethno-cultural 
and historical boundary markers of Kurdishness, and, as with the Basque case, 
language has played a significant role in the boundary-making of Kurdish identity. 
However, unlike the PNV, which has sustained the Basque and non-Basque 
distinction, the DTP, as a modernist, left-wing political party, has defended the 
continuing unity of Turks and Kurds on the basis of demanding equal rights and 
freedoms for all ethno-cultural groups and citizens. In a similar way with the SNP that 
 338
underlined egalitarian people of Scotland myth against neo-liberal policies the British 
governments rather than anti-English sentiments, the DTP has stressed and struggled 
against what it sees as the generally anti-democratic character of the Turkish state 
rather than anti-Turkish sentiments. 
 
In justifying sub-national demands, all the parties investigated here use both 
normative and practical arguments. While normative claims are related to cultural and 
historical distinctiveness in all cases, emancipation from an oppressive alien state are 
more common in the PNV and DTP cases.  These two cases offer a more complex 
picture due to, not only the existing violence, but also to the trans-stateness of the 
Basque and Kurdish nationalisms. While the boundaries of Scottish territory are clear, 
Basque nationalists claim a seven-region territory as the historical Basque territory that 
they aspire to unify. The territorial boundaries of the claimed Kurdish homeland, 
spanning at least four established nation-states, are even more unclear.  
 
In all three cases, it is clear that grievances are emphasized, but that practical 
arguments such as effective government are more obvious in the Scottish case 
compared with the emphasis on past grievances in the Basque and Kurdish cases.   
 
8.2. IDEOLOGIES, GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
Our exploration of the three cases through the SNP, the PNV and the DTP 
prove that nationalism can be articulated to different political ideologies. While the 
SNP and the DTP are located on the left of the political spectrum, the PNV is a center-
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right Christian democrat party. However, each party’s ideological stance is not 
correlated with their vision of European integration. The SNP, as a left-wing sub-state 
nationalist political party, favors an intergovernmental Europe with a degree of 
supranational powers; the PNV supports an ambiguous ‘Europe of the Regions’ project 
that is backed by many sub-state nationalist and regionalist parties from both left and 
right wings of the political spectrum; the DTP is in favor of a more egalitarian, 
internationalist European integration on the basis of a ‘Europe of the Peoples’.  
 
In terms of ultimate goals, the SNP wants an independent Scottish state. In this 
sense, it is the only sub-state nationalist party in the European context that explicitly 
pursues independence. As an independent party, constitutional politics, questions of 
sovereignty and power constitute the essence of the politics of the SNP. In accordance 
with its ‘Europe of the Regions’ ideal, the PNV seeks to achieve a kind of free 
association with the Spanish state. Falling just one step short of a fully independent 
state, this goal can also be seen as a gradualist strategy. Compared to the others, the 
DTP’s goal of democratic autonomy can be seen relatively moderate. This can be 
explained through both the highly restrictive opportunity structures for sub-state 
nationalist politics in Turkey and also the gradualist strategy of Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey.  
 
 Regarding the parties’ political strategies to achieve their aims, the SNP, as the 
major political force of Scottish nationalism, follows an electoral strategy. Recently, 
following a referendum supporting independence, it has aimed at negotiating the 
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conditions of secession with the central government in London. Since 2007, the SNP 
has headed the minority government in Scotland. Like the SNP, the PNV also rejects 
violent methods. Until the remarkable Basque elections in 2009, when Spanish 
Socialists and Conservatives took over the government, the PNV has formed all 
Basque governments since the 1979 elections. However, unlike the Scottish case, not 
all actors of Basque nationalism have stuck to constitutional methods. ETA, which 
split from the PNV in the late 1960s, has resorted to a violent strategy in order to attain 
an independent Basque state. The role of violent strategies is much more obvious in 
Kurdish nationalism, which is to a great extent monopolized by the PKK and PKK-
linked political parties. Although the DTP was not engaged in a violent campaign 
against the Turkish state, it has never accepted calls from the Turkish and EU 
authorities to condemn the PKK’s violent strategy.   
 
At this point, one should underline the fact that state violence, both in Spain 
during the Franco period and in Turkey especially after the 1980 military coup, played 
a key role in the emergence of political organizations adopting violence as the main 
political strategy against their host states. ETA in Spain, and the PKK in Turkey, 
appeared with the claim of national liberation against the ‘oppressive alien state’. In 
this regard, one can argue that sub-state nationalism becomes tougher under state 
repression because it increases the legitimacy of violent methods and fosters 
opportunities for mass mobilization. The interesting point about the Basque case is that 
ETA has continued its violent campaign against civil and official targets even after the 
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Spanish state provided the Basque Autonomous Community with a wide range of 
political autonomy.  
 
8.3. OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES IN COMPARISON 
 Sub-state nationalisms are challenging nation-states in various European 
countries, such as Spain, the UK, France and Belgium. While the UK has been 
confronted by Irish, Welsh and Scottish nationalisms, the Spanish state has been 
troubled by strong sub-state nationalist forces, especially in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. In response, these states have tried to democratically accommodate those 
challenges through specific policies. Thus, they have aimed at maintaining national 
unity within the existing national territorial boundaries. These host states’ use of 
democratic methods has required recognition of those ethno-cultural groups, and their 
recognition necessarily has brought about the devolution of a range of powers to those 
groups through various formulations that have taken shape through conflict and 
competition of nationalist politics. The policies of accommodation have, not 
unexpectedly, affected the opportunity structures which are essential to understand 
sub-state nationalist politics. In this regard, British and Spanish policies of 
accommodation provided broad opportunity structures to the SNP and the PNV, in 
contrast to the DTP case in Turkey. This accommodation was seen in the British state, 
with the 1997 devolutionary act, and the Spanish state during the transition to 
democracy.   
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Devolutionary processes in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales meant 
territorial a restructuring of the UK that carried significant implications for the political 
system in a general sense. The UK was a highly centralized unitary state until the 
devolution referendums, but it has now become a ‘regionalized unitary state’, in which 
Scotland has strengthened its distinctive place as a devolved unit. The Scotland Act of 
1998 re-constituted the Scottish Parliament, which has a historic significance, 
especially for Scottish nationalists. With the Scotland Act, the Scottish Parliament (or, 
Holyrood) obtained legislative competences over a wide range of ‘devolved matters’. 
Thus, there is no doubt that devolution has redefined opportunity structures in Scottish 
politics, and all political parties have been faced with a new set of challenges, 
problems and opportunities. While the Scottish branches of national parties have 
become more sensitive to Scottish interests, sub-state nationalist parties have found 
that the electoral system allows them to win more seats and strengthen their positions 
in the devolved parliaments or assemblies, thanks to proportional representation. In 
practice, the party system is today no longer a two-party, either in Scotland or in 
Wales. In Scotland, the SNP acts as the third party in the system, as has been proved 
three times with the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections. More crucially, the Scottish 
Parliament and Executive have provided not only a large measure of self-government 
for Scotland, but also a forum for Scottish political expression and an institutional 
vehicle to pressure and bargain with the British center.  
 
Similarly to the British context, the Spanish context now also offers highly 
favorable conditions to sub-state nationalist politics as a consequence of the 
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democratic accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity. By establishing a ‘regionalized 
state’ through the Autonomous Communities System, the 1978 Constitution 
guaranteed nationalities and regions the right to autonomy. Specifically, the 1979 
Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Community redefined opportunity structures for all 
political actors in the Basque Country. By reestablishing the lost Basque autonomy 
under new circumstances, the Statute of Autonomy provided Basque people with self-
government. It meant that the people of the Basque Country were recognized as a 
nationality. On the basis of foral (historical) rights, the Basque Autonomous 
Community was provided with a wide range of political, economic and cultural 
autonomies, which included political organs (the Basque Parliament and government) 
with wide competences to develop its own policies, its own public administration with 
a decision-making capacity, an autonomous police force (Ertzaintza), a high degree of 
fiscal autonomy (Concierto Económico), and the recognition of the co-official status of 
the Basque flag, anthem and language along with the Spanish national identity 
boundary markers.  
 
 Compared with the SNP and the PNV, the DTP has experienced highly 
restrictive opportunity structures in which regional or ethnicity-based politics have 
been banned, even if there has been no support for violence, whether in discourse or 
action. Turkey’s national ten per cent electoral threshold has effectively meant the 
non-representation of pro-Kurdish political parties in the Turkish Parliament despite 
their ability to win clear majorities of votes in the Southeast of Turkey. Kurdish sub-
state nationalist parties have been successively banned by the Turkish Constitutional 
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Court, mainly on the grounds that they acted against the unity of the state with its 
nation and territory by supporting terrorist activities. Besides these state-level factors, 
opportunity structures for the DTP have been limited by internal factors. Intra-party 
cleavages and its links with the PKK have also restricted its room for maneuver.  
 
Intra-party cleavages have not only harmed the DTP, but have affected all three 
political parties in question here. While the PNV has experienced two big splits, in 
1959 and then 1986, that eroded the party each time, the SNP has suffered tension 
between fundamentalist and gradualist camps within the party. Nevertheless, they were 
both able to overcome these critical difficulties, and maintain, or even enhance, their 
well-established, institutionalized structures with organization capacity, leadership, 
human and financial resources. On the other hand, the DTP suffered from being a 
movement party that was a coalition of political activists who disagree on the correct 
solutions to the Kurdish question and the best political strategies to pursue. The party 
existed as an alliance of ‘doves and hawks’. This intra-party cleavage essentially 
prevented the party from forming a complete, stable, collective ‘preference schedule’. 
Furthermore, because it has not transformed itself into an institutionalized political 
party it has been able to follow a dual track activism, by combining activities within 
the arenas of formal democratic competition with extra-institutional mobilization. It 
has become commonplace to witness that legislators of the DTP debate bills in 
parliamentary committees one day, but the next day, they participate in disruptive 
demonstrations.  
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In terms of fomenting factors that also condition opportunity structures, the 
SNP was positively affected by the discovery of North Oil, which increased the 
viability of Scottish independence. On the other hand, state violence to repress Basque 
and Kurdish ethnic identities has not only supported the idea of the host states as alien 
forces, has also stimulated the mass mobilization of citizens with sub-state nationalist 
motives.  
 
8.4. IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURES  
This study proves that the European integration process has significantly 
affected the opportunity structures available to each sub-state nationalist party. In a 
general sense, the EU’s impact has occurred through the transformation of the nation-
state and the emergence of new channels for regional influence that have been utilized 
also by sub-state nationalist forces. Specifically, the particular context of each case has 
predictably shaped the way the this impact has been experienced. 
 
The British accession to the EC and the devolutionary process that was induced 
by the EU’s regionalist perspective led to the transformation of the British state in 
favor of a Europeanized political structure and a remarkable decentralization process. 
Besides the state-level change, the SNP gained new resources at a European level to 
further its nationalist goals. Scottish interests about EU-related matters, whether in 
Britain or in the EU, are represented in various ways. The Scottish Government, which 
is responsible for the implementation of EU legislation and obligations into Scottish 
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law, is involved in decision-making on those EU matters that are related to devolved 
issues. Within the limits framed by the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Government 
also has a direct presence in Europe through the EU Office. Scotland is also 
represented in the EP with seven members, in the CoR with four members, and in the 
Economic and Social Committee with two members. In addition to these governmental 
channels, Scotland Europa, a partnership of public, private and voluntary bodies, 
stands as an influential organization to further Scottish interests in the EU.  
 
Within the process of integration, Scottish governments have carried out active 
paradiplomatic political activism. As well as the establishment of Scotland House, 
interregional cooperations with various regions from other European countries have 
been signed. The SNP has obviously associated the aim of raising Scotland’s status as 
a nation with the ability to take full advantage of European opportunities. For this 
purpose, boosting tourism, strengthening trade links and best practice exchange in 
anything from education to environment are presented by the SNP as chances, not only 
to increase Scottish welfare, but also Scotland’s profile as a European nation. The SNP 
has also sought to increase the credibility of its ‘independence in Europe’ policy by 
frequently stating how vital the EU is for Scottish people by stressing the importance 
of the structural funds and continued participation in the European Single Market. 
Apart from its deeds in the Scottish Government, the SNP, as a political party 
especially, has sought to make use of European Parliament elections and the EFA in 
order to enhance its recognition and legitimacy at an EU level. While European 
elections are used as occasions to increase mass mobilization in favor of 
 347
‘independence in Europe’, the alliance with other EFA members is used as support for 
the independence of Scotland as a ‘stateless people’.  
  
Unlike the British context, regionalization in Spain preceded European 
membership. During the transition to democracy after the Franco dictatorship, the 
Spanish elites restructured the state in accordance with the ethno-cultural plurality of 
the country. Having underpinned the emerging Spanish democracy, this 
regionalization of Spain’s political structure not only helped secure political stability, 
but also accession to the EC. In turn, EU membership has contributed remarkably to 
the transformation of the Spanish state. Similarly to the SNP, the meaning of European 
integration for the PNV has been the emergence of new EU-wide policies with funds, 
chances to make cross-regional cooperation and to increase political profile through 
EP level representation, and paradiplomatic activities. Within this process, the PNV 
was able to acquire a growing role in EU affairs, in particular, and international affairs 
in general. The general principle of subsidiarity adopted for a more democratic Europe, 
the principle of partnership in the planning and implementation of common regional 
policy, the CoR, and inter-regional cooperations have all reflected the relatively wide 
extent of the new opportunities available for the PNV’s sub-state nationalism. 
 
In marked contrast to the British and Spanish contexts, the relative broadening 
of opportunity structures for the DTP has owed much to the European integration 
process. This process was embraced by the AKP government, especially in its first 
term, as a way to challenge the Kemalist establishment, and the resulting 
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democratization reforms to meet the Copenhagen Criteria have played a major role in 
the transformation of the Turkish state into a more democratic political structure. 
Nevertheless, although the political reforms improved Kurdish cultural rights, this 
transformation did not amount to a political-administrative restructuring of the 
country. The Turkish state remains a firmly unitary, centralized state. Within this 
context, the DTP has legitimized its democratic autonomy project on both normative 
and practical grounds. The party has justified democratic autonomy as the most 
rational way to achieve effective governance, and has presented it as a fundamental 
reform project to create strong local governments. Actually, decentralization of 
administrative structure is a goal shared by different sections of society. However, as a 
sub-state nationalist party, the DTP’s normative arguments around the self-government 
of Kurdish people have always made it clear that the DTP’s proposals imply much 
more than local government reform. Kurdish demands for political autonomy have not 
only provoked secession debates; they have been also used by the center to justify 
retaining a centralized political structure. Within this context, any European calls for 
Kurdish cultural rights, or even administrative decentralization, have been considered 
as serving Kurdish nationalist interests.  
 
8.5. EUROPEAN IMPACT ON THE SNP, THE PNV AND THE DTP 
     This study shows that the SNP, the PNV and the DTP all support the EU 
integration process for a set of common and particular reasons. First, they all give 
support to the process since it provides them with new opportunity structures in their 
‘nationalist causes’ against their host states. At the same time, European integration 
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has had specific impacts on each party, which can be seen through the common criteria 
applied for comparison in this study.   
 
The comparative analysis of the SNP, the PNV and the DTP has shown that the 
way sub-state nationalist parties construct their collective identities and formulate their 
ultimate goals is influenced by the process of European integration to varying degrees. 
This impact is most obvious in the first two cases. The SNP and the PNV make use of 
European integration as a boundary marker of their collective identities. At the same 
time, they aim to achieve their aim of self-government within the framework of the 
EU. Thus, the SNP presents a pro-European stance in order to distinguish itself from 
traditionally Euro-skeptic Britain, with the Scottish nation portrayed as one of the 
stateless nations that will get what it deserves through the integration process. The 
SNP believes that Scottish statehood is still appealing, and it overtly pursues an 
independent statehood within the intergovernmental European political structure.  
 
Compared with the SNP, the European impact on the PNV’s policies is much 
older, considering that it declared its support for European integration just after the 
Second World War, parallel to its gradual transformation into a Christian democrat 
party. With the Spanish transition to democracy and accelerating European integration, 
this impact has become more noticeable. Like the SNP, the PNV claims to represent a 
stateless European nation, and it favors co-sovereignty with the Spanish state within a 
‘Europe of the Regions’.  
 
 350
As a sub-state nationalist party, the DTP has also developed a positive linkage 
with the ongoing European integration process. However, besides a historical, 
geographical and cultural distance to Europe that is even more profound than that of its 
host state (and whose Europeanness is also a matter of hot debate), highly restrictive 
opportunity structures have prevented the DTP from developing a deep-rooted 
European perspective in its policy formulations. Regarding the broad opportunity 
structures of various sub-national units, including Scotland and the Basque Country, 
the DTP considers that the European integration process might serve Kurdish interests 
through affecting the democratization process in Turkey. The DTP does not place a 
special emphasis on linking Kurdish and European identities. Instead, in accordance 
with its left-wing ideological stance, it envisions a ‘Europe of Peoples’ in which all 
peoples (which can be read as ‘nations’) will be free on an egalitarian basis.  
 
Thus, each party’s vision of the Europe of the future depends on a set of 
particular factors, namely their opportunity structures, their ultimate goals and 
ideological positions, their choice of political strategies and their conception of the 
nation. Therefore, their support for the European integration process does not 
necessarily mean that they are content with the existing form of the EU and share the 
same vision about the question of the finalité of European integration.  
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8.6. TRANSFORMATION OF ULTIMATE GOALS IN SUB-STATE 
NATIONALIST POLITICS?   
Against the neo-nationalist arguments that sub-state nationalism is no longer 
state-seeking within the integration process, the comparison of the three cases show 
that independent statehood still matters in terms of sub-state nationalist goals. Due to 
the integrative processes, especially within the European context, the nation-state 
structure has undergone a significant transformation as a consequence of the 
reinterpretation of sovereignty and territoriality. In this regard, sub-state nationalism 
finds favorable circumstances compared with the pre-integration period. Accordingly, 
the SNP, the PNV and the DTP all support the integration process; their formulations 
of ultimate goals clearly indicate that the integration process has become an essential 
element in sub-state nationalist calculations.  
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that sub-state nationalist parties have 
totally relinquished the ideal of independent statehood. The attraction of statehood is 
still great since power still lies predominantly with the state that officially represents a 
nation. The nation-state model continues to have the great attraction of combining a 
nation-based identity and interests with the idea of being ‘masters of ourselves’. In 
addition, the international political system that is based on the sovereign rights of 
independent states frequently reminds us of the importance of independent statehood, 
especially when the political or economic interests of the host state conflict with a sub-
national unit.   
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The dominance of the political scene by nation-states is also observable within 
the context of European integration. It is true that European integration is favorable for 
sub-state nationalist actors, but they face significant limitations within an evolving 
integration process that is overwhelmingly shaped by the nation-states. This study’s 
comparative examination of opportunity structures shows that, even in the most 
devolved structures of Spain and Britain, the success of the PNV and the SNP to 
expand their political competences has been limited, especially in terms of engaging in 
EU affairs as distinct political entities, since their host states continue to have the final 
word on EU affairs. The EU offers these parties new channels of influence on its own 
policies, yet only with the consent and cooperation of the Spanish and British central 
governments. In this sense, contrary to their hopes, it has been impossible for these 
parties to transform the Basque Delegation or the Scottish Office in Brussels into 
embassies. Meanwhile, unable to make use of the many new channels of influence 
restricted to the EU member states, the DTP’s expressed expectations have remained 
limited to a devolutionary process in Turkey through the effect of the Europeanization 
process.  
 
In fact, many sub-state nationalist parties have been disappointed by the course 
of integration since they expected that the CoR would evolve into a second chamber of 
the European Parliament, and that the European Constitutional Treaty would recognize 
the right of self-determination to stateless nations. It has gradually become clear that 
nation-states are persisting within the integration process. Nevertheless, the SNP, the 
PNV and the DTP continue to view the EU as an external support system. They 
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consider the transformation of the state and the emergence of new channels of 
influence within the European integration process contribute to the widening of 
opportunity structures despite the EU impact is seen insufficient in general.   Besides 
this point, one should point out that, parallel to the gradually fading prospects of 
Turkish EU membership, the reluctance of the Turkish state to make reforms during 
the open-ended negotiation process, and the insistence of the EU authorities that the 
DTP condemn PKK violence, references by the DTP to the European integration 
process have decreased dramatically. 
 
 This suggests that the sub-nationalists’ continued support for the integration 
process does not automatically mean that the ultimate goals of sub-state nationalist 
parties have been transformed so that they now formulate their ultimate political goals 
as less than independent statehood. In many cases, nation and statehood are still 
considered highly correlated. The SNP, for example, clearly declares that it is pursuing 
an independent Scottish state with EU membership. In this regard, it has reformulated 
its ultimate goal to include the European dimension, but it has retained its 
independence ideal.  
 
On the basis of the idea of limited sovereignty and subsidiarity that are seen as 
constitutive principles of ongoing European integration, the PNV has offered a new 
idea of sovereignty based on the notion of having access to power, rather than 
possessing absolute power within a specifically bounded territory. On other hand, it 
emphasizes the right to self-determination for the self-realization of the Basque people. 
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Even though this right does not necessarily amount to independence, the demand for it 
reflects the fact that the PNV has modified its ultimate goal through new formulations, 
albeit while still retaining, ambivalently, its aspiration for an independent Euskadi.   
  
 Regarding the Kurdish case, the DTP has stressed a democratic autonomy that 
seems to be a kind of federalist reorganization of the political structure in Turkey. 
However, the DTP has also occasionally stated that Kurds in Turkey and other 
neighboring countries have the right to self-determination.    
 
Consequently, it is not as easy as it seems to make any precise generalizations 
about the transformation of the ultimate goals of sub-nationalist parties within the 
European integration process. While the SNP’s declared aim of independence can be 
seen as a trump card in order to get more from the center, the ambiguity regarding the 
ultimate goals of the PNV and the DTP can be viewed as a reflection of their gradualist 
strategies. Nevertheless, our study emphasizes that independent statehood matters for 
all of the three cases investigated here, whether due to practical or normative reasons 
in the politics of nationalism.  
 
Support for this ideal among the ethno-cultural groups that these parties claim 
to represent, and the feasibility of the independence option are other important issues. 
Both in the Scottish and Basque cases, public opinion surveys reveal that democratic 
accommodation of sub-state nationalist demands by the host states have enhanced 
people’s dual identities. However, popular support for secession is very low in all of 
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the three cases, including the most polarized Basque case. The secession option is not 
supported by the EU either. Despite the inclusion of European integration into sub-
state nationalist calculations, sub-state nationalisms are seen as national questions. 
Therefore, the EU’s impact may be at best one of imposing a more democratic 
accommodation of these demands on member or candidate countries. The EU does not 
intentionally support sub-state nationalist parties, but these parties make use of the 
integration process. Nevertheless, this does not mean that no new independent nation-
states will eventually emerge within the EU, as achieving independent statehood is, in 
the end, a matter of power politics.  
    
 
As a final point, it can be seen that neither devolutionary processes nor EU 
membership are able to end sub-state nationalist aspirations. Rather, they reshape the 
interaction between sub-state nationalist political parties and their host states under 
new circumstances. Nationalism is not a force that is consumed in the integration 
process; rather, it successfully reproduces itself in different forms. Sub-state 
nationalism, as a form of nationalism itself, proves this claim. That is, as an 
oppositional form of nationalism, sub-state nationalism enhances the idea of the 
nation-state as a norm of political association, as well as contributing to the widespread 
adherence to nationalist ideology. So long as national identity remains always open to 
debate, there seems to be no end to nationalist politics, at least in the near future.  
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TABLE 1: SNP'S  ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE                                       
ELECTION 
PERCENTAGE 
OF SCOTTISH 
VOTE SEATS WON 
1935 General Election 1.1%  0 Seats 
1974 General Election (Oct.) (1) 30.4 %  11 seats 
1979 General Election (2) 17.3 %  2 Seats 
1983 General election 11.7 %  2 seats 
1987 General election 14.0 % 3 seats  
1992 General Election 21.5 % 3 seats  
1997 General Election 22.1 %  6 seats 
2001 General Election 20.1 % 5 seats 
2005 General election 17.7 %  6 seats 
2010 General election 19.9 %  6 seats 
      
1979 European Parliament Election 19.4 %  1 seat 
1984 European Parliament Election 17.8 % 1 seat 
1989 European Parliament Election 25.6 % 1 seat 
1994 European Parliament Election 32.6 %  2 seats 
1999 European Parliament Election 27.2 %  2 seats 
2004 European Parliament Election 19.7 % 2 seats 
2009 European Parliament Election 
(3) 29.1 %  2 seats 
      
1999 Scottish Parliament Election (4) 28.7 % 35 seats (including 7 first past the post seats) 
2003 Scottish Parliament Election 23.8 % 27 (including 9 first past the post seats) 
2007 Scottish Parliament Election (5) 32.9 %  47 (including 21 first past the post seats) 
      
2007 Council Areas Election (6) 29.7 (of seats)  363 seats                                                             
 
SOURCES:  
http://www.election.co.uk/   
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/msp/elections/index.htm     
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NOTES ON TABLE 1: THE SNP'S ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE 
 
1) High watermark until 2007 
2) Poor performance compared to 1979 October election. With "no" in 1979 
devolution referendum, it contributed to the intra-party conflict during the 1980s.  
3) The first EP Election in which the SNP won the most votes in Scotland.  
4) First election to the re-constituted Scottish Parliament. Finished second to Labour 
and became the official opposition to the coalition of Labour and Liberal Democrats. 
5) Largest party in the Scottish Parliament. It formed the government.  
6) Largest party in local government. 
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TABLE 2: Trends in Moreno National Identity in Scotland (in %) 
  1997 1999 2001 2003 
Scottish not British 23 32 36 31 
More Scottish than British 38 35 30 34 
Equally Scottish and British 27 22 24 22 
More British than Scottish 4 3 3 4 
British not Scottish 4 4 3 4 
Sources: British Social Attitudes Survey, Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, ESRC 
Surveys 
Available at: 
http://www.devolution.ac.uk/Final%20Conf/Devolution%20public%20attitudes.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: Moreno Identities and Constitutional Preferences in Scotland 2003.  
Constitutional 
Preferences 
in Scotland  
Scottish 
not 
British  
More 
Scottish 
than 
British  
Equally 
Scottish 
and 
British  
More 
British 
than 
Scottish  
British 
not 
Scottish  
Independence  47 22 8 5 10 
Devolution  41 63 62 66 68 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, Times Survey 
Available at: 
http://www.devolution.ac.uk/Final%20Conf/Devolution%20public%20attitudes.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Trends in Moreno National Identity in England (in %) 
  1997 1999 2001 2003 
English not British 7 17 17 17 
More English than British 17 15 13 19 
Equally English and British 45 34 42 31 
More British than English 14 11 9 13 
British not English 9 14 11 10 
Sources: British Social Attitudes Survey, Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, ESRC 
Surveys 
Available at: 
http://www.devolution.ac.uk/Final%20Conf/Devolution%20public%20attitudes.pdf 
 
 
 382
TABLE 5: PNV'S  ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE 
 
ELECTION PERCENTAGE OF VOTE SEATS WON 
1977 General Election 1.6 % 8 
1979 General Election 1.5 % 7 
1982 General Election 1.9 % 8 
1986 General Election 1.5 %  6 
1989 General Election 1.2 %  5 
1993 General Election 1.2 % 5 
1996 General Election 1.3 %  5 
2000 General Election 1.5 %  7 
2004 General Election 1.6 %  7 
2008 General Election 1.2 %  6 
      
1989 European Parliament Election     
1994 European Parliament Election     
1999 European Parliament Election (1) 2.90 % (total vote for coalition) 2 seats (of total 64 Spanish seats in the EP) 
2004 European Parliament Election (2) 5.15 % (total vote for coalition) 2 seats (of total 54 Spanish seats in the EP) 
2009 European Parliament Election (3) 5.12 % (total vote for coalition) 2 seats (of total 50 Spanish seats in the EP) 
      
1980 Basque Parliament Election 38.1%  25 seats (out of total 60 seats)  
1984 Basque Parliament Election 42.01 %  32 seats (out of 75 seats)  
1986 Basque Parliament Election 23.71 % 17 seats 
1990 Basque Parliament Election 28.49 % 22 seats (out of total 75 seats)  
1994 Basque Parliament Election 29.84 % 22 seats (out of total 75 seats)  
1998 Basque Parliament Election 28.1 % 21 seats (out of total 75 seats)  
2001 Basque Parliament Election (4) 42.72 %  33 seats (out of total 75 seats)  
2005 Basque Parliament Election (5) 38.60 %  29 seats (out of total 75 seats)  
2009 Basque Parliament Election 38.56 %  30 seats (out of total 75 seats)  
 
SOURCES: http://electionresources.org/es/index_en.html   
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NOTES ON TABLE 5: THE PNV'S ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE 
 
1) PNV entered elections as a partner of a four-party coalition of 
    Republican Left of Catalonia, Eusko Alkartasuna, and Mallorcan Union. 
2) PNV entered elections as a partner of a six-party coalition 
    ('People's of Europe') of Convergence and Union, 
    Galician Nationalist Bloc, Valencian Nationalist Bloc, 
    Socialist Party of Majorca, and Canarian Nationalist Party. 
3) PNV entered elections as a partner of a seven-party coalition 
    ('Coalition for Europe') of Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, 
    Democratic Union of Catalonia, Valencian Nationalist Bloc, 
    Majorcan Union, Canarian Coalition, and Andalusian Party. 
4) Electoral coalition with EA (Eusko Alkartasuna). 
5) Electoral coalition with EA (Eusko Alkartasuna). 
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TABLE 6: National Identities of the Basques (in %) 
 
     2010 
Basque not Spanish    29 
More Basque than Spanish    22 
Equally Basque and Spanish    37 
More Spanish than Basque    4 
Spanish not Basque    5 
Non-responding, undecided    3 
Sources: Euskobarometro Surveys,  
Available at: 
http://alweb.ehu.es/euskobarometro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Item
id=103, pp.42. 
 
 
TABLE 7: Support for Alternative Restructuring of the Spanish State (in %) 
   
Independence 
 
Federalism 
 
Autonomy 
 
Centralism 
 
Non-
responding 
Constitutional 
Preferences 
in the Basque 
Country 
 
 
25 
 
 
28 
 
 
36 
 
 
6 
 
 
5 
Sources: Euskobarometro Surveys,  
Available at: 
http://alweb.ehu.es/euskobarometro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Item
id=103, pp.43.  
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TABLE 8: DTP'S  ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE 
  
ELECTION 
PERCENTAGE 
OF VOTE SEATS/MUNICIPALITIES WON 
2007 General Election (1) 3.80 %  21 seats 
2009 Municipal Elections (2) 5.70%  99 municipalities 
      
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF DTP'S PREDECESSORS  
  
1991 General Election (from SHP lists) (3)   8 seats  
1995 General Election (HADEP) 4.17 % 0 
1999 General Election (HADEP) 4.75 % 0 
2002 General Election (DEHAP) 6.14 % 0 
      
1999 Municipal Elections (HADEP)   38 municipalities 
2004 Municipal Elections (DEHAP) (4)   56 municipalities  
 
SOURCES:    
www.ysk.gov.tr     
www.yerelnet.org.tr        
www.tesav.org.tr  
 
NOTES ON TABLE 8: THE DTP'S ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE  
1) In order to overcome 10 % national threshold, the DTP formed a platform of 
Independent Candidates. After elections, Kurdish MPs joined the DTP and formed 
party group in the TGNA. Total vote percentage of Independent candidates was 
5.24%.   
2) The DTP won 99 municipalities. 9 of 99 are provincial capitals: Diyarbakır, 
Batman, Hakkari, Iğdır, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Bingöl, Van.     
3) HEP joined elections through SHP lists. After HEP's closure by the Constitutional 
Court,  DEP became the successor party to which 8 Kurdish MPs joined.   
4) DEHAP entered 2004 local elections in coalition with the SHP.  
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